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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation focuses on the study of individual change in national identification and 
examines the factors which lie behind change under particular circumstances.  
The dissertation starts proposing a conceptual and analytical framework for the study of 
change along different dimensions of identification (self-categorization, content, salience and 
intensity).  
From here, the dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of national 
identification in the Catalan context. The Catalan context is argued to be a suitable case study 
because it has two characteristics which render change in the category of national identification 
possible. These two characteristics are a center-periphery cleavage and the presence of a 
demographically important immigration population. The findings of my research are thus 
generalizable to other contexts which share these two characteristics with Catalonia. 
The dissertation offers an alternative explanation which complements the decentralization 
argument, and provides a better account for the periodic changes that are observed when 
identification with Spain and Catalonia is tracked over time. The dissertation contends that 
political parties’ mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage drives individual change in 
national identification.  
Although the cleavage structures competition between political parties in a permanent way, 
there are some periods during which a particular policy or issue sharpens conflict between 
national and regional parties and exacerbates the cleavage. Individuals react to this conflict by 
updating their national identification. When individual changes occur in the same direction (or 
the changes which occur in one direction exceed the changes which occur in the other direction) 
and when they are numerically important, then individual change has large scale consequences 
on the aggregate. 
This argument is tested making use of longitudinal cross-sectional data from the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas and panel data from the Fundació Jaume Bofill. The empirical 
analyses show that higher levels of political confrontation have fostered the polarization of the 
feelings of attachment with Spain and Catalonia of the autochthonous population and second 
generations over the years. These analyses also show that dual identifiers’ exposure to Catalan 
public broadcasters makes individuals more prone to switch their identification towards a more 
Catalan oriented identification in periods in which the levels of political confrontation along the 
cleavage are high.  
The mechanism linking the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage and individual 
change is illustrated with qualitative evidence from a number of semi-structured interviews.  
Individuals’ perception that their group identity is being attacked provokes a reaction which is 
contingent on individuals’ prior identification. When individuals feel exclusively Spanish or 
exclusively Catalan, they react reaffirming these identifications. Conversely, when individuals 
identify with both Spain and Catalonia, they prioritize their identification with the group they 
perceive is being mistreated and weaken their identification with the elite group making the 
negative-framed claim. In this way, confrontation has a polarizing effect on individuals’ 
identification.  
In addition to this, my dissertation examines the nationalizing role of parents and school. 
Contrary to what previous research has argued, my analyses of the Fundació Jaume Bofill 
household data show that the alleged influence exerted by the educational system over 
individual national identification is more limited than thought. The dissertation exploits 
variation in parents’ identification with Spain and Catalonia to tease out these two agents’ 
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impact. I show that the omission of relevant family background variables have led to an 
overestimation of the influence of school. The results of my research show that even though 
years of schooling can increase the chances that children of immigrants develop a bi-national 
identification, parents’ attachment to Catalonia is the key element that fosters a Catalan oriented 
identification. Other family characteristics, such as the immigrants’ family economic 
performance or immigrant families’ self-selection into neighborhoods in which the share of 
natives is above a certain threshold are decisive elements in promoting children of immigrants’ 
identification with Catalonia.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation deals with an issue which, despite certain exceptions, has received little 
attention so far: change in national identification. In particular, this dissertation seeks to answer 
a substantive and clearly delimited question: what lies behind change in national identification?  
Although my main interest is the study of individual change, this dissertation also looks into 
inter-generational changes occurring within the family context. The analysis of both individual 
and inter-generational change will allow me to account for aggregate change.1  
By change in national identification, I refer to the changes that occur in an individual’s 
category of national identification. In this regard, this research leaves aside the study of change 
in other dimensions of identification (content, saliency, and intensity). Although I will come to 
this later on, it is worth clarifying here that change in an individual’s category of national 
identification can occur in three distinct ways: first, as the abandonment of the original category 
of national identification and its replacement by a new category; second, as the acquisition of a 
new category of identification that is added to the original one; third, as the reorganization of 
the categories of national identification.  
In order to examine change in national identification, this dissertation focuses on the case of 
Catalonia.2 Catalonia presents two characteristics which make it possible for national 
identification to become a matter of choice, instead of a self-ascribed characteristic. These two 
characteristics are the existence of a repertoire of nations with which individuals can potentially 
identify and the presence of an immigrant population arrived from other regions of Spain.3 As 
                                                      
1 My focus on the individual level comes from my belief that it is only from understanding how 
change takes place at the micro level that we can fully comprehend social change.  
2 Because of its peculiarities, Catalonia has attracted a great deal of researchers interested in studying 
Catalan identity (Barrera 1985; Comas and Pujadas 1991; Pujadas and Comas 1982); the relationship of 
Catalan identity and Catalan language (Woolard 1989); switches in language practices (Laitin 1989; 
Laitin, Solé and Kalyvas 1994); Catalan nationalism (Conversi 1997; Díez Medrano 1999; Keating 1996); 
Spanish immigration in Catalonia (Solé 1981a); as well as other issues related, for example, to Catalans’ 
electoral behavior (Aguilar and Sánchez-Cuenca 2007; Balcells 2007; Montero and Font 1991; Padró-
Solanet and Colomer 1992; Riba 2000). In this regard, and in order to avoid readers’ misperceptions, I 
would like to make clear here that this dissertation is not about Spanish and Catalan identities, or about 
Spanish and Catalan nationalism, nor is it about Spanish immigration into Catalonia. Even if these issues 
shape the context in which individuals’ national identification switches occur, as I have just mentioned, 
this dissertation tackles the study of change in national identification: its occurrence and its causes. 
3 As I will detail below, internal immigration from other regions of Spain into Catalonia was 
numerically very important between the forties and the mid seventies. Although the term migration is 
currently used to refer to the population movements between countries, it has been also applied in 
demographic and sociological studies to refer to inter-regional movements of population. Pascual and 
Cardalús (1987, 1988) and Fernández (2005) have warned against the use of the term immigrant to name 
those individuals who were born in other regions of Spain but have been living in Catalonia for long 
periods of time. In this dissertation, I use the term immigrant and second generation in a sociological 
basis. Moreover, with this decision I seek to avoid the alternative use of linguistically inefficient 
expressions such as the population born in other regions of Spain.  
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the next chapter will argue, these two characteristics render change in individuals’ category of 
identification possible.  
The population of reference in this dissertation consists of those individuals who have been 
born in Spain and whose parents were also born in Spain. This, therefore, excludes from my 
research the analysis of recent immigrants that have arrived in Catalonia from outside Spain. 
The reason why this population, which has gained in demographic importance in the last few 
decades, is not taken into consideration is a practical one. This dissertation examines 
individuals’ changes of identification between two national categories: Spain and Catalonia.4 
These two categories of identification might not be relevant for newcomers; nor are the two of 
them necessarily contending with immigrant’s original national identification.  
The timeframe of this dissertation is the period between the downfall of Franco’s regime 
and 2010. Nevertheless, data limitations will force me to restrict the long-term analysis to the 
period between 1987 and 2010. Within this timeframe, I will pay special attention to the decade 
from 2000 to 2010. I will analyze intergenerational changes within the family making use of 
cross-sectional data from 2001, and I will examine individual changes using a panel study 
which covers the period between 2001 and 2005. In addition, qualitative interviews with 
inhabitants of Catalonia from different backgrounds will focus on the period between 2004, 
when the negotiation of a new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia was initiated, and 2010, when 
the Spanish Constitutional Court pronounced on the constitutionality of the new Statute.  
In order to understand what lies behind changing patterns in Spanish versus Catalan 
identification over time, my dissertation employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques. It also takes advantage of multiple sources of data: a series of cross-sectional 
surveys from the Center of Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 
CIS), a household panel survey from the Panel of Social Inequalities in Catalonia (Panel de 
Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya, PaD –Fundació Jaume Bofill), and qualitative materials from 
around forty semi-structured interviews I conducted with inhabitants of Catalonia from different 
backgrounds.  
Although previous work has traditionally conceived national identity in static terms or has 
disregarded its analysis, some studies have examined change in the category of national 
identification, and offer different explanations for its occurrence. Here, we necessarily have to 
refer to the studies by Laitin (1998), Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2009), Guibernau (2007), 
Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a; 2008b) and de la Calle and Miley (2008). Despite the many 
insights these previous studies offer to my own work, they present either incomplete 
explanations of change in national identification, or noticeable shortcomings that this 
dissertation will try to overcome.   
At this point, it might be worth advancing this dissertation’s main argument. This 
dissertation argues that in Catalonia, political elites’ mobilization of the center-periphery 
cleavage leads to individual changes in national identification. These individual level changes 
are, in turn, driving the periodic changes that can be observed in the identification with Spain 
and Catalonia at the aggregate level. 
The combined analysis of the panel data from the PaD, along with the insights emerged 
from my qualitative interviews, allow me to identify the mechanism linking the mobilization of 
                                                      
4 It might be worth mentioning here that even if Spain and Catalonia are presented by political actors 
as national categories, they are not perceived as such for all individuals in Catalonia. Paraphrasing Linz 
(2008, 65), it could be said that today Spain is a state for all Catalans, a nation-state for a part of its 
population and only a state, but not a nation for an increasing minority. At the same time, Catalonia is 
officially an autonomous community for all Catalans, a stateless nation for a part of its population, and 
only a region, but not a nation for a decreasing minority. 
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the center-periphery cleavage and individual change. Individuals’ receive messages regarding 
the group they identify with through media exposure. When individuals perceive that elites’ 
claims or actions are an attack on the group they identify with, they respond by re-affirming 
their identification with the mistreated group and –in the case of dual identifications— by 
weakening their identification with the elite group making the negative-framed claim.  
When individual changes occur in the same direction (or the changes which occur in one 
direction exceed the changes which occur in the other direction) and when they are numerically 
important, then individual change has large scale consequences on the aggregate.  
In addition to this, my dissertation tests the role of the state’s alleged main agent of 
socialization: the school. Contrary to what previous research has contended, my analyses of the 
household data from the PaD show that the supposed influence exerted by the educational 
system over individual national identification is actually quite weak once we control for 
individuals’ social backgrounds and, in particular, for the economic performance of immigrant 
parents, the immigrant composition of the neighborhood and, above all, parents’ self-
identification. In other words, my findings suggest that the family is a more efficient agent than 
schools when forging the second generation’s national identification.  
Although this dissertation focuses on the case of Catalonia, the findings of my research are 
generalizable to other settings in which the two aforementioned characteristics (the existence of 
a center-periphery cleavage that structures political competition and the presence of a 
population from an immigrant origin) are present. These two characteristics, therefore, 
constitute the scope of this dissertation’s findings.  
 
1.2 Why studying change in national identification is worthy? 
 
From the now commonly accepted constructivist paradigm, identification is understood as 
situational, constructed and changeable. Individuals can identify with different categories: 
religion, gender, sexual orientation, occupation, ethnicity, nationality, etc.  However, not all of 
these categories will be equally central and salient for all individuals in any circumstances.5 The 
saliency of a particular category of identification over others depends on an individual’s 
socialization and life experiences, as well as on the political context in which individuals are 
embedded.6 That said, it is worth noting that there are some contexts (i.e. contexts with deep 
political cleavages) in which the saliency of a specific form of identification over others is 
constantly promoted by political actors. Also, and related to this, it is important to say that not 
all forms of identification are politically consequential in every context. So, for example, even if 
an individual’s gender identification were central to her, it is not clear that this identification 
would orient her vote if all the political parties participating in the elections stand for greater 
protection and promotion of women rights, or if gender is not an issue which is present in 
                                                      
5 The distinction between saliency and centrality has not been always made clear. In psychology, 
saliency is a relative individual characteristic that requires comparability among different identificational 
categories. Centrality is an absolute characteristic which attributes self-importance to that particular 
identity (Stryker and Serpe 1984). 
6 Take, for example, the case of black person, for whom his or her racial identification is central. 
However, the greater saliency of his or her racial identification vis-à-vis other forms of identification will 
vary depending on the context. So, in a context in which a law on same-sex marriage is being voted, this 
individual sexual orientation (or perhaps religious beliefs) will become more salient than his or her racial 
identification. This is, for example, what may have happened in November 2008 in California when a 
ballot proposition (Proposition 8) that sought to change the California Constitution to derogate same-sex 
marriage was successful in the California state elections. 
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electoral competition. Therefore, the relevance of a particular category of identification over 
others is context-specific. 
Initially, we could say that studying national identification is worthwhile for two reasons: 
First, because, as previous research has shown, national identification is socially and politically 
consequential; and secondly, because even though the consequences of national identification 
have received significant attention, we do not know that much about how it is shaped, nor do we 
know that much about what causes it to change. 
National identity has been claimed to be the means for legitimizing the authority of the 
state, and to instill individuals’ loyalty to its institutions (Kaplan 1999, 34). In addition, we 
know that national identification lies behind political preferences, attitudes and behavior. In the 
last few years, several studies have shown that national identification is related to individuals’ 
preferences regarding redistribution (Amat and Wibbels 2009; Shayo 2009), as well as attitudes 
towards immigrants (Díez Medrano 2005; Heath and Tilley 2005; Maddens, Billiet, and Beerten 
2000; Muñoz 2008). Additionally, a substantial body of research has shown that group 
identification is related to in-group favoritism and out-group bias (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 
Turner et al. 1987). However, when the salience of an individual’s category of identification 
changes, that individual’s emotional reactions to the group change as well (Ray et al. 2008).  
Besides, in contexts where the center-periphery cleavage is highly salient, both national and 
the regional elites are interested in promoting identification with the different ideas of the nation 
that they stand for. By promoting individuals’ identification with the nation-state, the centre’s 
government guarantees support for the status-quo, while by promoting individuals’ 
identification with the stateless nation, regional nationalist movements, parties or, regional 
institutions (in those context in which political decentralization has occurred) gather support for 
their demands for self-government or for secession. Political contestation around this dimension 
causes identification with the nation-state or the stateless nation to become politically relevant.  
In the Catalan context, for example, identification with Spain or Catalonia has been found to 
influence individuals’ preferences over the institutional organization of the state (Liñeira, 
forthcoming), as well as electoral behavior (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Bonet, Pérez-Nievas, 
and Hierro 2010; Fernández i Marín and López 2010; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006; Chernyha 
and Burg 2012). Bearing in mind the important consequences that national identification has on 
individuals’ political preferences and behavior in contexts, such as the Catalan one, in which the 
center-periphery cleavage structures party competition, the relevance of studying whether 
political elites and institutions (the school and the media) are able to alter individuals’ national 
identification, and whether they can overcome the influence of other socialization agents, such 
as the family is clear. 
 
1.3 State of the Art  
 
This dissertation builds on different literature, which I will refer to in each chapter of the 
dissertation: the literature on political socialization, the literature on immigration and the 
literature on political persuasion and attitude change. These fields of research, which move this 
dissertation away from the nationalism literature, will enrich each chapter, and will provide a 
better understanding of the determinants of national identification stability and change.  
In this section, though, I would like to revisit some of the classical work on the study of 
national identity, as well as more recent research. The purpose of this section is to frame this 
dissertation within the literature on nationalism. This revision is necessarily selective. It does 
not seek to cover the main contributions on the study of nationalism and national identity, but to 
reveal a change of approach in their study. While the study of nationalism was long devoted to 
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explaining the socio-political and economic historical transformations which led to the 
formation of nations and collective national consciousness, today scholars of nationalism have 
come to focus on the processes through which individual national identity is shaped and 
reproduced. My dissertation is embedded in this new approach.  
Within this section, I will also review the literature on the study of change in national 
identification, and I will explain how this dissertation seeks to contribute to this literature and to 
overcome its limitations.  
 
1.3.1 Classical approaches to the study of nationalism and national identity 
 
The formation of national identity has traditionally been associated to the process of nation-
building. However, historical accounts of the origin of nations have long disagreed on the order 
of appearance of nationalism and national identity’. The primordialism approach has argued that 
a particular ‘we-feeling’ precedes nationalism and the formation of the nation (Smith 1991). In 
contrast, the constructivism approach, which gathers major support today, has argued that the 
emergence of a collective national identity followed or, at least, accompanied the formation of 
the modern nation-state.7  
Constructivism has presented nations either as a by-product of the process of socio-cultural 
modernization and industrialization (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983), or as the intentional 
creation of state elites (Breuilly 1982; Hobsbawm 1991; Smith 1991). Unlike primordialism, 
which sees the nation as a natural entity with biological (Van der Berghe 1995) or cultural 
foundations (Geertz 1973), constructivism has argued that nations are human creations 
(Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Weber 1976).  
Gellner’s constructivism, however, goes further when he states that “it is the nation which 
makes the man; which models man’s convictions, loyalties and solidarities” (Gellner 1983). In 
Gellner’s view, nationalism does not rely on the previous existence of ethnic or cultural groups, 
supposedly natural units; on the contrary, nationalism is what crystallizes new units (Gellner 
1983). These new units appeared in a centralization process, which was facilitated by the 
generalization and the homogenization of a culture. Anderson (1983) coincides with Gellner in 
explaining nations as by-products of structural change. Print capitalism facilitated the expansion 
of vernacular languages among the reading class. Anderson refers to this change as “the 
philological-lexicographic revolution”. This revolution occurred in two different ways. In 
America, the press provided territorial administrative units with a symbolic meaning (Anderson 
1983). In Europe, “imagined communities” were formed through the action of an “official 
nationalism” set off by “naturalized” dynasties reacting to nineteenth century popular 
movements.  
Gellner (1983) and Anderson’s (1983) studies are, however, affected by an important 
problem: the absence of a theory of action. Gellner’s evolutionist (almost teleological) depiction 
of the origin of nations is void of actors and preferences. A similar problem is found in 
Anderson, who envisages the ‘imagined communities’ that gave rise to the nation as the 
unintentional result of print capitalism. This problem, however, is not common to all historical 
accounts on the origin of nations and national identity. Hobsbawm (1991) and Breuilly (1982), 
for example, depart from this approach. In these authors’ views, nationalism becomes an 
                                                      
7 Smith (2001) refers to four different paradigms in the study of nationalism: modernism, 
perennialism, primordialism and ethno-symbolism. In my understanding, perennialism can be assimilated 
into the primordialism paradigm, modernism can be subsumed in the constructivism paradigm, and etho-
symbolic approaches can be considered to be midway between primordialim and constructivism. 
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intentional project of national-building. Elites are the instigators of this project; they mobilize 
individuals, and coordinate their interests in order to legitimize their actions and preserve their 
power (Breuilly 1982). 
Notwithstanding the differences between these two approaches, Hobsbawm shares with 
Gellner and Anderson the idea that the expansion of literacy and the standardization of the 
culture is a necessary condition for the development of a collective national consciousness. As 
does Weber (1976), all these authors present schooling as the state’s main instrument for 
shaping collective national consciousness. 
Defenders of primordialism place themselves in a more demanding position when they 
claim that national communities necessitate a pre-existent ethnic community. Before the ethnie 
becomes a nation, it is essential that an ethnic community has settled in a territorial homeland, 
culture has standardized, division of labor has occurred, and a unified legal system has been 
developed (Smith 1991). Although, according to Smith, ethnic communities are the basis of 
nations, his idea that nations are historically shaped by different agents (the bureaucracies or the 
intellectuals) separates him from orthodox primordialism and moves him toward a heterodox 
constructivist approach, which concedes that a certain kind of “we-feeling” is necessary to 
establish the basis of a national identity. 
Classical studies on nationalism have been affected, in different ways, by four important 
flaws. One of the problems, to which I have already referred above, is the absence of a theory of 
agency. This problem, however, has not yet been fully overcome as agents’ preferences are very 
often imputed, rather than known. A second problem, which has been clearly exposed in 
Brubaker (1996), is the reification of the concept “nation”. This problem is not only confined to 
nationalist ideologues, but it is also present among many scholars of nationalism. Actually, as 
Brubaker (1996) points out, the reification of the nation is a common problem both among 
primordialists and constructivists. Yet, the idea that the nation is a substantial and enduring 
collectivity has been considered a symptom of a more serious and pervasive illness that affects 
social theory: “methodological nationalism”. This illness, which has been diagnosed by Martins 
(1974) and Chernillo (2006), occurs when the limits of the society are made equivalent to the 
limits of the nation, and when the nation is conceived as a self-sufficient entity, relevant at all 
social, intellectual and political levels (Smith 1979). 
Another flaw of these classical studies on nationalism is their disregard for citizens’ 
preferences, attitudes and attachments (Martínez-Herrera 2009). The omission of individuals’ 
national alignments derives, very possibly, from the lack of historical data on individuals’ 
national attachments. The lack of individual data is also related to an additional problem which 
affects many classical works on nationalism, i.e. the idea that collective national identities are 
uniform. Even if we accept that collective national identities are ideological creations modeled 
by the elites, uniform understandings of national identity are problematic because they 
anthropomorphize the nation-as-people and assume that all individuals have and share the same 
identity. Leaving aside the improbable but plausible circumstance in which an individual does 
not possess a national identity, the assumption that all individuals within a nation share a 
monolithic national identity becomes especially problematic in heterogeneous societies. 
Finally, I must refer to two additional shortcomings that have been combated by more recent 
work, to which I will refer in next section. First, the works mentioned above have failed to offer 
an explanation of the process through which collective identities give rise to individuals’ 
identification with the nation and vice versa. Second, this research ends its analysis when the 
nation and the collective national identity associated to it have been constructed. Such a 
perspective renders collective national identities as an outcome, and not as a process.  
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This dissertation departs from the classical literature on nationalism in two ways. First, it 
abandons the study of collective national identity and it focuses on the study of individual 
national identification, that is, individuals’ self-categorization as members of a particular nation. 
In doing so, this dissertation presents collective national identities as the aggregation of 
individual identities, and it avoids anthropomorphisizing the nation. Secondly, it rejects the 
common assumption that identification with the nation and the community that is associated to 
it, once constructed, is unchangeable. Specifically, it argues that under particular circumstances 
that I detail in next chapter, national identification may change not only between generations, 
but also over individuals’ lives.  
 
1.3.2 A different outlook in the study of nationalism and national identity 
 
The shift in the focus to individuals in the social research (Coleman 1986) ended up 
affecting the study of nationalism and national identity as well. With the exception of Weber’s 
(1976) seminal work “Peasants into Frenchmen”, which makes use of a variety of 
historiographic sources to depict the micro-processes which forge individual national 
allegiances, the studies mentioned above all focused on the study of the structural developments 
that gave rise to the formation of nations and collective national identities. However, in the last 
few decades, a new outlook in the study of nationalism and national identity has come to 
complement the classical historicist approach. This new approach has focused on the study of 
how individuals become identified with national categories, and how social identities are 
shaped.  
This approach, which is grounded in methodological individualism, has replaced the unit of 
analysis from collectivities to individuals.8  This has not meant that the existence of collective 
identities is denied, but rather, has entailed a turn to individuals in order to understand how 
these collective identities emerge or change. The movement from collective to individual 
identities is, however, a back and forth movement: from the macro to the micro level of analysis 
and, once again, from the micro to the macro level, through aggregation.    
This change of approach has also been parallel to the turn from objectivism to subjectivism 
(Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004). While national groups were seen before as 
primordial objective entities, today they are seen as constructed subjective social categories. 
Evidence of this approach is, for example, Seton-Watson’s (1977, 5) definition of the nation: “A 
nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form 
a nation, or behave as if they formed one”.  
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-categorization Theory (SCT) assumed these changes 
(from groups to individuals and from objectivism to subjectivism), and pioneered a cognitive 
turn (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987). They focused on individuals to learn how 
social identities were shaped, and envisaged social identities as something subjectively shaped. 
SIT and SCT offered a cognitive explanation for the origin of social identities. Their 
explanations were based on individuals’ proclivity to organize and classify the world in 
categories. Individuals’ awareness that others possess similar characteristics generates 
categorization and fosters the group. In addition, Tajfel and Turner showed that these 
characteristics did not need to be objectively defined, but subjectively perceived. SIT taught us 
                                                      
8 As Coleman (1986) pointed out, this change has been facilitated by the explosion of empiricism in 
social research. The generation of individual data on individuals’ feelings, attitudes and identification 
with the nation has, in turn, opened up a debate on the issue of measurement, which I will return to later 
on. 
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that social categorization is extremely relevant: it informs others’ identification, as well as self-
identification, and in so doing, it triggers in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.9  
Without explicitly engaging in this cognitive turn, recent works have also made use of this 
approach. Billig (1995), for example, has focused on the way in which nationalism is daily 
produced and reproduced in individuals’ minds, and he defines nationalism as cognitive 
schemas of the world which unnoticeably pervade individuals’ daily functioning. In a more 
explicit way, Brubaker et al (2004) have more recently campaigned for a cognitive approach in 
the study of ethnicity and nationalism. 
This cognitive approach is also the basis of Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott’s 
(2006) proposal to conceive collective identities as the combination of two elements: the content 
of this identity, and the degree of acceptance or disapproval that this content generates within 
the population of reference. Although these authors openly reject Brubaker and Cooper’s  
(2000) idea that the identity concept is useless for the social sciences, their proposal also fits this 
cognitive turn. In this regard, we can say that Abdelal et al’s proposal for the study of collective 
identities moves away from a historicist and deterministic approach to explain the origin of 
collective identities. Nevertheless, and even though the authors are fully committed to a social 
understanding of identity, their research agenda would require, as well, a move from 
collectivities to individuals. Ultimately, we need to understand how power relationships allow 
particular norms of belonging to become imposed over others, and how individuals’ come to 
accept them. 
Another important characteristic of this new outlook in the study of nationalism and national 
identity is that it breaks with the idea that national identities once shaped, remain the same over 
time. Today, we know that national identity is produced and reproduced not only in contested 
nations, but also in established uncontested nations (Barrera 1985; Billig 1995; Brubaker et al. 
2008; Johnston 1991; Pérez-Agote 1984). Actually, Abdelal et al (2006) have made explicit the 
possibility that collective identities change when they have argued that the content of identities 
can be contested and, therefore, modified.  
My dissertation is thus embedded in these recent developments in the study of national 
identification. And, as with these studies, I define national identification as a cognitive and 
subjective attachment to a (national) group, which is susceptible to change. 
  
1.3.3 Previous research on change in national identification 
 
The study of how individual identities, once that they have been formed, change over time 
has yielded little attention thus far. Social psychology has again taken the lead in the study of 
individual change (Burke 1991; Serpe 1987; Stryker and Serpe 1987; Tajfel and Turner 1979; 
Turner et al. 1987).10  
In the last few decades, however, a number of comparative works and case studies in the 
fields of political science and sociology have attempted to fill this gap (Argelaguet 2006; 
Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; de la 
Calle and Miley 2008; Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009). These 
                                                      
9 Brubaker (2002) and Brubaker et al (2004) have stated that these “accentuation effects” of 
categorization can help to explain the resilience of groupism, that is, the inclination to conceive that 
groups (or nations), and not individuals are the essential elements of social life.  
10 However, in these works, the conceptualization of change does not necessarily refer to the process 
of psychologically passing from one category of identification to another, as it also includes changes in 
role position, the saliency of identification or its content. I will return to this point in the next chapter. 
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studies reveal the occurrence of changes in national identification over time, and also explain 
the rationality behind these changes.11   
Laitin (1998), for example, has studied identity change in Russian populations living in the 
former Republics of the Soviet Union (Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). However, 
his research does not deal directly with the study of change in national identification, but rather 
with changes in language use. He contends that at the individual level, individuals make a 
rational calculus of the cost and benefits of remaining loyal to Russian language versus 
changing to the titular nations’ language. Change is presented as a problem of collective action. 
In other words, individuals’ perceptions that others are going to switch to the titular nations’ 
language determines their rational calculus, and pushes them to change. At the aggregate, 
change occurs as a cascade process. However, although Laitin’s explanation is suggestive and 
connects individual and aggregate changes, it does not explain in detail how language switches 
become identity changes, and it disregards non-rational explanations of change.  
Martínez-Herrera’s (2002, 2005, 2009) studies examine change in settings which have 
experienced a process of political decentralization (Scotland, Quebec, Catalonia, Galicia and the 
Basque Country). Decentralization has implied the transference of the nation’s responsibilities 
for the two main instruments of nation building (education and mass media) to regional 
governments. According to Martínez-Herrera’s explanation, identification with the region is 
encouraged in two ways. On the one hand, socialization agencies, such as the education system 
or the media, induce individuals’ identification with the political community through 
indoctrination. On the other hand, decentralization also creates new socialization milieux in 
which individuals familiarize and internalize structures conforming to a new political 
community. Decentralization facilitates regional governments promoting individuals’ 
identification with the region to the detriment of identification with the overarching state. In this 
way, decentralization would, therefore, account for both the increase in the levels of 
identification with the region, and the decrease in the levels of identification with the 
overarching political community. Martínez-Herrera provides an individual-level explanation of 
change: individuals’ exposure to messages from and indoctrination by socialization agents (the 
education system and mass media), and their experience of the new social milieus motivates 
their identificational change. Yet, even though the author offers an individual-level explanation 
of change, his tests are conducted at the aggregate level, what causes a problem of ecological 
inference. In addition, although Martínez-Herrera’s explanation can account for long-term 
trends in aggregate national identification, it leaves unexplained short-term changes in national 
identification.   
In the same direction, Guibernau (2006, 2007) has examined the effects of decentralization 
and devolution upon individuals’ identification in Canada, the United Kingdom and Spain. 
Guibernau’s analysis suggest that devolution has strengthened pre-existing regional identities 
and promoted the emergence of dual (national and regional) identifications in Spain’s non-
historical autonomous communities. Guibernau has pointed to the creation of regional 
parliaments and cultural networks; citizens’ participation in closer political institutions; and the 
emergence of regional elites as devices contributing to strengthen old identities and forge new 
ones. Guibernau’s research, however, does not provide longitudinal evidence of the occurrence 
of these identificational changes; neither does she go in-depth into the mechanisms linking the 
creation of new institutional polities and individual or inter-generational changes.  
                                                      
11 Here I only refer to research dealing specifically with the study of change in the category of 
national identification.  
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Centering on the Spanish case, Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008b; 2008a) have compared the 
Basque Country and Catalonia to learn about the effect that two distinct educational reforms, 
implemented about the same time, have had on individuals’ identification. While the reform in 
Catalonia made teaching in Catalan compulsory, in the Basque Country parents were allowed to 
choose the language in which their children would be educated. From the comparison of these 
two cases, the authors show that the assimilation setting of Catalonia is more successful than the 
multicultural setting of the Basque Country when promoting primary identification with the 
region. These authors’ research also shows that compulsory education in Catalan can explain 
both between-cohorts and within-cohort differences in the levels of primarily Catalan 
identification. The more years individuals’ remained in the education system after the reform 
was implemented, the greater their exposure to Catalan in school and the more identified they 
will be with Catalonia.  
However, their research has two important shortcomings. First, it omits relevant variables 
related to family background and, in particular, parents’ identification. In doing so, their work 
overestimates the influence of the school. Secondly, it assumes that exposure to Catalan in 
school forges a Catalan identification. This idea, which is also present in Martínez-Herrera 
(2002, 2005), is problematic as it is not so evident that learning the Catalan language 
automatically causes the children of immigrants to feel primarily Catalan. 
The idea that governments, through the mass media and the education system, instill a 
national Catalan feeling in the individuals under their rule is also present in Argelaguet (2006). 
Although Argelaguet (2006) is able to show the variation in the aggregate identification with 
Spain and Catalonia between 1984 and 2001, he does not show the effect of education and the 
mass media in shaping these identifications.  
Finally, de la Calle and Miley (2008) have also compared Catalonia and the Basque Country 
in order to learn about the process of assimilation among Spanish immigrants. The authors’ 
analysis, which is based on a synchronic analysis of survey data, leads them to conclude that 
even though linguistic assimilation has been greater in Catalonia, assimilation in the feelings of 
subjective identification has been greater in the Basque Country. De la Calle and Miley (2008) 
explain this apparent puzzle by arguing that Catalan language policies have turned immigrant 
linguistic assimilation into a product of institutional pressures, rather that the expression of a 
voluntary choice resulting from immigrants’ progressive identificational assimilation.  
Building on this previous research, my dissertation seeks to overcome some of their 
limitations. First, it employs and examines diachronic individual-level data to separate 
individual from inter-generational change, and to account for aggregate change over time. Some 
of the studies to which I have referred above (de la Calle and Miley 2008; Guibernau 2007) 
examine change or assimilation by making use of synchronic data. In contrast to these studies, 
the use of longitudinal data in my analysis allows me to trace the evolution of national 
identification over time. Secondly, the dissertation aims at providing an explanation of short-
term temporal changes. In this regard, the dissertation offers an alternative and complementary 
explanation to that of decentralization which better accounts for this kind of temporal changes. 
Third, it employs household and panel data to show the occurrence of both inter-generational 
changes within the family and switches in individual identification. Thus far, evidence on the 
occurrence of inter-generational change has relied on the comparison of the feelings of 
attachment to Spain and Catalonia between immigrants and second generations, or on the 
comparison of national identification among different generations. The use of household data 
allows us to show that these changes have also occurred within the families which have 
immigrant and native origins. Moreover, in the dissertation, I use panel data which also allows 
us to show the occurrence of individual changes; something which was only assumed when 
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cross-sectional data was used. Forth, I empirically test the hypotheses that the education system 
and the mass media shape and modify individual national identification. Although these two 
hypotheses are very often assumed in the literature, as far as I am concerned they have, so far, 
not been properly tested. And finally, the dissertation makes use of qualitative evidence 
collected in approximately forty semi-structured interviews to draw a non-instrumental 
explanation of individual change in national identification.  
 
1.4 Catalonia as case study  
 
In order to answer the questions posed above, this dissertation focuses on the case of 
Catalonia, examining aggregate and individual national identification in the period between the 
early eighties and 2010. Catalonia is an appropriate setting for the purposes of this research 
because it gathers together two characteristics which render change in individuals’ category of 
identification possible: the existence of a repertoire of nations with which individuals can 
identify, and immigration. These characteristics, as I will explain in next chapter, can be 
considered as pre-conditions for the possibility of changes in national identification. Although 
these pre-conditions do not have to exist simultaneously in order for changes in national 
identification to take place, in Catalonia the concurrence of these two characteristics together 
increase the chances of observing such identification switches.  
In the following pages, I will provide readers with some contextual background on the 
Catalan case. What follows is not intended to be a detailed historical account of the events that 
have taken place in Catalonia over the twentieth century. This section, which builds on 
secondary sources to which I refer the reader interested in the recent history of Catalonia, is 
only a brief summary of the elements which render change in the category of national 
identification possible.    
The existence of a repertoire of nations means that there are at least two nations with which 
individuals can potentially identify. A repertoire of nations is usually found in those settings in 
which there is a center-periphery cleavage which structures political competition. As Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967, 14) argued, the “conflict between the central nation-building culture and the 
increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations 
in the provinces and the peripheries” are the result of what they call the National Revolution. 
Although federalism and political decentralization can act as devices that accommodate 
different understandings of the political community and promote nested compatible identities in 
democratic states (Lijphart 1977; Linz 1999; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001),12 when 
territorial units within the state make national claims, identification with one or another idea of 
the nation becomes conflictive. Political parties contribute to crystallizing these tendencies, 
making conflicting interests salient and forcing citizens “to ally themselves across structural 
cleavage lines and to set up priorities among their commitments” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 5). 
In the Catalan context, this conflict can be explained by political parties’ interest in fostering 
individuals’ identification with Spain or Catalonia. Taking into account the leverage that 
national identity has on individuals’ electoral behavior and political preferences in Spain and 
                                                      
12 Linz and Stepan (1996) and Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2011) have argued that state-nations’ designs 
can also muffle this type of conflict. Against the model of nation-state, which seeks to match the state’s 
political boundaries with the nation cultural boundaries, the state-nation would seek to incorporate 
multiple and complementary socio-cultural identities under the overarching identity of the state. State-
nation policies would, therefore, aim to instill a “we-feeling” into the inhabitants of the state. This would 
make it possible for individuals to develop nested identities, and identify with the two territorial (nation 
and state) realms at the same time.  
María José Hierro Hernández 
13 
 
Catalonia (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Bonet, Pérez-Nievas, and Hierro 2010; Fernández i 
Marín and López 2010; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006; Chernyha and Burg 2012), political 
parties have strong incentives to promote and mobilize one form of identification over the other. 
Here, however, it is worth noting that the distribution of political parties along the center-
periphery cleavage in Catalonia is asymmetrical, and so are the means and resources that have 
been employed to encourage and mobilize Catalan identification vis-à-vis Spanish 
identification.  
 Despite this, individuals can opt for identifying with either of the two categories of 
identification (Spain or Catalonia), or with both of them (or they can identify with no national 
category).13 Ultimately, the ethno-territorial cleavage has caused and facilitated that different 
forms of exclusive and inclusive identification with Spain and Catalonia co-exist today in 
Catalonia (Moreno, Arriba and Serrano 1998, 66).  
The other pre-condition for the occurrence of change in national identification which is 
present in the case of Catalonia is the presence of a numerically significant immigrant 
population. Between the mid fifties and mid seventies, a significant number of immigrants 
moved to Catalonia from other regions of Spain. Obviously, when these individuals first came 
to Catalonia, they lacked any identification with the region.14 However, these immigrants are 
expected to undertake a process of structural assimilation, which at its late stage would lead to 
immigrants’ identificational assimilation (Alba and Nee 1997; Gordon 1964)15. 
 
 
                                                      
13 Here, it is important to note that when individuals express that they identify with two national 
categories at the same time, they can have different ideas of what that means. These different ideas derive 
from the meaning that they attribute to the category of identification. So, for example, when individuals 
declare that they identify with Catalonia and Spain at the same time, they may mean that they are 
subjectively attached to Catalonia as a nested part of Spain, or that they are attached to both Spain and 
Catalonia as separate and distinctive nations (Bonet 2012). In the first case, individuals are expressing 
their attachment to a region and a nation. In the second one, they are expressing their attachment to two 
distinct nations. 
14 Actually, it is reasonable to think that Spanish identification was not a salient form of identification 
for many individuals before the migratory process. This would be so because for these individuals 
Spanish identification was not a contested form of identification, but a superordinated form of territorial 
identification within which regional forms of identification would be nested. Accordingly, we could 
assume that Spanish identification became salient when these immigrants first came into contact with 
Catalan identity. Interestingly, Shafir (1995) has argued that because most immigrants to Catalonia came 
from regions with a strong regional identification (Andalusia and Extremadura) and a less developed 
overarching Spanish identification, they should not have experienced an identitarian conflict when they 
entered into contact with Catalans.  
15 Identificational assimilation is a specific case of change in the category of national identification. 
In its original formulation (Gordon 1967), identificational assimilation entails the individual’s 
abandonment of his/her original form of national identification and the development of a national 
identification with the receiving country. However, such a process is considered to be very 
psychologically demanding, because it involves a psychological loss. As a consequence, it is more likely 
that immigrants end up identifying with the receiving country without renouncing their identification with 
their country of origin as well. The acquisition of a new category of identification qualifies as a change in 
national identification. Here, it is worth highlighting here that individuals’ incorporation into the 
receiving society is not a linear process. Immigrants’ incorporation into the receiving society differs 
across individuals, and depends on the receiving society’s immigration policies (Berry 1984; Bourhis et 
al. 1997). Second generations can also follow multidirectional tracks in their maturity processes (Portes 
and Zhou 1993). These different tracks do not necessarily lead to the identificational assimilation to 
which Gordon (1964) referred in “Assimilation in American Life”. In fact, dual forms of identification 
and biculturalism are more likely to emerge in such contexts (Chen, Benet-Martínez, and Bond 2008). 
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1.4.1 The center-periphery cleavage  
 
Spain has been considered a case of early state-building in which the political, social and 
cultural integration of its territorial components was never fully achieved (Linz 2008, 3). 
According to Linz (2008, 65), the Spanish state’s failure to build a nation-state can be explained 
by the fact that the process of state building was initiated before the nationalism era, coinciding 
with a time of fierce ideological conflicts in Spain, and with the distress caused by the loss of 
overseas colonies.16 Álvarez-Junco (2001) has stressed this idea and has claimed that the 
Spanish nationalizing process took place during a political and economic crisis. The explanation 
that the weaknesses of the state made possible the emergence of national projects in the 
peripheries complements alternative explanations, which have emphasized the conflict of 
interests between the laggard economy of the centre and the developed economies of the 
peripheries.17 
Over the nineteenth century Catalonia experienced a process of endogenous industrialization 
based on the production of commodities, which contrasted with the stagnation of a Spanish 
economy based on agriculture (Díez Medrano 1999). According to Díez Medrano, this situation 
provoked a gradual estrangement between the Spanish government, which represented the 
interests of landowners and Basque financiers, and the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie which 
demanded a liberalization of cereal prices and industrial protectionism. As the centre controlled 
the political-administrative structure of the state, the periphery lacked the instruments to 
develop policies that supported their economic interests. Incongruence between economic 
development and political leadership provided the basis for tensions between the centre and the 
periphery (Gourevitch 1979). This fracture deepened due to the loss of the Spanish colonies 
overseas, what particularly affected Catalonia’s commercial interests (Conversi 1997). 
Altogether, these factors led Catalan industrialists to demand a greater degree of autonomy, 
which would allow them to defend their economic interests.18  
However, the two-party system (the so-called turnismo), which was established after the 
Spanish Monarchy had been restored in 1875, was not able to respond to the demands of 
Catalan industrialists and the petty bourgeoisie (Linz 1967, 213). This led to the emergence of a 
regionalist movement which sought to represent Catalan interests. However, regionalism in 
Catalonia lacked strong cohesion and local dominance (Linz 1967, 219). A cross-cutting class 
cleavage divided the emergent Catalan nationalists into two parties: the bourgeois nationalism 
of the Lliga Regionalista and the progressive nationalism of the Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC). The Lliga represented the industrial and trade bourgeoisie, as well as the 
rural owners, and aspired to a greater degree of autonomy within Spain. The ERC, on the 
contrary, represented the interests of professionals and the petit bourgeoisie, and it demanded 
the right to self-determination, although it would later aspire to creating a confederation of 
states within Spain (see Díez Medrano 1999, 129 - 30).  
Beginning in 1901, the Lliga gradually became the hegemonic party in Catalonia and kept 
its hegemony until the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship suppressed 
Catalan institutions, forbade any expression of Catalan identity, including the Catalan language, 
                                                      
16 Along these same lines, Moreno (1988, 162) has argued that “the malintegration of the minority 
nations of Catalonia and Scotland in the Spanish and British state-building processes must be identified as 
the cause of the revival of ‘modern’ nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia”. 
17 In addition to the economic factors, between 1833 and 1876, the flowering of a cultural movement, 
the Renaixença, led by the Catalan intelligentsia, made Catalan distinctiveness salient. 
18 For further details on the evolution of Catalan nationalism in the late nineteenth century and the 
early twentieth century see Conversi (1997), Díez-Medrano (1999), Linz (1967) and de Riquer (1979).  
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and betrayed the Lliga’s decentralizing interests. As a consequence, the Lliga, which had 
welcomed the dictatorship hoping it would end social conflict, which had intensified after the 
so-called Tragic Week in 1909, lost its hegemony (Díez Medrano 1999, 114-128).  
In the 1931 municipal elections, the Republican parties won over the monarchist parties in 
all over Spain. Their victory hastened the proclamation of the Second Republic. In Catalonia, 
the ERC won the elections and its leader, Francesc Macià, proclaimed the Catalan Republic. 
However, Spanish republicanism convinced Macià to maintain Catalonia within Spain. In 
exchange for this, the medieval institution of Catalan government, the Generalitat, was restored. 
Moreover, in 1932, the first Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was passed in the Spanish 
Parliament. The so-called Estatut de Núria recognized Catalonia as an autonomous region 
within the Spanish state and made both Spanish and Catalan official languages within Catalonia.  
During the Second Republic, the Catalan party system kept its autonomy from the rest of 
Spain. Different reasons account for this outcome: First, the strength of the anarcho-syndicalist 
movement in Catalonia prevented the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) from getting 
workers’ support and, secondly, native Catalans preferred to support regional parties instead of 
the right-wing CEDA (Linz 1967, 221). Actually, even the Communist Party created an 
autonomous branch in 1936: the Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluña (PSUC) (Linz 1967, 
221). 
In 1933, the inability of Manuel Azaña’s left Spanish government to tackle the many 
problems that Spain faced, forced it to call for new elections. The rise to power of a coalition of 
right-wing parties, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autonomas (CEDA), was 
accompanied by a series of measures which de facto limited Catalan autonomy. In 1934, a 
general strike against CEDA participation in the government and led by leftist forces, took 
place. On October 6, the Estat Català, a nationalist party which, along with the ERC, was part 
of the ruling coalition in Catalonia, put pressure on the Generalitat President, Lluis Companys 
to proclaim a Catalan Republic within the Spanish Federal Republic (Linz 2008, 35, 37). The 
Catalan Republic only lasted for a few hours and it ended with the imprisonment of Lluis 
Companys and the Generalitat government. In 1936, new elections brought to power the left 
coalition, Frente Popular, and led to the return of the President of the Generalitat. The 
revolutionary reforms carried out by the Frente Popular took place in a context of increasing 
political conflict that ended with Franco’s coup d’état and the emergence of the Spanish Civil 
war.19  
The Spanish Civil War, which was presented by the Right as a crusade against the “reds” 
and the “separatists” (Linz 1967, 263-264), ended with the victory of Franco’s side in April 
1939. Franco’s regime then started “the greatest nationalizing effort of the twentieth century” 
(Saz 2003, 50). In order to spread national Catholicism, it made use of the main instruments of 
state nationalism: the educational system and the mass media (see Aguilar 1996, 81-113). 
National Catholicism was a complex, not clearly shaped, doctrine which defended the idea that 
the Spanish people were God’s “chosen” people, and that Catholicism was the essence of the 
Spanish nation. National Catholicism defended traditionalism and national unity among other 
principles or ideas (see Muñoz 2008, 49-57). In addition, these nationalizing agencies were 
expected to promote the cultural homogeneity of Spain, and to assimilate the population of 
linguistically distinct areas (Muñoz 2008, 51). This might explain why the repression of 
Franco’s regime against Catalonia was especially harsh in the first years of the dictatorship (see 
Benet 1978, 1995; Marín i Corbera 2006). Franco’s regime suppressed the Catalan autonomous 
                                                      
19 For more details see, for example, Linz (1967, 231-264) and Montero (1977). 
Change in National Identification 
16 
 
institutions and it banned any expression of the Catalan culture and, particularly, the private and 
public use of the Catalan language. 
Despite this, the regime was not able to assimilate Catalans. Different circumstances 
converged to avoid this assimilation. On the one hand, as Díez Medrano (1999, 191) has noted, 
the economic structure of Catalonia, based on the commodities industry, made the Catalan 
bourgeoisie less dependent on the regime’s economic support. On the other hand, Catalonia’s 
rich associative tradition made the organization of different focuses of resistance possible, 
although they lacked unity and strength (Díez Medrano 1999, 197). Resistance to Franco’s 
regime developed in every social realm: the family, the intelligentsia, the Church, the university, 
the scouts, the trade unions and the political parties (see Guibernau 2003). 
 
My political awareness awoke when I got into the scouts. We celebrated San Jordi and then, 
there were a group of intellectuals from the Catalan bourgeoisie that woke our interest in 
these issues [...] We sang Catalan songs that were not heard anywhere else, the feeling that 
they passed on to you. They raised our patriotism for Catalonia. Of course, I had never heard 
about Jaume I in the history courses I had studied at the school. We knew who José Antonio, 
or Ramos were, we learned about the Falange, the Castilian Kings, but Catalonia had been 
totally sunk into oblivion. So then, the bourgeoisie: els Figueres, els Sala, els Riera… all 
these families from the Catalan bourgeoisie acted as sponsors of these groups [which were 
protected by a Catholic parish] [Interview # 36, Mari Antonia, autochthonous, born in 1944] 
  
Catalan families reproduced Catalan identity (Barrera 1985; Johnston 1991). As Pérez-
Agote (1984) has reported for the Basque Country, in Catalonia as well, people followed 
different strategies for resisting the dictatorship’s repression. These strategies ranged from self-
imposed silence to disobedience:20  
 
“In general, no one said anything because my grandmother was afraid to talk about that. A 
brother of my grandfather had been forced into exile in France and, I do not know, there were 
problems that we did not speak of. The fear was present. My family was a family of farmers 
and they had the impression that they (Franco’s repressive forces) could still find some things 
hidden in any corner. The brother of my grandmother, I would say, he was an important 
“boss”, because when they searched in the house there were typewriters buried, and other 
things. Then we were afraid, and we did not talk”. [Interview # 17, Clara, autochthonous, born 
in 1954] 
 
“My father grew up in a village in the interior of Catalonia and there, everyone spoke Catalan. 
But then, the children were going to the National School and every lesson was taught in 
Spanish. Then, what they did..., on Saturdays, there was a priest who was a little more open-
minded, a little more left wing than the others, and he taught Catalan on the sly. My father 
learned to write Catalan with him and other villagers who went there on the sly” [Interview 
#21, Pere, autochthonous, born in 1974]. 
 
In the early forties, intellectuals managed to create or reorganize clandestine and semi-
clandestine organizations (e.g., the Institut d’Estudis Catalans and the Omnium Cultural) 
(Guibernau 2003). Gradually, different publishing houses started to publish books in Catalan 
with the goal of preserving vernacular language. The Catalan Church and, in particular, the 
Abbey of Montserrat also played an important role through the promotion of different initiatives 
(e.g. the mass organized in 1947 to inaugurate a throne for the Montserrat Virgin, or the 
                                                      
20 In Catalonia, these practices excluded the use of violence. De la Calle (2010) has argued that the 
dictatorship’s local authorities’ greater responsiveness to nationalist demands in Catalonia vis-à-vis the 
Basque Country deterred the occurrence of nationalist violence in the former region. During the Second 
Republic, Catalan leaders had already mobilized Catalan citizens in favor of nationalism, so they did not 
need to resort to violence in order to mobilize citizens.  
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publication of the activist journal Serra d’Or). These initiatives also came also from lay 
Catholic organizations, such as the Torrás i Bages association, and the CC group21.  
During the sixties, the regime’s repression relaxed as it sought to clean up its international 
image (Marín i Corbera 2006). As a result, the opportunities for mobilization increased and 
flourished, especially in the university. In 1966, the foundational meeting of the Students’ 
Democratic Union was besieged and attacked by Franco police. The Caputxinada, named after 
the Cappuccino convent where it was held, would become the seed of the Assemblea de 
Catalunya. Also in those years, some spontaneous acts were carried out by leaders of the 
“movement” against Franco’s regime (e.g. Jordi Pujol, who was at that time one of the leaders 
of the CC group, and who would later become the president of the regional government, played 
a part in the 1959 boycott of the LaVanguardia newspaper).22  
Political parties also participated in the resistance against Franco’s regime. However, it was 
the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) which would lead the movement. During the 
Civil War and in the early years of Franco’s regime, the PSUC, as of 1956 led by Gregorio 
López Raimundo, would become the main underground party. The PSUC was not only involved 
in organizing the union struggle for better working conditions, but it also got Spanish 
immigrants in Catalonia engaged in the struggle for democratization and the defense of Catalan 
self-government (Conversi 1997; Díez Medrano 1999). In the latter years of the Franco 
dictatorship, an alliance between the Catalan nationalist intelligentsia, left organizations, and the 
local church was crafted (Conversi 1997: 131). This alliance was based on these groups’ 
resistance against Franco’s regime, and it was forged in the 1971 Assemblea de Catalunya. This 
coalition became visible in a massive demonstration which took place in Barcelona under the 
lemma “Llibertat, Amnistía, Estatut d’Autonomia” on September 11, 1977.23 The Assemblea de 
Catalunya, the Nova Canço (New Folk Song) movement and solidarity acts such as the 
September 11 demonstration would popularize opposition to Franco’s regime and transform 
Catalan nationalism into a mass movement (Guibernau 2003).  
In this way, while trying to contain Catalan nationalism, the dictatorship deepened the 
center-periphery cleavage, which had already become salient during the Second Republic. As 
Cambó had foreseen, Franco’s repression helped to strengthen Catalan nationalism (de Riquer 
1996). Moreover, resistance against Spanish national-Catholicism provided Catalan identity 
with new symbols that could be added to the collective imaginary.  
After Franco’s death in 1975, the democratization process initiated in Spain was 
accompanied by a process of political decentralization. In 1977, Catalonia’s institutions for self-
government were re-established and a provisional government headed by Josep Tarradellas 
(who had been the president of the Generalitat in exile between 1945 and 1977) was formed. 
The Catalan members of the Spanish Parliament, who had been elected in the foundational 
elections of the democracy, elaborated the Catalan Estatut d’Autonomia (Statute of 
Autonomy).24  The Estatut was passed in the Spanish Parliament and approved in referendum 
by Catalan citizens in 1979. The 1979 Statute endowed Catalonia with a regional government 
and a legislative parliament. Both the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute granted 
                                                      
21 The CC letters stand for Cristians Catalans, Catòlics Catalans or Crist i Catalunya. 
22 For more details on these acts of resistance to Franco’s regime see, for example, Colomer (1976), 
Crexell (1982,1984) or Marcet (1987, 1-10)  
23 September 11 was proclaimed Catalonia’s National Day in 1980. This day commemorates the 
defeat from the Siege of Barcelona in the War for the Spanish Succession, and the subsequent suppression 
of Aragon’s institutions by the Kingdom of Philip V.  
24 The Statute of Autonomy is Catalonia’s fundamental law. It has a constitutional function which 
consists of setting the normative framework, established in the 1978 Spanish Constitution, regarding 
Catalonia’s self-government. 
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regional institutions a wide number of responsibilities in education, health, culture, social 
services and police matters.   
As had occurred during the Second Republic, a Catalan party system developed 
independently of the Spanish party system. The democratization process resulted in the 
legalization of those Catalan political parties that had maintained clandestine activity (with 
different degrees of importance and visibility) during Franco’s regime: the Partit Unificat de 
Catalunya (PSUC), the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and the Unió Democràtica 
de Catalunya (UDC). New political organizations, as the Convergència Democrática de 
Catalunya (CDC), led by Jordi Pujol, emerged. Others, like the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-
Congrés, the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Reagrupament and the Catalan Federation of the 
PSOE, would merge into the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) (Colomé 1989).  
Five main political parties would end up configuring the Catalan party system (see Table 
A.1.1 in the Appendix for more details): the CDC, which from 1979 on would participate in the 
elections in coalition with the UDC under the Convergència i Unió (CiU) label; the ERC; the 
PSC; the PSUC, which would evolve into the Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV) in 1987; 
and the Popular Party (PP).25 Among these parties, the CiU and the ERC are the only two 
parties in the Catalan party system which have no relation to Spanish political parties. The PSC 
and the ICV are in a federal relationship with the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) 
and the Izquierda Unida (IU), respectively. And the PP, which was a re-founded version of the 
party created by Franco’s former ministers (Alianza Popular, AP), would become the only 
national party with representation in the Catalan Parliament.  
Political parties in Catalonia aligned along the left-right and the center-periphery axis. 
However, the distribution of parties along the center-periphery cleavage has always been 
asymmetrical, and skewed towards the “periphery” side of the cleavage. Thus, while the CiU 
and the ERC have always put the interests of Catalonia before the interests of Spain, and the 
PSC and the ICV have held a Catalanist position;26 the PP has ended up being the only party 
which clearly opposes greater levels of decentralization. The presence of Catalan nationalist 
parties in the Spanish parliament and the PP presence in the Catalan parliament have meant that 
the center-periphery cleavage has structured political competition both at the national and at the 
regional level. Multilevel party competition has also favored the growth of demands for 
autonomy in Catalonia. This has happened especially when Catalan nationalist parties have had 
a majority government at the regional level and they have been key to sustaining minority 
governments at the national level (Lago and Montero 2010, 408).  
Over the years, confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage has become a constant on 
the Spanish political landscape (Moreno 1997). The nationalist parties’ centrifugal strategies of 
political competition, the main Catalan parties’ aspirations to move the process of 
                                                      
25 In the first regional elections, the Partido Socialista Andaluz (PSA), a political party based in 
Andalusia which aimed at representing the Andalusian immigrants living in Catalonia, and the Centristes 
de Catalunya- Unión de Centro Democrático, the party led by Adolfo Suárez during the transition, got 
two and eighteen representatives, respectively. The Centro Democrático Social, the centrist party created 
by Suárez after the UCD’s project failed, got three seats in the 1988 regional elections. The CDS would 
end up being absorbed by the PP. In the 2006 and 2010 regional elections, Ciutadans-Partit de la 
Ciudadania (C’s), a political party which is against nationalist identity politics, got 3 seats. In the 2010 
regional elections, Solidaritat Catalan per la Independència (SI) entered the Regional Parliament with 4 
seats.  
26 The PSC-PSOE federal relationship and internal tensions within the PSC have caused this party to 
hold more ambivalent positions on the center-periphery cleavage. Within the PSC, the party members 
who have the support (and votes) of Spanish immigrants are closer to autonomist positions, while the 
Catalanist sectors support further decentralization. In the last few years, the PSC has intensified its 
demands for further self-government (Pallarés and Verge 2011). 
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decentralization forward, the Popular Party’s opposition to these aspirations, Spanish and 
Catalan party leaders and political commentators’ negative-framed stances on cleavage-related 
issues, the organization of divisive campaigns intended to oppose Catalan and Spanish identities 
and the organization of strategies of mobilization of Catalan or Spanish identities have all 
contributed to deepening the cleavage.  
 
1.4.2 The presence of a population susceptible to changing its identification 
 
Immigration is also a pre-condition for the experiencing of a change in national 
identification. In this section, I provide the reader with some context on the phenomenon of 
inter-regional immigration to Catalonia.  
Starting in the mid of 19th century, a significant number of immigrants arrived to Catalonia 
from less developed and impoverished regions in Spain. Around 1930, immigration came from 
Aragón, Valencia, Murcia and Almeria. Waves of immigration to Catalonia remained constant 
over time and only decreased slightly in the postwar period (Cabré and Pujadas 1984). Between 
the mid-fifties and the mid-seventies, economic growth and the growth of employment 
opportunities in Catalonia attracted a steady stream of immigrants. Newcomers came from all 
regions of Spain, although in this second wave of immigration, the arrival of people from 
Andalusia, Extremadura and Castile “la Nueva” was noticeably higher (Sancho and Ros 1998, 
110). Thus, before 1975, fifty-two percent of the immigrants came from Andalusia, twelve 
percent from Extremadura, eight percent from Castile “la Nueva”, seven percent from Castile 
“la Vieja” and six percent from Aragon (Recaño and Solana 1998, 224-225).  
Immigration contributed significantly to the growth of Catalonia’s population. In 1950, the 
population in Catalonia was 3,240,313. Twenty years later it had increased by over two million 
people (see Table 1.1). Between 1950 and 1975, Catalonia grew at a 2.25 percent annual rate 
(Sancho and Ros 1998, 109).  
 
Table 1.1 Evolution of the population in Catalonia 
 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Barcelona 1,931,875 2,232,119 2,877,966 3,929,194 
Tarragona 339,299 356,811 362,679 433,094 
Girona 322,360 327,321 351,369 412,340 
Lleida 297,440 324,062 333,765 347,091 
Total 2,890,974 3,240,313 3,925,779 5,121,719 
                 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 
 
Cabré and Pujadas (1984) have estimated that the net migration balance between Catalonia 
and the rest of Spain was over one million between 1951 and 1975. In 1975, the percent of the 
population not been born in Catalonia made up 38% of the total population (Cabré 1999, 183). 
These figures were even higher in the province of Barcelona, where those who have been born 
outside of Catalonia constituted 42% of the population (Cabré 1999, 183). Actually, in some 
areas of Barcelona’s industrial belt, such as, for example, Cornellà, the non-native population 
made up 78.4% of the total population (Strubell i Trueta 1981, 76) 
At the end of the seventies, this kind of inter-regional migration essentially came to an end. 
Between 1980 and 1985 the balance of migration turned negative for the first time (Bentolila 
2001; Cabré 1999, 190; Recaño and Solana 1998). Actually, ‘following the expansion of the 
welfare state, the traditionally poor and high unemployment regions (Andalusia and 
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Extremadura) became net immigration regions, while the better-off ones (such as Madrid and 
Catalonia) became net outmigration regions’ (Bóver and Velilla 1999, 10). Different 
circumstances can possibly account for this change in migratory trends, such as economic 
restructuring in the first years of the democracy, changes in individuals’ expectations due to the 
regime change and the expansion of the welfare state as Bóver and Velilla (1999) have 
suggested. Nevertheless, the return rate among immigrants was significantly low: 5.9 per 
thousand in the period 1988-1990 and 6.8 per thousand between 1992 and 1994 (Recaño and 
Solana 1998).  
 
Table 1.2 Net migration in Catalonia between 1941 and 1985 
 Catalonia 
1941-1950 189,913 
1951-1960 299,116 
1961-1965 270,287 
1966-1970 263,451 
1971-1975 217,608 
1976-1980 114 
1980-1985 -34,520 
Total 1,205,969 
Source: Cabré (1999) 
 
The following figure shows the distribution of population born in other regions of Spain 
living in the different Catalan municipalities, according to the 1981 census data, and the 2010 
Catalan Municipal Registers.  
 
Figure 1.1 Percent of the population born in other regions of Spain 1981 and 2010 
  
Source: IDESCAT, 1981 census data and 2010 Catalan Municipal registers 
 
These figures show that immigrant population concentrated in the seaside areas and, in 
particular, in Barcelona’s metropolitan area. They also reveal a change in the percent of 
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population born in other regions of Spain living in the Catalan municipalities. While in 1981 
there were municipalities in which the percent of population born in other regions of Spain was 
over 38%; thirty years later the municipalities with the highest percentage of immigrants 
approximately reached this figure, but they were not above it.  
Due to the die off of individuals who had been born in other regions of Spain and who have 
not been replaced by new arrivals, today the percentage of this population is significantly lower 
than it was in 1975. In 1981, the Spanish born population had already gone down from 38 
percent to around 35 percent. In 2010, the municipal register showed that this figure had 
decreased to 25 percent (after excluding foreign born population). Despite this, the Spanish born 
population and their children still account for an important percentage of today’s Catalan 
population. Actually, immigration from other Spanish regions in Catalonia altered the socio-
economic and demographic structure of the population in Catalonia, and these effects still 
prevail today. 
The great majority of newcomers were low-educated, unskilled or semiskilled Castilian 
speaking workers.  Upon arriving in Catalonia, these immigrants concentrated in the outskirts of 
Barcelona and in new neighborhoods built out of nothing in the main Catalan cities. These 
neighborhoods very often lacked any kind of infrastructure, severely affecting the living 
conditions of a population of a predominantly rural origin (Solé 1981a, 88-89). The lack of 
infrastructures also affected the children of immigrants’ education: 
 
“At that time, Hospitalet was a typical city of the desarrollismo period and, so, many services 
were missing. My parents had always given great importance to education, especially my 
father. Therefore, they wanted me to start school at the age of four. However, as schools were 
missing, I ended up going to a semi-public school. This was a typical school at that time; there 
were a lot in Hospitalet and there are still some. These schools were created in apartments. 
Classrooms were separated by any flimsy material, and sometimes schools were created on 
the ground floor of an apartment building, sometimes it was a U-shaped premise with the 
classes separated by plastic.” [Andrés, male, born in 1975, child of mixed couple] 
 
Immigrants’ concentration in neighborhoods and jobs where Catalan was completely absent 
reinforced their alienation from the Catalan culture. Moreover, the ban against the Catalan 
language not only prevented the post-war native generations from being educated in Catalan 
during the Franco dictatorship, but it also reinforced these immigrants and their children’s 
alienation from the Catalan language (Conversi 1997, 208). In addition, immigrants’ low-
educational levels pushed them into unskilled or semi-skilled jobs.  Immigrants’ concentration 
in these kinds of jobs caused the ethno-linguistic and the social-class divides to overlap. 
However, differences in immigrants’ educational levels, some arriving with a higher educational 
level than the average immigrant, meant there was no perfect overlapping of the ethnic and the 
class divides (Pinilla de las Heras 1973, 103-107).  
Today, and despite some significant differences in certain occupational groups - “Support 
Professionals and Technicians”, “Services”, “Skilled workers in industries”, “Unskilled 
workers” -, differences are not so salient along the occupational echelons between the native 
population and the population born in other regions of Spain. Yet, there is still today an 
overrepresentation of non-natives and their children in the lower occupational echelon. 27 
                                                      
27 Miley (2008, 13) has noted that the ethnic divide has also translated to political institutions, so 
today there is a lower percentage of non-native population among the local politicians and the members 
of the regional parliament. This can be attributed to the fact that the major political party in the regional 
parliament between 1980 and 2003, Convergència i Unió, hardly included immigrants in their lists for the 
Catalan parliament. The same applies to the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, and to a lesser extent to 
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Table 1.3 Distribution of origin groups within by occupational groups (column %) 
    Autoch-thonous 
Children of 
Mixed 
couples 
Second 
Genera-
tions 
Immigrants 
Companies and Public Administration 
Managers 8.13 6.48 6.86 8.37 
Scientific Professionals and 
Technicians 12.26 13.89 16.00 13.69 
Support Professionals and Technicians 16.45 17.59 18.29 9.89 
Clerical 2.73 5.86 5.14 2.28 
Services 14.42 16.36 14.29 11.03 
Skilled workers in Farming and Fishing 4.38 0.93 0.57 1.52 
Skilled workers in industries 16.39         15.74 15.53 21.67 
Machine operators and assemblers 15.63 15.43 12.00 16.35 
Unskilled workers 9.59 7.62 11.43 15.21 
Source: CIS, Study # 2857 (2010) 
 
The phenomenon of Spanish immigration to Catalonia has been an issue of interest for a 
significant number of publications (Cabré 1999; Cabré and Pujadas 1984; Candel 2008 [1964]; 
Cardelús, Oroval, and Pascual 1978; Comas and Pujadas 1991; Cruells 1965; Maluquer i 
Sostres 1963; Pinilla de las Heras 1973; Solé 1981a, 1981b). Researchers’ concern about this 
issue derives from the numeric importance of the waves of immigration which came to 
Catalonia from other regions of Spain. Besides the issues of immigrants’ residential, 
occupational and social integration, linguistic assimilation and catalanización (ideological 
assimilation) would become an issue of special relevance for Catalan political elites, as I will 
argue in chapter 4.  
However, when the waves of immigration stopped and foreign immigrants started to come 
in large numbers to Catalonia (and the whole of Spain, as well), researchers’ interest moved to 
the study of this new phenomenon. This dissertation, however, takes into consideration the so-
called “old immigration”, and looks into the identificational changes experienced by these 
immigrants, and their children.  
 
1.5 Theoretical and Methodological Contribution 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical contribution 
 
This dissertation makes a threefold theoretical contribution. It offers, first, an analytical 
framework for the study of change in national identification. Secondly, it contributes to the 
literature which explains change in national identification as an elite-driven process, and it 
                                                                                                                                                               
the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya and Iniciativa per Catalunya; although the two latter parties have 
exhibited a variation in the percentage of immigrants who have been included in their electoral lists over 
time (for more details see Coller, Ferreira, Meissner 2007; Coller and Santana 2009). Differences between 
elite and social structure have been seen as evidence of the political infra-representation of this sector of 
the population in the regional parliament, both by researchers and immigrants themselves, as will be 
shown in the qualitative chapter.    
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offers an alternative explanation to that of decentralization, which accounts better for short-term 
changes in national identification. Thirdly, the dissertation contrasts, for the first time, the effect 
that parents and schooling have upon individuals’ national identification and it shows the 
greater leverage of the parents in their children’s national identification.  
 In order to do so, the next chapter of the dissertation conceptualizes individual national 
identification. The concepts of ethnicity, nationality, as well as identity and identification are 
often used interchangeably. Conceptual confusion brings analytical confusion and hinders the 
study of these issues. To solve this problem, the theoretical chapter of my dissertation modifies 
previous work on the study of ethnic and national identity, and on the study of change in ethnic 
identity, and provides an alternative and operational definition of change in national 
identification. From here, the chapter distinguishes among different dimensions in individual 
identification (content, self-categorization, saliency and intensity) in which change can occur, 
and it establishes the preconditions of change; that is, the structural and individual 
circumstances under which national identification is susceptible to change.  
From here, the dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of national 
identification in Catalonia. As has already been argued above, Catalonia is an appropriate case 
study because we find some of the preconditions which render change in the category of 
national identification possible. The analysis of the Catalan case allows me to sustain 
empirically the main contention of my dissertation, that is, the idea that political context and, in 
particular, political elites’ mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage, drive change in 
individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia.  
Thus, the dissertation argues that the mobilization of the national cleavage makes 
individuals react (cognitively and emotionally) to political elites’ messages communicated by 
the media, and modify their category of national identification accordingly. However, the effect 
of the political messages coming from the political elites is heterogeneous; those individuals 
who have a clearly defined national identification will be immune or will see their prior 
identification reinforced after receiving these messages, while those individuals who hold dual 
identifications will be more susceptible to change.  
This dissertation contributes to the literature which points to political elites as agents 
shaping national identity, and it offers an alternative and complementary explanation to the one 
offered by Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2005, 2009) and Guibernau (2006, 2007). Unlike their 
explanation, my dissertation claims that political elites’ mobilization of the cleavage alters 
individuals’ prior-identification, which has been mainly forged by their parents’ influence. In 
addition, it argues that the effect of political elites’ mobilization is contingent on individuals’ 
prior-identification, so that not all individuals’ are equally susceptible to change.  
In short, the argument that the mobilization of the political cleavage by political elites 
affects individuals’ identification accounts better for short-term variation in aggregate national 
identification, and it provides a better link to relate individual and aggregate changes.  
Chapter five of the dissertation contrasts, for the first time, the influence of two agents who 
have traditionally been pointed to as shaping political attitudes in general and national identity 
in particular: parents and schools. The results of my analysis question a well-established idea of 
the literature on nationalism. Contrary to what classical works on nationalism, as well as recent 
empirical research (Martinez-Herrera 2002, 2009, Aspachs-Bracons et al 2008) usually claim, 
my results suggest that the main agent of national socialization is the parents and not the 
schools. The mechanisms through which parents shape the national identity of their children are 
not only direct (indoctrination, emulation, etc.), but indirect. In this way, the socio-economic 
mobility of immigrant parents, the neighborhood in which parents live and the school in which 
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parents enroll their children are elements which have a great impact on their children’s national 
identification.  
 
1.5.2 Methodological contribution 
 
This dissertation also aims to make a methodological contribution in studying national 
identification change. I have already referred in section 1.3.3 to the ways in which I will try to 
overcome some of the methodological limitations of previous research. 
The main contribution of the dissertation, from a methodological point of view, is the use of 
a combination of cross-sectional series of surveys, along with household and panel data. The 
combination of these data, and the employment of appropriate quantitative techniques, will 
allow me to perform all my analysis at the individual level and to adopt a longitudinal approach. 
Previous research has very often referred to the occurrence of cohort or generational 
identificational changes, but they have hardly ever estimated its magnitude. Unlike previous 
research, in chapter 3 I will make use of aggregate change decomposition techniques to separate 
generational replacement from individual change, and to estimate their magnitudes.  
I have summarized above the mechanism which, according to Martínez-Herrera (2002, 
2005, 2009), connects decentralization with individual change: individuals become 
progressively more identified with their regions in decentralized contexts due to their 
interactions with regional institutions, and due to indoctrination by and exposure to the actions 
of socialization agents (school and mass media) which are the regional governments' 
responsibility. However, this author's empirical analyses (2005, 2009), rather than carried out at 
the individual level, are performed at the aggregate level, and this raises concerns of ecological 
inference. To avoid this problem, in my dissertation I have carried out different strategies: first, 
I have made use of multilevel techniques to test the effect that contextual variables (i.e., 
confrontation between national and regional elites) have on individuals’ identification; 
secondly, I have directly tested the effect of indoctrination and exposure to socialization agents 
(schools and mass media) on individuals; third, I have conducted approximately forty semi-
structured interviews to provide evidence of the mechanism linking political elites’ mobilization 
of the center-periphery cleavage and individual change.  
Previous research has also inferred the occurrence of individual changes by showing within-
cohort or within-origin group (native, children of mixed couples, or second generation 
immigrants) change in national identification. Within-cohort change, however, does not provide 
complete evidence of the occurrence of individual change in national identification, since there 
is always a risk that sampling effects are in place. This dissertation benefits from the use of 
panel data to show that individuals’ national identification does actually change over time.  
So far, evidence on the occurrence of inter-generational changes has mainly relied on the 
comparison of unrelated individuals from different cohorts, or on the comparison of immigrants 
and second generations. Implicitly, this research assumes that the differences observed among 
the different cohorts, or between immigrants and second generations are a reflection of changes 
occurring within the family. However, inter-generational changes can only be tested properly by 
comparing the identification of parents and their offspring. The use of household data allows me 
to compare the national identification of native and immigrant parents’ and that of their 
offspring. By making use of household data, I will also be able to take into consideration 
important variables (such as parents’ identification) which have been omitted in previous 
research, causing an overestimation of the effect of the school on the shaping of individual 
national identification (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons 
et al. 2008a). 
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1.6 Research Strategy 
 
1.6.1 A case study analysis 
 
As I have detailed above, my research focuses on a single case, Catalonia. Case studies have 
frequently been misjudged in social research. However, dislike of the case study method 
derives, in many cases, from a misunderstanding of case study goals. Therefore, it is important 
to emphasize here that the main interest of single case studies in comparative politics is not to 
produce generalizations about outcomes, but generalizations about causes and mechanisms 
(Chandra 2006). This means that the specific case from which one wants to draw explanations 
on the causes of national identification change, must be selected based on this purpose.  
In particular, Catalonia must serve for the purpose of shedding light on the causes and 
mechanisms that explain the occurrence of national identification changes in contexts in which 
there is a national cleavage, and in migratory contexts. In this regard, possible inferences 
derived from this research should be restricted to similar kinds of changes (changes in the 
category of self-identification) and to these two particular contexts.  
Gerring (2004) has classified case studies regarding the observed co-variation of the 
dependent and independent variables in two distinct dimensions (space and time). According to 
Gerring’s typology, my research could be classified as single unit research in which variation 
within the unit is observed in the dependent variable (change) both at the aggregate and the 
individual level diachronically. The heterogeneity of the population under consideration 
(internal heterogeneity) introduces, moreover, synchronically, variation in the independent 
variables.  
Additionally, it should be note that case studies have an advantage over large-n studies, as 
the former offer “a better opportunity to gain detailed knowledge of the phenomenon under 
investigation” (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 84). In this regard, the in-depth analysis of 
the available and produced data for Catalonia will allow me to look into two different sources of 
aggregate change (individual and intergenerational), and to test in multiple ways whether 
political elites, the school and the media are able to alter individuals’ national identification, and 
counteract, in this way, parents’ national socialization.  
 
1.6.2 Operationalization of the dependent variable 
 
This dissertation endogenizes national identification, as well as change in the category of self-
identification. In what follows, I justify the use of a bi-directional indicator of national 
identification, and I will detail as well how I have operationalized change in its different 
dimensions.  
 
1.6.2.1 A measurement for national identification  
 
This dissertation draws on a bi-directional indicator of national identification that forces 
respondents to report on their identification with two national categories: Spain and Catalonia. 
The wording of the question is as follows: 
 
 “Which of the following phrases would you say best expresses your sentiments? 
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The answer makes use of an anchored scale that presents alternative categories of spatial 
identification in an exclusive (“only Spanish”, “only Catalan”) or inclusive way (“I feel more ... 
than ...”, “I feel as ... as ...”). 
This bi-directional measure was first included in two surveys conducted in 1979 and 1982.28 
It was subsequently used in a series of studies in which individual’s identification with both 
Spain and the Basque Country or Catalonia was examined (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986; 
Linz 1985, 2008; Linz et al. 1981; Linz and Montero 1986). This indicator has been 
progressively applied to other contexts in which individuals ascribe themselves to national and 
regional territorial spheres (such as Scotland, Quebec, Ireland, Belgium, Friuli-Venezia Giulia) 
(Moreno 1988; Segatti, Vezzoni, and Guglielmi 2008), and its use was generalized later on to 
contrast respondents’ identification with Europe with their nation of origin.  
The adequacy of this instrument for measuring Spanish and European identification has, 
however, been questioned by Sinnot (2005) and Ruiz-Jimenez (2007), who have argued that the 
instrument presents problems of validity.29 Two main answers could be given to the validity 
criticisms of this instrument: First, as Moreno, Arriba and Serrano (1998, 70) have noticed, the 
bi-directional indicator was originally conceived to capture ethno-territorial conflict. More 
specifically, this measure captures the identity (national vs. regional) trade-off that political 
parties try to build in those places where there is a center-periphery cleavage. 
Second, the bi-directional measure does not seem to present the same validity problems 
enunciated by Sinnot when applied to the Catalan context (Martínez-Herrera 2005, 89-141). 
Table A.1.1 and Figures A.1.1, A.1.2 and A.1.3 in the appendix show that the national 
identification measure is strongly associated to other measures capturing individuals’ position 
on the cleavage (i.e. the nationalism scale, and preferences over the institutional organization of 
the state).30 In this regard, we can state that the validity of the measurement is, at the very least, 
optimal.  
This bi-directional measure has been periodically included in the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas (Center of Sociological Research, CIS) surveys since 1984, and it was also 
included in the 2001/02, 2004 and 2005 waves of the Panel de Desigualtats (PaD), a survey in 
Catalunya carried out by the Fundació Jaume Bofill. As I will detail below, these are the two 
sources my quantitative analysis relies on.  
With slight changes in wording from one survey to another, the question included in the CIS 
surveys is the same as the original question above: Which of the following phrases would you 
                                                      
28 The 1979 survey for Catalonia was designed by Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie 
Shabad, and its results were presented in Gunther, R., Sani, G. and Shabad, G. (1986). The 1982 survey 
was designed by Juan Linz and José Ramón Montero, along with Pilar del Castillo, Richard Gunther, 
Hans-Jurgen Puhle, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad. The survey results were presented in Linz, J.J. and 
Montero, J.R (eds.) (1986) Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta. 
29 Sinnot (2005) has compared this measure with other unidimensional measures which ask 
respondents about the intensity of their feelings of identification (using a 0 to 10 scale) or, alternatively, a 
very attached to not at all attached scale. Sinnot’s tests show that the unidirectional measure’s predictive 
power is greater than the bidirectional predictive power. Ruiz Jimenez (2007) has based her discussion on 
the validity of this measurement instrument on the incoherence of the results of two different sources, the 
Eurobarometer and the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas’ surveys. Yet, the author quickly discards 
the possibility that differences can be due to “house effects”, attributable to different sampling designs, 
for example. 
30 Results in Table A.1 also show that those who identify as “only Spanish” or “more Spanish than 
Catalan” also state they identify with Catalonia in the uni-directional measurement, while the contrary is 
not true for those who identify as “only Catalan” or “more Catalan than Spanish”. In these groups, the 
levels of identification with Spain are lower.    
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say best expresses your sentiments? The question included in the first wave of the PaD is posed 
as follows: “On which point of the following scale, in which 1 is “only Spanish” and 5 is “only 
Catalan”, would you place yourself?” In the third, and the forth waves of the PaD the question 
regarding national identification is worded as follows “of the following words, I would like you 
to tell me the one you feel most identified with?” This, however, should not raise major 
concerns as the answer categories were kept the same over time.  
 
1.6.2.2 Operationalization of national identification change 
  
The use of the bi-directional measure of national identification provides an advantage in 
evaluating change in national identification in a context in which there are two competing 
territorial entities which are presented to individuals’ as nations. In addition, while a change 
from “only Spanish” to “as Spanish as Catalan” is meaningful and clearly interpretable, we 
cannot be certain about the meaning and interpretation of a change from 3 to 4 or from 4 to 5, 
for instance, on a 0 to 10 scale of identification with Spain.  
Beyond this, it is important to highlight that I am interested in measuring whether 
individuals experience a change in their subjective attachment toward two possible categories of 
identification (Catalonia and Spain), and not in the intensity of this attachment.  
 The operationalization of these kinds of changes will differ depending on whether we are 
referring to changes in the aggregate, intergenerational changes or individual changes.  
 In the aggregate, change is defined as the differences in the percent of individuals who self-
identify as “only Spanish”, more Spanish than Catalan”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, “more Catalan 
than Spanish” or “only Catalan” in t1 and t2. If the samples in t1 and t2 are representative of the 
population, and we discard the possibility that measurement errors occur, aggregate change in 
national identification must be the result of generational replacement or within-cohort changes. 
If the span of time between t1 and t2 is relatively short, then the occurrence of an aggregate 
change will not be the result of cohort replacement, but individual change.  
 Inter-generational change has usually been calculated as the differences in the percent of 
individuals who self-identify as “only Spanish”, more Spanish than Catalan”, “as Spanish as 
Catalan”, “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan” between generations. The availability 
of inter-generational data from the same family allows me to refine the measurement of these 
kinds of changes. Therefore, in chapter 5, I assume that an inter-generational change has 
occurred when parents and children differ in their category of self-identification. 
  Individual change occurs when a person self-identifies as Spanish in t1, and he or she 
identifies as Catalan in t2. These kinds of changes are, however, very demanding because they 
require a psychological (emotional and cognitive) change: the abandonment of a prior category 
of identification and its substitution for a different category. Thus, this kind of change will not 
occur suddenly, but as a result of a process of progressive adaptation. Unfortunately, as I lack 
panel data which follows individuals’ identification over a long period of time, this kind of 
process could not be tracked. However, in chapter 6, I examine individual change in national 
identification by looking at individuals’ placement in the “only Spanish” to “only Catalan” scale 
over a short period of time. Accordingly, in this chapter, I will measure change in individual’s 
national identification as every change in an individual’s preferred category of identification 
between t1 and t2.  
 
 
 
 
Change in National Identification 
28 
 
1.6.3 Methodology and data  
 
Case studies have been usually associated with the use of qualitative methodology; 
however, as Gerring (2004, 343) has argued “one cannot substitute case study for qualitative, 
ethnographic, or process-tracing without feeling that something has been lost in translation”. In 
this research, I adopt a pluralistic methodological approach. This position departs from my 
conviction that the method must serve the research question and not, the other way round. My 
research will make use of a mixed methodology that will combine quantitative, econometric 
techniques, and qualitative methods. In the empirical chapters, data-set observation, using Brady 
and Collier’s terminology (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2006; Collier and Brady 2004), will 
be examined to test the validity of causal relationships (chapters 4, 5 and 6); while qualitative 
interviews will be carried out to provide these causal hypothesis with a causal path or 
mechanism and illustrate the change (chapter 7). 
In the following sections I provide the reader with a brief overview of the data and the 
quantitative or qualitative techniques used in the dissertation. However, each chapter includes a 
section with a detailed account of the data characteristics, and the analytical techniques 
employed to examine change in its different dimensions.  
 
1.6.3.1 Data 
 
This dissertation benefits from two different data sets to carry out the quantitative analysis: 
a cross-sectional time series of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center of 
Sociological Research, CIS), and a household panel with three waves carried out by the 
Fundació Jaume Bofill. 
The CIS time series cross-sectional data covers a period between 1984 and 2010, with 
sixteen year points, and information on the national identification choices of 26,266 individuals. 
Although cross-sectional data on national identification in Catalonia is available from different 
sources (Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, Panel de 
Desigualtats de Catalunya), the data from the CIS is the most adequate for three reasons: the 
sample sizes, the information which is provided, and the span of time that the data covers.  
The “Panel de Desigualtats a Catalunya (PaD), Fundació Jaume Bofill, onades 1 a 4, 2001-
2005” is a pioneer panel study in the Spanish context. The PaD was originally designed with the 
objective of providing information on the inequalities that are present in Catalonia and 
generating information on the mechanisms and social processes which produce these 
inequalities. However, the data also includes information on the national identification of all 
household members, and other variables which are appropriate for dealing with the study of 
intergenerational changes in national identification within the family and individual change in 
national identification over time.  
The PaD is representative of the population living in Catalonia. The first wave of the PaD 
(2001/02) provides information on 1991 households and approximately 5,785 individuals. Data 
is obtained from computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) in the household of the 
respondents, and using the language (Spanish or Catalan) chosen by the respondent.  
 
1.6.3.2 Overview of the quantitative methodology 
 
The first empirical chapter of this dissertation (chapter 3) is a descriptive chapter which 
traces the evolution of national identification over the period between 1984 and 2010. As I 
mentioned before, the chapter uses decomposition techniques. These techniques serve to reveal 
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which proportion of the overall change is due to individual changes and which proportion is due 
to generational replacement.  
Chapter four takes advantage of the longitudinal character of the CIS time series cross-
sectional data to examine whether the adscriptive (individuals’ and their parents’ origin) and the 
semi-adscriptive (knowledge of Catalan) components of national identification have changed 
over time. In so doing, I will be able to learn whether individuals’ from different origin groups 
(immigrants, second generations, children of mixed couples, and natives) have become more 
similar in their identificational choices over time.  
Taking into account the nominal character of my dependent variable, national identification 
will be estimated using a multinomial logistic model. Although multinomial logistic estimation 
is a less efficient estimation method, it is more informative in terms of the impact that the 
independent variables have on individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia. In my 
model, the independent variables will be individuals’ adscriptive and semi-adscriptive 
characteristics, a time factor which will serve to estimate the passing of time, and cohort and 
educational control variables.  
In chapter four, I also carry out a hierarchical regression analysis to estimate the effect of 
contextual variables (e.g., national-regional government alliances and levels of confrontation 
between the national and regional elites) in individual national identification. In order to do so, 
data will be structured hierarchically with individuals clustered in year-surveys. However, due 
to the limited number of units I have at the second level (16), I will be forced to estimate my 
dependent variable as it was a continuous variable. Thus, the lower values of the dependent 
variable will mean identification with Spain and the higher values will mean identification with 
Catalonia.  
In the fifth and sixth chapters, I make use of the data from the PaD. In this chapter, I 
examine congruence between parents and children on their national identification feelings, and I 
investigate the determinants of individuals’ national identification. The descriptive analysis of 
children’s and parents’ national identification will help me to account for the occurrence of 
intergenerational changes within the family. In addition, I will make use of a multivariate 
analysis, which will allow me to contrast the influence of the family against the school in 
individuals’ national identification. In these analyses, individuals’ national identification will be 
treated as a nominal variable and it will be estimated with a multinomial logistic regression. 
Additionally, to control for the dependence of observations due to the presence of siblings 
within the household, standard errors will be adjusted for household clusters. 
The sixth chapter introduces the analysis of individual changes in the short term. So far, the 
lack of longitudinal panel data has forced researches to use cross-sectional data to infer changes 
in age by years (within-cohort changes). This empirical strategy, however, provides imprecise 
results. In order to overcome this problem, I examine the data from the first, third and fourth 
wave of the PaD. In the analysis of individual change, I use all the cases for which complete 
three-wave data is available. A multinomial logistic analysis will allow me to compare the 
proclivity to change of different groups within the Catalan population (natives, second 
generation, children of mixed marriages and immigrants) controlling for different socio-
demographic characteristics. Additionally, I will test the effect that television and party 
identification (as intermediaries which channel the political context) have upon the occurrence 
and the direction of change in individuals’ national identification. To avoid the problem of 
reverse causation, exposure to Spanish and Catalan TV and party identification will be 
measured in t-1, that is, before the change occurs. In this chapter, I also discuss issues related to 
the measurement error which are an important concern in panel studies.  
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1.6.3.3 Overview of the qualitative methodology 
 
As I have previously mentioned, the quantitative analysis will be complemented with a 
qualitative analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews.  
Fieldwork has been carried out in three stages. In the first stage, I interviewed mainly 
immigrants and second generations. In the second stage, I established a number of 30 interviews 
and I generated quotas according to different criteria (age, education and individuals and their 
parents’ origin). Each quota was assigned a number of interviews to assure the variability of the 
population. Since other variables (i.e., individuals’ left-right ideology or the years individuals 
from other regions of Spain have been living in Catalonia) were considered to be relevant to 
ensure the Catalan population variability, ad-hoc corrections were introduced in the selection of 
the individuals who were finally interviewed. In the third stage, interviews were carried out 
until I got a theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is satisfied when new interviews do not 
add original information to that collected in previous interviews. Due to this, the final number of 
implemented interviews went up to 38.  
The qualitative data gathered in the interviews was transcribed and processed. Qualitative 
materials have been used to exemplify the occurrence of stability and change over time, to 
provide support to the causal hypothesis of the quantitative analysis, and to illustrate the 
mechanism behind short-term individual change in national identification.  
 
1.7 A macro to micro analysis of change  
 
Individual and aggregate changes are intrinsically related. Changes in the aggregate can 
occur through two kinds of social processes: changes in the composition of the population and 
individual changes. Unless a population shock (e.g., a war or an epidemic) takes place, or the 
arrival of immigrants rises significantly within a few years, changes in the composition of the 
population usually occur very slowly and through a process of generational replacement. Still, it 
is usually stated that these changes have a high impact on the configuration of the aggregate, as 
younger generations, who have gone through different socialization experiences, hold beliefs, 
attitudes and opinions which differ from older generations.  
As figure 1.2 shows below, individual changes can, for example, imply a temporary 
alteration of individual’s prior opinions, or they can have effects that are permanent in time; so 
that once that they have occurred, individuals do not again change their beliefs, attitudes and 
opinions.  
Neither of these individual changes will have important consequences on the aggregate 
unless two conditions are fulfilled together: first, the number of individuals who change their 
national identification is numerically important and second, change occurs in the same 
direction. If many individuals change their category of identification at the same time, but 
change occurs in opposite directions, then the effect of the changes cancels out. However 
unlikely it may be, the occurrence of contextual changes might facilitate that these two 
conditions are fulfilled simultaneously. 
Other processes of individual change which are associated with time, are life-course or 
time-variant processes. These kinds of changes are the result of age effects (i.e., individuals’ 
propensity to become more conservative as they get older). Immigrants’ assimilation can also be 
seen as a life-course change.   
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Figure 1.2 Permanent and temporal changes in individuals A and B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
Here the continuous line represents individuals’ opinion regarding a particular issue. Individual A 
has a more positive position regarding this issue, and individual B has a more negative position. 
Individuals A and B change their opinion at time t, allegedly due to an external change which 
impacts their prior opinion. While at time t+1, A turns to its original opinion, B’s opinion has 
changed permanently and now he clearly holds a negative position regarding the issue. In between, 
an election occurs. If the issue is relevant for electoral competition, the aggregate individual change 
of opinion of A plus B might have impacted the result of the election.    
 
Now, coming back to my case of interest, aggregate changes in identification with Spain 
and Catalonia can be a result of a combination of generational replacement due to the 
substitution of old cohorts which came of age during Franco’s regime with new cohorts, which 
came of age in a democratic regime, and individual changes. Individuals can potentially change 
their category of identification in a temporal or permanent manner. Here, contextual changes 
and events can be seen as the trigger of individual changes in national identification. However, 
these triggers are not expected to have a similar impact on every individual; the effect will vary 
because of the heterogeneity of the Catalan population.31 As a consequence, these kinds of 
individual changes can be cancelled out in the aggregate. Change can also occur gradually, as 
the result of individuals’ process of assimilation or accommodation to a new context in which 
both Spain and Catalonia are legitimized categories of identification.  
Therefore, my work seeks to make a systematic and rigorous analysis of change in these 
dimensions. In the long run, this thesis examines the evolution of national allegiances making 
use of time series cross-sectional data organized hierarchically (chapters 3 and 4). It also 
compares the national identification of parents and children using a household survey (chapter 
5). In the short term, the dissertation examines the evolution of individual identification through 
the exploitation of data from a panel study (chapter 6). In short, this dissertation examines 
change at the aggregate and the individual level, over long and short periods of time, over 
individuals’ lives and between different generations of the same family. In order to do this, in 
the empirical chapters of the dissertation I follow a two-step research strategy; I first examine 
change, and then I run multivariate analyses.  
                                                      
31 This will be discussed more deeply in chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
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On the whole, the analyses carried out in chapters three to six are expected to provide the 
reader with a comprehensive understanding of the occurrence of aggregate and individual 
changes in national identification. 
 
1.8 Plan of the dissertation 
 
Aside from this introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of seven chapters: a 
theoretical chapter, five empirical chapters, and the conclusions.  
Chapter 2 is the theoretical chapter of the dissertation. This chapter has a threefold purpose: 
to conceptualize change in national identification; to review the existing literature on identity 
change; and to offer an analytical framework which facilitates the study of change in national 
identification. The chapter discusses previous definitions of ethnicity, nationality, identity and 
identification, and it proposes an operational definition of individual national identification. 
This definition emphasizes the subjectivity of individual attachment to the nation, and highlights 
its differences with the concept of ethnic identification.  
After offering a definition of individual national identification, the chapter reflects on the 
different circumstances that facilitate the occurrence of change. Two types of conditions are 
envisaged here: structural and individual ones. In the first case, individual shift is made possible 
by the occurrence of contextual changes that imply either a redefinition of the national 
boundaries or a change in the nation’s symbolic referents. Colonization (or decolonization), 
secession (or unification of countries) and regime changes are presented as examples of these 
kinds of structural changes. Change in individual national identification can also be motivated 
by the existence of a repertoire of objects of identification, as happens in multinational 
countries, or by individuals’ participation or witnessing of certain events (wars, catastrophes, 
terrorist attacks, etc.). Among the individual circumstances which facilitate the occurrence of 
changes in individuals’ identification, immigration and conscription are examined. 
After this, the chapter argues that research dealing with the study of change in national 
identification should distinguish among four kinds of changes: changes in the category of self-
identification, changes in the meanings individuals attribute to their national identification, 
changes in the salience of national identification, and finally changes in the strength of 
attachment. All in all, this chapter seeks to offer an analytical framework that contributes to 
improving our understanding of change in individual national identification, and to help 
researchers to examine the causes of change. Case studies and historical examples illustrate the 
chapter’s argument, thereby enriching the analytical framework. 
As I have said previously, this dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of 
national identification in Spain’s autonomous region of Catalonia. The empirical part of the 
dissertation consists of four quantitative chapters and a qualitative chapter which examine 
change in all the aforementioned dimensions.  
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) tracks the evolution of identification with Spain and 
Catalonia over the past thirty years. The chapter draws on in-depth analysis of the CIS series of 
surveys which cover the period between 1984 and 2010. The results of the decomposition 
techniques analyses I carry out show that the decrease in the percent of individuals who self-
identify as primarily Spanish in the overall population is the joint result of the generational 
replacement of the older cohort, and a compensation effect of period changes. This causes the 
overall decrease in the period under consideration to be lower than previous works have 
suggested (Martínez-Herrera 2002). 
After conducting this descriptive analysis of the changes occurred in the aggregate, the 
following chapters carry out individual-level analysis. In Chapter 4, I try to account for the 
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patterns observed in the evolution of national identification, as well as for temporal changes. 
The chapter examines the evolution of national identification of the different origin groups 
(immigrants, second generations, children of mixed couples and natives), and it checks whether 
the differences between these groups have decreased over time. This chapter, moreover, offers 
an explanation of period changes in the aggregate levels of national identification and it draws 
attention to the importance of other institutional factors (i.e., national-regional governments’ 
alliances and levels of confrontation between the national and regional elites) that have not yet 
been empirically examined. The chapter suggests that when the center-periphery cleavage 
becomes highly salient, individuals react to these contextual changes and, accordingly, changes 
in national identification are observed. Ultimately, and as has been already noted, this chapter 
seeks to contribute to the literature which explains aggregate changes in national identification 
as an elite-driven result; in addition, it tries to improve our understanding of temporal instead of 
generational changes.  
The next chapter, chapter 5, focuses on the study of inter-generational changes within the 
family. The chapter analyzes variation in parents’ national identification (which is partly due to 
the heterogeneous origin of the Catalan population) in order to identify the effect of both parents 
and school in crafting individual national identification. The results, which draw on analysis of 
the Fundació Jaume Bofill household data, suggest that although years of schooling can 
increase the chances that children of immigrants develop a bi-national identification, parents’ 
attachment to Catalonia is the key element fostering a Catalan oriented identification. The 
results also suggest that both immigrant families’ economic progress and immigrant families’ 
self-selection into neighborhoods in which the share of immigrants is low are decisive elements 
in promoting children of immigrants’ identification with Catalonia. Qualitative data is also used 
to show that native parents also select the school they want to send their children according to 
the school’s characteristics.  
Chapter 6 addresses the study of stability and change in individual national identification 
using individual panel data from the Fundació Jaume Bofill. Data covers a highly contested 
period of time, which started with the Partido Popular’s absolute majority in the Spanish 
Parliament and extended over the reform of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy. The chapter 
hypothesizes that the mobilization of the national cleavage channelled by nation-wide and 
region-wide television broadcasters led those who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in 
t1 to redefine their identification. The chapter also tests an alternative explanation, according to 
which, when partisan debate on an issue becomes salient, party identification influences 
individuals’ stands on this issue and, by extension, attitudes toward other related issues (or 
identifications). The logistic analyses show that Catalan television has a significant leverage on 
those individuals who self-identified as Spanish and Catalan in t1. Conversely, the analyses 
indicate that the influence of Spanish television is absent. The results also support the 
alternative explanation, although the leverage of party identification seems to be only important 
in explaining the changes that occur in the Catalan direction. 
Chapter 7 is the qualitative chapter. It aims at providing a general picture of the 
phenomenon I have dealt with in the previous chapters: change in the category of national 
identification. The chapter makes use of the materials gathered in thirty eight qualitative 
interviews with three main objectives: to illustrate the occurrence of change (and stability) in 
individuals’ national identification, to provide support to some of the causal hypothesis 
presented in previous chapters, and to illustrate the mechanism which links political elites’ 
mobilization of the national cleavage and individual change in national identification.  
The last chapter of the dissertation (Chapter 8) is devoted to summarizing the main findings of 
the dissertation. After discussing specific implications for the case of Catalonia, the chapter tries 
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to derive more general implications for other cases in which the presence of a center-periphery 
cleavage or the presence of an immigration population make the occurrence of change in 
national identification possible. 
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CHAPTER 2. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
OF CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has two goals. First, it seeks to conceptualize the object of study of this 
dissertation (national identification). Secondly, it provides an analytical framework for studying 
change in national identification comparatively. Precisely for this reason, in this chapter I move 
away from the Catalan case and I bring in other examples which illustrate the chapter’s 
argument, thereby enriching it.	  
The departure point of this chapter is the realization that we lack an appropriate framework 
for dealing with the study of change in national identification. Despite a broad number of works 
have dealt obliquely with the object of study of this dissertation, no previous work has taken 
seriously, nor systematically, its study. This deficiency is both a shortcoming, and a challenge. 
It is a shortcoming because I lack a theory which helps me to advance the study of the causes of 
change. However, it is also a worthy challenge because it forces me to dive into many fields of 
study and different areas of research to incorporate their many insights. As a result, I have 
developed a new framework of analysis, which separates the different dimensions along which 
change can occur and identifies the pre-conditions for it to happen.  
The proposed framework of study departs from the study of collective identities, and 
focuses instead on the individual. This focus on the individual separates my work from that of 
Abdelal et al. (2006; 2009). Actually, Abdelal et al. (2009, 30) have explicitly stated their 
interest in studying inter-subjectively shaped collective identities, rather than subjectively 
shaped individual identification, which they consider to be an object of study more suitable for 
social psychology. Whether this is so or not is possibly a matter of how rigid we want to make 
the contours of the different disciplines within social sciences. I, myself, consider that the 
important consequences that individual national identification has on understanding individuals’ 
political and social attitudes and behavior (preferences regarding redistribution and self-
government, attitudes towards immigration, vote choices, etc.) make the case for studying this 
issue from a political and sociological approach, and not only from a psychological approach. 
Additionally, as will be shown in this dissertation, both the pre-conditions and the causes of 
change in individual national identification are mainly related to political and social phenomena.  
Besides this introduction, this chapter consists of five more sections. In the second section, I 
start reviewing a multi-disciplinary literature which has dealt with concepts as complex as 
ethnicity and nationality, identity and identification, and ethnic and national identity. I justify 
my focus on individuals’ identification for practical reasons: identification is a more tractable 
concept than identity. However, despite its greater intuitiveness, the concept of identification 
still presents a high level of complexity. To reduce this complexity, I distinguish between four 
different dimensions: self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity.  
In this section, I also emphasize the importance of analytically separating national from 
ethnic identification. Different reasons explain this decision. First, the two objects of 
identification, the nation and the ethnie, have a different nature, and are only rarely concurrent. 
Secondly, the possibilities of change are constrained by inheritance in the case of ethnicity, 
while such a constraint is not necessarily present in the case of nationality. Third, many of the 
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preconditions which eventually facilitate the occurrence of change in national identification 
cannot be considered preconditions for the occurrence of change in ethnic identification.  
In the third section I review different works which have previously dealt with the study of 
identity change. I also contend that researchers dealing with the study of change in national 
identification should examine separately four different kinds of changes: changes in individuals’ 
category of self-identification, changes in the meanings individuals’ attribute to their national 
identification, changes in saliency and changes in intensity.  
From here, I reflect on the conditions of change. Two types of conditions are identified: 
structural and individual. In the first case, I argue that the existence of a repertoire of nations 
with which individuals can potentially identify (i.e. multinational countries), the redefinition of 
the national boundaries due to processes of colonization (or decolonization), secession (or 
unification of countries), and wars, deep political changes, such as regime changes, or elites’ 
mobilization of collective national identity, facilitate the occurrence of change in national 
identification. Among the individual circumstances which facilitate the occurrence of changes, I 
will refer to immigration and conscription.  
Before concluding, in the fifth section, I delimit the domains of analysis of my work. My 
dissertation focuses on the study of change in the category of national identification. It examines 
such changes in a context in which there is a repertoire of nations with which individuals can 
potentially identify, and in which massive immigration makes the observance of changes in the 
category of identification more probable. My work, therefore, leaves aside the study of changes 
in the category of identification caused by redefinitions of national boundaries, as well as the 
study of change in other dimensions. 
Section five concludes.   
 
2.2 From ethnicity to national identification 
 
This section reviews a multidisciplinary literature which has tried to make sense of concepts 
such as ethnicity, identity, and ethnic and national identity. The goal of the following pages is to 
make clear where this dissertation stands in regard to this literature, and to delimit the object of 
study of this dissertation: individuals’ identification with the nation.   
 
2.2.1 Ethnicity and ethnic identity  
 
As the issue of ethnicity and the issue of ethnic identity have gained ground in comparative 
politics and international relations, the need for a better understanding and measurement of the 
concepts has become evident. Yet, the attempt to offer a definition of the two concepts has been 
confronted with two major problems: the confusion of ethnicity and ethnic identity concepts, 
and the elusive character of the identity concept. These two problems explain why scholars have 
failed to accurately link ethnicity with individuals’ subjective identity.  
Despite this failure, some advances have been made. For example, the contours of ethnicity 
have been clearly depicted in Chandra’s (2006) work.1 According to her, ethnicity is a category 
of membership into which individuals are eligible to belong on the basis of descent-based 
                                                      
1 Here, it is worth noting that Chandra’s work originally sought to disentangle what ethnic identity is. 
Nevertheless, her definition of ethnic identity, a category of membership into which individuals are 
eligible to belong on the basis of descent-based attributes, suits the concept of ethnicity better. Laitin 
(1998) and Abdelal et al. (2006) also define social identities as social categories. Making social identities 
equivalent to social categories of membership confuses the outcome of the identification process 
(identity) with the object of identification (ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion).  
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attributes such as language, origin, religion or skin color (Chandra 2006). According to this 
definition, ethnicity is an externally assigned, objective characteristic.  
Yet, while ethnicity can be placed in the objective realm, (ethnic) identity moves us towards 
the subjective realm. Two additional reasons explain the necessity to analytically separate 
ethnicity from ethnic identity. First, although every individual has an ethnicity, it is not always 
the case that individuals have an ethnic identity, at least theoretically speaking. This is so 
because the ethnic categories into which individuals are eligible for membership do not 
automatically match with the social categories individuals identify with. In other words, 
individuals’ self-image and self-understanding can be based on their gender, class or ideological 
characteristics, and not necessarily on their ethnic characteristics. This implies that even though 
individuals are very often ethnically categorized by others, they might refuse to self-identify in 
the way others categorize them. This has been extensively documented, for example, in the case 
of “black” and “dark” skin second generation Puerto Ricans who self-identify as Puerto Ricans, 
but reject being classified in the conventional white-black dichotomy in the US in order to 
escape its negative social connotations (Duany 2002; Landale and Oropesa 2002; Loveman and 
Muniz 2007; Rodríguez 1994, 2000).  
Secondly, the descent-based condition that Chandra imposes on the definition of ethnicity 
constrains the possibility that individuals’ experience identity changes.2 Following Chandra and 
Laitin’s (2002) logic, a change in individual’s ethnic identity would be restricted to those 
circumstances in which an individual changes his or her category of ethnic self-description, 
activating a different attribute of his or her repertoire of inherited ethnic attributes. For example, 
the daughter of a Peruvian mother and a French-speaking Swiss father who has been raised 
Catholic could potentially identify as Swiss, Peruvian, Spanish-speaking, French-speaking or 
Catholic. Nevertheless, this woman’s voluntary acquisition of an attribute over her life course, 
such as the conversion to Evangelism, would not qualify as an ethnic identity change according 
to Chandra and Laitin, even though her new confession would turn out to be an important part 
of her life and a key element of her self-image or self-understanding.  
At this point, Chandra and Laitins’s (2002) understanding of ethnicity enters into conflict 
with individual identity. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that while one’s learning of a 
language or one’s conversion to a different religion might not alter individuals’ ethnicity, his or 
her self-identification is most likely to be changed on account of this process. Bearing all this in 
mind, I contend that an individual’s voluntary acquisition of an ethnic attribute should qualify as 
an identity change whenever this individual identifies him or herself with this new ethnic 
attribute. 
 
2.2.2 Identification along ethnic/national lines must not be taken for granted 
 
Once we have recognized that individuals’ ethnicity should not be confused with 
individuals’ identity, then we have necessarily to state that individuals’ identification with their 
putative ethnicity needs to be proven, instead of taken for granted (Wimmer 2007). 
Nevertheless, when researchers deal with these issues, they very often forget to make this clear.  
For example, ethnic fractionalization databases (Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003) or ethnic 
group datasets, such as Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009), 
assume that individuals, on the basis of their ethnic attributes, are embedded in ethnic groups 
which are internally homogenous and externally bounded. In so doing, these studies assume that 
                                                      
2 The descent-based condition implies that individuals possess certain attributes that have been 
inherited from their parents. According to this, individuals only identify on the basis of those attributes. 
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individuals’ ethnicity and identity are strongly connected; so those individuals’ who share 
certain ethnic characteristics will mobilize for the group interest. This practice, which Brubaker 
(2002, 2009) defines as groupism, relies heavily on the idea that those individuals who possess 
certain (ethnic) attributes are members of a specific group, identify with other members and 
share similar interests with them. Nevertheless, social researchers’ tendency to classify 
individuals in groups on the basis of their characteristics can turn out to be an ill-suited practice, 
one which can cause researchers to mix up the micro-mechanisms which underlie social action.  
The assumption that ethnicity/nationality and individuals’ identity are equivalent is also a 
frequent problem in many studies of nationalism. 3 Many of these works restrict the study of 
individuals’ identity to the ethnic/national categories. In doing so, they overlook the fact that 
ethnic/national identities are not necessarily central, nor salient to all individuals, and that 
individuals might prefer to identify with other social categories (gender, class), rather than with 
ethnic or national categories.4 Certainly, the pervasive presence of banal nationalism in our 
lives, along with certain individual and contextual circumstances that I will describe in section 
2.4, make the national category of identification salient for many individuals. However, scholars 
working on these issues should be aware that even though the context can contribute to make 
particular forms of identification (ethnicity or nationality) salient, individuals can still escape 
from them.56   
 
2.2.3 Identity and identification 
 
The study of identity was introduced in the social sciences by Cooley and Mead’s work on 
symbolic interactionism, and evolved towards identity theory (Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 
1987), social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). SIT moved the study of identity from its personal to its social 
dimension. Social identities were defined as categorizations of the self which minimize the 
uniqueness character of the self and emphasize sameness with others (Brewer 1991, 476). 
Individuals come to identify with others through a process of categorization, which is at the 
bases of the emergence of groups.  
                                                      
3 Some works, such as Kuo and Margalit (2010), have avoided binding individuals’ identity to the 
limits of nationality and ethnicity. This approach is, however, quite exceptional. 
4 The distinction between salience and centrality has not always been made clear. Salience is a 
relative characteristic that requires comparability among different categories of identification. Centrality 
is an absolute characteristic which attributes self-importance to that particular identification (Stryker and 
Serpe 1994). 
5 This assertion conflicts with the commonplace belief that the nation is self-sufficient and relevant to 
all dimensions of life (Smith 1979).  
6 Here it is worth making clear that my dissertation examines change in the national identification of 
those individuals who declare they have a national identification. Therefore, it leaves aside the study of 
those individuals who, not having a national identification, come to identify themselves along national 
lines (formation of a national identity). As readers will notice, in the quantitative chapters, I have 
excluded from the analysis those individuals who do not know how to answer the identification items. I 
have assumed that these individuals are, precisely, those who do not possess a national identification or 
for whom this form of identification is not salient. Alternatively, they can also be individuals who have 
not reflected enough about their national identification and, consequently, do not have an answer for such 
a category of survey items at the ready. This would imply that for these individuals their national 
identification is neither central, nor salient. In chapter 7, I also devote a section to show that in a context 
such as Catalonia, in which the national cleavage is highly salient, and individuals’ national identification 
is politically relevant, there are still people who reject thinking about themselves in national terms. 
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Growing interest in the social component of identity explain scholars’ greater efforts in 
bounding the concept of identity.7 However, despite these efforts, the concept of individual 
identity continues to be an irreductible concept with little analytical leverage (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000; Hall 2000). Admitting this problem, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) suggest moving 
our attention from individuals’ identity to individuals’ identification.  
Identity and identification are distinct but related concepts. While identification does not 
necessarily presume identity, identity cannot be detached from identification. At this point, it 
might be useful to consider here the distinction between identifying with (affect) and identifying 
as (self-categorization) (Citrin and Sears 2009; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). Identifying with a 
group implies that the individual empathizes with the group, with its symbols, values, 
worldviews and interests. “Identification with” a group can occur without the individual 
identifying as member of a group. The contrary does hold, although very exceptionally; a 
member of a group may not identify with the group’s symbols, values or interest.   
Individuals who identify with a group can eventually come to identify as members of the 
group. This occurs, for instance, when immigrants’ assimilate into the host group. The last step 
of the assimilation process implies that immigrants do not only identify with the values, the 
worldviews or interest of natives, but that they self-categorize themselves as members of the 
host group.  
The concept of identification has two important advantages over the concept of identity: 
first, identification can be operationalized more easily.8 Secondly, it does not presuppose 
individual sameness with others (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 14). The fact that identification 
does not presuppose individuals’ sameness derives from the fact that individuals can identify 
with groups to which they might not belong on the basis of objective relevant characteristics.9 
Actually, identification can occur even in circumstances in which the degree of similarity 
between an individual and the others is minimal (Brewer 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979). This is 
so because similarity is not necessarily defined in objective but rather subjective terms. 
Ultimately, the necessary condition for identification is not sameness, but psychological 
attachment (Hyman and Singer 1968).  
Bearing all this in mind, identification is defined here as the outcome of a cognitive 
(evaluative and affective) process through which an individual subjectively attaches him or 
herself to a group, whether he or she belongs to the group or not.  
   
2.2.4 Dimensions of individuals’ group identification  
 
Roccas et al. (2008) have recently tried to unify different theoretical perspectives (social 
identity, individualism-collectivism, nationalism-patriotism and identification with 
organizations) in order to build a unifying model of identification with groups. According to 
                                                      
7 Abdelal et al. (2006) have proposed examining identity from two elements: content, which refers to 
the group’s identity meanings, and contestation, which refers to the degree of agreement within a group 
over the content of the identity. Abdelal et al (2006) refer, however, to collective, rather than individual 
identities. 
8 Identification is found at a more superficial layer of the individual, and does not require the 
introspective analysis of the self that the study of identity would require. The identity concept falls into 
Blalock’s (1990) category of concepts by postulation, that is, primitive and undefined constructs whose 
meaning can only be deductively understood. Identification can be considered as a concept by intuition.    
9 Making use of survey data from the American National Election Study, Koch (1993) has shown that 
identification with the elderly or the poor occurs even though individuals may not be elderly or their 
income exceeds that of individuals who can be objectively considered as elderly or poor. In these cases, 
moreover, individuals share preferences with the people they identify with, even if they do not share such 
characteristics with them. 
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these authors, identification consists of four elements: first, the importance individuals’ attach to 
the group, that is, how much an individual sees the group as part of his or her self-concept; 
second, the commitment an individual develops towards the group or how much he or she wants 
to benefit members of the group; third, the superiority with which an individual sees his or her 
group; and fourth, the deference an individual feels towards the symbols and leaders of the 
group.  
However, to my understanding, when speaking of different modes of identification, Roccas 
et al. (2008) are mixing up the identifying process (how much I see my group as part of who I 
am), with the consequences that derive from this identifying process (how much I want to 
benefit my group, how much I see my group as superior to others, how much I honor, revere, 
and submit to the group’s norms, symbols, and leaders), and they are leaving aside other 
dimensions of the identification process. These dimensions are: self-categorization, content, 
saliency and intensity.  
Self-categorization is the basis of individuals’ self-concept, self-image or self-understanding 
and can be considered a pre-requisite of individuals’ identification as member of a group 
(Brewer 1991; Turner et al. 1987). Yet, as stated above, here I do not assume individuals’ 
identifying as member of a group necessarily implies sameness, but rather psychological 
attachment. As Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) have noted, individuals’ self-categorization as 
member of a group needs to be affirmed by others’ identification. This, for example, affects 
immigrants’ assimilation. When immigrants’ are not recognized as members of a society, it is 
hard to believe that they will still self-categorize as members of this society. 
Content refers to the cognitive meanings an individual attributes to being a member of a 
group (Huddy 2001). These meanings are very often constrained by the collective meanings of 
the group identity: the membership criteria, the group symbols, or the values, interests and 
aspirations of the group. Although individuals might share these meanings with other members 
of the group, some degree of contestation often surrounds them (Abdelal et al. 2006). This has 
been highlighted, for example, in the work of Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001), which reflects 
differences in the collective representations of the American national identity among individuals 
of different ethnic backgrounds. 
Salience refers to the importance that an individual’s identification as a member of a group 
has in comparison to his/her identification as a member of another group. Salience involves a 
rank-ordering of individuals’ identifications (Stryker 1968; Stryker and Serpe 1994). The higher 
an identification is in this hierarchy, the greater its salience. When an identity is highly salient, it 
becomes the basis for individual behavior and, it very often informs individuals’ attitudes and/or 
stances regarding particular issues.  
The last dimension of identification, intensity, refers to the strength of individuals’ 
attachment to a category of identification (Citrin and Sears 2009). Although saliency and 
intensity are empirically related, they are analytically distinct. In this regard, we can anticipate 
here that even though individuals’ group identification can become stronger (or weaker) in 
certain moments, saliency is not necessarily affected. I will come back to this point later on 
when I examine change in these dimensions.  
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Table 2.1 Dimensions of identification 
Self-categorization Do I see myself as member of X group? 
Content What meanings do I attribute to my being member of X group? 
Salience How important is me identifying as member of X group over my identifying as member of Y group? 
Intensity How strong is my attachment to the group? 
 
As it will be made clear in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, distinguishing these dimensions makes it 
less complex to systematically study the pre-conditions and the causes of change along the 
different dimensions. 
 
2.2.5 National and ethnic identification 
 
In this section, I conceptualize the object of study of this dissertation (national 
identification), and I distinguish it from ethnic identification. However, in order to clarify what I 
understand by identification with the nation, it is necessary to first define the concept of nation.  
Nations can be defined as human populations (Smith 1991), communities (Anderson 1983) 
or groups of people (Hobsbawm 1991) made up by individuals, who share certain relevant 
characteristics, who self-categorize and self-identify as members of the nation, and who are 
categorized and identified as members of the nation by others. According to this definition, 
nations present three basic characteristics: first, nations have a collective character; second, 
nations’ existence is contingent on individuals’ voluntary self-categorization and voluntary self-
identification as members of a group (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991);10 and third, its 
constituent elements (people) share certain relevant characteristics. These relevant 
characteristics are the criteria for membership into the national group and are, very often, 
disputed.11  
All modern states have established boundaries to delimit the acquisition of nationality 
through the jus sanguinis and the jus soli rules. Nationalists (and scholars of nationalism, as 
well) very often set the limits of national membership on certain ethnic characteristics. In 
general, these rules or characteristics discriminate among individuals and determine who is 
member of a given nation and who is not. 
Certainly, the boundaries which separate ethnic and national group are blurred, and in many 
circumstances overlap. In the United States, for example, the original nationalities of first 
generation immigrants (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Irish, Italian, etc.) become ethnic categories 
which are passed on to the following generations, and eventually transform into symbolic 
ethnicities (Gans 1994). However, nationality and ethnicity are seldom concurrent, as most 
                                                      
10 Based on this perspective, a nation exists as long as an aggregate of individuals feel a particular 
nation as real. Other individuals’ recognition of a nation’s existence is not a requisite for the nation to 
exist, although this external recognition legitimizes it. 
11Here I purposely avoid resorting to the ethnic/civic dichotomy of nationalism coined by Kohn 
(1944) to define nations’ criteria of membership. This dichotomy has been criticized for being a 
problematic typological distinction for social-scientific analysis (Miley 2007). Moreover, it is difficult to 
find such distinction in practice. Nationalist discourses, for example, very often make use of a 
combination of civic and achieved traits and ethnic or ascribed traits to define national membership 
(Serrano 1998). Bonet (2011) has compared citizens’ views of the nation in 22 countries and has found 
that civic traits are at the base of collective national representations in all countries, while ethnic traits are 
the items which differentiate these representations among the different countries. 
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nations are ethnically heterogeneous (i.e., nations with indigenous populations or ethnic 
minorities) and individuals from different nations very often share ethnic attributes, such as 
language or skin color.  
However, the aforementioned characteristics are common to all social groups. Yet, nations 
present two additional characteristics which distinguish them from other social groups, in 
general, and from ethnic groups, in particular. These two characteristics are nations’ territorial 
character and their political nature (Breuilly 1982; Etherington 2010; Gellner 1983; Herb 1999; 
Hobsbawm 1991).12 These two elements, which define individuals’ cognitive attachment to the 
nation, are not present when individuals self-categorize as members of an ethnic group. Thus, 
members of ethnic groups are, on the one hand, linked to each other in the absence of a shared 
territory and, on the other hand, do not seek to achieve self-government, but most often other 
specific goals such as voting rights or affirmative action policies (Richmond 1987, 4-5).  
Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004) and Brubaker (2009) have recently argued in 
favor of an integrated approach to study race, ethnicity and nationalism. Brubaker (2009, 24) 
provides the rationality for this argument: these categories of identification can be all considered 
“idioms of cultural understanding, modes of social organization, and patterns of political 
claims-making”. Despite this, the authors have also acknowledged that these categories should 
be treated as differentiated domains in a series of dimensions (including “criteria of 
membership”), to which I will add “change”. And this is so because, as I will show below, many 
of the causes which trigger change in national identification cannot be considered causes of 
change in ethnic identification.  
In any event, for the analytical purposes of this dissertation, nations can also be defined as 
categories of identification which are intuitive to individuals, pervasive in their lives, and 
exogenous to them.13 National identification would be defined, therefore, as individuals’ 
subjective attachment to a nation.  
From a very early age, individuals learn the idea that the world is organized into a system of 
countries and that every individual is member of a specific nation (Hess and Torney 1967, 36). 
As happens with values and symbolic attitudes, parents shape their children’s national 
identification through classical conditioning. The state, through the school curricula, provides 
cognitive content to individuals’ national allegiances.14 In the early years of schooling, children 
learn to categorize themselves and others as members of different countries; they internalize 
their national affiliation and come to identify as members of a nation. Beyond this, national 
allegiances are continuously stirred up by both hot and banal expressions of nationalism that are 
channeled through the media everyday (Billig 1995). The outcome of this socialization process 
is individuals’ self-categorization as members of a nation and their identification with it.  
Now, here it is worth highlighting that individuals’ subjective self-categorization and 
identification with a nation can conflict with the state’s definition of membership. This conflict 
derives from the fact that state and national boundaries are not always concurrent. Thus, where 
the limits of the state concur with the limits of the nation, state membership and national 
identification are observationally equivalent. However, such concurrence is hardly ever 
                                                      
12 Both elements are, moreover, closely related, as nations aspire to achieve self-government for their 
territory (Barrington1997; Kaplan and Herb 1999) . 
13 Of course, as I will argue below, it is possible that, over their lives, individuals witness institutional 
changes or a redefinition of the nation’s boundaries, which, for example, result in a change in the 
meanings of the nation. Still, ordinary citizens very rarely participate in the redefinition of the nation’s 
symbols and values. Instead, elites take on a more active role in the reformulation of the nation’s 
meanings. 
14 Chapter 5 compares the influence that parents and school have on individuals’ national 
identification.  
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achieved; partly due to the fact that the processes of state-building and nation-building have 
been distinct historical processes, and partly due to the fact that state-led processes of nation-
building have very often failed (Linz 2008, b). In multinational countries, or in countries where 
the center-periphery cleavage is highly salient, state membership and national identification do 
not necessarily overlap. As a result, even though an individual is assigned a particular 
nationality in official registers (e.g., as a Canadian, Spanish or Belgian), he or she can identify 
as a member of a different nation (e.g., Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country or Flanders).  
Apart from these circumstances, state membership and national identification can come into 
conflict in circumstances of migration. For example, before 1999, second and third generation 
immigrants in Germany were denied German citizenship because the German legislation on 
citizenship was based on ethnic criteria (the jus sanguinis rule). This implied that these people, 
who were born in Germany and who very possibly identify as German, were denied 
“membership” in the German nation. In contrast, it is also possible that Pakistani or Nigerian 
immigrants, who have applied and obtained Spanish citizenship to improve their legal status and 
avoid legal problems, do not necessarily identify as Spanish.  
In these two circumstances, that is, in multinational countries and in migratory 
circumstances, state membership and national identification do not necessarily match. And this 
is so, because even though states define membership objectively, individuals’ national 
identification is placed in the sphere of the subjective. In these circumstances, national 
identification becomes, therefore, a matter of choice. 
 
2.3 Change in national identification 
 
In this section, I review of some of the literature which has dealt with the study of identity 
change. The purpose of this review, which is necessarily selective, is to illustrate that this 
literature has dealt with different dimensions of change (even though they have not explicitly 
stated it). From here, I will argue that change in national identification should be studied on four 
distinct dimensions: self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity.  
 
2.3.1 Identity change in previous research 
 
The study of identity change has been approached from different fields of study: social 
psychology, political science and sociology. In the social psychology field, social identity 
theory (SIT) associates change in group identification to group status and, in particular, to the 
perceived fairness of the group status. According to SIT, identity change takes place in two 
ways: as a change in social mobility (individuals “psychologically passing from one group to 
another”) or as a result of social change (“psychologically changing in the evaluation of group-
membership”) (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995, 260). Social mobility occurs when individuals 
who are members of a legitimate and stable low-status group, attempt to gain psychological 
entry to high-status groups. Social change, on the contrary, occurs when the group members 
consider the group to be in an illegitimate and unstable low-status position, and the group rebels 
against this situation, demanding a greater status for the group. While social mobility is 
presented as an individual change in the category of self-identification, social change can be 
considered a collective change in group meanings which occurs, precisely, because social 
mobility is not a viable option (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1986). 
Also in social psychology, identity theory adopts a conservative position regarding the 
possibilities of role identity change. Serpe (1987), for example, has contended that salient 
identities transcend situations and are, therefore, very stable. Changes in the saliency of role 
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identities would, however, be possible, but only as a result of life course changes (maternity and 
paternity, for example) (Wells and Stryker 1988). Nevertheless, identity theory has not only 
looked at changes in the salience of role identities, but also at changes in their meanings (Burke 
2006). These kinds of changes take place under two circumstances: First, when there are 
discrepancies between the meanings of the identity and the meanings of the role performance; 
and secondly, when role identities enter into conflict. Thus, Burke (2006) has shown that when 
men and women become parents they adapt their gender identities to their father and mother 
identities, so that men become more masculine and women more feminine as a result of 
parenthood. In addition, when the meanings of a woman’s gender and wife identities conflict, 
these two identities accommodate each other until discrepancy is reduced. This, for example, 
would occur when an independent woman marries and allows her husband to take the lead 
(Burke 2006, 84-85).  
Outside of the social psychology field, political scientists have come to agree that identities 
are not as stable as they were once thought to be. Actually, some representatives of the 
constructivist approach have even argued that identity change is the result of a conscious 
decision motivated by the expected benefits of the change (Chandra 2004; Eifert, Miguel, and 
Posner 2010; Kalyvas 2008; Laitin 1998). 
Laitin’s research, for example, has provided an explanation for the macro-micro-macro 
processes of change in language use among the Russian speaking populations in Estonia, Latvia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine. At the macro level, the shift would be explained by a cascade or 
tipping mechanism. At the micro level, change would be the result of a rational calculus. This 
calculus would be based on the expected economic returns that are associated with the language 
change (the expected benefits of adding a language to the child’s repertoire subtracted from the 
opportunity cost of learning it), the in-group scorn or punishment, the out-group acceptance and 
the credible threat of the titular group to drop using Russian (Laitin 1998, 56). Although Laitin 
(1998, 23) is aware that language changes do not automatically cause an identity change, he 
argues that these changes alter the ethnic options of the following generations.  
The idea that identity change is a process in which individuals redefine their ethnic 
categories of belonging is also present in Chandra and Laitin (2002) and Chandra (2004). 
Chandra’s (2004) work, for example, has shown that in patronage democracies, ethnic choice is 
contingent on the distribution of ethnic attributes in the population.15 As a result, in patronage 
democracies political parties have incentives to unify several previously dissimilar ethnic 
categories to create a broader ethnic category to increase their possibilities of becoming a 
winning electoral coalition. Chandra illustrates her argument with the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP), which, between 1984 and 1998, electorally targeted the group of “Scheduled Castes”, a 
category that joined an amalgam of 400 castes previously treated as different groups.  
From a sociological approach, Davis (1991), Lind (1995) and Schildkraut (2002) have 
examined the evolution of collective understandings of racial and national identity in America. 
In their work, change has been understood as a shift in the meanings that elites and ordinary 
citizens attribute to blackness (Davis 1991) and Americanness (Lind 1995; Schildkraut 2002). 
Yet, even if these studies have focused on the analysis of collective meanings, Muñoz (2009) 
has shown that similar kinds of changes can actually occur at the individual level. Looking at 
the evolution of the ideological, religious and regional bases of Spanishness, Muñoz (2009) has 
contended that the renewal of elites’ nationalizing discourses following Spain’s transition to 
                                                      
15 Patronage democracies are democracies in which elected representatives can distribute the state 
resources discretionally on individual bases (Chandra 2004).  
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democracy influenced the content of Spanish citizens’ national pride, causing its progressive 
secularization and de-ideologization. 
The study of identity change has also attracted the interest of immigration studies from the 
perspective of Gordon’s assimilation theory (1964). Although the classical assimilation theory 
has today been renewed (Alba and Nee 1997), and alternative theories have been proposed to 
explain the process of immigrants and second generations’ intergration into the receiving 
society  (Berry 1984; Bourhis et al. 1997; Mok, Morris, and Benet-Martínez 2007; Portes and 
Zhou 1993), the study of identity change has attracted and continues to attract scholars’ 
attention (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Sears et 
al. 2003; Waters 1990).  
Among all these studies, it might be worth referring here to two in particular: Sears et al.’s 
(2003) and Waters’ (1990). Sears and colleagues examine changes in the strength of Asian and 
Latino immigrants’ ethnic identities during their college years.16 Waters’ (1990) work looks into 
the ethnic identity options of European descendents in the United States by analyzing their self-
categorization choices in US census forms. In Waters’ work, change adopts two forms: census 
related changes and identity changes experienced by European descendents over the course of 
their lives. Changes in the US census happen when children choose, in the census form, a 
category of identification which differs from the one their parents had previously chosen for 
them. This kind of change, however, cannot be considered a real change in identification. 
Conversely, “real changes” occur when individuals highlight a new ethnic attribute that stems 
from the repertoire of attributes inherited from their grandparents attributes and/or through 
parents’ ethnic intermarriage. 
The following table classifies the aforementioned studies according to the type of identity 
they examine, the level of analysis and the dimension of change they deal with. Although the 
list of studies which have examined identity change is certainly much broader, the ones 
presented here suffice to illustrate the multiple ways in which identity change has been 
understood, and they highlights the importance of coming up with a common analytical 
framework that favors the advancement of its study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
16 However, it could be debated whether the indicators these authors use to measure the strength of 
ethnic identities is properly measuring this concept; they may also be registering the salience of ethnic 
identities. 
María José Hierro Hernández 
47 
 
Table 2.2 Review of studies regarding identity change 
Study Type of 
identity 
Level  Dimension of 
Change 
Tajfel (1974) & Tajfel and Turner (1986) Social Individual 
Laitin (1998) & Chandra (2004)  Ethnic Individual & aggregate 
Gordon (1964) Ethnic to national Individual 
Waters (1990) & Sears et al (2003) Ethnic Individual 
Self-
categorization 
Tajfel and Turner (1986) Social Collective 
Burke (2006) Role Individual 
Davis (1991), Lind (1995) & Schildkraut (2002) Racial and national Collective 
Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) Ethnic and national 
Individual & 
collective 
Muñoz (2009) National Individual 
Content 
Serpe (1987) & Wells and Stryker (1988) Role Individual Saliency 
Sears et al. (2003) Ethnic Individual Intensity 
 
2.3.2 Dimensions of change in national identification 
 
As the preceding section has shown, previous research has approached the study of identity 
change in different dimensions. Bearing this in mind, and in order to clarify the study of change 
in national identification, I contend here that researchers interested in this topic should study 
separately the changes which occur along the four dimensions of identification: self-
categorization, content, saliency, and intensity. In this section, therefore, I seek to clarify what a 
change in each of these dimensions of national identification implies.17 
  
a. Change in individuals’ category of national identification 
 
Change in individuals’ category of national identification can be understood in three 
different ways: first, as the replacement of individuals’ original category of national 
identification by a new national category; secondly, as the adding of a national category of 
identification; and third, as the rearrangement of individuals’ categories of national 
identifications.  
Although these kinds of changes have been mainly reported in circumstances of 
immigration, as I will argue in the following section, these changes can also be observed when 
other exogenous changes takes place (colonization, territories’ secession, etc). Nevertheless, for 
the time being, the examples I will use here will mainly refer to migration circumstances.  
Changes of the first type are psychologically demanding as they require that individuals 
abandon their original national identification and substitute it for a new category that they did 
not possess before (e.g., an immigrant’s loss of his original identification as Pakistani). The 
                                                      
17 The relative novelty of this and the following section explain the limited number of references in 
these pages. Although this section is inspired by the literature reviewed in previous section, the following 
section is based on my own reflections on these issues.  
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second type of change in the category of national identification is less demanding, as it only 
requires the acquisition of a new category of identification, which is added to the original one 
(e.g., the adding of an English identification to the Pakistani one).18  
Rearrangements in the category of national identification happen when individuals have two 
nations with which they can identify. At some point in time, an individual’s identification with 
one of his or her national categories can become more important than the other moment. Think, 
for example, in the case of a Peruvian-Swiss person who moves to Peru after having spent her 
childhood and part of her adulthood in Switzerland. If she stays in Peru for a period of time, her 
Peruvian identification can come to have greater importance than her Swiss identification. Or, 
on the contrary, due to the contrast she will possibly experience when interacting with other 
Peruvians, her identification as a Swiss person can become more important. 
 
b. Change in the content of individuals’ national identification 
 
Change can also occur in the content of individuals’ national identification. Such changes 
will take place when the cognitive component of individuals’ subjective attachment to the 
nation is altered. Individuals’ cognitive attachment to the nation includes: 
- Criteria of membership. These criteria can be primordial (ascendancy and origin), 
territorial (residency), or voluntary (willingness to be part of the national group) (Linz 
1985). Although collective definitions of membership constrain individuals’ definitions, 
individuals can choose one or the other criterion to give substantive content to their 
identification with the nation.  
- Symbols or anchors for identification: the nation’s territory, its symbolic and its 
historical referents (the anthem, the flag), the group collective achievements, or its 
ethnic basis (the language). 
- The values, interests or goals of the national group (i.e. defense of the nation’s 
language, self-government, self-determination, etc.).  
When the criteria of membership, the symbolic referents, or the values individuals’ attribute 
to their identification with the nation are modified, then a change in the content of individuals’ 
identification occurs. Such changes might correlate with similar changes that occur in the 
nation’s collective identity as a result of political transformations, such as regime changes.   
 
c. Change in the saliency of individuals’ national identification 
 
Building on Stryker and Serpe (1994), in section 2.2.4 I defined identity salience as a 
hierarchy of identities. The salience of national identification over other forms of identification 
is contingent on the broad context in which individuals are embedded. For example, in contexts 
where the center-periphery cleavage is present, individuals’ national identification can be a 
highly salient form of identification.  
A change in the salience of national identification occurs when, in comparison with other 
categories of identification (gender, class, religiosity), national identification gains or losses 
salience.  
 
 
 
                                                      
18 Note that the first two forms of change in the category of national identification are not constrained 
by an individual’s set of inherited categories of national identification.  
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d. Change in the intensity of individuals’ national identification 
 
Change can also occur in the strength of individuals’ feelings of attachment. These kinds of 
changes occur when the emotional component of individuals’ subjective attachment to the 
nation strengthens or weakens.  
 
Although saliency and intensity are very often confused due to their observational 
correlation, they are analytically different. Let me use an example to clarify this point. Suppose 
someone identifies herself as women and as Spanish at the same time, although this person’s 
Spanish identification is more salient than her gender identification. Due to certain 
circumstances, a change in the intensity of her national identification can occur without a 
change in the salience needing to occur, and viceversa. For example, when Spain won the World 
Cup in 2010, this person’s Spanish identification possibly became stronger. However, since her 
Spanish identification was already more salient than her identification as a woman, it can be 
assumed that there was not a change in the salience of identification.  
Now, suppose this person attends a job meeting in which she is surrounded by men. It might 
be the case that, under these circumstances, her identification as a woman becomes more salient, 
compared to her national identification. Now, imagine that she attends a meeting, in which all 
participants are men, but some are Spanish and others are Americans. In this case, as her 
national identification is more salient than her gender identification, it would be the case that 
her national identification will remain more salient than her identification as woman. In these 
two latter cases, however, the intensity of her national identification would not have changed.  
With these examples, I do not imply that saliency and intensity might be empirically related 
in many circumstances. For example, let’s take now the case of a person whose Spanish 
identification is not highly salient. When the Spanish national team won the World Cup, this 
event might have caused a change in both the salience and the intensity of this person’s national 
identification. Nevertheless, the possibility that these two dimensions of individuals’ social 
identifications are observationally related does not mean that they do not need to be 
distinguished analytically. 
 
2.4 Preconditions of change in national identification 
 
Under which circumstances do individuals’ identification with the nation change? Are these 
circumstances similar to those which produce a change in individuals’ ethnic identification? 
This section seeks to answer to this question and it identifies a number of circumstances which 
make the occurrence of change in the different dimensions of individuals’ national identification 
possible. Some of the circumstances that affect individuals’ national identification are 
exogenous to the individuals, others, on the contrary, are inherent to their lives, such as for 
example, when an individual migrates to a different country (nation) or when he or she enrolls 
in the army. As it will become evident in the following pages, most of the circumstances which 
facilitate the occurrence of a change in the category of national identification do not affect 
individuals’ ethnic identification.  
In all the circumstances which will be describe here, individuals’ identification with the 
nation becomes a matter of choice, instead of an ascriptive characteristic. These circumstances 
must be understood, nevertheless, as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the change to 
occur. These circumstances act, therefore, as “remote” causes of change. That being said, we 
have to bear in mind that individuals can either resist the pressures for change, and remain 
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attached to their old categories of identification or they can opt for change. There is nothing 
deterministic here: change is not necessarily the only possible result, nor is stability. 
 
2.4.1 Structural circumstances 
 
By structural circumstances, I refer here to circumstances or events which are exogenous to 
individuals. These structural circumstances must be seen as the ground on which change in 
national identification can occur. We can refer to four types of circumstances here: when there 
is a repertoire of nations available for individuals’ identification; when there is a change in the 
territorial boundaries of the nation or an institutional-political transformation; when events, 
such as national holidays, wars or world championship, take place.  
 
a. Changes associated with the existence of a repertoire of nations 
 
The existence of a repertoire of nations can be seen as grounds upon which  individuals can 
change their category of self-identification.  
By repertoire of nations, I mean a number of nations are available for individuals’ 
identification. In multinational contexts, in which there is a conflict between the central culture 
and the distinct populations of the peripheries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), individuals can either 
identify with the minority nation (Catalonia, Basque Country, Quebec and Flanders, for 
example) and/or with the overarching nation (Spain, Canada and Belgium). Federalism and 
political decentralization can certainly act as devices that accommodate different understandings 
of the political community and promote nested compatible national identities in democratic 
states (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Lijphart 1977; Linz 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; 
Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011).  
However, as this dissertation aims to show, political elites’ mobilization of the center-
periphery cleavage confronts the two national groups and pushes individuals to perceive these 
identities as incompatible or opposing. When this occurs individuals react giving priority to one 
identity over the other, or rearranging their dual identifications.  
 
b. Changes in the territorial boundaries of the nation and institutional-political 
transformations 
 
There are other structural changes which might facilitate the occurrence of change in 
national identification. We can think, for example, about processes of colonization, 
decolonization, the separation or unification of countries, democratization and decentralization 
processes and wars. History offers a number of examples in which changes in the territorial 
boundaries of the nation or regime changes have compelled individuals to face the dilemma of 
redefining their national allegiances, and the meanings they attribute to them. To illustrate this, I 
will briefly recount some of these cases. 
Until 1945, the inhabitants of Alsace were subject to the alternative rule of France and 
Germany. In a preeminently German-speaking area, during the decades of German annexation 
(1870-1918), the use of the French language progressively gained importance as a way of 
defying German rulers. The stamp of Nazi occupation also led the generations which witnessed 
Nazis’ atrocities to get rid of any connection with Germany (Vassberg 1993, 25-26). In addition, 
after its reintegration into France in 1918, and again after 1945, French officials rigidly imposed 
the French language in primary schools in order to promote cultural affiliation and loyalty to 
France (Boswell 2002). 
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After the First Opium War, Hong-Kong was placed under British jurisdiction, first as a 
colony and, later on, as a dependent territory. This lasted for 156 years. When China regained 
sovereignty over the island in 1997, a number of significant reforms were implemented in the 
political and institutional realms. Beyond these changes, other micro-changes, such as the 
display of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s flag in public buildings or the establishment 
of new public holidays such as PRC National Day replaced former symbolic referents. 
Even though Czechs and Slovaks shared the same state for seventy five years, they failed to 
construct a shared sense of nationhood. However, the split of the state of Czechoslovakia into 
two separate nation-states in 1993 and the redefinition of the national territorial boundaries 
might have had significant consequences for both the Czech’s and the Slovak’s national 
referents.  
The 1974 revision of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Constitution got rid of any 
referent to the “German people” and it also eliminated the constitution’s pledge to seek 
reunification (Turner 1992). This shift was part of Erich Honecker’s strategy to legitimize East 
Germany’s separate national character. Although the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to the 
territorial reunification of East and West Germany, and restrained East German nationalism, 
twenty years later, the construction of German national identity is still a work in progress. 
Victimization experiences during wars have been found to impact significantly on the 
identities of those involved in the war (Balcells 2011). Although Balcells’ (2011) work focuses 
on the analysis of the effects of ideological wars (Spanish Civil War), her argument that wars 
cause victims to reject the identity of those who have victimized them can be extrapolated to 
other conflicts. Thus, similar effects are expected to be found in the national and ethnic 
identification of the victims of wars which develop along ethnic or national lines.  
Wars can also alter the configuration of the available categories of identification. Between 
1992 and 1995, the war in the Balkans redrew the map of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia disappeared 
as a category of identification and those individuals, who had self-categorized as Yugoslavs in 
the 1991 census (Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson 1994), were forced to choose among the new 
repertoire of available categories of identification.  
Regime changes can also propitiate changes in national identification. In 1975, after 
Franco’s death, a democratization process was started in Spain. Fears of an involution in the 
democratic process forced reformers to keep some of the national symbols of Franco’s 
dictatorship. In this way, the music of the national anthem, as well as the colors of the 
dictatorship flag were maintained as symbols of the new democratic regime. Despite this, the 
new institutional framework managed to foster the emergence of new national referents. In this 
way, the constitutive elements of Spanish identification during Franco’s regime (Catholicism 
and Conservatism) became progressively less important when defining individuals’ 
identification with Spain (Muñoz 2009). 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is another example which serves to illustrate how 
exogeneous events might alter individuals’ national referents. In his seminal work, Identity in 
Formation, Latin (1998) describes how the Russian-speaking populations of the Baltic countries 
were forced to assimilate culturally in order to obtain citizenship. While some Russian speakers 
chose this option, passed exams in the vernacular language and overcame bureaucratic obstacles 
to get access to citizenship through naturalization, many others chose not to apply for 
citizenship.  
All the examples I have referred to here are examples of deep institutional transformations: 
processes of colonization and decolonization in the cases of Alsace and Hong Kong, the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, German reunification, the Balkan war and democratization and 
decentralization processes. These institutional changes have entailed either a redefinition of the 
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territorial boundaries, or the emergence/disappearance of national categories. All these changes 
have also been accompanied by a redefinition of national referents. For example, regime 
changes are very often followed by the designation of a new national anthem, the design of a 
new national flag, the adoption of new names for the streets of cities and towns, and even the 
designation of a new capital city. The history that children learn in the textbooks is also 
reformulated and some historical figures recover relevance, while other disappear or are 
publicly condemned. Although these kinds of political changes are, in most cases, elite-driven, 
they not only have consequences for the symbolic referents or meanings ordinary people 
attribute to their national allegiances, but they also alter the categories of national identification 
which are available to them.  
 
c. Changes associatedwith individuals’ participation in and witnessing of important events 
 
Events such as national holidays, the Olympic Games, a country’s victory in a world 
sporting championship, individuals’ participation in/witnessing of a war with an external 
enemy, terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes can also make people’s national identification 
change along the saliency and intensity dimensions.  
Here, we could think, for example, about the victory of the Spanish national soccer team in 
the World Cup in South Africa in 2010; a victory which led many people to go out in the streets 
hoisting the Spanish flag. Or we could think about how the rescue of miners in the San Jose 
Mine led Chileans to  chant “Chi-le” in unison, not only outside the San Jose Mine, but also in 
the Santiago’ streets. In these particular cases, individuals’ attachment to their nation may not 
only become more salient, but individuals’ feelings of attachment may also intensify. 
Although our national allegiances are continuously stirred up by banal expressions of 
nationalism (Billig 1995), events as those mentioned above can foster hot expressions of 
nationalism.  Political and cultural entrepreneurship can take advantage of these events to 
encourage individuals’ identification with the nation. Under these circumstances, individuals’ 
feelings or attachment can intensify. However, expressions of fierce nationalism do not 
necessarily intensify individuals’ attachment to the nation. On the contrary, in multinational 
contexts, hot expressions of nationalism by the titular nation’s elites can also lessen the feelings 
of attachment with the overarching nation on the part of citizens in the periphery.  
 
2.4.2 Individual circumstances 
 
Aside from the structural circumstances described above, there are other circumstances 
which are endogenous to individuals’ lives and which can also favor the occurrence of changes 
in national identification.  
 
a. Migration 
 
Migration places individuals before the strain of assimilating or remaining loyal to their 
original national identification. When individuals migrate they bring with them their original 
national identification. Exposure to and experience of a new culture can lead them to develop 
feelings of attachment to the host country and, as a consequence, develop a new national 
identification. The result of this process is very often the emergence of some form of bicultural 
identity (Chen, Benet-Martínez, and Bond 2008; Mok, Morris, and Benet-Martínez 2007). The 
maintenance of links of attachment to the original nation is very often facilitated when migrants 
are involved in some form of circular migration or sojourning.  
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Migration, however, does not only cause individuals to change their category of national 
identification. Interaction with individuals from other nationalities can also cause an 
individual’s national identification to become more salient. The effect of interacting with 
persons of other nationalities not only affects immigrants, but natives as well. 19  Actually, the 
presence of immigrants can have consequences not only on the salience of natives’ national 
identification, but also on the content of their national identification (membership criteria) and 
the intensity of their national feelings. In the context of immigration, far right political 
entrepreneurs very often resort to nationalist discourses, which try to spread the idea that the 
nation is being threatened by the increasing presence of immigrants. These discourses can also 
cause native’s national identification to intensify.  
 
b. Conscription and army enrolment 
 
The indoctrination and ideological training to which individuals are exposed in the army can 
also strengthen or weaken individuals’ identification with the nation. Of course, it can be argued 
that, where the military service is not compulsory, those individuals who enroll in the army 
already possess strong links with the nation. Nevertheless, even in these cases, it is still possible 
that enrollment strengthens these individuals’ national identification (Peisakhin and Pinto 2009) 
or that it affects it in the opposite direction. In other words, those individuals who have gone 
through the harshness of army indoctrination can develop feelings of rejection of the army and 
of the idea of nation that the army seeks to instill in its members. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the different types of changes I have referred to in this section. It 
details the circumstances and the causes which make the occurrence of changes in individual 
national identification possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
19 I am grateful to Verónica Benet-Martínez for calling my attention to this point.  
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Table 2.3 An analytical framework for studying change in national identification 
Type of Change Ground for change or  pre-condition 
Causes 
Immigration Interaction with individuals’ from other nationalities 
Colonization / Decolonization  
Unification   / Separation of 
countries & Wars  
Emergence or disappearance 
of the available categories 
for national identification  Category of self-identification  (replacement of an old category with 
a new one)  
(adding a new category)  
(rearrangement of categories) Multinational states  
Mobilization of the center-
periphery cleavage  
 
 
Decentralization processes 
 
 
Regime Change  
Transformation of national 
symbols &  
nationalizing discourses 
Content 
(meanings individuals’ attribute to 
the nation) Colonization / Decolonization 
Unification   / Separation of 
countries & Wars 
Emergence or disappearance 
of the available categories 
for national identification  
 
Transformation of national 
symbols &  
nationalizing discourses 
Immigration  Interaction with individuals’ from other nationalities 
War 
Terrorist Attacks 
Catastrophes 
International sporting 
championships 
Mobilization of collective 
national identities 
Salience  
(relevance of this national 
identification vis à vis other kinds of 
identification)  
 
&  
 
Intensity 
(strengthening or weakening of 
individuals’ feelings of attachment)  
Conscription or army enrolment Mobilization of collective national identities 
 
Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning that the preconditions which have 
been examined in previous chapter are expected to facilitate both the occurrence of changes in 
individuals’ lives, but also intergenerational changes. We know that a particular event 
(processes of colonization, decolonization, the separation or unification of countries, 
democratization and decentralization processes, wars, terrorist attacks, etc)  will have a greater 
impact if experienced when an individual is a child or young adult, than if experienced when he 
or she is a mature adult. Differences in socialization experiences will, therefore, explain the 
variability in national identification (category, content, saliency, and meaning) of the different 
generations.   
For example, after the transition to democracy in Spain, the use of the Spanish flag was 
limited to official acts, and it was only raised on official buildings. The fact that the flag colors 
had been inherited from the dictatorship meant that those generations which had directly or 
indirectly experienced the dictatorship’s repression saw it as a symbol of the old regime. In 
recent times, José María Aznar’s government strove to promote its use and proposed a monthly 
tribute to the Spanish flag. Only Popular Party sympathizers supported this proposition. 
However, after the Spanish national team’s victory in the 2010 World Cup, many young people 
went out on the streets hoisting the Spanish flag, and many flags were hung in the windows and 
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over the balconies of people’s apartments. This may mean that the younger generations have 
gotten rid of the old connotations that the Spanish flag had, and have redefined its meaning. 
2.5 How does my dissertation fit in this framework of analysis? 
 
Although the object of study of my dissertation was already delimited in the introductory 
chapter; it might be worth recalling here this dissertation’s scope, so the reader can understand 
how my dissertation fits in the comparative framework which has been developed in this 
chapter. 
This dissertation is restricted to the study of individual change in the category of national 
identification and, in particular: the replacement of an old category with a new one, the adding 
(or disappearance) of a category of identification, and the rearrangement of categories. In order 
to avoid confusion, I would like to make clear that, unless I specify the contrary, from now on, 
when I refer to change in national identification I am specifically referring to a change that 
occurs in the category of national identification (in any of these forms).  
The dissertation’s focus on the Catalan case is not incidental. As argued in the introductory 
chapter, Catalonia is a suitable setting for the observation of change in the category of national 
identification. First, it is a place in which there is a repertoire of nations competing for 
individuals’ identification (Spain and Catalonia). Second, it is a place with a high presence of 
immigrants (arrived from other regions of Spain) for which the Spanish and Catalan identities 
are relevant categories of identification. Precisely because of this, I exclude from my study 
those individuals for whom Spain and Catalonia are not the only relevant categories of 
identification (immigrants from outside of Spain). In other words, I focus only on individuals 
born in Catalonia or other regions of Spain and of Spanish or Catalan parents. Third, Catalonia 
has experienced over the last thirty five years a decentralization process, which has fostered 
Catalan identification vis à vis Spanish identification (Martínez-Herrera 2009).20 Any of these 
circumstances could separately make the occurrence of changes in national identification 
possible, so their combination is expected to increase the chances of observing such changes.  
This chapter has paid special attention to the preconditions for change in national 
identification. It has, however, left open the immediate causes of change. Bearing this in mind, 
the following chapters will try to unravel what causes individuals to change their category of 
national identification, and shed light on the mechanisms which explain change. In this regard, 
the dissertation will argue that political elites’ definitions of membership, on the one hand, and 
their mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage, on the other, is behind both individual and 
aggregate changes in national identification.   
Although the main interest of this dissertation is the study of the change that occurs in the 
category of identification over an individual’s life, I will also examine inter-generational 
changes. The study of inter-generational changes will also lead me to investigate the formation 
of individuals’ national identification in chapter five.21  
Generally speaking, the following chapters can be seen as an exercise in which I go in-depth 
into the analysis of changes in the individual category of identification, and in which I seek to 
study the consequences of political elites’ mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage.  
 
                                                      
20 As I have already mentioned the transition to democracy also triggered the occurrence of changes 
in the constitutive elements of Spanish national identity (see Muñoz 2009).   
21 Here, it is worth highlighting that the formation of individuals’ national identification is a different 
process than that of change in national identification. In order for change to occur, it is a prerequisite that 
individuals’ national identification has been first shaped and crystallized.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this study, I have set up a framework to study change in national identification and I have 
built my research on the insights and recent developments of different areas of research. I have 
shifted the focus from identity to identification and, more specifically, from collective identities 
to individuals’ identification.  
National identification has been defined as the cognitive and emotional attachment which 
links individuals subjectively to a nation, and I have distinguished the dimensions of 
identification (self-categorization, content, saliency and intensity) along which change can 
occur. From that starting point, I have looked into the circumstances under which national 
identification is susceptible to change. Finally, I have explained how my dissertation fits into 
this analytical framework. 
Three additional points should be raised before concluding. First, we have to be aware that 
not all changes in individuals’ national identification are politically or socially consequential. 
However, some of them are. Thus, for example, the changes that occur in the category of 
identification after individuals migrate facilitate assimilation in other realms. Changes in the 
category of identification are also important in multinational contexts where the individuals’ 
national identification informs their preferences for self-government, self-determination and 
their voting choices. In this regard, research dealing with the study of change in national 
identification in its different dimensions should specify whether for the particular case being 
examined change is political or socially relevant, and in which regard.  
Secondly, an issue which has not appeared in the previous pages, and which is worth 
mentioning here is the durability of the changes. We can imagine that changes in the saliency or 
intensity of national identification are temporary changes, while changes in the category of self-
identification and content are more permanent. Besides durability, another aspect worth 
examining is the feasibility of these kinds of changes. Huddy (2001), for example, has 
suggested it is much easier to modify the salience of feminist identity than change the collective 
meanings of the feminist identity. This is, undoubtedly, an issue which also deserves the 
attention of researchers interested in the study of individual change in national identification.  
Finally, the lack of data for tracking individuals’ national identification diachronically very 
often hinders the study of individual change in national identification. This lack of data is a 
challenge which forces researcher to be imaginative regarding the use of different 
methodologies, and regarding the use of valid and reliable indicators which measure change 
over the different dimensions of identification. 
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CHAPTER 3. TRACKING THE EVOLUTION OF AGGREGATE 
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN CATALONIA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This first empirical chapter tracks the evolution of identification with Spain and Catalonia over the 
past thirty years. This is a question which has recently drawn significant attention from case studies 
(Argelaguet 2006) and comparative studies (Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005). Some of these studies have 
focused on the analysis of the aggregate level (Argelaguet 2006; Martínez-Herrera 2005). Other 
studies, in turn, have moved down to the individual level to explain the mechanisms which underlie 
these aggregate changes (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 
2008a). Most of these studies recognize that levels of identification with Spain have decreased 
substantially in the past thirty years (Argelaguet 2006, 434; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 435-36). This 
decrease could be attributed to the identificational assimilation of part of the immigrant population 
(Solé 1981a) to the process of political decentralization (Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 
2002, 2005, 2009), to the introduction of Catalan as the language of instruction in schools (Aspachs-
Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a), or, more generally, to the 
language policies carried out by Catalan elites (Argelaguet 2006; Miley 2006).  
However, before moving to the study of the causes that account for observed macro 
transformations, here I contend that it is necessary to carry out an in-depth diagnostic of the 
phenomenon under consideration. In order to do this, I examine first, the evolution of national 
identification; second, the magnitude of the changes; third, the trend pattern; and finally, the 
generational or periodic character of the changes. Ultimately, if we want to have a clear picture of the 
phenomenon, three different questions must be answered: How important are the changes that have 
occurred in national identification over the past thirty years? Are the changes in the percent of persons 
who identify with Spain and/or Catalonia affecting the mean tendency? How much of the overall 
change is due to population changes and how much is due to individuals’ transformation of their 
national identification?  
Although these seem to be quite basic questions, previous studies have examined them very 
superficially. These studies have been merely based on depicting the evolution of national 
identification, and they have not conducted any statistical analysis which helps us to solve the 
questions posed above. Thus, even though Martínez-Herrera (2002) and Argelaguet (2006) have traced 
the evolution of national identification with Spain and Catalonia, the question regarding the magnitude 
of the change or the trend pattern remains unanswered. In addition, although Martínez-Herrera (2002, 
433) and Aspasch-Bracons et al (2008b; 2008a) have referred to the occurrence of inter and intra 
generational changes in national identification, we do not yet know how much of the overall change is 
due to each kind of change. Therefore, even though we have an explanation which accounts for 
changes between and within cohorts in national identification (differential exposure to Catalan in 
school as a result of the implementation of the 1983 Law of Language Normalization), we do not know 
the magnitude of these changes.  
This chapter, therefore, seeks to solve this need for an in-depth descriptive analysis of the evolution 
of national identification in Catalonia. The chapter draws on cross-sectional data produced by the 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS, Center of Sociological Research), covering the period 
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between 1984 and 2010. The implementation of trend analyses, cohort analyses and decomposition 
analyses will help me to answer the questions posed above, and to account for the decrease in the levels 
of primarily Spanish identification that previous works have reported.  
After presenting the data, the following section shows the evolution of national identification in 
Catalonia and it provides a measure of the magnitude its change. Then, a comparison of the trends 
among different origin groups is carried out. Here we expect that the evolution of the identification 
mean for the group of individuals who were born in Catalonia and whose parents were also born in 
Catalonia will be different from the evolution of the national identification mean for the children of 
mixed couples, second generations and immigrants. After analyzing the different groups’ trends, a 
decomposition of the aggregate trend regarding primarily Spanish identification is carried out 
separately for the whole population, for the immigrant and native groups.  
 
3.2 Data and variables 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of the dissertation, individuals’ national identification 
will be measured by means of a bi-directional indicator which, as described, has the following values: 
1 when individuals feel “only Spanish”, 2 when individuals feel “more Spanish than Catalan”, 3 when 
individuals feel “as Spanish as Catalan”, 4 “when individuals feel ‘more Catalan than Spanish”, and 5 
when individuals feel “only Catalan”. In some of the descriptive analysis, the side categories will be 
merged, and the resulting variable will take the following values: 1 when individuals feel primarily 
Spanish, 2 when individuals feel “as Spanish as Catalan’ or dual identification, and 3 when individuals 
feel primarily Catalan.  
Although data on individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia, measured by this bi-
directional indicator, is abundant and other survey house1 have been generating series based on this 
indicator for a long time, the CIS data is possibly the most appropriate when three different aspects are 
consider together: first and foremost, the length of the span of time covered by the CIS data, secondly, 
the size of the samples and third, the greater information which is provided in the CIS surveys.  
CIS’ series on individuals’ national identification are left truncated in 1984. This means that we 
lack information on what happened with individuals’ national identification in the aftermath of 
Franco’s death. Before that date, a number of nationwide surveys conducted between 1976 and 1982 
asked respondents about national identification, then referred to as the ‘regional consciousness’ 
question. 2 Despite this, only two surveys conducted by DATA S.A in 1979 and 1982 included the bi-
directional item asking about individuals’ national identification in Catalonia. 3   
Yet, if we compare the distribution of frequencies for the national identification item coming from 
these two surveys (1979 and 1982) and from the first two surveys of the CIS series (1984 and 1985), 
we can observe a significant decrease in the percent of individuals who identify as ‘primarily Spanish’, 
that is, as “only Spanish” or ‘more Spanish than Catalan’ (see Table 3.1). This decrease can be due 
                                                      
1 The Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS, Institute of Social and Political Science) and the Centre 
d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO, Center of Public Opinion Studies) have data on identification with Spain and Catalonia 
from 1992 and 2006, respectively. The ICPS data is collected yearly and the CEO is collected on monthly bases 
from 2006 on.  
2 See Salustiano del Campo et al (1976), Jiménez Blanco et al (1977), and López-Aranguren (1983). The 
surveys on which these studies rely were carried out by ICSA-Gallup, DATA S.A. and ALEF Gabinete de 
Estudios Económicos y Sociales, S.A. The questionnaire designed by Salustiano del Campo included a first item 
asking respondents ‘Which part of Spain are you from?’, and a second item asking, ‘within your region, to what 
are you more attached: the village, the province or the region?’ The surveys coordinated by Jiménez Blanco in 
1976 and 1977 also included a question which sought to get spontaneous answers to the question, ‘where are you 
from?’ None of these surveys included the bi-directional indicator which will be traced in this chapter. 
3 See note 28 in Chapter 1. 
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either to an actual decrease in the percent of individuals who self-identified as ‘primarily Spanish’ at 
that time, to the occurrence of house effects, or it could be the result of these two joint effects.4 This 
identification problem is found as well when we compare the data from the CIS and the ICPS (see 
Figures A.3.1 to A.3.4 in the appendix). The small differences we find in the distribution of frequencies 
of the national identification indicator in these two datasets could be either attributed to actual changes 
in individuals’ identification or to house effects.5 Due to this identification problem, I will restrict the 
analyses to the data coming from the CIS, and I will avoid the compilation of data coming from 
different sources.  
 
Table 3.1 Distribution of frequencies in National Identification (%) 
Comparison of DATA and CIS data  
 1979 1982 1984 1986 
Only Spanish 31.30 23.10 10.08 11.80 
More Spanish than Catalan 6.70 8.70 7.72 8.28 
As Spanish as Catalan 35.40 41.20 45.48 49.95 
More Catalan than Spanish 11.70 11.70 27.41 19.24 
Only Catalan 14.90 9.30 9.31 10.73 
N 1079 1176 2274 2399 
Source: DATA 1979, 1982 (Shabad 1986) and CIS study # 1412 (1984) and 1527 (1985) 
 
Table A.3.1 presents the CIS surveys which include information on the main variables of interest: 
respondents’ national identification, respondents’ and their parents’ place of birth, and respondents’ 
knowledge of Catalan. Information on other variables and on other questions of interest (sample size, 
month of fieldwork…) is also provided in Table 3.1.6   
Most of the analysis conducted in this chapter will distinguish between four groups of individuals, 
who are defined according to their parents’ and their own place of birth.7 These groups are 
‘autochthonous’, individuals who were born in Catalonia and are descendants of parents who were also 
born in Catalonia; ‘mixed’, individuals who are children of mixed couples, that is, those individuals 
                                                      
4 House effects are systematic effects which can be attributed to the differences in question wording, the 
sampling or the treatment of non-response between the different survey organizations.   
5 Here it should be noted that when the CIS and the ICPS surveyed the Catalan population in the same year, 
fieldwork was not necessarily carried out in the same month. Differences in the dates of fieldwork could account, 
therefore, for the small differences in the distribution of frequencies. Yet, the ICPS presents an additional 
problem related to the mode of survey administration. Between 2003 and 2004, surveys were not conducted by 
personal interviews, but by telephone interviews. The CEO also used telephone interviews to collect data on 
individuals’ national identification. Differences in the mode of questionnaire administration among the CIS, ICPS 
and CEO surveys advise against the compilation of data coming from these three sources of data.  
6 When more than one survey with information on these three variables was available for one year, I have 
selected the first survey implemented that year. In 1984, study number ‘1412’ which includes information on the 
individuals’ and their parents’ origin, as well as identification with Catalonia, does not include the age variable, 
so for those analyses in which national identification is only examined as a function of age, birth cohort or time, 
study number ‘1403’ will be used instead. Although data on the distribution of respondents’ national 
identification is available for 1985, the data matrix does not exist for that year and, therefore, it will not be used 
in the empirical analyses. For 1986, the study number with information on individuals’ national identification 
only includes an item on the individuals’ origin, but not on his or her parents’ origin. The first survey which 
includes information on all the relevant variables is the 1988 survey, as the 1987 survey does not include children 
of mixed couples. Information on the respondents’ and their parents’ origin is lacking for 2003 and 2008. 
Information on individuals’ national identification is unavailable for 1989, 1990, 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2004. In 
those years, no CIS survey included the national identification indicator. 
7 There are two residual categories: those individuals born outside of Catalonia that currently live in 
Catalonia and whose parents were born in Catalonia will be considered “autochthonous”. Those individuals who 
were born outside of Catalonia but who have one parent born in Catalonia and one in another part of Spain will 
be included in the “mixed” category.   
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who were born in Catalonia, with one of the parents born in Catalonia and the other born in other parts 
of Spain; ‘second generation’, individuals who were born in Catalonia and whose parents were born 
outside of Catalonia; and ‘immigrants’, individuals who were born in other regions of Spain and whose 
parents were also born in other regions of Spain.8  
Restricting the analyses to the data from the CIS does not free me from comparability problems. As 
the notes in Table 3.1 indicate, over the whole period there have been four different wordings for this 
question. Some of the question wordings make reference to individuals’ feelings, while others do not. 
Nevertheless, the answer categories have remained the same, which guarantees the equivalence of the 
item from survey to survey.9 Taking into account these caveats, I will avoid using the comparison 
between two points in time to make claims on social trends, or on the movement of society in one 
direction or the other (Firebaugh 1997, 12).  
Before concluding this section, I would like to call attention to a problem which can potentially 
affect variation in the levels of national identification. This problem is sample composition. If 
fluctuations in the levels of identification with Spain and Catalonia are due to fluctuations in the 
percent of immigrants in the sample, for example, then the observed changes in the levels of national 
identification could be actually reporting sample changes, instead of real changes in individuals’ 
identification. Table 3.3 shows the imbalances in the number of immigrants in the population and in 
the CIS’ samples. These imbalances are greater than the sample error in the 1987, 1988, 1991 to 1996 
and 1999 samples.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
8 I have excluded from my analysis those individuals who were born outside of Spain or whose parents were 
born outside of Spain. As I argued in chapter 1, Catalonia and Spain might not be their nations of reference, and 
therefore their answers to this question may be randomly chosen. In fact, among these group of respondents, the 
levels of don’t know or no answer are significantly high. 
9 The sampling design has also changed over time, so the first surveys of the series used socio-economic 
strata for generating the quota sampling. Nevertheless, the sampling has been always conducted in a multistage 
and stratified process.  
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Table 3.2 Comparison of data in the Population and in the CIS Samples  
 Population Sample Sample Error 
Differences 
between 
population 
& sample 
1984 33.82 † 33.98 ±2.2 -0.16 
1986 32.92 40.23 ±5.00 -7.31* 
1987 32.54 † 38.61 ±1.86 -6.07* 
1988 32.17 † 36.91 ±1,86 -4.74* 
1991 31.04 33.73 ±2.00 -2.69* 
1992 30.77 † 37.11 ±2.01 -6.34* 
1993 30.49 † 39.65 ±1.70 -9.16* 
1995 29.94 † 35.88 ±2.44 -5.94* 
1996 29.67 33.89 ±3.65 4.22* 
1998 29.10 31.55 ±3.15 2.45 
1999 28.69 33.18 ±2.70 4.49* 
2001 28.36 30.18 ±1.89 1.82 
2002 27.98 28.06 ±2.97 0.08 
2005 26.36 26.09 ±0.98 -0.27 
2006 25.92 25.67 ±2.58 -0.25 
2007 25.46 26.38 ±4.00 0.92 
2009 24.49 28.11 (n.a.) 3.62 
2010 24.01 24.28 ±1.80 0.27 
Sources: For the population data in Catalonia, INE Census Data (1981, 1991) & 
Municipal Registers (1986, 1996-2010). For the sample data, CIS. Foreign 
residents have been included from the calculus.  
†Imputed: figures have been interpolated making use of the INE data (1981, 
1986, 1991) 
*Differences between the population and the sample are greater than the sample 
error  
(n.a.) non available 
 
This, however, should not be a problem if these differences did not affect variation in the levels of 
national identification. In order to test for this, I look at the correlation between the changes in the 
levels of identification and the changes in the percent of immigrants. Table 3.4 reports these 
correlations. Correlation is significant for changes in the percent of immigrants and changes in the 
percent of respondents who self identify as primarily Catalan or as”more Catalan than Spanish” 
between surveys. This result has important implications: It means that the ups and downs in these 
categories are explained to an important extent by sampling effects. So, in order to correct for this bias, 
the analyses in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3 have been weighted by the percent of immigrants in the 
population. 
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Table 3.3 Correlation of changes in percent of immigrants between surveys & changes in levels of 
identification 
 Differences in the percent of 
 Primarily 
Spanish 
As 
Spanish as 
Catalan 
Primarily 
Catalan 
Only 
Spanish 
More 
Spanish 
than 
Catalan 
More 
Catalan 
than 
Spanish 
Only 
Catalan 
Differences 
in % of 
immigrants 
.081 .297 -.600* .220 -.212 -.549* -.015 
Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). Data from CIS(2543) and CIS(2734) has been excluded 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
3.3 Disentangling aggregate change in the national identification over time 
 
In this section, three kind of descriptive analyses will be carried out: a first analysis in which I 
depict the evolution of aggregate changes and measure the magnitude of the aggregate change occurred 
between survey-years; a second analysis of the group differences in the mean trends; and a third 
analysis in which I separate intra-cohort from inter-cohort changes.  
 
3.3.1 Depicting the evolution of aggregate change 
 
I start this section by tracking the evolution of national identification over time. Figure 3.1 depicts 
national identification with Catalonia and Spain after weighting by the levels of immigrants in the 
population.10 The figure shows that identification with Spain and Catalonia fluctuates significantly over 
time. Over the whole period, those who choose the “as Spanish as Catalan” identification are always 
the highest percentage. The group of those who state they are “more Catalan than Spanish” is the 
second largest group. The percentage which chooses the “only Spanish” category has usually remained 
below the percentage of those who feel “only Catalan”, although the two percentages are about the 
same in 1987, 1995, 1996 and 1998. Between 1984 and 1987, and since 1991 on, the changes observed 
in the ‘as Spanish as Catalan’ category seem to correlate inversely with the changes observed in the 
“more Catalan than Spanish” category.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
10 This depiction excludes those respondents who were born outside Spain or whose parents were born 
outside Spain (see note 8). As information on the respondents’ origin was not available in 2003 or in 2008 and, 
therefore, national identification frequencies could not be weighted by the percent of immigrants in the 
population, we have not included these years in the analyses. Differences in the depiction of national 
identification evolution with Martínez-Herrera (2002, 2005) and Argelaguet (2006) can be explained by our 
different treatment of the data. As I have just mentioned, I exclude those individuals who were born outside Spain 
or whose parents were born outside of Spain. I have also weighted the data by the differences in the percentage of 
immigrants in the population and in the CIS samples. In addition, for methodological reasons, I have avoided 
both the compilation of data coming from different sources and imputations of the dependent variable.  
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Figure 3.1 Evolution of National Identification (%) 
 
Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1527), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), 
CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852) 
 
In Figure 3.2, I have merged the side categories to summarize the results presented in Figure 3.1. 
This figure shows a smooth trend of decrease in the percentage of individuals who primarily identify 
with Spain. This trend, however, is not linear, nor monotonic. Thus, periods in which the percentage of 
individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish increases alternate with periods in which this 
percentage decreases. In 1987, 2001 and between 1991 and 1998, the percentage of primarily Spanish 
identifiers is around 20 percent. In the rest of the period, levels are below that figure.  
 
Figure 3.2 Evolution of National Identification (side categories merged) (%) 
 
Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1527), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), 
CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852) 
 
Changes in the percent of dual identifiers and primarily Catalan identifiers are trendless. Changes 
in these two categories of identification seem to be inversely related. The correlation between the 
differences in the percent of dual identifiers and the differences in the percent of primarily Catalan 
identifiers between one survey and the previous one is -.64. This coefficient of correlation seems to 
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suggest that the causes which explain the increase and the decrease in the levels of dual identifiers and 
in the levels of primarily Catalan identifiers between one year and the following year are very similar, 
if not the same.   
I am also interested in learning about the magnitude of these changes. Figure 3.3 shows the 
differences (increase or decrease) in the levels of primarily Spanish identification, dual identification 
and primarily Catalan identification between one survey and the previous one. The figure shows that 
the magnitude of the changes in the primarily Spanish and primarily Catalan categories is below ±5 
percent, in the first case, or around ±5 percent, in the second case. Despite this, the primarily Catalan 
category declines 15 percent between 2009 and 2010. Changes are more important in the category of 
dual identifiers. Between 1984 and 1987 and between 1999 and 2001, the percent of dual identifiers 
decreases by 9 and 7 points, respectively. However, dual identifiers increase again between 1988 and 
1991 (10%) and between 1998 and 1999 (7%).  
 
Figure 3.3 Magnitude of the changes in national identification between surveys 
 
Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), CIS(2374), CIS(2410), 
CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852) 
 
In any case, the magnitude of change is a relative question. How much change has to occur to 
consider a change as significant? We could consider a change as significant if it is above or below the 
mean plus or minus a standard deviation (see table 3.4). 
  
Table 3.4 Mean and Standard Deviation of the between-year change in the level of identification 
 Mean Std. 
Dev 
Mean + 
 Std.Dev. 
Mean –
Std.Dev 
Differences in the %  of 
Primarily Spanish -.186 3.163 2.977 -3.349 
Differences in the % of Dual -.107 5.662 5.555 -5.769 
Differences in the %   of 
Primarily Catalan -.859 5.276 4.417 -6.135 
Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). As data from CIS #2543 (2003) and CIS # 2734 (2008) did not include 
information on individuals and their parents’ origin, these two datasets have been excluded from the analysis. 
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Based on this, the changes occurred in the percentage of primarily Spanish identification between 
1987 and 1991, between 1998 and 1999, and 2007 and 2009 are statistically significant. The changes 
occurred between 1984 and 1987, between 1988 and 1991, and between 1998 and 2001 in the 
percentage of individuals who feel ‘as Spanish as Catalan’ can also be considered significant. Finally, 
regarding the percentage of individuals who feel primarily Catalan, it can be said that change was 
significant between 1995 and 1996, between 1999 and 2001 and between 2009 and 2010. The years in 
which a lower level of change took place were 1993, 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless, in spite of those 
years of stability and, in view of what we have just said, it can be stated that notable fluctuations have 
occurred over the last twenty six years, and that some of these fluctuations can be considered 
significant.  
 
3.3.2 Evolution in mean national identification over time. 
 
As the previous section has shown, over the twenty six years the CIS data covers, short-term 
changes have occurred in the levels of national identification. The question which this section tries to 
answer is whether these fluctuations have also affected mean national identification. Figure 3.4 below 
plots the evolution of the mean national identification for the whole population and, separately, for the 
autochthonous, the children of mixed couples, the second generations and the immigrants. 
At first glance, we can see that there are significant differences in the mean for each of these 
groups. However, beyond these differences between the groups’ means, there seem to be slight 
differences in the slope of the trend between the groups.  
 
Figure 3.4 Evolution of national identification (means by origin group) 
 
Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), CIS(2374), 
CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852) 
 
In order to know whether these slight differences in the trend in the slope of these four groups’ are 
significant, I estimate four different models. The first model regresses national identification over time 
to test whether the evolution of the national identification mean is a function of time. In the three other 
models, I include an interaction between the year variable and each of the groups (children of mixed 
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couples, second generations and immigrants) (Firebaugh 1997). The basis of the comparison will be 
those individuals who were born in Catalonia, and whose parents were also born in Catalonia11:  
 
E(NIit) = β0 + β1Yearit +δ0Group + δ1[Group*Year] it        (equation 3.1) 
 
where: i= 1, 2, 3, ….., It, and t=0, 1, 2,…..,25 
 
In the equation 3.1, E(NI) is the expected value of national identification, NIit refers to the national 
identification of individual ith in the tth survey, and It refers to the sample size of the tth survey.12  
Table 3.5 presents the results of these analyses. I have rescaled the year variable, so the year 
coefficient values can be interpreted directly. Thus, year 1984 will take a value of 0 and year 2010 will 
take a value of 26. In this way, β0 can be interpreted as the national identification mean in 1984.13 In 
Model (1), β1 is not statistically significant. This means that the expected value of the national 
identification does not change as a function of the year. Yet, the observed stability in the aggregate 
trend can be hiding some change in the mean of the different origin groups. In order to test this, we can 
now look at models 2 to 4. In Model (2), β0 is the mean value of the autochthonous group in 1984 
(3.821). β1 refers to the slope (the year trend) of the autochthonous group, and the positive sign of this 
coefficient reflects an upward trend in the mean. However, the small magnitude of the coefficient 
indicates that the magnitude of the slope is also very small. Despite this, taking into account that the 
higher values of our indicator reflect a more Catalan oriented identification, we can say that the 
autochthonous group has on average felt slightly more Catalan as time goes by.  
β0 - δ0 is the mean national identification for the children of mixed couples in 1984. The mean 
value of this group is lower than in the autochthonous group (3.501). δ0 + δ1Yearit determine whether 
the trend in the children of mixed couples’ national identification mean is significantly different from 
the native group. However, in order to know whether this interactive effect is significant or not, we 
have to calculate the coefficient and the standard error of this effect. The information on the 
significance of the interaction is presented in the first column of Table 3.6. The results indicate that the 
trend for the children of mixed couples is not statistically significant, and that therefore the mean trend 
is not a function of time. 
The comparison of the second generation and autochthonous groups provides different results. In 
1984, the mean value in the second generation group (3.172) was significantly lower than the mean 
value in the autochthonous group (3.821). I have also calculated the marginal effect and the standard 
error of the interaction to test whether the second generation group has a different trend than the 
autochthonous. The results presented in Table 3.6 confirm that the trend for the second generations is 
significantly different than the trend for the autochthonous. Additionally, as δ0 and δ1 are both non-zero 
and have opposed signs, we can say that the trends for the autochthonous and the second generation 
groups’ means diverge. 
 
                                                      
11 As in this section, I am interested in estimating the mean; the analyses performed here treat the dependent 
variable as a continuous variable. Although mean values for ordinal/nominal variables are not directly 
interpretable, they convey an idea of the distribution of the variable over time. In the next chapter, I will carry out 
a similar analysis in which I treat this indicator as a nominal variable.  
12 I would like to make clear here that the models presented in Table 3.5 are not explanatory models of 
individual national identification. The goal of these analyses is to provide the reader with an idea of the trend in 
mean national identification for the groups of different origin. This explains why the R2 in these models is so low.  
13 In this section, I assume that the relationship between time and identity is linear. The depiction of the 
groups’ means in Figure 3.4., as well as a dummy analysis of the year indicates that this assumption does not hold 
for all the years. However, since here I am more interested in the analysis of the trend and the comparison of the 
groups’ trends, I have opted for imposing a linearity constraint to make the group comparison possible.    
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Table 3.5 Analysis of the national identification’ mean trend by origin group (1984-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables/Models All Autochthonous 
vs. Children of 
Mixed Couples 
Autochthonous 
vs. 
S. Generation 
Autochthonous 
vs. 
Immigrants 
     
Year 0.001** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Children of Mixed Couples  -0.333***   
  (0.037)   
Year*Mixed  -0.008***   
  (0.002)   
Second Generation   -0.635***  
   (0.030)  
Year*S.Generation   -0.017***  
   (0.002)  
Immigrants    -1.518*** 
    (0.023) 
Year*Immigrants    -0.006*** 
    (0.002) 
Constant 3.276*** 3.821*** 3.821*** 3.821*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
     
Observations 31536 16253 17696 21719 
R2 0.000 0.038 0.152 0.409 
Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). As data from CIS #2543 (2003) and CIS # 2734 (2008) did not 
include information on the individuals and their parents’ origin, these two datasets have been excluded from 
the analysis. 
Notes:  
-Reference category for origin groups’ dummies: Autochthonous  
-The “Year” variable refers to the year when the survey was conducted.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Model (3) compares the immigrant group with the native group. As in previous cases, the positive 
and significant coefficient for the ‘Year’ variable indicates that the trend in the national identification 
of the native population is increasing, although as we saw previously the slope is almost flat. The mean 
national identification among the immigrants group (2.317) is significantly lower than the mean 
national identification among the autochthonous group (3.821). The marginal effect and the standard 
error of the interaction show that the mean for the immigrant group also increases as time goes by. This 
increasing trend reflects a pattern of assimilation among the immigrant group, which contrasts with the 
second generation trend. Nevertheless, the small coefficient of the slope shows that this assimilation 
process occurs at a very slow pace and that convergence with the native group will not occur.  
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Table 3.6 Marginal effect of time on mean national identification by origin group  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Autochthonous vs. 
Children of Mixed 
Couples 
Autochthonous vs. 
S. Generation 
Autochthonous vs. 
Immigrants 
    
Native 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Children of Mixed Couples -0.001   
 (0.002)   
Second Generation  -0.008***  
  (0.002)  
Immigrants   0.003** 
   (0.001) 
Note: Estimations from results in Table 3.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
From these results, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the trend for mean national identification 
is increasing for the native and the immigrant groups, decreasing for the second generations, and flat 
for the children of mixed couples. Secondly, the small magnitude of the slope coefficients for each 
group confirm, consistent with figure 3.4, that the group trends in the means increase or decrease at a 
very slow pace. Nonetheless, we know from the results of previous section that the relative stability in 
mean national identification is masking significant changes in the percentage of persons who choose 
the different response categories in the questionnaire item. The next section deals with this question.   
 
3.3.3 Decomposing aggregate change: population and individual changes 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, previous studies have reported that identification 
primarily with Spain decreased significantly in the first years of democracy (Martínez-Herrera 2002, 
435). My depiction of the evolution of aggregate identification with Spain and Catalonia also suggests 
that the percentage of individuals who identify as primarily Spanish has declined in the last twenty-six 
years, although my analyses only shows a slight decrease over the whole period under consideration 
(see figure 3.1 and 3.2). 14  
Could it be possible that this decrease was more significant within each origin group? If we look at 
the evolution of national identification in each origin group (see figures 3.5 to 3.8 below), it can easily 
be seen that the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers has remained more or less constant in the 
autochthonous group. Yet, this percent shows greater fluctuations in the children of mixed couples and 
the second generations’ groups and, above all, in the immigrants’ group. Now, due to the stability of 
the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers among the autochthonous group, changes in the percent of 
those who feel as Spanish as Catalan and primarily Catalan correlate inversely (-.95). The same occurs 
in the group of immigrants with the primarily Spanish and dual identification: the correlation of change 
in these two categories increases to -.91. 
 
                                                      
14 Here it is worth noting that my depiction of national identification is left-truncated in 1984. Since the 
available data from before 1984 comes from other sources, we cannot be certain on whether the decrease in the 
levels of primarily Spanish identification comes from actual changes in the levels of national identification, as 
Martínez-Herrera (2002) suggest, or whether these changes are the result of house effects. Due to this problem of 
identification, I have avoided the compilation of data from different sources and, so my data does not cover the 
first years of democracy.  
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Figure 3.5 Evolution of national identification. Autochthonous (%) 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Evolution of national identification. Children of mixed couples (%) 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Evolution of national identification. Second generations (%) 
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Figure 3.8 Evolution of national identification. Immigrants (%) 
 
Source: CIS (1412), CIS(1719), CIS(1750), CIS(1978), CIS(1987), CIS(2052), CIS(2137), CIS(2228), CIS(2298), 
CIS(2374), CIS(2410), CIS(2450), CIS(2610), CIS(2643), CIS(2667), CIS(2799), CIS(2852) 
 
Returning to the whole population, it could be argued that the slight decrease in the levels of 
primarily Spanish identification reported in figure 3.2 could be related to population changes 
(replacement of older cohorts and the immigrants) or individuals’ gradual abandonment of this form of 
identification. In contrast, the trendless evolution of dual and primarily Catalan identification suggests 
that the contribution of generational replacement changes to the overall change is cancelled out by 
period-effects (see figure 3.2).  
However, we do not know how much of the observed aggregate change in the identification with 
Spain and Catalonia is due to population turnover, and how much is due to switches in individuals’ 
national identification choices. In order to gain some insight on the occurrence of population or 
individual changes, in the next sections I examine inter-cohort and intra-cohort changes, and I 
decompose aggregate changes to learn how each type of change contributes to overall change. 
 
3.3.3.1 Population changes 
 
In Catalonia, population changes can be the result of both the replacement of immigrants who 
exhibit a more Spanish oriented identification by natives who exhibit a more Catalan oriented 
identification, and the generational replacement of older cohorts.  
In the introductory chapter, I already mentioned that the balance of immigration from other regions 
of Spain was over one million between 1951 and 1970 (Cabré 1999). The return of these immigrants to 
their home regions or the die off of the immigrant population, who were not replaced by the arrival of 
new immigrants coming from other Spanish regions, would obviously have impacted the percentage of 
individuals who identify as ‘primarily Spanish’. Cabré (1999, 181) has estimated that between 1980 
and 1985 the balance of immigration in Catalonia was negative for the first time (-86.492). However, 
immigrants’ return rate was significantly low: 5.9 per thousand in the period 1988-1990 and 6.8 per 
thousand between 1992 and 1994 (Recaño and Solana 1998).  
In any event, as individuals with a Spanish origin concentrate in the older cohorts as table 3.7 
shows, it is also possible that generational and immigrant’ replacement overlap. 
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Table 3.7 Origin by cohort (column percentage) 
 Cohort1  Cohort2 Cohort3 Cohort4 Cohort5 Cohort6 Cohort7  
Origin Group/ Cohort <1924 1925-
1934 
1935-
1944 
1945-
1954 
1955-
1964 
1965-
1974 
>1975 Total 
         
Born in Catalonia 56 54 49 54 69 84 88 64 
Born outside Catalonia 44 46 51 46 31 16 12 36 
         
Total 2080 2403 2776 3002 3465 3166 1523 18415 
Source: CIS Cumulative data (1984 to 2010). As data from CIS #1412 (1984) did not include information on individuals’ age, 
I have here used data from CIS # 1403 (1984).  
 
It is worth noting that the generational replacement of the older cohorts will only affect aggregate 
national identification if the percentage of individuals within the younger cohorts who identify as 
primarily Spanish is smaller than the percentage among the older cohorts they are replacing. In order to 
test this, here I make use of the cohort classification created by Montero, Torcal and Gunther (Montero, 
Gunther, and Torcal 1998) with some slight modifications. These modifications have been introduced 
bearing in mind relevant political or social events in recent Spanish and Catalan history.15  
Thus, the first cohort includes those who were born before 1924 and who were of age at the end of 
the Alfonso XIII monarchy, the Second Spanish Republic or the civil war. Part of this generation 
experienced the 1931 to 1936 democratic period as adults, and witnessed Lluis Companys’ 
proclamation of the Catalan Republic within the Spanish Federal Republic in 1934. The second cohort 
includes those who were born between 1925 and 1934. This generation reached political maturity 
during the harshest years of repression of Franco’s regime. In Catalonia, repression meant the 
prohibition of the public use of the Catalan language and, more generally, of any expression of Catalan 
identity (Benet 1978). I have divided Montero et al’s (1998) third cohort in two different cohorts. The 
third cohort corresponds to those who were born between 1935 and 1944. This is the cohort that 
reached political maturity at the end of the isolation period, and during the arrival of the development 
plans that followed the entrance of the technocrats to power. The forth cohort includes those born 
between 1945 and 1955. This latter generation came to age during the dictatorship’s economic boom 
and the regime’s liberalization, which also reached Catalonia, and entailed some degree of toleration 
towards the use and teaching of the Catalan language (Woolard 1989, 29). These two cohorts are the 
migratory cohorts, that is, the cohorts in which a higher number of immigrants came to Catalonia from 
other regions of Spain. Cohort five is the transition to democracy cohort and includes those who were 
born between 1955 and 1964. This generation is, moreover, the generation which experienced the 
height of the movement for autonomy in Catalonia. Cohort six includes those who were born between 
1965 and 1974. This is the generation that came of age when the democratic system seemed to be 
consolidated: after the 1981 coup d’état, during the CiU’s majority governments in Catalonia, and in 
the year of the Olympic Games in Barcelona. Cohort seven includes those who were born after 1975. 
This generation is the generation of democracy, it has grown up with Catalan television, and has been 
educated in an educational system in which Catalan gradually became the main language of instruction.  
Taking into account the experiences that the different generations had when they came of age, we 
can make some hypotheses regarding these generations’ identification with Spain and Catalonia. For 
example, we can hypothesize that the third and forth cohort, that is, the generations born between 1935 
and 1954, are possibly the ones who feel most Spanish. On the one hand, these generations experienced 
the liberalization of Franco’s regime and, on the other hand, these generations concentrate the greatest 
number of immigrants born in other regions of Spain. Although these immigrants may have developed 
                                                      
15 The main reason for modifying Montero, Gunther and Torcal’s (1998) classification is the statistical need 
to have cohorts of the approximate same size when carrying out the decomposition of the change calculus.  
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some degree of fondness towards Catalonia due to assimilation, I expect they have remained attached 
to Spain to a great extent. Compared to these cohorts, I expect that the oldest cohort will show a more 
Catalan oriented identification due to their socialization experience. This expectation holds also for the 
second generation. This generation’s ‘more Catalan’ identification could be interpreted as a reaction 
against the harshness of Franco’s regime. Finally, I expect that fifth to seventh generations, which have 
experienced the height of the autonomist movement and the CiU’s rule of the regional government, 
will exhibit a more Catalan identification. 
I can very roughly test these hypotheses by estimating the following model of the national 
identification mean:16  
 
E(NIit) = β0 + β1Cohortit + β1Periodit                                                                                                 (equation 3.2) 
 
Here, I assume that the effect of age is small enough to be ignored. This strategy solves the 
identification problem which “exists whenever three or more independent variables need to be included 
in an analysis and each one is a linear function of the others” (Glenn 2005).17  
The results of the analysis presented in Table 3.8 show that, contrary to our expectation, the first 
and the second cohort are not significantly different from the third (1935-1944) and fourth (1945-1954) 
cohorts together. The mean value of the third and forth cohorts is around the midpoint of the national 
identification scale (3.176) for the whole period under consideration. The fifth to seventh (1955->1975) 
cohorts are the most Catalan oriented. For these three generations, their mean values are 3.326, 3.403 
and 3.405, respectively.  
Yet, here we are more interested in learning whether the replacement of the older cohorts for the 
younger ones is going to change the distribution of national identification in Catalonia. If there is no 
difference in the national identification levels of the older and the younger cohorts, then generational 
replacement should not have any impact on the percentage of individuals who identify as primarily 
Spanish, as Spanish as Catalan, or as primarily Catalan. Models (2) and (3) in Table 3.8 indicate that 
there are, in fact, significant differences between the oldest and the youngest cohorts in the mean 
values of their national identification. While the mean national identification value for the first (born 
before 1924) and second (1925-1934) generation is 3.230, the sixth (1964-1974) and the seventh (born 
after 1974) generations have a mean value of 3.404 and 3.406, respectively. Said this, it is worth noting 
that the replacement of first and second generations will not be as important as will be the replacement 
of the third (1935- 1944) generation, which is the least Catalan oriented (3.082). From here, it is 
reasonable to think that if newer cohorts keep being more Catalan oriented, the generational 
replacement of the third cohort will make the mean value of national identification go up for the whole 
population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
16 Again, it is important to make clear that this is not an explanatory model of individual national 
identification. This model only seeks to provide the reader with an idea of the differences in the national 
identification mean for the different cohort groups.  
17 In any case, this strategy seems to be a plausible hypothesis, as there is not any a-priori reason to think 
that individuals become more Spanish oriented or more Catalan oriented as they get older. 
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Table 3.8 Cohort analysis for National Identification1 
 
 
Variables/Model 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
Birth Cohorts     
Before 1924 0.067 0.083   
 (0.063) (0.063)   
1925 and 1934 0.032 0.038   
 (0.044) (0.044)   
1935 and 1944   -0.139*** -0.148*** 
   (0.047) (0.047) 
1945 and 1954   0.034 0.026 
   (0.045) (0.045) 
1955 and 1964 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.107** 0.097** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) 
1964 and 1974 0.229*** 0.227*** 0.185*** 0.174*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) 
B 1975 0.241*** 0.229*** 0.197*** 0.176*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.042) 
Year  0.006**  0.006** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant 3.298*** 3.176*** 3.342*** 3.230*** 
 (0.023) (0.058) (0.031) (0.058) 
     
Observations 13903 13903 13903 13903 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
Source: CIS cumulative file (1984 – 2010). As data from CIS #1412 (1984) did not include information on 
individuals’ age, I have used here data from CIS # 1403 (1984) 
Category of Reference: Third and forth cohorts in models (1) and (2) and first and second cohorts in models (3) 
and (4) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
3.3.3.2 Individual changes vs. generational changes 
 
As I mentioned above, aggregate change can also be the result of individual changes, that is, 
changes caused by the alteration of individuals’ national identification over time. Individual shifts can 
be the result of time or period effects. Here we can think of two kinds of time effects: age or life course 
effects and immigrants assimilation. In principle, it is hard to believe that individuals become more 
Catalan oriented or more Spanish oriented as they get older. However, among the immigrants, a 
particular kind of time effect might be present: identificational assimilation. The longer immigrants 
have been living in Catalonia, the more probable it is that they will exhibit a more Catalan oriented 
identification. Besides these time effects, contextual circumstances might cause individuals to change 
their national identification. These shifts in individuals’ identification are the result of period effects. 
Hereafter, I proceed to estimate how much of the overall change in primarily Spanish identification 
and primarily Catalan identification is due to population changes (generational and immigrant 
replacement) and how much is due to individual shifts (immigrants’ identificational assimilation and 
individuals’ alteration of their identification due to period effects). We first focus on the analysis of the 
whole population and then we turn to the immigrant group, which is expected to display higher levels 
of individual change due to assimilation. I will also examine the autochthonous group to learn which 
proportion of the change in primarily Catalan identification is caused by the replacement of older 
generations and which proportion is due to period effects.  
The strategy which I follow here to estimate the magnitude of these two types of changes consists 
of separating intra-cohort change from inter-cohort change. Intra-cohort or within-cohort change will 
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account, therefore, for the individual changes (immigrants’ identificational assimilation and 
individuals’ alteration of their identification due to period effects). Inter-cohort or between-cohort 
changes, on the other hand, will account for the replacement of the older cohorts for younger cohorts 
and of the immigrants for natives. 
Overall change can be expressed as a function of intra-cohort and inter-cohort change (Firebaugh 
1997). 
 
Δµ = Σj[(pj1 + pj2)/2]Δµj + Σj[(µ j1+ µ j2)/2]Δpj        (equation 3.4) 
 
where Δ denotes change over time, 1 and 2 subscripts refer to the yearly surveys, and the j 
subscripts refer to the jth cohort. In this equation, the first term of the equation refers to within cohort 
change and the second term refers to inter-cohort change. Within cohort change for the jth cohort [Δµj] 
is weighted by the cohort’s average population share in the two surveys [(pj1 + pj2)/2]. On the other 
hand, change in the population share for the jth cohort [Δpj] is weighted by the cohort’s average mean 
[(µ j1+ µ j2)/2].  
Although the primarily Spanish category displays a decreasing trend in some moments of time, its 
trend is non-monotonic (see figure 3.2 above). When a trend is non-monotonic, a comparison of the 
starting and the ending point of the series cannot be made. To solve the problem, we can break the 
trend up into the pieces that are monotonic. Once the ‘primarily Spanish’ trend is broken up into these 
monotonic pieces decomposition of overall change can be implemented.18 Looking at figure 3.2, we 
can easily see that the ‘primarily Spanish’ identification displays an increasing trend between 1988 and 
1992, 1993 and 1996, 1999 and 2001 and, finally, between 2006 and 2009, while the trend turns 
decreasing in between these periods.19 Therefore, in order to decompose the evolution of primarily 
Spanish identification over this period, we need to break the trend in eight pieces (1988-1991, 1991-
1992, 1992-1996, 1996-1999, 1999-2001, 2001-2006, 2006-2009 and 2009-2010). 
Table 3.9, Panel A and B displays the intra-cohort (change within row) and the inter-cohort 
changes that occurred between 1988 and 2010 in the whole population. However, although we are 
tracking the evolution of primarily Spanish identification over a period of twenty two years, the oldest 
generation does not definitely die off over this time. This may explain why the magnitude of 
generational replacement is not as significant as expected.  
Table 3.9 show that significant fluctuations have occurred in the period under consideration in the 
all-cohorts change (see Panel B), although the greater change took place between 2001 and 2006 when 
the levels of primarily Spanish identification decreased 7.09 percent points.20 Now, where do these 
changes come from? If we pay attention to the variation in between periods, we see that the changes 
that occurred within-cohorts are significantly greater than the changes that have occurred between-
cohorts. This is reasonable because these periods are too short for a generational replacement to have 
occurred between them. Strikingly, the within-cohort changes are usually in the same direction and, in 
particular, this is the case for the 1988 to 1992, 1999 to 2001, 2006 to 2009 and 2009 to 2010 periods. 
This seems to indicate that all cohorts are reacting to period effects.  
 
 
 
                                                      
18 I am thankful to Professor Firebaugh for his advice on the analysis of non-monotonic trends.  
19 I exclude from the analysis the 1984, 1986 and 1987 surveys. As I mentioned above, the 1988 survey is the 
first survey which has complete information on the respondents’ age, and the respondents and their parents’ 
origin.  
20 Chapter 6 examines this period of time in depth making use of individual panel data.  
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Table 3.9 Decomposing aggregate change in the primarily Spanish category (whole population): 
within and between cohort change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
19
24
80
15
.6
6
72
23
.7
1
29
28
.1
6
17
24
.5
8
17
17
.1
41
30
.9
3
2
5.
09
4
23
.3
4
8
22
.4
1
19
25
-1
93
4
72
17
.1
8
81
23
.4
6
28
19
.8
5
17
18
.7
7
41
22
.2
6
82
23
.4
7
16
11
.8
8
13
28
.2
6
30
16
.8
9
19
35
-1
94
4
93
19
.8
7
90
22
.7
3
30
23
.3
36
38
.0
4
38
23
.9
92
26
.6
26
14
.5
3
22
22
.7
3
59
18
.5
6
19
45
-1
95
4
91
17
.5
3
78
20
.4
5
36
21
.4
2
21
18
.1
9
34
16
.4
1
80
20
.4
7
30
15
19
17
.1
7
59
15
.7
1
19
55
-1
96
4
80
13
11
8
23
.7
7
31
16
.3
4
28
22
.1
1
33
13
.9
8
70
15
.2
5
37
15
.7
4
25
18
.0
5
74
15
.4
2
19
65
-1
97
4
38
10
.5
1
86
16
.0
3
35
17
.1
1
30
19
.2
3
29
10
.5
88
16
.7
6
38
12
.0
7
32
19
.3
8
92
13
.4
5
>1
97
5
0
0
0
0
4
11
.4
1
9
16
.7
3
27
14
.9
7
67
15
.4
52
13
.4
8
37
13
.8
1
11
6
11
.6
3
A
ll 
co
ho
rts
45
3
16
.2
7
52
5
21
.7
7
19
3
20
.6
9
15
8
24
.2
7
21
9
17
.5
3
52
0
20
.8
7
20
1
13
.7
8
15
2
18
.8
8
43
8
14
.6
9
19
88
-1
99
2
19
92
-1
99
3
19
93
-1
99
6
19
96
-1
99
9
19
99
-2
00
1
20
01
-2
00
6
20
06
-2
00
9
20
09
-2
01
0
To
ta
l
<1
92
4
8.
05
4.
45
-3
.5
8
-7
.4
8
13
.8
3
-2
5.
84
18
.2
5
-0
.9
3
19
25
-1
93
4
6.
28
-3
.6
1
-1
.0
8
3.
49
1.
21
-1
1.
59
16
.3
8
-1
1.
37
19
35
-1
94
4
2.
86
0.
57
14
.7
4
-1
4.
14
2.
7
-1
2.
07
8.
2
-4
.1
7
19
45
-1
95
4
2.
92
0.
97
-3
.2
3
-1
.7
8
4.
06
-5
.4
7
2.
17
-1
.4
6
19
55
-1
96
4
10
.7
7
-7
.4
3
5.
77
-8
.1
3
1.
27
0.
49
2.
31
-2
.6
3
19
65
-1
97
4
5.
52
1.
08
2.
12
-8
.7
3
6.
26
-4
.6
9
7.
31
-5
.9
3
>1
97
5
0
11
.4
1
5.
32
-1
.7
6
0.
43
-1
.9
2
0.
33
-2
.1
8
5.
5
-1
.0
8
3.
58
-6
.7
4
3.
34
-7
.0
9
5.
1
-4
.1
8
-1
.5
8
6.
14
-0
.7
7
3.
29
-6
.1
7
3.
57
-6
.3
3
5.
05
-3
.9
1
0.
86
-0
.6
4
-0
.3
1
0.
29
-0
.5
7
-0
.2
3
-0
.7
5
0.
05
-0
.2
8
-2
.4
4
So
ur
ce
: C
IS
(1
75
0)
, C
IS
(1
98
7)
, C
IS
(2
05
2)
, C
IS
(2
22
8)
, C
IS
(2
37
4)
, C
IS
(2
41
0)
, C
IS
(2
64
3)
, C
IS
(2
79
9)
, C
IS
(2
85
2)
N
ot
e:
C
ha
ng
e
w
ith
in
ro
w
sr
ef
le
ct
s
in
tra
-c
oh
or
tc
ha
ng
e.
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
sa
re
th
ed
iff
er
en
ce
s
in
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
in
di
vi
du
al
s
w
ho
se
lf-
id
en
tif
ie
d
as
pr
im
ar
ily
Sp
an
is
h
in
on
e
su
rv
ey
ye
ar
an
d
th
e
ne
xt
on
e.
Fo
re
xa
m
pl
e,
be
tw
ee
n
19
98
an
d
19
92
,t
he
pe
rc
en
to
fi
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
w
ho
se
lf-
id
en
tif
ie
d
as
pr
im
ar
ily
Sp
an
is
h
in
th
e
ol
de
rc
oh
or
t(
bo
rn
be
fo
re
19
24
)i
nc
re
as
ed
in
8.
05
%
[2
3.
71
-1
5.
66
=8
.0
5%
].
O
n
th
e
ag
gr
eg
at
e,
th
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
in
cr
ea
se
in
 th
e 
pr
im
ar
ily
 S
pa
ni
sh
 id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
19
98
 a
nd
 1
99
2 
w
as
 5
.5
0%
. 
Pa
ne
l B
: D
iff
er
en
ce
s i
n 
th
e 
pe
rc
en
t o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls 
wh
o 
fe
el
 p
rim
ar
ily
 S
pa
ni
sh
 w
ith
in
 e
ac
h 
co
ho
rt 
be
tw
ee
n 
pe
rio
ds
O
ve
ra
ll 
ch
an
ge
Av
er
ag
e 
w
ith
in
 c
oh
or
t c
ha
ng
e 
(w
ei
gh
te
d 
by
 si
ze
)
Av
er
ag
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
ho
rt 
ch
an
ge
 (w
ei
gh
te
d 
by
 m
ea
n)
20
06
20
09
20
10
N
ot
e:
 C
ol
um
n 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s r
ep
re
se
nt
 th
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
 w
ith
in
 e
ac
h 
co
ho
rt 
w
ho
 se
lf-
id
en
tif
y 
as
 p
rim
ar
ily
 S
pa
ni
sh
 in
 e
ac
h 
su
rv
ey
 y
ea
r. 
Th
e
“A
ll-
co
ho
rts
”
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
sa
re
w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
es
of
th
e
co
ho
rt
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s.
Fo
re
xa
m
pl
e,
in
19
88
th
e
“A
ll-
co
ho
rts
”
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
co
m
es
fr
om
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n:
[1
5.
66
x
(8
0/
45
3)
]+
[1
7.
18
x(
72
/4
53
)]
+
[1
9.
87
x
(9
3/
45
3)
]
+
[1
7.
53
x
(9
1/
45
3)
]
+ 
[1
3.
00
 x
 (8
0/
45
3)
] +
 [1
0.
51
 x
 (3
8/
45
3)
] =
 1
6.
27
Pa
ne
l A
: I
nd
iv
id
ua
ls 
wh
o 
se
lf-
id
en
tif
y 
as
 p
rim
ar
ily
 S
pa
ni
sh
 w
ith
in
 e
ac
h 
co
ho
rt
19
88
19
92
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
01
María José Hierro Hernández 
77 
 
Now, to compute the overall change occurred over the period under consideration, we have to sum 
the percent change occurred in between periods. Over the whole period, the primarily Spanish 
identification has experienced an overall decrease of 1.58 percentage points. Yet, while within cohort 
change has shown a small increase (.86) in the percentage of primarily Spanish identification, between-
cohort change has shown a decrease of 2.44 percentage points. Taking this into account, it can be 
argued that inter-generational decrease in the primarily Spanish identification has been slowed down 
by the within-cohort changes occurred over time.  
Certainly, we cannot be sure whether the within-cohort increase in the primarily Spanish 
identification (.86) comes from life-cycle or period effects. Unlike standard cohort tables, in which the 
row and column categories are the same width and, therefore, cohort-groups can be followed 
diagonally (Firebaugh 1997: 24), in Table 3.9 cohort-groups cannot be followed diagonally. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the change within rows is mainly the result of period-effects and 
not life-cycle effects. There are three reasons to assume this: first, there is no a priori reason to think 
that individuals become more Spanish oriented as they get older; second, assimilation (a form of within 
cohort change) should cause a decrease, instead of an increase in Spanish identification; and finally, 
the changes observed usually occur in the same direction in all cohorts, which seems to suggest that 
cohorts are reacting to contextual circumstances.  
Yet, if we compare figures 3.5 to 3.8, we can clearly see that immigrants are the main contributors 
to the primarily Spanish (“only Spanish” and ‘more Spanish than Catalan’) categories of the national 
identification indicator. Taking this into account, the same strategy can be followed to decompose the 
changes observed over time in the immigrants group.  
Table 3.10 (panels A and B) examines the overall change in the primarily Spanish identification of 
the immigrant group between 1988 and 2010. As the evolution of the primarily Spanish identification 
does not exhibit a monotonic trend, this has to be broken up into the pieces that are monotonic in order 
to decompose the change.  
The balance of the overall change for the whole period is negative (-2.00). In agreement with the 
depiction of figure 3.5, the changes occurred within each time period were noticeably important. Most 
cohorts experienced a change in the same direction between 1988 and 1991, 1999 and 2001, 2001 and 
2006, and finally between 2006 and 2009. This seems to indicate that in those periods, contextual 
circumstances affected all cohorts at the same time. The period which registered the greater within-
cohort change was also the 2001 to 2006 period (-22.28).21  
Contrary to what happened in the analysis of the whole population, here the main source of overall 
change in primarily Spanish identification is not inter-cohort change (generational replacement), but 
intra-cohort change. Actually, between-cohort change presents a positive sign (.86), which might be 
capturing the arrival of new younger immigrants to Catalonia. Within-cohort changes in this group 
may be either the result of period effects or life-cycle effects associated with the immigrants’ 
assimilation process. If intra-cohort changes were only due to assimilation, we should observe that in 
each cohort, (and especially, in the oldest cohorts, who have been living in Catalonia longest) the 
percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers will have decreased in between all the periods. 
Nevertheless, if we pay attention to the row changes, we can see that positive changes alternate with 
negative changes in all the cohorts. This seems to suggest that the within-cohort changes experienced 
by the immigrant group are more the result of period-effects than the result of assimilation processes. 
 
 
 
                                                      
21 Since immigrants are the main contributors to the primarily Spanish category, this group’s fluctuations 
determine the whole population’s fluctuations.  
Change in National Identification 
78 
 
Table 3.10 Decomposing aggregate change in the primarily Spanish category (immigrants group): 
within and between cohort change 
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Before concluding this section, it could also be of interest to look at the evolution of the 
primarily Catalan identification among the autochthonous group. The decomposition of the 
aggregate change in the period under consideration will determine whether change is mainly the 
result of generational changes (the replacement of the older cohorts for new cohorts, supposedly 
more Catalan oriented), or individual changes.  
Again, to decompose aggregate change we have to look at those periods which exhibit a 
monotonic trend. According to the depiction of primarily Catalan identification in figure 3.5, 
these periods are 1988 to 1992, 1992 to 1996, 1996 to 1998, 1998 to 1999, 2001 to 2002, 2002 
to 2006, 2006 to 2007, 2007 to 2009 and 2009 to 2010. However, instead of representing the 
percent of autochthonous who self-identify as primarily Catalan within each cohort, in the next 
table (table 3.11) I only present the differences in the percent of autochthonous who feel 
primarily Catalan within each cohort between the mentioned periods.  The 1988 to 1992 and the 
1992 to 1996 periods present the highest levels of aggregate change. Primarily Catalan 
identification increased 13.65 percentage points between 1988 and 1992, it decreased by about 
the same magnitude (12.65) between 1992 and 1996, and it recovered again in the following 
period (8.26). The magnitude of change is also significant between 2001 and 2002, when the 
percentage of primarily Catalan identifiers decreased by 6.81 percentage points, and between 
2002 and 2005, when this percentage increased by 7.39 points.  
In the first three periods, 1988 to 1992, 1992 to 1996 and 1996 to 1998, change occurs in the 
same direction in almost all cohorts. However, from that moment on, within each period, the 
percentage of primarily Catalan identifiers increases in some cohorts and decreases in others.  
The right-handed column in table 3.11 shows the magnitude of the overall change, and the 
proportion of change which comes from within cohort and between cohort changes. Over the 
whole period, primarily Catalan identification increased by 6.53 percentage points. Yet, the 
main source of change was not generational replacement of older cohorts, but within-cohort 
change. Specifically, within-cohort change makes up to 85 percent of the overall change in the 
period under consideration. As was mentioned above, we lack any reason which lead us to think 
that the autochthonous become more Catalan oriented as they become older. Therefore, within-
cohort change must be the result of the passing of time: the autochthonous population has 
become more Catalan over the years.  
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Table 3.11 Decomposing aggregate change in the primarily Spanish category (autochthonous group): 
within and between cohort change 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
This first empirical chapter of the dissertation has examined aggregate change in national 
identification descriptively and, it has looked into the changes that occurred between 1984 and 
2010 from different perspectives. The aim of the chapter was to answer three basic questions 
that previous studies have left unanswered: How important are the changes that have occurred in 
national identification over the past thirty years? Are the changes in the percentage of persons 
who identify with Spain and/or Catalonia affecting the mean tendency? How much of the 
overall change is due to population changes and how much is due to individuals’ alteration of 
their national identification?  
The results of the descriptive analyses that have been carried out in this chapter provide an 
answer to these questions. Thus, it has been shown that notable fluctuations have occurred in the 
levels of primarily Spanish, dual and primarily Catalan identification over the period under 
consideration, both in the whole population, and each origin group (especially in the dual and 
primarily Catalan identification in the autochthonous group, in the dual and primarily Spanish 
identification in the immigrants group, and in every form of identification in the children of 
mixed couples and second generation group). However, even though the magnitude of the 
fluctuations has been significant, the fluctuations have not affected the national identification 
mean. In this regard, my analyses have shown that the evolution of the national identification 
mean for the whole population does not seem to be a function of time. However, when each 
origin group has been examined separately, we have learned that the national identification 
mean has increased a bit in the native and the immigrant groups, and decreased in the second 
generation group.22  
In this chapter, I have also carried out decomposition analyses of the aggregate change to 
separate between and within cohort changes, and to learn how much of the aggregate change is 
due to population changes (generational replacement) and how much is due to individual 
changes (identificational assimilation and individual change in the national identification). 
Separate analyses have been implemented for the whole population, the immigrants and the 
autochthonous groups.  
For the whole population, the aggregate decrease in the percentage of individuals who self-
identify as primarily Spanish has been shown to be the joint effect of inter-cohort change and a 
compensation effect which comes from intra-cohort change. The result of these two joint effects 
has been a 1.58 percent decrease in the number of individuals who self-identify as primarily 
Spanish in the whole population.  As figure 3.2 already suggested, the magnitude of the change 
in primarily Spanish identification has been relatively small in the period between 1988 and 
2010.  
The decomposition method used here does not allow an estimation of how much of the 
inter-cohort change is attributable to the replacement of the old cohorts by new ones and how 
much is attributable to the replacement of immigrants by natives. Therefore, the 
intergenerational change observed in the whole population can be considered the compound 
effect of the replacement of older generations and immigrants.  However, the separate effects of 
these two processes cannot be identified. The decomposition analyses also do not allow 
separating of age effects from period effects. However, here I have argued that there is no 
reason to think that individuals become more Spanish (or more Catalan) oriented as they get 
                                                      
22 The fact that the second generation mean has decreased over time is a surprising result, which calls 
for further research. The next chapter will return to this point.  
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older, and that therefore, within cohort change can be mainly attributed to identificational 
assimilation and individual change in national identification.  
Thus, in order to distinguish between these two effects, I have decomposed aggregate 
change in the percent of primarily Spanish identifiers within the immigrant group. Here, the 
decrease trend in the levels of primarily Spanish identification has also been found to be the 
joint effect of generational replacement and individual change. However, in the immigrants 
group, it has been shown that intra-cohort negative change surpasses inter-cohort positive 
change. The fact that inter-cohort change is positive can be explained by the arrival of new 
younger immigrants from other regions of Spain. Yet, as the within-row change does not 
correspond to a pattern of assimilation, intra-cohort change in the immigrant group can be 
attributed to immigrants’ alteration of their national identification over time. 
In any event, as happened with the whole population, the magnitude of the change in 
primarily Spanish identification among the immigrants group is relatively small. Two reasons 
could explain the small magnitude of this change. First, immigrants’ identificational 
assimilation could have occurred before 1988. This would be consistent with Martínez-Herrera’s 
(2002) analysis, which has shown that the most important changes in this category of 
identification occurred in the aftermath of Franco’s regime. Second, it could be that a floor 
effect is preventing the percentage of primarily Spanish identifiers to decrease even more. 
In addition, it is worth noting that, keeping the balance of immigration between Catalonia 
and the other Spanish regions constant, a decline in the levels of primarily Spanish identification 
is not expected to occur until the most Spanish oriented cohort, that is, the cohort of those 
individuals who were born between 1935 and 1944 and who were between 66 and 75 years old 
in 2010, is replaced. 
In the autochthonous group, the decomposition analyses I have carried out have shown a 
significant increase in the levels of primarily Catalan identification (6.53). Although the 
replacement of the eldest cohort for the youngest cohort has contributed to the overall change, 
this change is mainly attributable to individual change. However, contrary to what has been 
found in the decomposition analyses of the immigrants group, in the autochthonous group the 
effects of context do not seem to have affected all the cohorts in the same direction in all the 
periods. 
Taking into account that period-effects seem to be essential to explain not only trendless 
changes in the dual and primarily Catalan identification, but also change in the primarily 
Spanish identification of immigrants, the next chapter will look for possible explanations for 
these period-effects. 
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CHAPTER 4. CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION OVER 
THE LONG-TERM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has examined the evolution of aggregate identification with Spain and 
Catalonia from the mid eighties to 2010. This chapter moves down to the individual level to 
look into individual change. The chapter tries to explain what lies behind these changes, and it 
argues that individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia is shaped in relation to elites’ 
mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage.  
In line with previous studies (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986; Linz and Montero 1986; 
Torcal and Chhibber 1995), here I assume that cleavages are mobilized by political parties. 
Since the arrival of democracy in Spain, party competition has helped to crystallize a conflict of 
interest between Spain and Catalonia which was forged in the ninetieth century and became 
explicit during the Spanish II Republic. The claims political parties make regarding the cleavage 
and the stances they adopt regarding the issues that are embedded in it, contribute to mobilizing 
the cleavage. In the aggregate, individuals’ reactions to political parties’ claims explain the 
movements of society in one or another direction.  
In order to show this, two strategies will be followed here. First, I will examine whether the 
Catalan parties’ understandings of Catalan identity and the assimilation policies implemented by 
the CiU governments, with the support of the main Catalan parties, have influenced individuals’ 
identification with Catalonia. In particular, in the following pages, I will argue that Catalan 
parties have attempted to de-primordialize Catalan identity, that is, to dissociate it from purely 
adscriptive elements (ancestry and origin) and to build a single Catalan-speaking community. 
This is an idea which has been already suggested in Woolard (1989), Conversi (1997) and 
Argelaguet (2006). Qualitative evidence will be provided to show that Catalan elites have 
presented Catalan identity as something that could be voluntarily adopted. In addition, 
secondary sources will be used to describe the language policies that were promoted by the CiU 
governments to assimilate the children of immigrants.1  
From here, I will examine whether the relative weight of the adscriptive (descent and origin) 
and acquired elements (knowledge of Catalan language) of identity has evolved over time. 
Taking into account the strategy of Catalan political parties, I expect to find that the adscriptive 
elements have lost weight in favor of the acquired elements. If this expectation is confirmed 
then we could argue that the CiU strategy and the other Catalan parties have been successful 
when “converting” Spanish immigrants and their children into Catalans through language 
assimilation.  
Secondly, I will try to relate the political context with change in national identification. 
Here, two hypotheses will be tested in an attempt to account for both aggregate level and 
individual level variation. The first hypothesis refers to the Catalan nationalist parties’ 
incentives to mobilize the cleavage depending on whether they hold a strong or a weak position 
                                                      
1 Even though language planning in Catalonia has touched on many aspects of social life, I will pay 
special attention to language policies in the school realm. In the next chapter I will return to this point, 
and will examine the impact that the 1983 language reform has had on those generations that have been 
educated since that year. 
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in the regional and the national governments, and to the consequences that the mobilization of 
the center-periphery has upon identification with Catalonia. The second hypothesis refers to the 
effect that confrontation along the center-periphery at the time the survey is conducted has on 
respondents’ identification. These two hypotheses are presented as alternative and 
complementary explanations to the hypothesis that decentralization explains change in national 
identification (Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009). By looking at 
political elites’ incentives for mobilization and to levels of confrontation along the center-
periphery cleavage, I seek to account for short-term changes, instead of long-term patterns in 
identification with Spain and Catalonia.   
In this chapter, I make use of the longitudinal data I presented in the previous chapter. The 
results of the empirical analyses are mixed. On the one hand, the results show that today 
Spanish immigrants and their children differ more from the autochthonous population in their 
national identification than twenty years ago. This is a result of the autochthonous population 
today’s greater likelihood to identify exclusively with Catalonia. This result is contrary to the 
Catalan political parties’ aspiration to build a single Catalan community. On the other hand, the 
results show that the level of political confrontation along the cleavage contributes to polarizing 
autochthonous and second generations’ identification. However, non consistent results are 
found for the hypothesis that identification with Catalonia increases when the nationalist parties 
have greater incentives to mobilize the cleavage.  
This chapter is organized in six sections. The next section shows how political elites’ have 
defined national identity in territorial and voluntary terms, and not in primordial ones, and it 
then looks at the strategy that Catalan elites’ have followed to assimilate Spanish immigrants. 
This section pays attention as well to the period between 2003 and 2010, when the Tripartit 
replaced the CiU in the regional government. Section three introduces the chapter’s hypotheses. 
Section four briefly describes the data and the variables. Section five presents the results of the 
analysis and section six concludes.  
 
4.2 A look at the period under consideration (1977 – 2010) 
 
“Before a diverse society, which was still touched by the effects of Franco’s regime, I opted for 
a policy of dissemination. When one opts for dissemination a less profound degree of adhesion 
is demanded; however it was better that six million Catalans were or felt a bit or reasonably 
Catalan or, at least, identified with the country, than that three million of them were very 
nationalistic and the other three were not at all.” [Jordi Pujol’s Memoirs (2009, 48-49)] 
 
Rather that providing a detailed account of what has happened in Catalan politics over the 
last thirty years,2 this section looks at certain issues that are relevant to the expectations that will 
be presented in section 4.3. I will first explain how the contemporary definition of Catalan 
identity was built. In particular, I will focus on the period of the Spanish transition and I will 
leave aside the genesis of Catalan identity (see Conversi 1997; Díez Medrano 1999; Keating 
1996). This decision is motivated by the fact that it was during the transition when political 
parties in Catalonia structured their electoral constituencies. And this is important because, as I 
will argue next, the  leading Catalan political parties’ definition of Catalanness and their choice 
                                                      
2 See Calzada and Llorens (1995) for a review on the fifteen first years of the CiU Government, and 
Lo Cascio (2008) for the period between 1980 and 2003. For a very complete and detailed review of the 
language policy in Catalonia see Argelaguet (1999) and Miley (2006). The latter includes, moreover, 
abundant references to other works. An interesting review of the first Tripartit can be found, for example, 
in Mercader’s (2008) chronicle of t Pasqual Maragall’s presidency. For a detailed account of the process 
of reform of the Statute see Ridao (2006).  
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for assimilation policies were strongly influenced by the their electoral interests. After depicting 
elites’ definition of Catalanness, in the following pages I will refer very briefly to the language 
policies that were implemented by the CiU’s regional governments (1980-2003). The last part 
of this section will cover the Tripartit governments (2003-2010).  
 The following pages, therefore, seek to show that Pujol’s Convergència i Unió (CiU) 
governments developed a strategy that consisted in combining a definition of Catalanness based 
on territorial and voluntary criteria, with policies of language assimilation. This strategy was not 
only expected to get immigrants and their children to learn Catalan language, but also to get 
them to feel Catalan, as the quote above suggests. The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, the 
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), 
and later on the Iniciativa per Catalunya-els Verds (ICV), have participated in this goal directly 
or indirectly.  
 
4.2.1 Delimiting the boundaries of Catalan identity (1977-1980) 
 
The contemporary definition of Catalan collective identity cannot be understood without 
making reference to Jordi Pujol’s book: Immigració; esperança i problema de Catalunya. In 
this book, Pujol argued against the division of Catalonia into two separate (immigrant and 
native) communities, and for the integration of the immigrants into Catalan society.3 This is also 
the book in which Pujol established the rules for membership in the Catalan group. These rules 
of membership are made of a combination of territorial and voluntary criteria: 
 
“The definition [of Catalan] that we like most is that which says: A Catalan is every person who 
lives and works in Catalonia and, who makes Catalonia their home and the country they identify 
with” (Pujol, 1976). 
  
Pujol’s stances against building two communities in Catalonia and his open definition of 
Catalanness would be electorally beneficial for his political project, the Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC). In 1977, Catalan political parties, in general, and the CDC, 
in particular, needed to develop a catch-all party’ strategy which would attract as many voters as 
possible. Although competition around the left-right dimension meant that Catalan political 
parties renounced competing for votes of a part of the electorate, political parties could try to 
widen their electorate by obviating the linguistic division that was caused by the presence of a 
significant number of Spanish immigrants in Catalonia.   
Making the boundaries of membership into the Catalan group more permeable allowed the 
Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) to attract the votes of a part of the population 
which had its origins outside the nation that the nationalist party sought to represent.4 Thus, the 
slogan which the CDC used during its launch in 1977, “A Catalonia valid for everyone”, “did 
not only show a willingness to foster inter-class integration, but also a willingness to integrate 
the different cultural and social communities which lived in Catalonia” (Marcet 1987, 203). 
                                                      
3 Here, it is worth noting that even though Pujol avoids using and even dislikes the term 
“assimilation” (see Pujol 1976, 2009), and he prefers to use instead the terms dissemination or 
integration, the language policies implemented in Catalonia can be classified as assimilation policies. 
4 As Linz (1985) has contended in ethnically heterogeneous contexts, as the Catalan context is, 
nationalist parties with hegemonic political goals are compelled to abandon their ethnic claims, and to 
adopt territorial or voluntary criteria for group membership in order to widen their targeted community. 
The underlying motivation for nationalist parties with hegemonic political goals to abandon ethnic claims 
would be to get both in-group and out-group members to participate in these aspirations for self-
government. 
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Left-wing parties were also electorally interested in promoting this single community but for 
different reasons to those of the CDC. Building a single community allowed Catalanist left-
wing parties, the PSUC and the PSC, to appeal to two types of left-wing voters that differ in 
their origin: Catalanist natives and the Spanish immigrant working class.  
The victory of the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congrés (PSC-C) and the Catalan 
Federation of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)’s joint candidacy in the 1977 
general elections in Catalonia had already showed that an alliance between these two parties 
could be successful.5 So in 1978, the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congrés, the Partit 
Socialista de Catalunya-Reagrupament and the Catalan Federation of the Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español (PSOE) merged and the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) was formed 
(Colomé 1989).6 Ultimately, the PSC expected to gather the support of all left-wing voters in 
Catalonia, regardless of their origin.  
The Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya’s (PSUC) claim for building a single 
community in Catalonia was just a continuation of the underground political action the party 
had carried out during the dictatorship. This political action had been defined in the Congress 
that the party had celebrated in 1956 in France. In that Congress, the PSUC had signaled its 
wish to “not turn class conflict into an ethnic conflict (between immigrant workers and the 
native businessmen of the bourgeoisie) and to foster the cultural integration of immigrants into 
Catalan society” (Díez Medrano 1999, 198). In the latter years of Franco’s regime, the PSUC 
had achieved this goal and so had managed to bring the Spanish working-class into the struggle 
for self-government (Conversi 1997, 213-214). 
Nevertheless, these parties’ interest in building a single community in Catalonia conflicted 
with the Partido Socialista Andaluz (PSA)’s own electoral interest. The PSA, a political party 
that was based in Andalucía, set itself up as responsible for defending the identity and the 
cultural and social interests of  Andalusian immigrants who were living in Catalonia (Rojas 
Marcos, El Periódico de Cataluña, March 15, 1980: 15).  
The question of “who is Catalan” became explicitly salient in the first years of the 
democracy and it was present everyday in the newspapers (Woolard 1989, 36). During the 
elaboration of the Statute of Autonomy, the CDC made an initial proposal to recognize 
immigrants’ right to decide freely whether they wanted to retain the citizenship of their 
birthplaces. The socialists and the communists presented an alternative proposal according to 
which everyone who resided in a Catalan municipality would be granted the “political condition 
of Catalanness” (Lo Cascio 2008, 64). This latter proposal was accepted unanimously and 
included as such in the Statute: “Spanish citizens who, in accordance with general Spanish law, 
are administrative residents of any municipality of Catalonia, will be considered as Catalans for 
political purposes” (Article 6.1, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 1979).7  
The PSA, together with the Partido Socialista Aragonés and the Partido Aragonés 
Regionalist, fought strongly against this definition of the political status of Catalans political 
and defended immigrants exercising their right to vote in their regions of origin. The PSA 
declared, moreover, “the existence of several communities within Catalonia” (Rojas Marcos, 
                                                      
5 Table A.4.1 in the appendix presents the results of the regional elections, the distribution of seats in 
the Catalan parliament and the type of government. 
6 The relationship between the PSC and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) has always 
been complex. Legally the PSC is independent from the PSOE, although it is federated to it (Colomé 
1989). The PSC’s “strange nature” and the heterogeneous origins of the PSC electoral base explain this 
party’s ambiguity on the issues that are embedded in the center-periphery dimension.  
7 The proposal was accepted unanimously by all the members of the Comissió dels Vint, which was 
responsible for drawing up the Statute. The Comissió consisted of representatives of the PSC, the PSUC, 
the Centristes de Catalunya- Unión de Centro Democrático (CC-UCD), the CDC, the ERC and the AP.  
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Diario 16, August 22, 1979: 1). However, the PSA’s attempt to trace a dividing line between the 
“Catalans” and the “immigrants” was rejected by the main Catalan parties, which accused the 
PSA of trying to divide Catalonia’s inhabitants according to their racial characteristics.8 The 
controversy moved Catalan political parties to emphasize even more strongly that immigrants 
were full Catalans.  
During the campaign over the Statute of Autonomy, two slogans were used extensively: 
“Now more than ever, one single people” and “All those who live and work in Catalonia are 
Catalan” (Woolard 1989, 36), which was a simplified formula of Pujol`s definition of 
Catalanness. The campaign sought to get immigrants to participate in Catalonia’s demands for 
autonomy, and obviated the ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity of the population.  
In November 1979, only one month after the Statute of Autonomy had passed in a 
referendum, Jordi Pujol (the CDC’s leader), Heribert Barrera (the ERC’s leader), Gregorio 
López Raimundo (the PSUC’s leader), and Joan Reventós (the PSC’s leader) participated in the 
closing roundtable of the conference “Catalunya: immigració i reconstrucció nacional”. The 
conference had been organized by the Fundació Jaume Bofill to discuss the challenge that 
immigration meant from a social and cultural perspective. The speeches delivered by these 
parties’ leaders show that Catalan elites had come to agree on a definition of Catalanness which 
was based on voluntary criteria, and that they expected Catalonia to become a single Catalan-
speaking community in the course of two generations. 
Jordi Pujol and Heribert Barrera emphasized a definition of Catalanness based on 
individuals’ willingness to be Catalan (Barrera, 1980; Pujol, 1980). The two leaders rejected, 
moreover, any definition of the Catalan identity based on primordial characteristics, either 
because a definition of the Catalan identity based on primordial characteristics was too 
demanding: 
 
“We do not want to make being Catalan difficult. Or at least, our party does not want to make 
being Catalan difficult. We do not want to say: ‘Catalan is everyone who has been here for 
many generations…Catalan is everyone whose grandparents, and the grandparents of his 
grandparents descend from the first Catalans, Catalan is everyone who… etc, etc. No! Catalan is 
everyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and who wants to be Catalan” (Pujol 1980, 220-
221}. 
 
Or because, it was not a sufficient criterion to show one’s Catalanness:  
 
“It is not enough to have been born in Catalonia. It is possible that there are people who were 
born in Catalonia, who were born in a family from another culture, and they do not want to be 
Catalan” (Barrera 1980, 212). 
 
The willingness to be Catalan, however, was not yet clearly associated with language 
abilities or practices.  
 
“One can be Catalan and speak in Castilian every day or not have achieved the ability to speak 
in our language, and that has no importance” (Barrera 1980, 212).  
 
“[Being Catalan] is neither a linguistic issue nor a genealogical one” (Jordi Pujol, El Correo 
Catalán, May 1st, 1977: 48).  
 
                                                      
8 Sopena, Enric. ‘Ofensiva lerrouxista en Cataluña. El voto de los inmigrantes, objetivo fundamental 
de la campaña’. Informaciones. March 10, 1977 in Linz, Juan J. Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. 
Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e 
Investigaciones, 2006 [Cited: (August 6, 2008)]. Available at: http://www.march.es/ceacs/linz/. 
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the immigrants who had arrived in Catalonia 
between the mid fifties and the mid seventies concentrated in neighborhoods and worked in jobs 
in which the Catalan language was completely absent. In addition, during Franco’s regime, the 
teaching of Catalan in school had been forbidden. Franco’s ban on teaching Catalan in schools 
had prevented natives from becoming full competent in Catalan, and it reinforced the young 
immigrants’ alienation from the language. These two circumstances advised against the use of 
any definition of Catalanness based on the language. Nevertheless, the disassociation between 
the willingness to be Catalan and the Catalan language would not last long. Ultimately, Pujol 
was convinced that language was the only means by which immigrants and their children could 
become full Catalans: 
 
“(Language is) the decisive factor in the integration of the immigrants in Catalonia. It is the 
most definitive. A man who speaks Catalan to his children, is a Catalan through and through” 
(Pujol 1976, 83).  
 
Thus, when he came to power in 1980, the language policies he implemented sought to get 
immigrants and their children to switch to Catalan. In fact, the two Catalan nationalist leaders 
envisaged a Catalonia that, in a period of two generations, would be transformed into a single 
community in which, according to Barrera (1980, 213), Catalan would be the language of daily 
communication or, in which, according to Pujol (1980, 219), everyone could speak, understand, 
read and write Catalan. 
In Gregorio López Raimundo and Joan Reventós’ view, this single community was already 
a reality, and not a goal, as Jordi Pujol and Heribert Barrera seemed to think: 
 
“In Catalonia there are not two communities separated by place of origin or the language, but a 
single community, the Catalan people, that has the peculiarity of including a significant number 
of immigrants, who are being gradually integrated within it, adopting its language and other 
national attributes” (López Raimundo 1980, 227}. 
  
“Catalonia is a single national community – a single people, as has been recently shouted with 
different accents-. And this is so not only because of its history and specific characteristics, but, 
especially, because we assume that there is an historic necessity to build a national project for 
working people” (Reventós 1980, 236} 
 
Catalan parties have come to agree, therefore, on the idea that Catalonia could not be 
divided in two linguistically distinct communities. Gradually, the question of “who is Catalan” 
faded from public debate, but the simplistic version of Pujol’s definition of Catalanness 
(“Catalan is everyone who lives and works in Catalonia”) remained.  
Different reasons could explain why the debate over the criteria for Catalanness lost 
prominence. First, the Statute of Autonomy had granted immigrants and their children the 
political status of Catalans. Secondly, both Catalan nationalist parties and left-wing parties 
subscribed the idea that Catalonia could not be divided into two ethnic and linguistic 
communities. Third, the only political party that had fiercely advocated for the existence of 
different communities within Catalonia, the PSA, was only able to elect two representatives to 
the Catalan parliament in the first regional elections. As a result, after 1984 the party 
disappeared from Catalan politics.  
Building on the idea that the Catalan population should become a single Catalan-speaking 
community, the CiU government would start to implement a policy that sought to assimilate the 
immigrants and their children into Catalonia. 
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4.2.2 The CiU governments (1980-2003) and language policies  
As mentioned in the introduction, the victory of the Convergència i Unió (CiU), a coalition 
made of the CDC and the Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC), in the first regional elections 
came as a surprise. The PSC had won the 1977 and the 1979 general elections, and so there was 
widespread conviction that the PSC would also win the regional elections (Lo Cascio 2008, 96). 
The results of the 1980 regional elections resulted, nevertheless, in the CiU becoming the ruling 
party in Catalonia, with the support of the ERC. The CiU would also win the 1984 regional 
elections, and it would continue to rule Catalonia over the next nineteen years, until a coalition 
of three left-wing parties (the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, the Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya and the Iniciativa per Catalunya-els Verds) replaced it in 2003.9  
On the debate or his investiture, Jordi Pujol established his government’s priorities: the 
development of the regional government’s responsibilities and the institutionalization of the 
regional administration, the recuperation of the productive fabric, and the promotion of Catalan 
identity (Lo Cascio 2008, 103).  
The recuperation of the Catalan language was essential to fostering Catalan identity 
(Argelaguet 2006; Lo Cascio 2008, 103). Bearing this in mind, the Catalan government 
promoted two laws that were intended to increase the levels of knowledge and use of Catalan: 
the Law on Language Normalization (1983) and the Law that created the Catalan Corporation of 
Radio and Television (1983). The passing of these laws and, in particular, the passing of the 
Law on Language Normalization had been facilitated by the fact that the PSC, as well as the 
CiU, defended Catalonia as a single community in which the Catalan language would be its 
“own” language. Raimon Obiols, which was at that time the PSC leader, and who represented 
the more Catalanist wing within it, expressed the idea in this way: 
 
‘We (the PSC) have believed that the objective of achieving language normalization, the full 
recovery of Catalan as Catalonia’s own language, was inseparable from the national 
reconstruction of the country. It must be integrated into the global objective of making Catalonia 
a single people’ (Obiols 1984, vii}. 
    
However, even if the CiU, the ERC, the PSUC and the PSC agreed on the goal of building a 
single Catalan community, there were important divergences on the means these parties thought 
were necessary to achieve this goal. One of the issues which confronted political parties during 
the negotiations over the Law on Language Normalization (Llei de Normalització Llingüística, 
LNL, 1983) was the model of school that should be implemented in Catalonia. Obviously, the 
school was key to the goal of normalizing the use of Catalan, and to achieve the language 
assimilation of the children of immigrants.  
Catalan parties were divided in two groups. The first group consisted of the CiU, the ERC 
and the Centristes de Catalunya-UCD, and defended a model of language separation. The 
PSUC and the PSC were against this model (Lo Cascio 2008, 121). The PSC and the PSUC 
managed to avoid the model of language separation and the LNL was finally passed with the 
                                                      
9 The 1980-1984 CiU minority government had the support of the ERC and the Centristes de 
Catalunya-UCD. Even though the CiU got an absolute majority in the 1984 regional elections, the ERC 
renewed its support for the CiU in the second term (1984-1988). In the next two regional elections (1988 
and 1992), the CiU got a majority of the votes. So, between 1984 and 1994 the CiU ruled with a majority 
government. The CiU lost the majority in the fifth term (1995-1999) and the sixth term (1999-2003). The 
coalition’s poor electoral results in 2003 facilitated a change in the regional government. In those 
elections the PSC got forty-two seats, the CiU, forty-six seats, the ERC, twenty-three, the PP, fifteen, and 
the ICV, nine seats. For more details, on the coalition governments in Catalonia see Ridao (2006). See 
table A.4.1 in the appendix. 
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support of all political parties, with the only abstention from a member of the Parliament that 
was not ascribed to any political party. The LNL established Catalan as one of the languages of 
instruction in the schools; it guaranteed children’s right to be initially educated in in their 
mother tongue (whenever parents request it); it obliged public authorities to avoid the separation 
of children in schools and classes based on language, and to guarantee that the Catalan language 
would be increasingly used at schools (Argelaguet 1999, 236).10  
Over the years, the CiU would fully assume a school system in which children from Catalan 
and Spanish backgrounds should be educated together. In 1992, the CiU government passed the 
language immersion decree (Decret 75/1992). This decree turned Catalan into the main 
language of instruction at all the educational levels. In nationalist leaders’ calculus there was 
very possibly the belief that language assimilation would turn immigrants into Catalans. Left-
wing leaders, on the other hand, supported the idea that language assimilation would improve 
the employment opportunities of the children of immigrants. In this way, at that time, Catalan 
political parties agreed on moving the status quo from bilingual education to language 
immersion. The only exception was, however, the Partido Popular (the PP, the former AP) 
which demanded parents’ right to choose their children’s language of instruction. 
Five years later, in 1997, the CiU started the reform of the Law on Language Normalization. 
This reform would help to silence criticisms for the CiU’s support of the PP’s minority national 
government (Miley 2006, 297).11 All Catalan parties, except for the PP, agreed that the Catalan 
language continued to be in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the Spanish language. This 
disadvantage was caused by the pervasive presence of the Spanish language in the media and in 
cultural-economic activity. They also agreed that as a result, the Catalan language needed to be 
further protected and promoted; however, they disagreed on the means to achieve this goal. The 
negotiations on the Law on Language Policy (Llei de Política Lingüística, LPL, 1998) revealed 
these differences between the Catalan parties.12 Actually, the negotiation of the law provoked 
discrepancies even within the political parties and, in particular, within the PSC.  
As detailed above, the PSC was formed by the merging of the PSC-Congrés, the PSC-
Reagrupament and Catalan Federation of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). While 
the first two parties’ electoral bases were left-wing authochthonous Catalan nationalists, the 
PSOE base was made up of Spanish immigrants in Catalonia, and so party leadership positions 
were divided between the Catalanist branch and the Spanish branch. This has often led to 
internal conflicts and has meant that party discourse has often been contradictory (Baras 1999; 
                                                      
10 The 1983 Orders on the implementation of the Language Normalization Law in Primary and 
Secondary School (Ordre de 8 de setembre de 1983 and 6 de desembre de 1983) generalized a bilingual 
model of education. The order mandated that, besides the course on Catalan language, one basic subject 
(either social or natural sciences) should be taught in Catalan in the first stage of primary school. In the 
second stage, both subjects should be taught in Catalan. In the secondary schools, at least two subjects 
(among natural sciences, drawing, history or mathematics) should be taught in Catalan. In practice, there 
were substantial differences in the model implemented in schools. Some schools adopted, from the 
beginning, a model of language immersion, others implemented a bilingual model of education 
(Argelaguet 1999, 114).  
11 In 1996, the PP won the Spanish elections for the first time. However, the PP was not able to get 
enough votes to form a majority government and was forced to rely on the CiU’s support. In exchange for 
its support, the CiU got certain important things in return, the most important of which was the revision of 
the system of regional financing. Thus, the PP pledged to transfer 30% of the revenue from income tax 
and the legislative responsibilities over it to Catalonia. Despite the importance of these achievements for 
Catalonia, the agreement placed the CiU in a delicate situation with regard to their voters, who had 
witnessed how the PP carried out an aggressive campaign against CiU nationalism during the previous 
legislature in which the CiU had also supported the PSOE minority national government. 
12 See Argelaguet (1998, 1999) and Miley (2006: 295-358) for a detailed account of the negotiation 
of the 1998 Language Policy Law, and of the changes this law introduced. 
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Martínez, 1999). This internal conflict became clear during the negotiation of the LPL, as the 
PSC leaders that had gained power within the party thanks to immigrants’ votes in the local 
elections argued that the law, on many points, violated the rights of Spanish-speakers (Miley 
2006: 305). Despite this, the PSC would end up supporting the new law after the CiU made 
some concessions regarding the language obligations of the state’s civil servants, and renounced 
imposing sanctions on individuals when they failed to use Catalan, even though its use was 
required.13 The law adopted a series of measures that regulated the use of Catalan in the state 
and regional administration, the media, and in cultural-economic activities. In the educational 
sphere, the law consolidated a model that was already fully deployed: a model of language 
immersion in Catalan.  
The law would be passed with the support of the CiU, the PSC, the Iniciativa per Catalunya 
(IC), and the Partit per la Independència (PI). However, unlike the 1983 law, this new law was 
not supported by the ERC. The ERC claimed that the law made little progress on the promotion 
of the use of Catalan language. The PP also opposed the law, arguing that it went too far in 
imposing sanctions and in regulating the use of Catalan in the private sector.  
Confrontation regarding Catalan language policies has been one of the issues that has 
contributed most prominently to the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage. In Catalonia, 
opposition to language policies has come mainly from the PP.14 However the PP minority 
position in the Catalan parliament has meant that the party’s stances regarding the language 
have not been mirrored in the language legislation.15 This can explain why the PP has channeled 
its opposition to the courts and, specifically, to the Constitutional Court.16 However, language 
policies have also led to conflicts between Spanish and Catalan governments. The confrontation 
on this issue has not only been a conflict over the division of responsibilities between the 
national and the regional government, but it has very often been framed as an identity conflict.    
 
4.2.3 The Tripartit governments (2003- 2010) and the reform of the statute  
 
In 2003, a three-party left-wing coalition consisting of the PSC, the ERC, and the ICV, 
replaced the CiU in the regional government. Although most political parties in the Catalan 
                                                      
13 After these changes were introduced, the law recognized citizens’ right to be attended in their own 
language by state institutions’ civil servants, but not necessarily to be responded to in their language, as 
was the CiU’s original aim. The CiU also renounced imposing sanctions on individuals for their use of 
Spanish. Nevertheless, the final text of the law allowed for imposing sanctions on businesses that did not 
obey the norms regarding signage, for example. 
14 Language policies have also been contested by a few initiatives promoted by well-known 
intellectuals. So, for example, the 2300 Manifesto for the equality of language rights in Catalonia in 
1981, and the Babel Forum, in 1997, argued in favor of bilingualism, and against the regulation of the use 
of Catalan. These initiatives, which got a lot of resonance in the media, were responded to by acts such as 
La Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalanes (Call for solidarity in 
defense of the Catalan language, the Catalan culture and the Catalan Nation), which gathered together 
100,000 people in the Camp Nou in 1981. Some professional sectors have also expressed their opposition 
to those measures of the language policy that affect their interests. Thus, for example, just before 
responsibilities for the school system were transferred to the Generalitat in 1980, Spanish-speaking 
teachers, backed by the UGT, protested against language discrimination (Miley 2006, 230-231). 
Manufacturers and commercial associations also opposed the CiU’s attempt to make product labeling in 
Catalan mandatory because of the cost increases. Movies distributors have also protested against the 
imposition of a Catalan quota for the dubbing of movies because of the Catalan market’s size limitation. 
In addition, organizations such as Convivencia Cívica Catalana have carried out campaigns demanding 
freedom of choice regarding language in the school. 
15 See Table A.4.1 in the appendix. 
16 The review of Constitutional Court decisions on this matter is beyond the scope of this chapter. See 
Argelaguet (1999), Miley (2006), 
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Parliament had formally requested a reform of the Statute of Autonomy in 2002 (La 
Vanguardia, 04.10.2002, pp. 13), the CiU’s regional government had then decided to delay the 
reform to the following term.17 Between 2000 and 2003, the PP majority in the Spanish 
Parliament had prevented the CiU from continuing to play the key role that the Catalan 
nationalist coalition had played in the Spanish minority governments between 1993 and 2000.18 
The PP’s disregard of demands for greater levels of self-government was very possibly behind 
Catalan parties’ interest in reforming the Statute of Autonomy. Actually, the president of the 
Catalan government also justified the necessity to reform the 1979 Statute of Autonomy because 
of the PP’s blockage of the decentralization process (“Pujol blames PP for the Statute Reform”, 
La Vanguardia, 23.11.2003, pp. 15). 
The government shift at the regional level was followed by a shift in the Spanish 
government just six months later. In March 2004, the PP lost the general elections and was 
replaced by the PSOE in the Spanish government. The PSOE’s poor electoral results, however, 
forced it to rule in minority with the parliamentary support of the IU and other regional parties, 
among which, was also the ERC. The change in the Spanish government and the fact that the 
new government had barely achieved a sufficient majority had, undoubtedly, important 
consequences for the reform of the statute. So, in January 2004, the Tripartit government, 
chaired by the PSC’s leader Pasqual Maragall, started to negotiate a new Statute of Autonomy. 
The negotiation of the new statute polarized political parties’ positions on the center-
periphery dimension. Although, four out of five of the Catalan political parties were in favour of 
the reform, the Tripartit parties and the CiU did not have a common position regarding the 
content of the reform.19 Nevertheless, in spite of all the difficulties, in September 2005, the new 
statute was passed with the support of the PSC, the ERC, the ICV and the CiU.  
In October 2005, the new statute project was taken to the Spanish Parliament. The 
negotiation of the statute in the Spanish Parliament led Spanish parties and Spanish elites to take 
a position regarding the content of the statute. Apart from the financial issues, the definition of 
Catalonia as a nation, and the language issues were the most conflicting issues. The PSOE’s 
stance regarding the statute reform in Catalonia was not unanimous. Within the PSOE, different 
voices argued against the reform (“Maragall confronts Ibarra after the latter requests the 
interruption of the statute proceeding in the Spanish Parliament”, La Vanguardia, 20.01.06, pp. 
13). The PP, on the contrary, held a unique position against the reform. All the PP’s regional 
and national leaders rejected the Catalan statute project, which, according to their perspective, 
diminished the central government’s responsibilities and threatened the unity of Spain. 
                                                      
17 Here it should be note that any statute passed in the Parliament of Catalonia also had to be passed 
in the Spanish Parliament. Thus, in 2002, the Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), a right wing party 
against any reform of the Statute of Catalonia, held office and possessed an absolute majority in the 
Spanish Parliament, allowing it to block any reform of the Catalan Statute. 
18 Between 1993 and 2000, the CiU was key to secure the stability of the PSOE (1993-1996) and the 
PP (1996-2000) minority national governments. In exchange for this support, the CiU got important 
returns from the PSOE, first, and from the PP, later on. Possibly, the most important of these was the 
revision of the system of regional financing. In 1996, the PP pledged the transfer of 30% of income tax 
revenues, and the transfer of the legislative responsibilities over it to Catalonia. This situation was 
reversed after the PP won the elections to the Spanish Parliament with an absolute majority. For more 
details regarding the participation of the CiU in the PP and PSOE minority governments, see  Artés 
(2008) and  León-Alfonso (2006). 
19 The negotiations over the statute led to confrontations among the Catalan parties over several 
issues. In this regard, it is worth noting that the CiU and the ERC adopted more maximalist positions than 
the PSC and the ICV. Within the PSC, the Catalanist leaders and those leaders who were backed by the 
population of immigrant origins also held different positions.  
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The Catalan Parliament proposal was passed in the Spanish Parliament in March 2006 after 
some of its articles were cut or modified. These cuts led the ERC to oppose the final text. 
Eventually, the ERC’s position against the statute would force Pasqual Maragall, then President 
of the Generalitat, to make an early call for elections in November 2006. Before these elections, 
the Catalan population endorsed the new Statute of Autonomy in a referendum that took place 
on June 2006, with 73.9 percent of the voters supporting the new statute although, only 48.4 
percent of the electorate participated in the referendum and 5.3 percent cast a blank ballot. 
Many of the advancements that had been made since 1980 regarding the protection and 
promotion of the Catalan language were written into the statute. The statute also advanced some 
of the measures which had not gathered enough support in 1998: for example, the statute 
reinforced the principle of linguistic availability, according to which citizens have the right to be 
attended and responded in their own language by the state civil servants in the judicial system, 
in addition to every business which provides services in Catalonia. The new statute also 
increased the Generalitat’s responsibilities on educational matters and it stipulated its 
responsibilities regarding the organization of the educational curriculum.20  
The reform of the statute led to the emergence of the Ciutadans- Partit de la Ciutadania 
(C’s). The C’s introduced itself as a non-nationalist party and participated in the 2006 elections 
taking a position against nationalist identity policies. The new party, which sought to respond to 
a political supply failure in the Catalan electoral market (Lago, Montero, and Torcal 2007), 
managed to get three seats in the Catalan Parliament.  
After the 2006 regional elections, the Tripartit government was renewed. José Montilla, a 
PSC leader with an immigrant origin, would become president of the Catalan government. The 
new Tripartit passed other laws which also sought to strengthen the protection of the Catalan 
language: i.e. the 2009 Catalan Education Law, the 2010 Law of Cinema, or the 2010 Decree 
which regulated the accreditation of university professors’ linguistic competencies. The 2009 
Catalan Education Law (LEC) consolidated the system of language immersion that had been 
implemented in Catalonia since 1992. The LEC confirmed that the curriculum should guarantee 
that children were fully competent in Catalan and Spanish at the end of compulsory education; it 
added that children cannot be separated into different classes or centers for reasons of language 
and it clarified that children’s right to get their initial years of education in their mother tongue 
refers to pre-school education.  
All in all, it can be stated that the change from the CiU governments to the Tripartit 
governments did not alter policy regarding Catalan language protection and promotion. On the 
contrary, the Tripartit government widened its protection, and endorsed the system of language 
immersion in schools that the CiU government had started in 1992. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses on long-term trends and short-term changes in national identification 
 
In this section, I present two sets of hypotheses that are derived from the previous section. 
The first set of hypotheses tries to account for the effect that Catalan elites’ understandings of 
Catalan identity, and the policies of language assimilation have had upon national identification. 
The second set of hypotheses refers to the effect that institutional variables and the mobilization 
                                                      
20 This responsibility is relevant because it has important consequences on the organization of the 
curriculum. In 2006, the central government passed a decree that stipulated that every primary school 
centre had to teach at least three hours of Spanish every week. In 2007, the Generalitat deployed its 
responsibilities on the organization of the curriculum. The 142/2007 Decret established that children 
should be taught at least 420 hours of Spanish language and literature, 420 hours of Catalan language and 
literature, and 245 hours of common language structures during the primary school.  
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of the center-periphery cleavage have on aggregate and individual variation of national 
identification. These two sets of hypotheses try to answer two different questions: whether elites 
have been able to foster identification with Catalonia, especially among the population of 
immigrant origin; and whether the institutional context and the mobilization of the center-
periphery cleavage can account for aggregate and individual change in national identification. In 
this regard, the hypotheses that I present next seek to contribute to our understanding of long-
term processes of assimilation and periodic changes in national identification. 
 
4.3.1 Accounting for long-term trends: political parties’ definition of Catalan identity and 
language policies  
 
The idea that the nation and national consciousness are shaped in a top-down process in 
which the state and its agents have a leading role is well established in the literature (Lipset  
1967; Linz 1973, 1985; Weber 1976; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; 
Guibernau 2003; Muñoz 2008, 2009; Smith 1991; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009; Miley 
2006, 2008). Some of these studies go even further when they claim that political elites do not 
only contribute to shape collective identities, but individual attachments to the nation 
(Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009; Muñoz 2008, 2009; Linz 1985; 
Miley 2006, 2008)  
In the previous section, I argued that between the late seventies and the early eighties, 
Catalan elites agreed to dissociate Catalan identity from purely primordial characteristics 
(descent and origin). I also argued that the CiU governments started a policy of language 
assimilation that was intended to increase the knowledge and use of Catalan among the whole 
population, but especially among the population of immigrant origin. Now, as the quote from 
Pujol’s memoirs at the beginning of section 4.2 shows, the policies implemented by the CiU 
governments were also intended to make the immigrants and their children “feel a bit or 
reasonably Catalan, or at least, identified with the country” (Pujol 2009, 48-49). Ultimately, the 
goal was to build a single Catalan community, and the main opposition Catalan parties (the 
PSC, the ERC and the PSUC first, and the ICV afterwards) also shared this goal. Actually, the 
Tripartit governments would continue the language policies that CiU governments had 
developed during twenty-three years.  
Now, if Catalan political elites were able to dissociate Catalan identity from purely 
primordial characteristic, then we should find that the association between origin and national 
identification would have declined over time (hypothesis 4.1.1). In other words, we should find 
that over the years immigrants and their descendants have become more similar in their national 
identification to the native population. Such a result would reveal a process of identificational 
assimilation of the immigrant population and their descendants. 
In addition, we know that the levels of knowledge and use of Catalan have significantly 
increased in the last thirty years. As the data from the 1986 municipal register and the 2001 
population census show, this increase has been noticeable among both natives and immigrants.21  
While in 1986 the percentage of natives who declared they spoke Catalan was 81 percent, in 
2001 this figure had gone up to 89 percent. Within this group, those who could write Catalan 
correctly rose 22 points: from 44 percent in 1986 to 66 percent in 2001. At the same time, 
among those who had been born in other regions of Spain, those able to speak Catalan increased 
                                                      
21 This data comes from the 1986 municipal register and the 2001 population census. Data from the 
2011 population census was not yet available at the time this chapter was finished.  
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by 17 percentage points (from 30 to 47 percent) between 1986 and 2001, and those who could 
write it correctly increased by 10 percentage points, going from 7 to 17 percent. 
 
Table 4.1 Knowledge of Catalan among natives and immigrants 1986, 2001 
 Natives Immigrants 
 1986 2001 1986 2001 
Can speak Catalan 81 89 30 47 
Can write Catalan 44 66 7 17 
Source: 1986 municipal register and the 2001 population census 
 
Language policies also lay behind language switches. Thus, the 1998 CIS survey on the 
“knowledge and use of languages” shows that among the 54 percent of the respondents whose 
mother tongue was Spanish, 3 percent had switched to Catalan in 1998 and 9 percent used both 
Catalan and Spanish (Siguán 1999). The 2008 IDESCAT Survey on Language Uses shows a 
similar pattern in the language switches.22 
 
Table 4.2 Change in the use of language 1998, 2008 
 1998 CIS Survey 2008 IDESCAT Survey 
 Mother 
tongue 
Today’s 
most 
frequently 
used 
language 
Change Mother 
tongue 
Today’s 
most 
frequently  
used 
language 
Change 
Catalan 38 41 +3 32 36 +4 
Spanish 54 43 -11 55 46 -9 
Both 7 16 +9 4 12 +8 
Other languages 1 - -1 9 6 -3 
Source: 1998 CIS survey on the “Knowledge and use of languages” in Spain and 2008 IDESCAT Survey on the 
Linguistic Uses 
 
Besides this, the IDESCAT Survey also shows that 8 percent of the immigrants and 16 
percent of the second generations used Catalan more frequently than Spanish in their daily 
interactions in 2008, while 9 percent of immigrants and 21 percent of the second generations 
used Catalan and Spanish equally.23   
 
Table 4.3 Most frequently used language among immigrants and second generations (2008) 
 Immigrants Second Generations 
Catalan 8 16 
Spanish 83 63 
Both 9 21 
Source: 2008 IDESCAT Survey on the Linguistic Uses 
 
All these data suggest that language policies have had a great impact on the population’s 
knowledge and use of Catalan. What is doubtful, however, is whether the language policies 
have also encouraged identification with Catalonia among the population of immigrant origin, 
as Jordi Pujol and the CiU governments sought to achieve. Now, if language policies have 
                                                      
22 The 1998 and 2008 data are not comparable, as the 2008 data also includes data regarding the 
foreign population.   
23 In 2003 a Survey on Language Uses was carried out for the first time in Catalonia. Five years later, 
the survey was repeated. The 2003 survey lacked, however, any question on the respondents and their 
parents’ origin. 
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affected identification with Catalonia, then we should find that the association between the 
knowledge of Catalan and national identification has strengthened over time (hypothesis 4.1.2).  
Change in the strength of this association should be observed mainly in the second 
generation group for two reasons. First, because language is for this group an acquired, rather 
than an adscriptive characteristic and, therefore, we can test whether the learning of Catalan has 
triggered identification with Catalonia and secondly, because this group is the one that has been 
exposed more intensively to the language policies through schooling. Unlike many immigrants 
who arrived in Catalonia after having gone through compulsory education in their hometowns, 
second generations have been educated in Catalonia.  
If the results that I get show that the association between origin and identification with 
Catalonia has weakened, while the association between knowledge of Catalan and identification 
with Catalonia has strengthened, then we could state that the constitutive elements of Catalan 
identity have experienced a transformation in the period under consideration. This result could 
be cited as evidence of the elites’ ability to assimilate immigrants and their children in Catalonia 
through their learning the Catalan language.  
 
4.3.2 Accounting for short-term changes: political parties’ incentives and the mobilization of 
the center-periphery cleavage  
 
Today, there is little doubt that the political context plays a decisive role in determining 
individuals’ political attitudes and political behavior. So, for example, events, such as 
presidential campaigns have been claimed to affect pre-adult socialization, and generate partisan 
predispositions that persist over time (Sears and Valentino 1997). However, the political context 
can also affect other political predispositions beyond partisanship, among them individuals’ 
identification with the nation. I have already mentioned previous studies which have argued that 
decentralization processes and the transference of responsibilities from the state to regional 
institutions strengthens individuals’ regional identifications, to the detriment of national 
identifications (Argelaguet 2006; Guibernau 2006, 2007; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 2009).  
Here, however, I want to examine another aspect of the political context: the mobilization of 
the center-periphery cleavage. Thus, my argument is that elites’ mobilization of the center-
periphery cleavage accounts for the periodic changes that are observed in identification with 
Spain and Catalonia, both at the individual and the aggregate level.24 
To capture the influence of the cleavage upon individuals’ identification here I will look at 
two distinct aspects: Catalan nationalist parties’ incentives to mobilize the center-periphery 
cleavage, and the level of confrontation between Catalan and Spanish parties along the center-
periphery cleavage.  
 
1. Political parties’ incentives to mobilize the center-periphery cleavage  
 
In Spain, there are two levels of political competition (the national and the regional) in 
which both national and regional parties are represented and compete. Since 1982, either the 
PSOE or the PP has been the majority party in the Spanish Parliament. Yet, when neither of the 
two parties has been able to get a sufficient number of votes to form a majority government, 
these two national parties have been pushed to search for parliamentary support to create a 
                                                      
24 This hypothesis will be also examined more deeply in chapter 6.  Making use of data collected in 
qualitative interviews, chapter 7 will go in depth into the micro-mechanisms linking the mobilization of 
the cleavage and individuals’ identification.   
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stable minority government.25 The prominence of the nationalist parties at the national level, 
along with the fact that the IU excluded itself during many years from forming a coalition with 
the PSOE, has meant that nationalist parties’ support has been crucial to forging successful 
parliamentary majorities (Lago and Montero 2010).26 Now, as Lago and Montero (2010, 403-
403) have noted multilevel political competition has had a significant impact on nationalist 
parties’ strategies and their accountability practices.  
Generally, we can assume that nationalist parties have a strong preference for pushing 
policies that benefit the regions they represent. To achieve this goal, nationalist parties very 
often have to become active members of government coalitions, or alternatively try to impact 
the legislative production from outside national governments (Kedar 2004). In order to become 
influential in the legislative process, nationalist parties need to maximize their vote share. 
However, nationalist parties’ strategies to achieve this goal vary depending on their bargaining 
power.  
 When nationalist parties are crucial to form national parliamentary majorities, they can 
influence legislative production. Accordingly, they will be evaluated retrospectively (Fearon 
1986). In order to satisfy the re-election threshold, they must get some kind of compensation 
from the national government to satisfy their voters and, in exchange, they will have to 
moderate their nationalist demands. This does not mean that they will give them up, but they 
will have to tone them down if they want to keep their privileged position. 
Conversely, when the nationalist parties’ vote share is low (and nationalist parties are not 
politically influential), they have a strong incentive to behave in a forward-looking manner. 
Hence, nationalist parties strategically mobilize and agitate the center-periphery cleavage to 
maximize the nationalist vote in the next election. By mobilizing the cleavage, they seek to 
activate the selective or prospective mechanisms of voting (Fearon 1999).  
However, the bargaining power of nationalist parties is not only a function of their vote 
share. It also depends on whether there are other smaller parliamentary parties that the majority 
national parties can form a coalition with. Taking this into account, and thinking about the 
Spanish context, I see two scenarios in which the bargaining power of nationalist parties has 
been weak and therefore, nationalist parties’ incentives to mobilize the cleavage should be 
stronger; and one scenario in which the nationalist parties’ bargaining power has been stronger, 
and so nationalist parties should have incentives to de-mobilize the cleavage.  
Thus, when national parties have gotten parliamentary majorities, then nationalist parties 
become dispensable. Majority national governments (see table 4.4 below) have limited Catalan 
nationalist parties and, in particular, the CiU’s ability to affect policy and to extract returns for 
Catalonia. As a consequence, when a national party has had the majority of the seats in the 
Spanish parliament, the Catalan nationalist parties have had greater incentive to mobilize the 
cleavage, under the expectation that this mobilization will bring more votes in the following 
general elections.  
Incentives to mobilize the cleavage have also been important when the minority national 
                                                      
25 According to Reniu (2002), four elements have determined the possibilities for forming minority 
governments in Spain: the Spanish electoral system; the parliamentary mechanisms for investiture and for 
confidence votes; and the prominence of the regional parties in the Spanish parliament. 
26 Here it must be noted that, rather than parties’ ideological or policy distance, situations of “mutual 
dependence between the party in the national minority government and regional parties that are either in a 
vulnerable position due to their own minority government status or are in an executive coalition with the 
national governing party at the regional level” have widened the possibilities to build alliances (Field 
2009). Additionally, the Spanish experience shows that such alliances have also been established between 
national minority governments and regional parties that were, at the same time, the regional ruling party.  
María José Hierro Hernández 
 99 
government has turned to other parties to build legislative majorities and, therefore, Catalan 
nationalist parties’ influence over legislative production has been limited (for example, during 
the 2004-2011 PSOE minority governments). In such a case, Catalan nationalist parties also 
have greater incentives to mobilize the cleavage.  
However, during the PSOE minority government (1993 -1996) and in the PP minority 
government (1996-2000), the CiU support to these governments was of key importance to 
secure the stability of these minority governments. As Heller (2002, 680) has noted, the PSOE 
and the PP’s need to build legislative majorities gave the CiU significant power to affect policy. 
This power meant that the CiU was in a better position to achieve its policy goals. Thus, for 
example, in exchange for its support, the CiU won greater fiscal responsibilities for the regional 
government. As a result of this, the CiU’s incentives to mobilize the cleavage to get more votes 
decreased. The strategy was to take credit for the benefits obtained for Catalonia under the 
expectation that voters would compensate the party electorally for these outcomes.  
All this considered, I hypothesize that identification with Catalonia should go up when the 
nationalist parties had greater incentives to mobilize the cleavage, that is, during the PSOE and 
the PP majority governments. A similar effect should be observed when the majority national 
parties were able to gather support from several small parliamentary parties, that is, during the 
two latter PSOE minority governments (between 2004 and 2011). Conversely, I hypothesize 
that aggregate identification with Catalonia should decrease when the minority national 
governments have resorted to the support of a strong nationalist party, that is, between 1993 and 
2000 (hypothesis 4.2).  
 
Table 4.4 Majority and minority national governments (1982 – 2011) 
 PSOE PP 
Majority governments 1982 – 1993 2000 – 2004 
Minority governments (with the support of CiU) 1993 – 19961 1996 – 20002 
Minority governments (with the support of ERC) 2004 – 20083   
Minority governments (with alternative legislative 
majorities) 
2008 – 2011  
1 The PNV also supported the PSOE 1993 – 1996 minority government. 
2 The PNV and the CC also supported the PP 1996 – 2000 minority government. 
3 The Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), the IU and the CC also gave their support to the PSOE 2004 – 2008 
minority government. 
 
2. Confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage (hypothesis of individual change) 
 
A more direct way to test the impact that the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage 
has upon individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia consists of looking at the levels of 
confrontation between national and e regional governments, and national and regional parties.  
In Catalonia, the center-periphery cleavage pervades daily politics and structures political 
competition on a permanent way. However, when Catalan parties have introduced on the 
political agenda cleavage-related issues (e.g. language policies, the reform of the Statute), 
political parties’ claims on the issue have increased. Negative claims and identity frame claims 
mobilize the cleavage. 
The immediate connectedness of the stances made by the elites regarding those issues that 
are embedded in the center-periphery cleavage and identification with Spain and Catalonia 
should affect individuals’ identification.  
Nevertheless, the impact of elite’s stances on such issues should not be the same for all 
individuals, but should be contingent on individuals’ prior identification. In this way, it could be 
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hypothesize that when political elites’ stances regarding a particular issue harden and, therefore, 
the level of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage increases, exclusive identification 
with Spain and Catalonia should be reaffirmed and dual identifications should lean to one or the 
other side. In other words, confrontation is expected to polarize individuals’ identification, 
reinforcing the Catalan (or Spanish) identification of those who felt already Catalan (or 
Spanish), and fostering exclusive identification among those who identify with Spain and 
Catalonia at the same time. On the aggregate, we should observe that when confrontation along 
the center-periphery cleavage rises, then the levels of primarily Catalan and primarily Spanish 
identification should also increase.  
The lack of panel data that provides information on individuals’ prior identification and 
covers the period under consideration hinders the proper test of these hypotheses. However, 
being aware of the relationship between individuals’ family origin and national identification, in 
this chapter I will make use of individuals’ origin group as a proxy for prior identification. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that when confrontation along the center periphery cleavage 
increases, then the immigrants and their children’s identification with Catalonia will decrease, 
and the children of mixed couples and the autochthonous’ identification with Catalonia will 
increase (hypothesis 4.3).  
 
Table 4.5 Summary of hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses on the impact that elites’ definition of Catalanness and  language policies have upon 
long-term trends in national identification 
 
Hypothesis 4.1.1 The association between origin and national identification will have declined over time 
Hypothesis 4.1.2 The association between the knowledge of Catalan and national identification has strengthened over time 
 
Hypotheses on the mobilization of the cleavage and its effect over identification with Catalonia 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 
Identification with Catalonia should moderate when the PSOE and the PP 
minority governments  had the CiU support 
Identification with Catalonia should be higher when the PSOE and the PP 
majority governments, and when the 2004-2011 PSOE minority 
governments resorted to alternative legislative majorities 
Hypothesis 4.3 
When the levels of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage go up, 
immigrants and second generations’ identification with Catalonia should go 
down, while the children of mixed couples and the autochthonous’ 
identification with Catalonia should increase 
 
4.4 Data and variables 
 
In this chapter I draw on the CIS cross-sectional time series that were presented in the 
previous chapter. The data consist of a pool of cross-sectional surveys with information on 
individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia and other variables of interest.27 As I 
detailed in the introduction, national identification is measured by means of a bi-directional 
indicator that forces respondents to report on their identification with two national categories: 
Spain and Catalonia.  
                                                      
27 As not all surveys have information on all the variables of interest, the surveys used in each 
analysis will be reported in each table. 
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For the test of the first set of expectation on the long-term trends, the analysis will include a 
series of individual characteristics: individuals and their parents’ origin and individuals’ 
knowledge of Catalan. While the first two variables are ascriptive characteristics, the knowledge 
of Catalan is an ascriptive characteristic for the autochtonous population and their children, and 
an acquired characteristic for the immigrants and their children. Respondents’ knowledge of 
Catalan will be proxied with three dummy variables that refer to individuals’ ability to 
understand, speak and write Catalan.28 Due to Spanish and Catalan language’ linguistic 
closeness, it is relatively easy for Spanish-speakers to come to understand Catalan. This is 
mainly a passive process. Thus, what it makes a difference is Spanish-speakers’ ability to speak 
Catalan.   
Dummy variables for respondents’ educational levels and for birth cohort will also be 
introduced in the analysis as control variables.  
For the second set of expectation, I will include in the analysis the individual and their 
parents’ origin characteristics, individuals’ educational level and the birth cohort dummies.29  
Generating indicators that allow us to capture the effect of the context on individuals’ 
attitudes is always a challenge. Previous studies have roughly approximated the effect that 
context has on national identification using dummy variables for certain political events (e.g. 
Olympic games). Here, I will follow two different strategies to proxy the effect of the 
institutional context. First, taking into account the argument presented in the previous section 
regarding the influence that government alliances between national and regional parties might 
potentially have on national identification, I have generated a variable with four categories. This 
variable will take a value of 1 in those years in which there was a majority government in the 
Spanish government (1982 – 1993 and 2000 – 2004); a value of 2 in the years during which the 
PSOE minority government had the support of the CiU  (1993 – 1996); a value of 3 in those 
years in which the PP minority government had the support of the CiU  (1996 – 2000) and a 
value of 4 in those years in which the PSOE minority government had the punctual support of 
the IU, the ERC or other regional parties (2004 – 2011). Therefore, for example, if a survey 
from the CIS series was carried out in 1995, then this survey will be assigned a value of 2. The 
categories of this variable will be introduced in the analysis as dummy variables and the first 
category will be the reference category. 
I am also interested in capturing the influence of the political context surrounding the 
implementation of the surveys has on individuals’ national identification. To proxy the 
mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage, I have examined the front pages of “La 
Vanguardia” newspaper in the month prior to each survey’s fieldwork, as well as during the 
fieldwork.30 Next, I have counted the number of news stories reporting a conflict, and the 
number of news stories reporting a positive relationship between the Spanish and the Catalan 
government, or between Spanish and Catalan parties, and I have subtracted the two figures for 
                                                      
28 The item that asks about individuals’ knowledge of Catalan in the CIS’ series has not always been 
the same from survey to survey.  In the 1984 to 1992 and 1995 surveys, the answer categories were 1 
“speaks and writes”, 2 “understands and speaks”, 3 “understands but does not speak” and 4 “does not 
understand”. In the 1993 and 1996 to 2010 surveys, respondents were asked separately whether they were 
able to understand, speak, read and write Catalan. In order to make the series equivalent, those 
respondents who stated they were able to read Catalan, but not to write Catalan correctly were merged 
with the group of those who were able to understand and speak Catalan. 
29 As the number of surveys for which the knowledge of Catalan is available is twelve, and I need to 
maximize the number of points in time to account for variation at the aggregate, I have excluded the 
knowledge of Catalan variable from this second analysis.  
30 La Vanguardia is Catalonia’s leading daily newspaper. It has been published in Spanish since 1881 
and in Catalan since 2011.  
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each survey year. So, for example, news such as “Pujol makes his first criticisms of the Spanish 
Government” (October 31th, 1996) or “The PP ratifies in Barcelona its position against the 
Statute” (May 11th, 2005) are considered negative news stories which contribute to the 
mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage. On the contrary, news such as “Pujol says that 
pacting with Madrid benefits Catalonia” (October 16th, 1996) or “Zapatero demands the PP 
respects Catalonia and its identity” (May 20th, 2006) are considered actions which seek to 
mitigate the cleavage.  
 The resulting index, which I have named the confrontation index, takes a negative value 
when the number of news stories reporting a positive relationship between the central and the 
regional government, or the central and the regional parties outnumbers the news stories 
reporting a conflict and vice versa. In the period under consideration, the confrontation index 
ranges between -3 in the 1988-year survey and 13 in the 2005-year survey.   
 
Table 4.6 Index of Confrontation: Number of positive and negative news stories included on the 
front page of the Catalan newspaper “La Vanguardia” in the month prior to fieldwork, as well 
as during the fieldwork 
Study No. Fieldwork Month Negative 
News 
Positive 
News 
Difference 
Neg.- Pos. 
1719 December 1987 3 3 0 
1750 June 1988 1 3 -2 
1978 October 1991 12 4 8 
1987 January 1992 4 2 2 
2052 April 16 – 26, 1993 2 0 2 
2137 February 20 – March 6, 1995 2 5 -3 
2228 November 16 – December 5, 1996 19 4 15 
2298 October 8 – 21, 1998 8 7 1 
2374 October 21 – November 5, 1999 7 1 6 
2410 March 3 – 26, 2001 12 8 4 
2450 March 9 –April 26, 2002 7 3 4 
2610 December 2 – 31, 2005 26 12 14 
2643 May 22 – 31, 2006 2 4 -2 
2667 January 1 – 5, 2007  7 4 3 
2799 April 27  – May 3, 2009 6 5 1 
2852 October 15  –November 4, 2010 6 1 5 
 
4.5 Change in the ascriptive and acquired determinants of national identification  
 
In this section, I examine the evolution of the constitutive elements of identification with 
Spain and Catalonia over time. Here, it is important to make clear that the analyses that I present 
next do not seek to explain individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia, but to show the 
change in the ascriptive and acquired determinants of identification with Spain and Catalonia: 
respondents’ origin and descendancy and knowledge of Catalan. 
To learn about these changing relationships, I compare the evolution of identification with 
Spain and Catalonia in the different origin groups (natives, children of mixed couples, second 
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generations and immigrants) over the period between 1987 and 2010.31 Taking into account the 
nominal character of the national identification indicator, I use a multinomial logistic 
regression.  
In the analysis, the “only Spanish” and “more Spanish than Catalan” categories have been 
merged, and the “as Spanish as Catalan” category will be the referent category.  
To assess change in the strength of the association between respondents’ origin and 
identification with Spain and Catalonia, a time variable will be introduced in the analysis. This 
variable will take the value of the year in which the survey was conducted. Respondents’ 
education level and his or her birth cohort will be also introduced as control variable 
Table 4.7 reports the estimates and the standard errors of the dummies variables (respondent 
and their parents’ origin), their interaction with the time variable, and the control variables. I 
will first pay attention to the control variables to focus afterwards in the analysis of the 
changing relationships.  
Looking at the education dummies, it can be seen that education increases the odds that 
individuals identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” and “only Catalan” and decreases the odds 
that they identify as primarily Spanish.32 The sign of the birth cohorts’ coefficients is negative 
for the primarily Spanish category and positive for the “more Catalan than Spanish” category.33 
This means that those individuals who were born before 1965 have a lower probability of self-
identifying as primarily Spanish and a greater probability of self-identifying as “more Catalan 
than Spanish” than  individuals who were born after that year. This result contrasts with the 
results we got in Table 3.6 of the previous chapter and seems to indicate that differences in the 
national identification of these cohorts can be explained, to a large extent, by the differences in 
their education levels. Besides this, all the cohorts, but the third one, seem to have a similar 
probability of identifying as “only Catalan”, and this is coherent with results in the previous 
chapter.34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
31 As it was already mentioned in previous chapter, the first year with information on the variables of 
interest is 1987.  
32 Primary education is the reference category here.   
33 The two younger cohorts are the reference category here.  
34 This is the cohort that reached political maturity during Franco regime’s development plans and 
the cohort that has the greatest number of immigrants. 
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Table 4.7 Estimation of the changing relationship between individuals and their parents’ origin 
and national identification. Multinomial logistic regression with selected variables (1987-2010) 
 
 
Primarily 
Spanish 
More Catalan than 
Spanish 
Only Catalan 
 
Year 0.017* -0.004 0.016*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Origin groups    
Children of mixed couples 0.860*** -0.527*** -0.949*** 
 (0.207) (0.117) (0.152) 
Second generations 1.111*** -1.346*** -1.550*** 
 (0.148) (0.099) (0.144) 
Immigrants 2.702*** -2.249*** -3.161*** 
 (0.119) (0.100) (0.193) 
Interactions    
Mixed x Year -0.023 -0.017* -0.017* 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) 
S. Generation x Year -0.016 -0.012 -0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Immigrant x Year -0.034*** -0.004 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) 
Education    
Vocational Training -0.452*** 0.237*** 0.200** 
 (0.067) (0.053) (0.064) 
Secondary Education -0.492*** 0.310*** 0.229*** 
 (0.073) (0.055) (0.066) 
University -0.531*** 0.377*** 0.440*** 
 (0.073) (0.054) (0.063) 
Birth Cohorts    
< 1924 -0.471*** 0.264*** -0.022 
 (0.082) (0.069) (0.082) 
1925-1934 -0.458*** 0.278*** -0.026 
 (0.072) (0.062) (0.075) 
1935-1944 -0.524*** 0.220*** -0.179* 
 (0.069) (0.060) (0.074) 
1945-1954 -0.508*** 0.314*** -0.056 
 (0.067) (0.056) (0.068) 
1955-1964 -0.368*** 0.166** 0.010 
 (0.063) (0.051) (0.061) 
Constant -1.919*** 0.267*** -0.206** 
 (0.120) (0.061) (0.070) 
Observations 
Log-Likelihood 
LR Chi2 
Adj. Count R2 
26266 
-28937.231 
11843.38(45) 
0.154 
Note:  
1Category of reference: “as Spanish as Catalan” 
2Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated 
Source: CIS cumulative series CIS(1719) 1987, CIS(1750) 1988, CIS(1978) 1991, CIS(1987) 1992, CIS(2052) 
1993, CIS(2137) 1995, CIS(2228) 1996, CIS(2298) 1998, CIS(2374) 1999, CIS(2410) 2001, CIS(2450) 2002, 
CIS(2610) 2005, CIS(2643) 2006, CIS(2667) 2007, CIS(2799) 2009, CIS(2852) 2010 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure 4.1 represents the evolution of the predicted probabilities of self-identifying as 
“primarily Spanish”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, as “more Catalan than Spanish” and as “only 
Catalan” over the period under consideration for the different origin groups. The figure 
simulates the probability for an individual born between 1964 and 1974, who has completed 
secondary education.35 
Two important points can be highlighted from Figure 4.1. First, between group change has 
been more important than within group change. Second, if we take the native group as the 
reference category, the assimilation pattern that was expected to occur in the other origin groups 
(children of mixed couples, second generations and immigrants) has only occurred moderately.   
 
Figure 4.1 Evolution of the predicted probabilities of identifying as “primarily Spanish”, as “as 
Spanish as Catalan”, as “more Catalan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan” by origin group 
(1987 – 2010). 
 
 
 
Between 1987 and 2010, immigrants’ probability of self-identifying as “primarily Spanish” 
has decreased significantly, while their probability of self-identifying as “as Spanish as Catalan” 
is greater in 2010 than it was in 1987.36 Immigrants exhibit a very low probability of identifying 
as “more Catalan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan” and this low probability has remained 
constant over time. In the second generations’ group an interesting pattern appears. Individuals’ 
in this group are today more prone to identify themselves “as Spanish as Catalan”. Now, these 
individuals’ probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan” has 
                                                      
35 In the figure, the x axis represents the period under consideration, where 0 means 1987 and 26 
means 2010. As Table A.1 shows1987 is the first year with complete information on the variables of 
interest.  
36 Here, it is worth noting that I am looking only at the trends over time. The margins of confidence 
overlap show that the change within the group might have been less important.  
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decreased over time. This is something surprising, and reflects that the probability of second 
generations’ identifying as primarily Catalan has decreased over time, contrary to what would 
be expected according to our assimilation expectations. Children of mixed couples’ probability 
of identifying “as Spanish as Catalan” or as “only Catalan” have increased, while their 
probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” has decreased. Between 1987 and 
2010, the autochthonous have experienced a 10 point increase in the probability of identifying 
as “only Catalan”. This increase has been in parallel to a decrease in the probability of 
identifying “as Spanish as Catalan” and, especially, of identifying as “more Catalan than 
Spanish”. Individuals’ in the autochthonous group display a zero probability of identifying as 
primarily Spanish, and this has remained constant over the period of analysis.  
Divergences in the probability of identifying “as Spanish as Catalan” between the 
autochthonous group and the rest of the groups have caused these groups to become more 
different over the years. Divergences have been more important between the autochthonous and 
the second generation groups. This has been due to the fact that the probability of identifying as 
both Spanish and Catalan at the same time has increased in the second generation group but it 
has decreased in the autochthonous group. And the contrary trend has been observed with the 
probability that these two groups identify as “only Catalan”. Thus, if the difference in the 
probability of identifying as “only Catalan” between these two groups was around 15 points in 
1987, in 2010 this difference has gone up to around 35 points.  
The changes experienced by these groups in their probabilities of identifying as “primarily 
Spanish”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, as “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan” have had 
an effect that contradicts hypothesis 4.1.1. Thus, the association between individuals’ and their 
parents’ origin and national identification seems to be stronger in 2010 than it was in 1987. 
While the immigrants and the second generations feel both Spanish and Catalan with a greater 
probability in 2010 than in 1987, the autochthonous group has evolved towards a more 
exclusive identification with Catalonia.  
After having shown that the results presented here do not confirm hypothesis 4.1.1, I turn 
now to the second hypothesis. If language policies have contributed to increasing identification 
with Catalonia, we should see that the association between the knowledge of Catalan and 
national identification has strengthened over time. To check this, I focus on the second 
generation group. For this group, language is not an ascriptive characteristic, transmitted by 
their parents, but an acquired characteristic that has been learned at school. The second 
generation, therefore, is the group that has been exposed to the language assimilation policies 
most intensively.37  
Here, I estimate the national identification of second generations as a function of the 
parents’ origin, the respondents’ linguistic competences, the respondents’ level of education and 
their birth cohort. In the period between 1987 and 2010, only twelve surveys provide 
information on the respondents’ linguistic competencies or knowledge of Catalan. I have re-
codified the dependent variable into three distinct categories: a category which merges the “only 
Spanish”, “more Spanish than Catalan” and “as Spanish as Catalan” categories, and the “more 
Catalan than Spanish” and “only Catalan categories”.38 The results of the analysis are presented 
in Table 4.8.  
                                                      
37 Many immigrants had already completed their education at the time they came to Catalonia, so 
they have not experienced the language policies so directly.  
38 I have oted for this recodification of the dependent variable because what I want to test here is the 
effect of knowledge of Catalan on identification with Catalonia. The knowledge of Catalan is not 
expected to have any effect on Spanish identification. Although the results are not presented here, I have 
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Table 4.8 Estimation of the changing relationship between knowledge of Catalan language and 
national identification (Second generations). Multinomial logistic regression with selected 
variables (1987-2010) 
 
 
More Catalan 
than Spanish 
Only Catalan 
   
Year 0.025 -0.035 
 (0.027) (0.066) 
Knowledge of Catalan   
Can Speak 1.307*** 0.791 
 (0.376) (0.679) 
Can Write 2.045*** 2.086** 
 (0.373) (0.670) 
Interactions   
Year x Can Speak -0.030 0.037 
 (0.029) (0.068) 
Year x Can Write -0.044 0.014 
 (0.029) (0.067) 
Education   
Voc. Training -0.105 -0.234 
 (0.133) (0.222) 
Secondary 0.225 -0.127 
 (0.154) (0.271) 
University 0.334* 0.071 
 (0.146) (0.236) 
Birth cohorts   
< 1924 1.659*** 2.428*** 
 (0.240) (0.339) 
1925-1934 1.245*** 2.536*** 
 (0.189) (0.257) 
1935-1944 0.887*** 1.868*** 
 (0.204) (0.292) 
1945-1954 0.767*** 1.492*** 
 (0.167) (0.268) 
1955-1964 0.538*** 1.203*** 
 (0.127) (0.215) 
Constant -3.179*** -4.573*** 
 (0.360) (0.665) 
Observations 
Log-Likelihood 
LR Chi2 
Adj. Count R2 
3,101 
-2132.4515 
321.54(26) 
0.006 
Note:  
1The category of reference is a merged category of the “only Spanish”, “more Spanish than Catalan” and 
“as Spanish as Catalan” categories 
2Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated 
Source : CIS(1719) 1987, CIS(1750) 1988, CIS(1978) 1991, CIS(1987) 1992, CIS(2052) 1993, 
CIS(2137) 1995, CIS(2228) 1996, CIS(2298) 1998, CIS(2374) 1999, CIS(2410) 2001, CIS(2450) 2002, 
CIS(2667) 2007, CIS(2857) 2010 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
repeated the analysis with the same recodification that I used in the previous analysis. The results are 
equivalent.  
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Now, in order to see whether the second generation’s linguistic competencies have altered 
their identificational choices over time, I have represented in figure 4.2 the evolution of the 
probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” and “only Catalan” in those 
individuals who cannot understand Catalan or only understand it, and in those who can speak 
and write Catalan. The figure simulates the national identification of an individual, born 
between 1964 and 1974, who has completed lower secondary education.  
 
Figure 4.2 Evolution of the predicted probabilities of identifying as “more Catalan than 
Spanish” or “only Catalan” by knowledge of Catalan: second generations (1987-2010).  
 
The figure shows that until 2000 significant differences were present in the probability of 
identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” between those who could not understand or were 
only able to understand Catalan and those who were fully competent in Catalan and, therefore, 
could write it. From that moment on, the differences disappear. Now, it is striking that there has 
been a convergence in the probability of identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” of those 
who “do not understand or are only able to understand Catalan”, and those who can “speak” and 
“write” Catalan. Certainly, these results should be interpreted carefully due to the limited 
number of second generations in these categories;39 yet, they suggest that the relationship 
between being competent in Catalan and Catalan identification has weakened over time. This 
result could be related to the fact that the proportion of second generations who could speak and 
write Catalan was lower in 1987 than in 2010. In 1987 those who could speak and write 
Catalan, within the second generation group, were also more attached to Catalonia. Today, as 
the levels of knowledge of Catalan have increased within this group, the impact of knowledge 
of Catalan has weakened.  
In view of these results, some points can be raised. First, it can be stated that immigrants and 
their children have tended to identify with both Spain and Catalonia over the years. As Jordi 
                                                      
39 The low number of individuals within the second generation group who self-identify as “more 
Catalan than Spanish” in 2009 and 2010 explains the large confidence intervals of the point estimate.  
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Pujol seemed to want (see the quote from his memoirs at the beginning of section 4.2): today 
the immigrants and their children feel reasonably Catalan and they identify themselves with 
Catalonia. Yet, this process has run parallel to the autochthonous group trend of abandoning 
their identificational attachments with Spain, and coming to identify as only Catalan.   
The results also suggest that the strategy carried out by the Catalan elites, consisting in 
dissociating Catalan identity from the origin and descendancy, and assimilating the population 
from an immigrant origin through language policies, has not achieved the expected results. 
Identification with Catalonia continues to be strongly linked to individuals’ and their parents’ 
Catalan origin. Moreover, linguistic adaptation has not caused second generations to abandon 
their Spanish attachment and to identify as exclusively Catalan. This latter result corroborates 
de la Calle and Miley`s (2008) argument: policies of language assimilation can foster linguistic 
adaptation, but they are not able to cause identificational assimilation.40 It also shows that 
linguistic competencies have lower leverage today when explaining individuals’ identification 
with Catalonia, at least, in the second generation group.  
The fact that second generations identified as primarily Catalan with a lower probability in 
2010 than in 1987 is striking. One possible explanation could be that in 1987, the second 
generations felt a stronger empathy and, consequently, a greater attachment for an identity that 
had been oppressed during many years; while now, Spanish identity has lost its negative 
connotations and so they feel more entitled to feel both Spanish and Catalan. It could also be  
the case that the development of Catalan nationalist policies and, in particular, language 
assimilation policies may have resulted in second generations feeling less Catalan oriented. This 
is actually an argument that has been raised in some qualitative interviews. 
Here, nevertheless, two important caveats should be raised. Unlike panel data, longitudinal 
data from cross-sectional surveys should not be used to make inferences on the evolution of 
individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia over time. This is so because the 
individuals that are being compared in 1987 and 2010 are not the same. Additionally, data 
limitations (e.g. limited number of cases in some categories, unequal number of cases in the 
cross-sectional surveys) and some of the assumptions behind the statistical analysis (e.g. the 
assumption of linearity in the time effect) can be partially driving the results obtained here. 
These two caveats mean that the previous statements should be taken very cautiously, and they 
emphasize the importance of looking at individual data to learn the micro-mechanism that lies 
behind individual change over time.  
Chapters five and six are intended to solve this problem. Before that an attempt is made in 
the following section to account for the effect of the context on individual and aggregate short-
term changes using the cross-sectional series of data.  
 
4.6 Accounting for contextual effects on national identification 
 
The CIS cross-sectional series of surveys (see Table A.1) generates a dataset that is 
structured in groups: each year survey (j) being a different group, and individuals (i) clustered in 
each year survey. The hierarchical structure of the data allows me to estimate the effect of 
contextual variables with a multilevel linear model.41  
                                                      
40 The next chapter will examine more in depth the effect that the implementation of the language 
policies in the schools has had on national identification among second generations.  
41 Multinomial models, as the ones used in section 4.5, are informative on the influence that the 
independent variables have on each category of the dependent variable. In exchange, these models are 
very demanding as they consume many degrees of freedom. In the analysis that I carry out in this section, 
information on all the variables of interest is only available for 16 survey years. This means that I only 
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In estimating group-level regression coefficients, I want to account for both individual and 
group level variation in national identification. While the treatment is placed at the group level 
(year survey), national identification is measured on individuals.  
Four models will be presented: an empty model with no individual variable, nor group level 
predictors, a second model with varying intercepts, a third model with varying intercepts and a 
group level predictor, and a fourth model with a cross-level interaction to predict both 
individual and group level variation. Two group level predictors will be included in the third 
model. A first group consisting of three dummy variables that provide information on the 
PSOE/PP minority governments and the kind of supports they received from regional parties, 
and the index of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage.  
The specification for the third model, that is, the model including the cross-level interaction, 
is as follows: 
 
NID = β0j + β1j originij + β3 educationij + β4 cohortij + εi j (4.1) 
 
Where origin is a dummy variable for (immigrant, second generation and children of mixed 
couples) and β0j and β1j are modeled as a function of the group level predictor or context variable 
(the index of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage), so:  
 
β0j = γ00  + γ01contextj + u0j   (4.2) 
β1j = γ10  + γ11contextj + u1j  (4.3) 
     
The first level intercept is modeled as a function of both fixed and random effects. γ00 is the 
second-level fixed effect,  γ10 is the second-level coefficient, and u0j is the second-level random 
effect. Similarly, the slope of origin β1j is modeled as a function of a second-level fixed effect 
(γ10), the second-level coefficient (γ11), and the second-level random effect (u1j). By substituting 
one equation (4.1), we get: 
 
NID = γ00 +γ10originij +γ01contextj + γ11contextj originij + 
+ β3 educationij + β4 cohortij+u0j + u1jorigin ij + r ij  
(4.4) 
 
Cross-level interactions are included in the analysis to account for the heterogeneous effect 
that the political context, and in particular, confrontation along the center-periphery index has 
on individuals who differ in their prior identification with Spain and Catalonia. Yet, the lack of 
panel data that tells us about this prior identification does not allow testing my hypotheses 
properly.42 However, being aware of the strong relationship that there is between the origin and 
national identification, we can test the effect that political context has on the national 
identification of individuals with a different origin. 
Table 4.9 reports the results of models 1 to 4. The empty model (1) displays the level of 
variance in the average national identification over time. The intercept in the empty model is 
equal to the average national identification, which for this sample is 3.275. The variance 
component corresponding to the random intercept is .102. The two-variance components can be 
                                                                                                                                                               
have 16 units at the second level. Due to this limitation, I estimate national identification as if it was a 
continuous variable. To facilitate interpretation, readers could think that the dependent variable reports 
individuals’ attachment to Catalonia only, going from 1 (when the respondent does not identify with 
Catalonia) to 5 (when the respondent only identifies with Catalonia).   
42 In chapter 6, I make use of panel data to test the heterogeneous effect that the elites’ messages, as 
reported in the media, have on individuals who differ in their identification with Spain and Catalonia.  
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used to partition the variance across levels. The intra-class correlation coefficient is equal to 
.102 /(.102+ 1.152), which means that roughly 8 % of the variance is attributable to context 
effects.  
In the second model, I introduce first level predictors (origin, education and cohort). The 
effect of these variables is robust with the results presented in Table 4.4. Therefore, being a 
child of a mixed couple, a child of an immigrant couple or immigrant reduces identification 
with Catalonia by .45, .85 and 1.58, respectively. Education positively influences identification 
with Catalonia. Thus, keeping all other variables constant, the difference between those who 
have a university degree and those who have primary studies is .316 (0.079*4).43 Finally, as we 
already saw in Table 4.7, once we control for education, the older cohorts seem to be more 
Catalan oriented than the younger cohorts (those born after 1965).  
In third to fourth models I introduce year-survey variables to account for across surveys 
variation. Due to the limited number of cases in the upper level (16), it will be harder to get 
significant coefficients for the macro variables.  
Model 3 tests expectation 2.1 and introduces the dummy variables for the periods during 
which the PSOE/PP minority governments got the support of a strong Catalan party (PSOE-
CiU, 1993 to 1996; and PP-CiU, 1996 to 2000) and the periods during which the PSOE 
minority government ruled with the alternative support of national and regional parties (2004-
2011). Model 3 results partially confirm my expectation. Certainly, in the period during which 
the PSOE minority government had the CiU support (1993-1996), identification with Catalonia 
moderated. This result is coherent with the data presented in figure 3.4 in Chapter 3. In this 
figure, it can be seen that the average identification with Catalonia decreases in 1995. In 
contrast, the expectation that Catalan parties’ and the CiU, in particular, had incentives to de-
mobilize the cleavage during the PP minority government and that, accordingly, we should 
observe a decrease in the average identification with Catalonia is not confirmed. Neither is the 
expectation confirmed for the 2004-2011 PSOE minority governments, although the sign of the 
coefficient goes in the expected direction.  
The non-significance of the PP minority government dummy could be driven by a short-
term effect that will be captured by the confrontation index. As it can be seen in Table 4.3, the 
confrontation index has its highest value in 1996. The 1996 survey was conducted during the 
negotiations that the PP and the CiU held to reach an agreement on the CiU support of the PP 
minority government.  
Taking this into account, we can think that what matters most for explaining variability in 
individual and aggregate identification over time are the actual levels of mobilization at the time 
individuals are interviewed. Thus, in order to test the effect that the mobilization of the center-
periphery cleavage has on national identification, I introduce in the analyses the confrontation 
index. In model 4, it can be seen that the confrontation index does not have any effect on 
national identification. This is reasonable because the levels of confrontation along the center-
periphery cleavage are expected to produce opposite effects on individuals from different 
origins, which causes the variable’s joint effect is not significant.  
Model 5 tests the hypothesis that the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage has a 
different effect on individuals depending on their group origin.44 To test this, model 5 specifies 
a cross-level interaction between the confrontation index and the origin group. The respondents 
and their parents’ origin is treated here as a random effect.  
                                                      
43 Note that education is introduced here as a continuous variable with four categories. 
44 Due to the lack of panel data, I cannot test whether confrontation has a different impact depending 
on individuals’ prior national identification. Therefore, I will approximate individuals’ identification with 
individuals’ origin.  
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Table 4.9 Mobilization of the cleavage’ effects on individuals’ identification with Catalonia. 
Hierarchical linear model. 
 Empty Model Individual 
Variables 
Context 
Variables I 
Context 
Variables II 
Cross-level 
interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fixed effects      
 Origin groups      
Children of mixed couples  -0.454*** -0.454*** -0.454*** -1.534*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.063) 
Second Generations  -0.851*** -0.851*** -0.852*** -0.476*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.040) 
Immigrant  -1.584*** -1.584*** -1.584*** -0.785*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.042) 
Education  0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Birth cohorts      
< 1924  0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.120*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
1925-1934  0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
1935-1944  0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
1945-1954  0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
1955-1964  0.079*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Context variables      
  -0.135***   PSOE minority gov.  
(with CiU support)   (0.050)   
  -0.044   PP minority gov. (with  
CiU support)   (0.034)   
  0.019   PSOE minority gov. (with  
alternative supports)   (0.039)   
Confrontation Index    0.031 0.100+ 
    (0.055) (0.062) 
Cross-level interactions      
Mixed X Conf.Index     0.065 
     (0.092) 
S. Gen. X Conf.Index     -0.211** 
     (0.095) 
Imm. X Conf. Index      -0.128 
     (0.140) 
Intercept γ00 3.275*** 3.728*** 3.743*** 3.717*** 3.699*** 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) 
Random Effects      
Std. Dev. Intercept τ00 .102 0.056 0.042 0.055 0.047 
Std. Dev. Residual σ  1.152 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.919 
Std. Dev. Mixed     .055 
Std. Dev. S.Gen     .075 
Std. Dev. Immigrant     .143 
Observations 26,477 26,266 26,266 26,266 26,266 
Number of groups 16 16 16 16 16 
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Model Fit Measures      
Log-likelihood -41344.81 -35165.99 -35162.39 -31561.83 -35100.27 
Notes: 
1Dummy variables for:  
- Majority governments (reference): 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002 
- PSOE minority goverment with CiU support: 1995 year-survey 
- PP minority goverment with CiU support: 1996, 1998 and 1999 year-surveys 
- PSOE minority goverment with alternative supports: 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009 and 2010 year-surveys 
2The confrontation index has been transformed into a 0 to 1 variable 
3Covariance matrix for the random effects is unstructured 
4 Model 2 intra-class correlation coefficient is roughly 6%, model 5 intra-class correlation is 5% 
5Variance reduction between the empty model and the model with cross-level interactions: 7% 
6The LR test indicates that the Model 5 is significantly different to model 2 
Source: CIS cumulative series of surveys 
CIS(1719) 1987, CIS(1750) 1988, CIS(1978) 1991, CIS(1987) 1992, CIS(2052) 1993, CIS(2137) 1995, 
CIS(2228) 1996, CIS(2298) 1998, CIS(2374) 1999, CIS(2410) 2001, CIS (2450) 2002, CIS(2667) 2007, 
CIS(2857) 2010 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, +almost significant 
 
In agreement with my expectation, model 5 confirms that confrontation along the center-
periphery cleavage in the month prior to fieldwork, as well as during the fieldwork has an effect 
of opposite sign on the autochthonous and the children of immigrants’ identification. The effect, 
however, is not significant for the children of mixed couples and the immigrants. This suggests 
that the autochthonous and the second generations are the most sensitive to context effects.  
Now, to show more clearly the effect that the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage 
has on individuals’ identification I depict in figure 4.3 the marginal effect of the confrontation 
index for the autochthonous and second generations’ groups (the two groups for which the 
effect is significant). The figure shows that higher values of confrontation make the 
autochthonous feel more Catalan, while higher values of confrontation make children of 
immigrants feel less Catalan.  This implies that in those periods of time in which the 
mobilization of the cleavage is more intense, then the autochthonous have reacted strengthening 
their feelings of attachment to Catalonia, while second generations have reacted weakening 
these feelings.  
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Figure 4.3 Marginal effect of the level of confrontation on autochthonous and second 
generation’s identification with Catalonia. 
 
 
Although far from conclusive, the results presented in this section suggest that the 
mobilization of the cleavage can actually affect individuals’ identification with Spain and 
Catalonia. In this regard, it must be stated that Catalan parties’ incentives to mobilize or 
demobilize the cleavage depending on whether they have a key position at the national and the 
regional level cannot fully account for short-term changes in national identification. However, 
the actual levels of confrontation along the center-periphery dimension at the time individuals’ 
are interviewed seem to be important when explaining individual and aggregate variability in 
identification with Spain and Catalonia over time.  
Here, it should be stressed that the effect of confrontation along the center-periphery 
dimension has a different effect on individuals depending on their origin group. This finding 
calls for a more in-depth look at the effect that the mobilization of the cleavage has on 
individuals’ identification at t2 depending on their identification at t1. Chapter 6 will return to 
this issue. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter sought to demonstrate that political elites’ strategies and the mobilization of the 
center-periphery cleavage affects national identification at the individual level, and accounts for 
the changes observed in the aggregate levels of identification with Spain and Catalonia over 
time.  
The empirical analysis has shown that the Catalan elites’ strategies to build a single 
community in Catalonia have been only partially achieved. Immigrants and their children 
identified in 2010 “as Spanish as Catalan” with a greater probability than in 1987. Now, the 
autochthonous population is today more likely to feel “only Catalan”. In view of these results, it 
could be said that Catalan governments have been successful in encouraging identification with 
Catalonia, both among the immigrants and their children, and among the autochthonous 
population. Yet, in the latter group, the effect seems to have been more intense, as these 
individuals have tended to also lose their attachments to Spain.  
Further research should be done to learn about the heterogeneous and causal influence that 
the Catalan governments’ policies have on individuals’ identification. In the next chapter, I 
return to this issue and look in-depth at the effect that the introduction of Catalan as the 
language of instruction at school has had upon the national identification of children of 
immigrants and the children of natives.  
So far, the results presented here suggest that the learning of the Catalan language has not 
promoted a more oriented Catalan identification among the second generations. These results, 
which draw on the longitudinal analysis performed in this chapter, confirm that the learning of a 
language does not necessarily foster identificational assimilation, as already argued by de la 
Calle and Miley (2008). Here, it is worth noting that environmental or institutional pressures to 
learn a language can be useless if they do not get individuals to use this language on a daily 
basis, and within their groups of reference.   
In their review of the Assimilation theory, Alba and Nee (1997) have stressed that 
assimilation is a long-term process which occurs mainly inter-generationally. Taking this into 
account, it seems unrealistic to expect that the immigrants and second generations lose its 
identification with Spain. As will become evident in the qualitative chapter, many immigrants 
and their children still consider that their Catalan identification is nested to their Spanish 
identification. Feeling attached to Catalonia does not exclude also feeling attached to Spain, 
even though immigrants or second generations recognize both Spain and Catalonia as different 
nations.  
On another matter, the results presented here suggest that elites’ mobilization of the center-
periphery cleavage has a say when explaining individuals’ identification with Spain and 
Catalonia and change at the aggregate level.  
Despite the modest results, my analyses suggest that Catalan political parties’ incentives to 
mobilize the cleavage can, in some cases, have consequences on the aggregate levels of 
identification with Catalonia. In particular, it has been shown that, as expected, during the 
period in which the PSOE ruled with CiU support, the levels of identification with Catalonia 
went down. Although the effects have not been found significant in the other two cases (when 
the PP ruled with CiU support, and when the PSOE minority government resorted to the support 
of alternative parties), the sign of the coefficient goes in the expected direction.  
Nevertheless, what seems to really matter when explaining short-term changes of 
identification is the level of confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage at the time 
individuals are interviewed. The results presented in this chapter have shown that confrontation 
affects autochthonous and second generations the most. Confrontation strengthens Catalan 
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identification among the autochthonous and weakens it among the second generations. In the 
rest of the groups, the effect is not significant (immigrants and children of mixed couples), 
although its sign (positive in the case of children of mixed couples and negative in the case of 
immigrants) suggest that confrontation contributes to polarizing individuals’ identification.  
More research should be done to confirm these results. On the one hand, more cross-
sectional surveys should be included in the analyses to increase the number of units at the 
second level.  The lack of significance of the cross-level interactions for the immigrant and the 
children of mixed couples could be due to the limited number of cases at the second level (year). 
In addition, data from other Catalan newspaper could be used to check the robustness of the 
results. 
More generally, and before ending this chapter, it should be stressed again that the results 
obtained from the analyses of these cross-sectional series of data have an important 
shortcoming: these data do not permit us to make inferences on the individual level changes 
occurring over time. Chapter 6 and 7 tackle this problem, and make use of panel data, as well as 
qualitative data from interviews, to learn about the micro-mechanisms that lie behind individual 
change.  
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CHAPTER 5. PARENTS AND SCHOOL AS AGENTS OF 
“NATIONAL” SOCIALIZATION 
 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
The two previous chapters (chapter 3 and 4) have examined the evolution of identification 
with Spain and Catalonia between the late eighties and 2010. These analyses have provided 
some evidence showing the occurrence of inter-generational changes, on the one hand, and 
changes between the immigrant and the second generation, on the other. Yet, this evidence has 
relied on the comparison of unrelated individuals. By comparing the national identification of 
parents and children within the same family, this chapter seeks to enrich the evidence provided 
by previous chapters. 
Beyond this, this chapter’s main goal is to contrast the influence that parents and school 
have on individuals’ national identification. The idea that education has an important influence 
in the formation of national consciousness is well established in classical studies of nationalism 
(Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Smith 1979; Weber 1976). 
Recent works have also argued that in multinational countries, in which the educational 
responsibilities have been decentralized, school can also promote identification with the 
“stateless” nation, and counteract the nation-state dominant identity (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-
Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005, 
2009). Studies of nationalism have, nevertheless, obviated the parents’ role; and in doing so 
they might have overestimated the influence of the school.  
This chapter builds on two recent studies in which the authors find that the 1983 language 
reform in Catalan schools had a profound influence on the promotion of individuals’ 
identification with Catalonia (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-
Bracons et al. 2008a). These studies argue as well that exposure to Catalan in school has even 
promoted a more Catalan oriented identification among individuals belonging to families of a 
Spanish origin (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 
2008a). This chapter questions Aspachs-Bracons et al.’s findings, and contends that the 
omission of key variables such as the social composition of the neighborhood in which children 
grow up and, even more importantly, the parents’ national identification, introduces a bias with 
a positive sign in favor of school influence. 
The chapter draws on data from the “Panel de Desigualtats a Catalunya, Fundació Jaume 
Bofill, 2001-2005”, which is a household survey that includes information on the national 
identification of all household members aged 16 or over. The empirical analysis examines the 
determinants of the national identification of Catalan-born individuals who reached the age of 
18 between 1983 and 2005. The empirical analyses consist of a multinomial logistic regression 
which estimates the influence of parents’ identification and years of schooling on the probability 
that the offspring generation identifies itself as: “primarily Spanish”; “as Spanish as Catalan”; 
“more Catalan than Spanish”; or “only Catalan”.  
The influence of peers will be very roughly captured by a variable that provides information 
on the immediate context of individuals: namely the immigrant composition of the 
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neighborhood. The influence of other agents of socialization (e.g. the television) is assumed to 
be captured by the parents’ national identification.1  
The analysis suggest that the introduction of education in Catalan in schools helps to 
explain, on the one hand, differences in the national identification between those individuals 
who completed their whole education under the new educational system, and those who did not 
and, on the other, the decrease in the number of primarily Spanish identifiers among the 
younger generations. However, the results also imply that the years of schooling do not have the 
degree of impact suggested by previous works. 
Two reasons explain the limited influence of school. First, the influence of school years on 
the promotion of Catalan identification is contingent upon the immediate context in which 
children live, in which they socialize with other children, and in which they go to school. 
Therefore, when children go to schools in neighborhoods in which the presence of immigrants is 
moderate, post-compulsory years of schooling2 can foster a more Catalan oriented 
identification. Conversely, when children go to schools in which there are no immigrants, or in 
which the number of immigrants reaches 35% or over, the years of post-compulsory education 
do not seem to be related with a greater Catalan identification in the offspring. This finding 
suggests that it is not only exposure to the Catalan language and to Catalan culture in school that 
promotes individuals’ Catalan identification, but contact with other Catalan identifiers. 
Second, the effect of the school is limited because parents are the key agents that affect their 
children’s Catalan oriented identification. Thus, in those families in which parents identify 
themselves as primarily Catalan, the school “national” socialization effect is null. Any 
additional year of schooling beyond compulsory education can increase the probability that 
children of immigrants feel “as Spanish as Catalan”; however, and contrary to what Aspachs-
Bracons et al. (2008) have claimed, my results show that school is not able to foster a more 
Catalan oriented identification among these children, once I control for their parents’ national 
identification. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The following section reviews the literature on the 
formation of political orientations as it relates to national identification. The third section 
contextualizes the study. The hypotheses are presented in section four. After presenting the data, 
the dependent and independent variables are introduced. Section six examines the similarity of 
national identification for parents and children. Section seven contrasts the effect that the school 
and the parents have in individuals’ national identification. Finally, section eight discusses the 
results and conclusions. 
 
5.2 Where does individuals’ national identification come from? 
 
“One of the first features of a child’s political involvement is his sense of belonging to a political 
unit. Although it is difficult to obtain evidence on the nature of this early attachment, interview 
material and early questionnaires indicated that in the United States the young child develops a 
sense of ‘we’ in relation to his country and a sense of ‘they’ with respect to other countries” 
(Hess and Torney 1967, 31). 
                                                      
1 In my sample, individuals’ consumption of Catalan or Spanish television correlates very strongly 
with the mother’s national identification. 
2 Here we refer to years of schooling in lower and upper secondary education. We exclude from the 
analyses the years of higher education for different reasons. First, nationalism studies have emphasized 
the importance of school, rather than that of university. Second, while individuals at school receive 
roughly the same kind of contents in the language, literature, geography and history courses, the diversity 
of university degrees does not allow us to make any assumption regarding the national messages 
individuals’ receive.    
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Even though this chapter’s main concern is to learn about the influence that parents and 
school have upon individuals’ identification, rather than about how national identification is 
shaped, it may be worth devoting some space to explain how this process is thought to 
occur.3According to Hess and Torney(1967, 33-37), the development of individuals’ national 
identification occurs in three-stages: a first stage in which children learn that national symbols 
are anchors for attachment, a second in which children add cognitive significance to these 
symbols, and a final stage in which children become aware of the existence of a system of 
countries.4 
Now, where do these affective bonds to the nation and related cognitive substance come 
from? The literature on political socialization has traditionally pointed to the family and to the 
school as the main sources of attitude formation. Hence, family and school should also play a 
leading role in the shaping of children’s national identification. 
Identification with the nation may be learned through the mechanisms of classical 
conditioning to which Hess and Torney (1967, 107-111) referred in the “The Development of 
Political Attitudes in Children”: namely direct teaching, emulation and adjustment of 
expectations. At home, parents’ purposive transmission of their national allegiances, the 
emulation of parents’ cultural practices, and children’s adjustment to family expectations about 
national loyalty, would all point to the belief that children learn and then internalize their 
parents’ national identity. 
Children’s national allegiances can also be shaped through other indirect mechanisms. 
According to Jennings and Niemi (1974) and Glass et al.(1986), the inheritance of certain social 
attributes, such as social status, would cause  children to develop the same political preferences 
as their parents. Although it is unclear how the transmission of social resources impact on the 
formation of a particular national identification, it could be argued that the inheritance of certain 
attributes, such as mother tongue, mediates the formation of individuals’ national identification. 
This is particularly true in the context of minority groups where the transmission of the minority 
language is connected to the formation and maintenance of an ethnic identity (Phinney et al. 
2001a; Rumbaut 1994).  
At school, “national” socialization has been thought to take place through exposure and 
indoctrination. On the one hand, the displaying of the flag, the singing of the national anthem, 
the drawing of the national flag or other expressions of hot nationalism would help children to 
become familiar with the nation’s symbols. Furthermore, the school curriculum and, in 
particular, the history, geography, literature and language courses would provide children and 
adolescents’ attachment to the nation with substantial content.5 
                                                      
3 As far as I am aware, the few pages that Hess and Torney (1967, 33-37) devote to the formation of 
individuals’ identification with the nation are the only pages in the political socialization literature that 
deal specifically with the formation of a national identity. 
4 Hess and Torney’s (1967) quote indicates that this kind of social identification is developed in early 
middle childhood. However, the precise moment in which national identity or other kind of group 
oriented attitudes are formed is disputed. Previous works have examined this question by investigating the 
formation of ethnic identity among minority group members and second generations. These works have 
reached different conclusions; so, while Phinney (1989) argues that adolescence is the time during which 
individuals explore and commit to an ethnic identity, Aboud and Doyle (1993), Akiba et al. (2004) and 
Marks et al. (2007) have found evidence in favor of the idea that individuals’ self-recognition and self-
identification with their parents’ country of origin occurs earlier in life. 
 
5The function that education has traditionally had in the promotion of national consciousness is 
supposed to vary depending on which institution has the education responsibilities. So, while for the 
state’s agents, secular education and schooling would have been viewed as a key instrument to achieve 
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However, and despite the influence that school presumably should have on individuals’ 
national identification, as I mentioned above, the literature on political socialization has not paid 
much attention to the “national” socialization role of the school. Conversely, this literature has 
focused on examining the role that civics courses play in shaping adolescents’ political 
knowledge, political interest or political efficacy. Evidence on the influence of school is, 
however, mixed. On the one hand, Langton and Jennings (1968, 866) and Jennings et al. (1974) 
have argued that the civics curriculum’s leverage on adolescents’ political knowledge, political 
interest or political efficacy is limited, and mediated by children’s background. In particular, 
these authors have argued that school substitutes parents’ political socialization in deprived 
families. Conover and Searing (2000)and Hart and Atkins(2002) are, however, less positive 
regarding the counteracting influence that school can have among those children who come 
from underprivileged ethnic enclaves; as the schools these children attend are, with a higher 
probability, “failing” schools.  
At odds with these works, Westholm et al. (1990) and Niemi and Junn(1998) have claimed 
that the civics curriculum and history courses do actually have an effect on all teenagers’ level 
of political knowledge. Ultimately, the fact that school makes more use of indoctrination than 
any of the other mechanisms of political socialization would explain why schools have been 
found to be more successful in the transmission of political information, than in the shaping of 
actual political attitudes and beliefs (Ehman 1980, 113).6 
In this same direction, Percheron (1993) has also contended that the influence that school 
has upon students’ political opinions is considerably less than parents’. According to Percheron 
(1993, 16-17, 147-148), four reasons would explain the lesser impact of the French school on 
the political opinions of children. First, the laïcité and neutralité principles of the French school 
mean that political training is undertaken outside the school. Second, the teaching method as 
inculcation is seen as a less successful method of teaching than that of simple emulation which, 
according to Percheron, is a much more common mechanism of socialization within the family. 
Third, is the fact that many students develop distant attitudes, and even hostility, towards their 
teachers. And finally, there is the multiplicity and heterogeneity of teachers’ political positions. 
Nevertheless, even if school had a limited influence on the formation of children’s political 
orientations and in the configuration of children’s political opinions, it would still be expected 
to have a significant influence on the shaping of individuals’ national identification. This is, in 
fact, the position of the literature on nationalism that has linked the expansion of education to 
the process of language standardization and the formation of a collective national consciousness 
(Anderson 1983; Hans 1949; Hobsbawm 1991; Miliband 1969; Seton-Watson 1977; Smith 
1979; Weber 1976). 
Recent works have also argued that beyond the role that education has historically 
performed in the formation of collective national-state consciousness, school also has a say in 
the formation of individuals’ actual identification with “stateless” nations. Thus, Martínez-
Herrera (2002) has argued that education is an instrument through which decentralized regional 
institutions, with educational responsibilities, shape individuals’ identification with the region. 
Furthermore, according to Martínez-Herrera (2005, 209), in multinational countries, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
the political socialization and assimilation of ethno-linguistic minorities –and to secure, therefore, the 
nation’s cultural homogeneity– for ethno-linguistic minorities, education would have been envisaged as a 
means of achieving political emancipation and promoting their own national identity (Tomiak and 
Kazamias 1991, 8-10). 
6Ehman (1980) argues that teaching methods or classroom climate should have a greater impact than 
the curriculum on the formation of certain political attitudes. 
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fostering of individuals’ identification with the nation not only occurs through a process of 
indoctrination, but also through the learning of the vernacular language in school. 
In particular, with the goal of examining the impact that exposure to the vernacular language 
in school has on individuals’ national identification, Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008b) have 
recently compared two settings in which language reforms were implemented at the same time: 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. While the reform in Catalonia made teaching in the 
vernacular language compulsory, in the Basque Country parents were allowed to choose the 
language in which their children would be eventually educated. From the comparison of these 
two cases, the authors show that assimilation settings are more successful than multicultural 
settings when promoting identification with decentralized region.7 Moreover, Aspachs-Bracons 
et al.’s results indicate that compulsory language policies can counter the effect of the family’s 
immigrant origin, while non-compulsory language policies produce a sorting of students in the 
different school models, thereby canceling out the school effect. 
However, while these empirical works have made an important contribution by explaining 
the role that schooling can eventually have in the shaping of national identification, they have 
overlooked the role that parents perform in the formation of their offspring’s national 
identification.8By focusing on institutions and leaving aside the family, these studies could be 
playing down the importance of the family as an agent of “national” socialization. 
Nevertheless, the studies that have looked empirically into the role that parents have when 
shaping their offspring’s national identification is noticeably scant. Two studies deserve 
attention here. In “La Reproducción del Nacionalismo. El caso Vasco”, Pérez-Agote(1984) 
examines the reproduction of Basque national identity within the repressive environment of 
Franco’s dictatorship. Using in-depth interviews, Pérez-Agote explains how Basque parents 
made use of different strategies to deal with the dictatorship’s linguistic, cultural and political 
repression. As already mentioned in the introduction, Basque citizens’ “weapons of the weak” 
ranged from accommodation strategies, such as self-imposed silence within the family, to the 
use of violence (Pérez-Agote, 1984, 88-105). 
Using the same household data that I employ in this chapter, Rico and Jennings 
(forthcoming) have also examined the intergenerational transmission of national identification 
within the Catalan family. By comparing the transmission of national identification with the 
transmission of other political orientations, Rico and Jennings find that parents in Catalonia are 
more successful when passing on their national identification to their children, than when 
transmitting other allegiances (such as social class identification, left-right orientation, or 
religious practices). The authors’ analyses lead them to conclude, in agreement with Jennings 
and Niemi (1974, 153-178) and Tedin (1980), that parents’ concurrence regarding national 
identification enhances parent-child similarity in their national identification. Moreover, they 
find that it is the same-sex parent that seems to be the main agent fostering offspring’s 
identification. 
The study of how family and education together influence individuals’ ethnic and national 
identification have mainly come from the literature addressing the study of immigrant 
                                                      
7In his comparative study of Irish and Basque Country policies of language recovery in school, Mezo 
(1996) claims that the voluntary and incentivized schooling in Basque has been more effective than the 
compulsory schooling in Irish when promoting the  recovery of the language in schools. However, this 
study does not examine the effectivenessof these policies in the promotingthe general use of Irish or 
Basque, nor does it look at the influence of these policies on individuals’ identification. 
8 Although Martínez-Herrera (2002) and Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008) introduce family origin as an 
element influencing national identification, they do not examine the parents’ role in the formation of 
individuals’ national identification. 
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minorities in the United States. These studies, however, have focused on  minorities, and have 
not contrasted the role of these two agents of socialization on the children of natives.  
A number of studies in this area have emphasized the decisive role that parents play in 
shaping their children’s ethnic/national identity (Alba 1990; Hurtado, Gurin, and Peng 1994; 
Knight et al. 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001). Parents 
transmit ethnic content to their children through their childrearing practices, and enculturate and 
socialize their children into their own ethnic culture. At the same time, non-familial agents 
transmit to these ethnic minority children the content of the dominant culture ,in this way 
fostering children’s acculturation or re-socialization into the dominant culture (Knight et al. 
1993, 108-109). Social learning and the development of different cognitive adaptation 
mechanisms to multi-ethnic environments would model the minority children’s attitudes, values 
and identification choices (Knight et al. 1993), fostering different forms of bi-cultural identities 
(Haritatos and Benet-Martínez 2002). 
Some of these studies have also shown that education  not only favors children’s exposure 
to the host society’s values and lifestyles, but it also promotes identification with the host 
nation, in a direct(Casey and Dustmann 2010; Rogler, Cooney, and Ortiz 1980) or indirect way, 
through the learning of the receiving society’s language (Rogler, Cooney, and Ortiz 1980). 
Other studies have also argued that the influence that education has on second-generation 
nation/ethnic identification choices is mediated by the immediate context in which children 
grow up (Lin, Wu, and Lee 2006; Rico and Jennings forthcoming). When second generations 
concentrate in a particular type of school, stimuli leading to an acculturation process will be 
limited. In contrast, when second generation children come into contact with children from the 
mainstream culture, contact is considered to foster either second generation’s openness to the 
new culture, or children’s ethnic awareness (Supple et al. 2006; Umaña-Taylor 2004).  
Some authors have argued that biculturalism is more likely to emerge in these multicultural 
contexts (Phinney and Devich-Navarro 1997). Others, on the contrary, have claimed that second 
generations can follow multidirectional tracks as they mature (Portes and Zhou 1993). These 
various tracks have three possible main directions: a path of upward mobility into the white 
middle-class majority, a path of downward mobility into the underclass, or a path of economic 
advancement and ethnic awareness. While the first process can lead to what Gordon (1964) 
referred to as identificational assimilation, it is hard to believe that the other two processes lead 
to the same result. In fact – and contrary to the idea that the immigrants’ structural assimilation 
into the receiving society is a linear process– we now know that the process of immigrants and 
second generations’ incorporation differs among immigrant families, and that it depends on the 
receiving society’s immigration policies (Berry 1984; Bourhis et al. 1997; Nauck 2001).  
Building on this broad discussion and on previous empirical work, in this chapterthe impact 
that family and school have upon children of natives and children of immigrants’ identification 
with Spain and Catalonia is compared for the first time. Although school and family messages 
regarding the nation are very often consistent; in those polities in which the idea of the nation is 
contested or in those contexts in which immigrants participate in the mainstream educational 
system, the messages that family and school deliver about the nation are not necessarily the 
same. In these circumstances, as I have argued above, schooling should play a significant role in 
the promotion of individuals’ identification with the nation. Thus, by carrying out this 
comparison in Catalonia, I will be able to explore various hypotheses regarding the acquisition 
of Catalan identification among children of immigrants, how immigrants and their children 
diverge in their feelings toward Catalonia, and the comparison of the influence that parents and 
school have on individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia.  
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However, before doing so, in the next section, I provide additional details and analysis 
regarding the circumstances that surrounded the implementation of the 1983 language reform to 
which I referred in the previous chapter. 
 
5.3 A note on the context 
 
I have already mentioned that the Convergence and Union (CiU, ConvergènciaiUnió) 
government that emerged from the first regional elections in 1980 had as one of its first 
objectives the restoration and promotion of Catalan identity. This objective was based on the 
normalization of the use of the Catalan language and, of course, school was crucial in this 
endeavor. 
However, the promotion of Catalan identification and of the learning of the Catalan 
language among the Catalan population was not an easy task. On the one hand, the Catalan 
population comprised a large number of immigrants who were low-educated Castilian speakers. 
Additionally, Franco’s legacy had also left its mark. For almost forty years the dictatorship had 
tried to promote Spanish nationalism. The Catalan language had been forbidden in schools, 
Catalan writers had sunk into oblivion, and Catalonia’s past had been erased from history 
courses (Benet 1978; Calzada and Llorens 1995).9  
The relaxing of the prohibition of the use of Catalan in the sixties was followed in 1970 by a 
new education law (the General Law of Education, LGE) that authorized the teaching of 
Catalan. However, the implementation of this law was delayed (Woolard 1989, 29). In fact, five 
years later, in 1975, a new regulation established that the promotion of vernacular languages in 
schools would only have an experimental and voluntary character (Calzada and Llorens 1995, 
221). Thus, even though some of the initial regulations of Josep Tarradellas’ transitional 
government sought to extend the presence of the Catalan language in schools (Argelaguet 1999, 
110), by 1980, when responsibility for education was transferred to the CiU’s Catalan 
government, the actual number of schools in which Catalan was taught was still very limited.10 
In 1983 the Law of Language Normalization was approved by the Catalan Parliament with 
broad support (Lo Cascio, 2008, 126). This law generalized a bilingual model of school. The 
new law mandated that, besides a course on the Catalan language, one basic subject (either 
social or natural sciences) should be taught in Catalan in the primary schools. In addition, in 
secondary schools, at least two subjects (from natural sciences, drawing, history or 
mathematics) should be taught in Catalan. The law aimed at gradually making Catalan the 
language of instruction in all the educational levels and courses11 and expanding the knowledge 
and use of Catalan. Ultimately, the law sought the assimilation of immigrants and their 
descendants into Catalonia (Keating 1996). 
However, the implementation of the law in Catalan schools had to surmount significant 
difficulties. First, at the beginning of the eighties, Spanish-speaking students were the majority 
in 31% of the schools (Linz 2008, 470). In these schools, the high rates of Spanish-speaking 
students made teaching in Catalan difficult. First, these children were being taught in a language 
that was different from their mother tongue, and secondly, they were likely to receive few 
                                                      
9 It is worth noting that the teaching of Catalan in school was only allowed and encouraged during 
the period of the Second Republic (García  Garrido 1991) 
10These schools were the Col·lectiud’Escoles per l’Escola Pública Catalana (Collective for the 
Catalan Public School), which comprised eighty Catalan oriented and progressive school cooperatives 
(Lo Cascio, 2008, 194).  
11 Article 6 of the September 8, 1983 Order on the implementation of the Language Normalization 
Law in Primary and Secondary School. 
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stimuli from their surrounding environment to motivate them to learn and use Catalan. In fact, 
the use of the Catalan language in school was strongly related to the social status of the 
students’ families: so, while Spanish-speaking middle class students adopted Catalan quite 
rapidly, lower class students resisted speaking it (Woolard 2003, 94). After all, even if students 
perceived that learning Catalan had a “premium” (Linz 2008, 479), Catalan was seen as 
completely unnecessary for the kinds of jobs the children of the working class aspired to in the 
future (Woolard, 2003). 
A second problem with the implementation of the law in the schools was teachers’ limited 
competence in Catalan. On the one hand, many primary and secondary teachers, who were 
immigrants themselves, were Castilian-speakers.  
 
I remember my fourth grade teacher, for example. She was from Lago de Sanabria, near 
Leon. Because she was responsible for teaching all the subjects, she taught us Catalan while 
she was learning Catalan herself. [Interview #20, Andrés, child of mixed couple, born in 
1975]. 
 
On the other hand, many native Catalans who had become teachers during the dictatorship did 
not possess fluent Catalan. In the 1977-78 school year, 48% of primary school teachers stated 
that they could not speak Catalan well, and 20% of this group admitted that they could not 
understand Catalan (Argelaguet 1999, 142-143). The acquisition of competence to teach in 
Catalan was, on many occasions, a costly process for teachers.  
 
 
“There were people who suffered with Catalan. That happened when I started to work (as 
teacher) here (in Catalonia) around 1982 or 1983. I passed the state competitive examination for 
being a teacher, and I did a test of understanding in Catalan. But, even those (teachers) who had 
studied here in Catalonia had studied in Castilian. They did not know Catalan; they knew less 
written Catalan than I knew. They could speak Catalan, but many of them could not write it, 
because they had never written it.” [Interview #22 Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956]. 
 
Nevertheless, by the 1986-7 school year, 87.38% of primary school teachers stated that they 
felt competent in Catalan (Argelaguet 1999, 143).  
Progressively, other changes would be introduced in the Catalan educational system. Some 
of these changes affected to the school curricula, others were sought to enlarge the presence of 
the Catalan language in school. So, for example, in 1988, the Catalan government passed a 
regulation that added new content about Catalan history and Catalan geography to the history 
and geography courses that were taught in primary and secondary education. In 1990, a national 
law, the “Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo” (LOGSE), established that the regional 
governments with educational responsibilities could decide over 45 percent of the contents of 
the school timetable. In addition, I have already mentioned that in 1992, the Catalan government 
passed a series of decrees that transformed the bilingual model of education into a model of 
language immersion. The model of language immersion would be endorsed by the 1998 
language reform and, more recently, by the first Catalan Education Law, which was passed 
during the second Tripartit government in 2009.  
Yet, among all these reforms, the 1983 reform can be considered of special relevance 
because it made the teaching of Catalan in school compulsory. Taking this into account, and 
from what has been discussed in the previous section, I present in the next section some 
hypotheses regarding the influence that parents and school should have in shaping individuals’ 
national identification. 
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5.4 Hypotheses 
 
As mentioned above, this chapter’s main goal is to test parents and school influence upon 
individuals’ national identification. However before presenting this chapter’s hypotheses, I 
would like to make clear that here I am especially interested in learning about the role of the 
years of schooling, and not about the role of education. This clarification is relevant as 
education and identification with Catalonia are strongly correlated. This correlation, however, 
does not necessarily show the effect of a socialization process, but the effect of a selection 
process, as the children of natives achieve higher education in a greater proportion than the 
children of working class immigrants. 
Two sets of hypothesis will be presented in this section. The first set of hypotheses relates to 
family influence and, the second set refers to the role of schooling. The last hypotheses in this 
section will try to disentangle whether parents and school have a separate influence on 
individuals’ identification.  
I start, therefore, with a first hypothesis on the family’s background and, more specifically, 
on the impact that the family’s economic status has on the modeling of an individual’s 
identification. Although the relationship between certain familial characteristics, such as the 
parents’ identification or the family origin, and offspring’s identification with Spain and 
Catalonia is well known and does not need further elaboration (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-
Figueras, and Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Rico and Jennings forthcoming), 
the relationship between the family’s economic background and individuals’ Spanish or Catalan 
identity has not yet been established. Rico and Jennings (forthcoming) test the influence that 
family economic background has on an individual’s identification. The authors did not find any 
positive or negative influence. Here, however, I am interested in testing the impact that the 
economic status of immigrant families has on their children’s national identification. In 
agreement with Rumbaut (1994, 756) who has argued that the children of better-off immigrant 
families remain attached to their parents’ national identification, I hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 5.1.1: The children of better-off immigrant parents will be more likely to exhibit 
a stronger identification with Spain. 
 
On the other hand, and in line with Hogg et al.’s (1995, 260) idea that social mobility can 
make members of a low-status group adopt the identity of high-status group members, I expect 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.1.2: The children of better-off immigrant parents will be more likely to exhibit 
a stronger identification with Catalonia. 
 
The economic success of immigrants who came to Catalonia from the less developed and 
impoverished regions of Spain can make them feel grateful to the receiving society for their 
social progress (external attribution). This gratitude can turn into a positive image towards 
Catalonia, and can make immigrants more attached to it. Parents’ positive feelings towards 
Catalonia can be passed on to their children. If this is the case, we should observe, as hypothesis 
5.1.2 suggests, that children of immigrant families who are better-off, identify more with 
Catalonia.  
The second set of hypotheses refers to the influence of school. I have already discussed in 
section 2 of this chapter the idea that school is an agent of “national” socialization. Through the 
teaching of history, geography, literature and language, schools provide cognitive content to 
María José Hierro Hernández 
 127 
children’s psychological attachment to the nation. Moreover, as language not only performs a 
communicative function, but is also the most distinctive symbol –a “core value” of the Catalan 
collective identity that carries with it an emotional and affective load(Barrera 1985; Conversi 
1997; Woolard 1989) – exposure to the Catalan language should foster stronger identification 
with Catalonia. Finally, the greater presence of “primarily Catalan” identifiers among 
Catalonia’s school teachers (Miley 2006) should potentially have a say in the configuration of 
individuals’ identification with Catalonia. 
The changes introduced in the Catalan school after the Law of Language Normalization was 
implemented in schools (1983) undoubtedly had a significant impact on the spread of the 
knowledge of Catalan, as the Catalan linguistic censuses have reported.12 However; did the 
school have a similar impact on the promotion of identification with Catalonia? 
Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008b; 2008a) have shown that differential exposure to Catalan in 
school explains the differences in the probability of self-identification with Catalonia among 
those individuals who were educated before the implementation of the Law of Language 
Normalization, those educated after and those who were in the educational system both before 
and after 1983.13 In the empirical analysis of my data, I will also test the impact of the reform 
under the expectation that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.2.1: For those children who were educated after the Law of Language 
Normalization was implemented, school will have a different impact than for those who started 
their education before that date. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2.2: For those children who were educated after the Law of Language 
Normalization was implemented, each year of additional schooling will positively influence 
their identification with Catalonia. 
 
However, school is also a general context for socialization and thus, it can also contribute to 
the fostering of Catalan identification by promoting contact between children of immigrants and 
children who already feel Catalan. However, as I have argued in a previous section, in 
Catalonia, school composition is heterogeneous and contingent on the composition of the 
neighborhood in which children live. So even though bilingual education was introduced in 
Catalonia in all schools after 1983, in the playgrounds, and even sometimes in the classroom, 
Spanish continued to be, for some years, the predominant language of communication in those 
schools where children of immigrant background were concentrated. Therefore, the influence of 
school in the promotion of identification with Catalonia should vary according to the 
composition of the neighborhood where individuals went to school. Thus, I expect that the 
effect of school will be limited in those neighborhoods where individuals of immigrant origin 
concentrated. Nor do I expect that the influence of school will be that significant in those 
neighborhoods in which most of the population was born in Catalonia, as the students who 
                                                      
12 In addition to this, Woolard and Gahng (1990) have shown that language policies have also 
influenced the symbolic meanings that people attribute to the Catalan and Spanish languages, and also to 
the attitudes that individuals attribute to the speakers of each language (status assessments and solidarity 
values).  
13 Exposure to Catalan in school varies according to the child’s year of birth and to the years children 
remained in school. Thus, those individuals who were born after 1977 would have completed their 
education in a bilingual educational system, while those who were born before will have had 
heterogeneous exposure to bilingual education, depending on whether they also completed secondary 
education or whether they dropped out of school before 1983. 
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attend those schools already bring a Catalan identity that has been fostered by their own families 
to school. As a result, I conjecture that:  
 
Hypothesis 5.3: the years of schooling will positively affect individuals’ identification with 
Catalonia only in those neighborhoods where the presence of individuals born in other regions 
of Spain is moderate. 
 
The final hypotheses refer to the joint effect of the school and the parents. In principle, we 
might assume that in those families, in which parents already have a Catalan identification, the 
‘national’ socialization role of the school would be redundant and, therefore, I expect that:  
 
Hypothesis 5.4: the influence of the school diminishes once parents’ national identification 
is taken into account. 
 
However, among immigrant families, in which the parents have a predominantly Spanish or 
dual identification, the school could perform a more significant role in fostering children’s 
identification with Catalonia. Therefore, I expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 5.5: the influence of the school will be greater in the children of families with an 
immigrant background than in the children of native families. 
 
If this was the case, as Aspachs-Bracons et al.(2008b; 2008a) results suggest, we could 
confirm that the Catalan school counteracts immigrant parents as agents of “national” 
socialization.  
 
Table 5.1 Summary of hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses on the parents’ influence 
 
Hypothesis 5.1.1 The children of better-off immigrant parents will be more likely to exhibit stronger identification with Spain. 
Hypothesis 5.1.2 The children of better-off immigrant parents will be more likely to exhibit stronger identification with Catalonia. 
 
Hypotheses on the school’s influence 
 
Hypothesis 5.2.1 
For those children who were educated after the Law of Language Normalization 
was implemented, school will have a different impact than for those who started 
their education before that date. 
Hypothesis 5.2.2 
For those children who were educated after the Law of Language Normalization 
was implemented, each year of additional schooling will positively influence 
their identification with Catalonia. 
Hypothesis 5.3 
The years of schooling will positively affect individuals’ identification with 
Catalonia only in those neighborhoods where the presence of people born in 
other regions of Spain is moderate. 
 
Contrast of the parents’ and school’s influence 
 
Hypothesis 5.4 
The school’s influence diminishes once parents’ national identification is taken 
into account. 
Hypothesis 5.5 The school’s influence will be greater in the children of families of an immigrant background than in the children of native families. 
María José Hierro Hernández 
 129 
5.5 Data and Variables 
 
5.5.1. Data 
 
In this chapter I draw on household data from the “Panel de Desigualtats a Catalunya (PaD), 
of the Fundació Jaume Bofill”, waves 1 to 4, 2001-2005. The 2001 original sample of the PaD 
is representative of the population living in Catalonia, and includes information on 1,191 
households and approximately 5,785 individuals.14 
For this study, I have selected those households in which parent-child relationships were 
present. This means that households without children, for instance, were excluded from the 
analysis. In order to maximize the number of observations, I have pooled the data from the three 
waves for which this information was available. Whenever information on the national 
identification of any members of the family was missing in the first wave, either because the 
child was not yet eligible to answer in the first wave, or because members of the household did 
not reply to that particular issue in that wave, I have used the data from the subsequent wave 
that included complete information on all the members of the household (parents and children in 
two-parent households and father/mother and children in single-parent households). In this way, 
observations regarding parents and children all come from the same wave. 
Only individuals born in Catalonia15 who were aged between 15 and 39 years old when they 
were interviewed are included in the analysis.16 Altogether 490 parent-child pairs are present in 
the study. When only mother-child or father-child pairs are considered, the sample amounts to 
588 and 505 cases, respectively. The presence of single-parent families and lack of information 
on one of the parents explains the differences between these figures. Before excluding the 
individuals who did not answer this question or answered “don’t know” or “none of them”, 
parent-child pairs made up 643 cases, mother-child made up 628 and father-child pairs made up 
538.17 In total, the number of cases with information for at least one parent and his or her child 
(or children) goes up to 614, before excluding the “don’t know/don’t answer” cases, and 589 
after excluding them.18 
 
 
 
                                                      
14 Only those individuals who were aged fifteen or over at the time of the interview were eligible to 
answer the individual questionnaire. 
15 Children of immigrants from other countries are not considered in this analysis as the question we 
are examining here (identification with Spain vis-à-vis identification with Catalonia) commonly lacks 
relevance for them. I have also excluded from my analysis first generation Spanish immigrants as most of 
them did not go to school in Catalonia. 
16 There are two reasons behind the decision to exclude from the sample those individuals who are 
older than 39. The number of individuals aged forty years or more in children-parent pairs was very low. 
Also, in the households where children are older than 39 years old, the probability that parents live in 
their children’s home, instead of the reverse, is higher. As this can have consequences on the direction of 
the causality mechanism that we are studying, I preferred to leave these individuals out of the sample. 
17 In total, the number of individuals who did not answer this question or answered “don’t know” or 
“none of them” in the offspring and in the parents’ generations amounts to 16 cases in the mothers group 
and 29 cases in the offspring group.  
18 Although the PaD is a representative sample of the population living in Catalonia, the final sample 
in this paper is only representative of the cohorts born between 1965 and 1987, aged between 15 and 39 
between 2001 and 2005, and within this, of those individuals who are still living with their parents. In this 
regard, I would like to emphasize that the main goal of this paper is to gain insight into the influence that 
parents and school have upon individuals’ national identification.  
Change in National Identification 
 130 
Table 5.2 Number of cases with information on the parents and the children national 
identification 
 Parents-Children 
Pairs 
Mother-Child Pairs Father-Child Pairs At least one 
parent 
information 
Including don’t 
know/don’t answer 490 588 505 614 
Excluding don’t 
know/ don’t answer 643 628 538 589 
Source: “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001-05” 
 
5.5.2. Dependent and independent variables 
 
National identification is measured by means of the bidirectional indicator that forces 
individuals to report on their identification regarding two national categories: Spain and 
Catalonia. The answer categories are 1 “only Spanish”, 2 “more Spanish than Catalan”, 3 “as 
Catalan as Spanish”, 4 “more Catalan than Spanish” and 5 “only Catalan”. The “don’t answer”, 
“don’t know” and “none of them” responses were excluded from the analysis.19 Moreover, as 
the “only Spanish” and “more Spanish than Catalan” categories present very few cases in the 
offspring group, in the analysis that I carry out in section 5.7 I have merged these two categories 
into an “only/primarily Spanish” category (see Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3 Distribution of the dependent variable in the offspring generation 
Category Frequencies Percent (%) 
Only Spanish 15 2.55 
More Spanish than Catalan 35 5.94 
As Spanish as Catalan 163 27.67 
More Catalan than Spanish 204 34.63 
Only Catalan 170 28.86 
Total 589 100 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats –Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-05” 
 
The models presented in section 5.7 include a series of independent variables that seek to 
contrast the influence that family and school have upon children’s national identification. For 
the sake of simplicity, I have treated parents’ national identification as a continuous 
variable.20The immigrant family variable takes a value of 1 when at least one of the parents was 
born outside Catalonia. Other background characteristics will be included in the analysis to test 
for other hypothesis. Therefore, I introduce household income as a continuous variable, and I 
interact this variable with immigrant family origin to test whether the economic status of 
immigrant parents affects their children’s identification with Catalonia. 
Following Rico and Jennings (forthcoming), I also include the percentage of the population 
from other regions of Spain present in the census section of the respondent’s household to 
control for the effect of the immediate context on children’s national identification. After testing 
its linear form, this variable is introduced in the analysis as a continuous variable. This variable 
                                                      
19 As I mentioned above, the total number of “don’t know/don’t answer” and “none of them” 
responses for the offspring final sample was 29, which limits the scope of any in-depth analysis of this 
group. 
20 The implicit assumption for treating these two variables (mothers’ and fathers’ national 
identification) as continuous is satisfied. The coefficients increase by a similar proportion in each 
category. 
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takes a value of 0 when the percentage of individuals who were born in other regions of Spain 
and live in the same census tract as the respondent is lower than 5 percent, and a value of 7 
when the percentage of individuals who were born in other regions of Spain and live in the same 
census tract as the respondent is over 35 percent.21 The rationale behind this variable is that 
respondents who live in neighborhoods in which the share of the immigrant population is high, 
will have fewer opportunities to interact with the native population and to assimilate Catalan 
identification. This variable will also allow me to check for the heterogeneous impact that 
schooling can have, according to neighborhood composition. 
To test for school influence I include a variable that measures years of schooling beyond 
compulsory education and before university. In my sample, the years of schooling variable 
ranges between 8 and 12. Individuals who have 8 years of education only completed 
compulsory education. Conversely, individuals who have 12 years of education completed, at 
least, secondary school.22 The influence that school can have in those additional four years is 
very relevant, as those years correspond to children’s adolescence, an age in which group 
attitudes are, according to the literature, being formed.  
However, as the impact of school is, according to Aspachs-Bracons et al. (2008b; 2008a), 
different for those who went to school before and after the Law of Language Normalization was 
implemented, I will contrast the different effect that years of schooling have among those 
individuals who were born before 1977, and those who were born after that year. In order to do 
this, I have divided the sample into two groups: those who were born between 1965 and 1976 
and those who were born between 1977 and 1987.23 The first group is made up of those who 
entered school between 1971, after the General Law of Education was passed, and 1982, a year 
before Catalan was made compulsory in schools. The second group is made up of those who 
entered school between 1983 and 1993, and who therefore were completely exposed to the 
reform. Since the Catalan government passed a further regulation in 1988 that added new 
content to Catalan history courses, all individuals in this group who remained in school after 
finishing primary education would have also been taught Catalan history in their history 
courses. 
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
21 This variable’s original values ranged between 1 and 7. 
22 In the logistic analysis, I have rescaled this variable so it includes a zero value. In this way, the 
years of education variable takes a value of 0 when the individual has completed primary school (8 years 
of education) and a value of 4 when the individual has completed secondary school (12 years of 
education). 
23 In the logistic analysis in which I test the influence of school, I have excluded those individuals 
who were aged 17 or less when they were interviewed. Excluding these individuals leaves me with a 
more homogeneous sample, in which every individual has had the time to complete pre-university 
education. Some of the older respondents, who had four to five years of education, were assimilated into 
the group of individuals with eight years of education. 
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Table 5.4 Summary of Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Age 22.71 4.64 15 39 589 
Age groups (1 = born between 1977 and 1987) 0.72 0.43 0 1 589 
Years of Education (including university) 13.07 2.82 4 18 587 
Years of Schooling (all) 11.35 1.03 8 12 587 
Years of Schooling (children of natives) 11.46 1.00 8 12 376 
Years of Schooling (second generations) 11.25 1.00 8 12 211 
Mothers’ Origin (1= native) 0.73 0.44 0 1 576 
Fathers’ Origin (1= native) 0.75 0.43 0 1 491 
Immigrant Family (1= immigrant) 0.36 0.48 0 1 589 
Neighborhood Composition 3.54 2.10 0 7 581 
Household Income 28861.80 16492.83 4200 106000 493 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001-05” 	   	   	  
 
 
5.6 Children-parents congruence in native and immigrant families 
 
In the previous chapter, I have provided evidence on the occurrence of intergenerational 
changes in identification with Spain and Catalonia. This evidence was based on the comparison 
of unrelated individuals from different cohorts, and from different descendency groups. In order 
to enrich the previous chapter’s findings, this section compares parents and children’s national 
identification. First, I test whether there are significant differences between the parents’ and the 
children’s generations –distinguishing between the native and the immigrant parents – to learn 
about the assimilating process of second generations. Then, I examine the degree of parent-child 
similarity/dissimilarity. As a basis for comparison, besides self-declared national identification, 
I include in these descriptive analysis, the use of language in private spheres,24 which is very 
often taken as a component of individuals’ national identity, and parents-child left-right 
ideology. 
Language use is computed as a summarized scale of four indicators: language spoken in 
shops, with friends, neighbors and in the household. The scale, which ranges between 0 and 
100, includes information on the frequency of Catalan usage over a week. Left-right 
identification represents individual’s positioning on a scale that goes from extreme left to 
extreme right.25 
Table 5.5 reflects the intergenerational change that occurred within families in Catalonia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
24 Therefore, I exclude from the analysis the language spoken at work and at school, as in these two 
public spheres the language spoken is less voluntarily determined. 
25 As the item scale changed between first, second and third waves, this variable has been 
transformed into a 0=Extreme-Left to 1=Extreme-Right scale. 
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Table 5.5. Mothers, Fathers and Children Groups Comparison. National Identification and 
Language Usage.  
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Table 5.5 shows, for example, that children’s national identification differs significantly 
from both mothers and fathers’ national identification. Children exhibit a more Catalan oriented 
identification than their parents; and this is so not only among the immigrant families where a 
process of intergenerational assimilation was expected to occur, but also in those families in 
which both parents were born in Catalonia. A similar pattern is found when immigrants and 
their children’s usage of Catalan are compared. In sum, immigrant children’s usage of Catalan 
is significantly higher than that of their parents.  
However, this change is not observed among the children of Catalan-born parents: 
strikingly, this group speaks Catalan less often than their parents; although differences are not 
significant, at least when frequency of use between mothers and their children are compared. 
Significant differences prevail, however, between the children of Catalan-born parents’ and 
the children of immigrant families or mixed couples (see Table 5.6). Differences are quite large 
when usage of the Catalan language in the children of natives and the children of immigrants 
are compared. Thus, even if the children of immigrants have learned to speak Catalan, with their 
family, friends and neighbors and in shops, usage of the Catalan language does not seem to be 
necessary. A possible explanation for this result is the linguistic separation of the Spanish and 
Catalan-speaking communities. This result suggests, moreover, that the assimilation language 
policy has not been able to alter individuals’ language practices in the private sphere. Strikingly, 
children of immigrants are closer to the children of natives in their national identification. This 
finding provides additional evidence in favor of the idea that subjective affiliation to Catalonia 
is not deterministically linked to the language most frequently spoken, especially among second 
generations, for whom birthplace seems to be a sufficient criterion to vindicate a Catalan 
identity (Woolard 1989). Despite this, it is worth noting that, as Woolard (forthcoming) has 
recently argued, transitions to university, entrance into the job or into the marriage market and 
parenthood can alter individuals’ language patterns. These life-course transitions can therefore 
mean that the differences between these two groups decrease as they get older. Unfortunately, 
data that tracks generations over time is unavailable, and therefore we are unable to test this 
hypothesis. 
However, children of immigrants are closer to the children of natives in their national 
identification. This result may reflect the fact that second generations’ attachment to Catalonia 
is not linked to the language, but to the birthplace, something that Woolard (1989, 136) had 
previously noted. 
 
Table 5.6 National identification and language usage differences by origin. Mean Values 
  Mean Valuesa 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
N 
National  Identification     
 Catalan-Born parents 0.80 [.78 .83] 306 
 One immigrant parent 0.60 [.56 .65] 109 
  Both  parents  immigrants 0.51 [.46 .57] 63 
Language  usage     
 Catalan-Born parents 0.90 [.87 .92] 210 
 One immigrant parent 0.57 [.50 .65] 82 
  Both  parents  immigrants 0.27 [.19 .34] 53 
Note: a The variables range has been transformed into a 0 to 1 scale for comparability reasons. 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001-05”	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Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide detailed information on the degree of parents-child 
similarity/dissimilarity. At first glance, it can be noted that parents who feel “only Catalan” are 
the most “successful” in transmitting their national identification to their children. Fifty eight 
percent of those mothers who feel “only Catalan” have children who declare the same. For 
fathers the percentage is 56. The level of success in the transmission of the parents’ national 
identification is not as high among those individuals who hold an inclusive national 
identification. Less than half of the mothers and half of the fathers who have a dual 
identification have transmitted their national identification to their children. 
 
Table 5.7 Offspring national identification by mother’s national identification 
  Offspring National Identification 
  Only 
Spanish 
More 
Spanish 
Dual More 
Catalan 
Only 
Catalan 
Marginal N 
Only Spanish 16.67 22.22 50.00 5.56 5.56 3.13 (18) 
More Spanish 7.89 23.68 39.47 23.68 5.26 6.60 (38) 
Dual 2.80 7.94 46.26 32.24 10.75 37.15 (214) 
More Catalan 0.00 2.14 14.97 44.92 37.97 32.47 (187) 
M
ot
he
r N
at
io
na
l 
Id
en
tif
ic
a-
tio
n 
Only Catalan 0.84 0.84 8.40 31.93 57.98 20.66 (119) 
 Marginal 2.26 6.08 27.95 34.90 28.82 100  
 N (13) (35) (161) (201) (166)  (576) 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001-05” 
 
 
Table 5.8 Offspring national identification by father’s national identification 
  Offspring National Identification 
  Only 
Spanish 
More 
Spanish 
Dual More 
Catalan 
Only 
Catalan 
Marginal N 
Only Spanish 15.79 15.79 47.37 15.79 5.26 3.87 (19) 
More Spanish 0.00 16.67 56.67 26.67 0.00 6.11 (30) 
Dual 3.64 6.67 47.88 31.52 10.30 33.60 (165) 
More Catalan 0.00 3.51 11.70 42.11 42.69 34.83 (171) 
Fa
th
er
 N
at
io
na
l 
Id
en
tif
ic
a-
tio
n 
Only Catalan 0.00 2.83 7.55 33.96 55.66 21.59 (106) 
 Marginal 1.83 5.70 27.09 34.83 30.55 100  
 N (9) (28) (133) (171) (150)  (491) 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -FundacióJaumeBofill, 2001-05” 
 
Those parents who hold a minority position within Catalonia and self-identify as primarily 
Spanish are the least successful in transmitting their national identification to their children, 
although in this case mothers seem to be more influential when transmitting their identification 
with Spain, a result which has also been found in Sabatier (2008). Looking at the diagonal, we 
can say that children seem to be slightly more similar to their mothers than to their fathers; 
especially, as I have just mentioned, in the case of mothers who self-identify as primarily 
Spanish. The only exception to this pattern is found in the group of parents who self-identify as 
“as Spanish as Catalan”. In this case, fathers seem to be more successful than mothers in 
transmitting their national identification to their children. 
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Overall, tables 5.7 and 5.8 confirm the occurrence of an intergenerational change within 
Catalan families. Children are more “Catalan oriented” than their mothers and their fathers. In 
this regard, it is worth mentioning that the percentage of those individuals who feel “only 
Catalan” is significantly higher in the offspring generation than in the parents’ generation. 
A quick way to test the degree of parent-child similarity/dissimilarity consists in looking at 
the mother-child and father-child correlations. According to the acculturation hypothesis, I 
expect that the influence of immigrant parents is lower than that of Catalan-born parents. The 
results in table 5.9 confirm this expectation. Interestingly, parents and children are much more 
alike in their language patterns than in their self-declared national identification. Even if parent-
child language use’ correlations are lower in immigrant families than in families in which both 
parents were born in Catalonia, correlations are still high in this group, and they are also greater 
than in the national identification variable.  
Compared to these two components of national identity, parent-child resemblance is lower 
in their left-right positioning; a finding that has been made by Rico and Jennings (forthcoming).  
Although Rico and Jennings explain this result by the “accessible and less abstract character 
that territorial identities have, compared with overt political orientations”, I argue here that the 
accessibility of national identification is contingent on Catalan context, and that, therefore, the 
greater similarity of parents’ and children’s national identification cannot be extrapolated to 
other contexts. In fact, it could be that in other contexts in which the left-right cleavage was 
more salient than the center-periphery cleavage, parent-child continuity on the left-right scale 
would be larger. In addition, we should take into account the fact that the average age of the 
offspring generation in this sample is around 22. Therefore, differences in the left-right 
positioning of the offspring generation and their parents can be due to a life-cycle effect, which 
makes young children more progressive and adult parents more conservative. This life-cycle 
effect is not believed to be present in national identification.  
 
Table 5.9 Parents-Children Correlation in national identification and language use 
  Mother  Origin Mother-
Child 
Obs. Father Origin Father-
Child 
Obs. 
National  Identificationa             
 All .55*** 588 All .55*** 505 
 Catalan Born .45*** 423 Catalan Born .39*** 372 
 
Language  Useb 
Immigrant .39*** 157 Immigrant .28** 126 
 All .84*** 437 All .85*** 367 
 Catalan Born .83*** 302 Catalan Born .81*** 261 
  Immigrant .68*** 129 Immigrant .65*** 101 
Note:  
aSpearman Rank Order Correlation (rho).  
bPearson Correlation 
Source:  ‘Panel de Desigualtats –Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-05’ 	   	   	   	  
 
5.7 Family and school as determinants of children’s national identification 
 
In this section I examine the role that family and school have as determinants of individuals’ 
national identification. First, I separately examine the effect of family characteristics and the 
effect of years of schooling on national identification. Next, I look at the interplay of these two 
sources of “national” socialization. Ultimately, I am interested in learning whether school has 
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any effect on individuals’ identification, and whether it can be separated from the effect that 
parents have on their children’s national identification. 
The models that I present next have been estimated using a multinomial logit regression that 
does not impose the constraint of proportional odds.26 Although multinomial logit models 
produce a loss of efficiency in the estimation, these models provide more information on the 
effect that independent variables have on each category of the dependent variable. In order to 
control for the presence of siblings within the households, which would violate the assumption 
of the independence of observations, standard errors have been adjusted for household clusters. 
Table 5.10 presents two models that examine the influence that family characteristics have 
on offspring’s national identification. The first model includes parents’ national identification, 
family immigrant origin and household income. The second model includes an interaction 
between household income and parents’ immigrant origin to test hypothesis 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.  
 
Table 5.10 Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of Family 
Background (Multinomial Logistic Regression Model) 
  Model 1   Model 2  
  
Primarily  
Spanish 
More  
Catalan 
Only  
Catalan 
Primarily  
Spanish 
More  
Catalan 
Only  
Catalan 
Id_father 0.289 0.815*** 1.299*** 0.273 0.814*** 1.300*** 
 (0.339) (0.212) (0.251) (0.331) (0.213) (0.252) 
Id_mother -1.017** 0.428* 1.004*** -1.039** 0.450** 1.026***  
 (0.449) (0.219) (0.247) (0.448)  (0.221) (0.251) 
Immigrant Parents  0.663 -0.928*** -1.099** 0.738 -2.073*** -1.743**  
(IP) a (0.601) (0.350) (0.445) (0.919) (0.585) (0.849) 
Household Income  0.898 0.486 0.492 1.552 -1.222 -0.775 
(HI)b (1.279) (1.035) (1.109) (1.855) (1.185) (1.281) 
IP x HI     -0.184 4.472** 2.658 
     (2.427) (1.837) (2.472) 
Age -0.073 0.037 0.016 -0.073 0.040 0.019 
 (0.055) (0.033) (0.039) (0.055) (0.034) (0.040) 
Constant 0.149 -2.102** -3.847*** 0.014 -1.756* -3.614*** 
  (1.177)  (0.903) (1.191) (1.244) (0.924) (1.193) 
Observations  405    405  
Cluster  279    279  
ll  -404.405    -401.116  
Wald Chi2  104.996(15)     108.316(18)  
Adj.Count R2   0.28     0.31   
Notes: 
The reference category is “As Spanish as Catalan” 
aIP at least one immigrant parent 
HI has been transformed into a 0 to 1 variable 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated 
Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5 
Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
                                                      
26 For the multinomial logit, the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives has been 
tested, and has not been proved to be violated in any of the additive models presented in this section. 
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The results in table 5.10 confirm the fact that parents’ national identification has a 
significant influence on their children’s national identification. Mothers are more successful 
when transmitting to their children their primarily Spanish identification. In fact, fathers’ 
identification does not influence their offspring’s primarily Spanish identification at all. This 
seems to indicate that minority identities are better transmitted by the mother, a result that is 
coherent with Sabatier (2008). 
Family’s immigrant origin has an independent effect on children’s identification, and it 
makes less likely that children self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan” 
than “as Spanish as Catalan”. In addition, family immigrant origin seems to be related positively 
with the probability that children self-identify as primarily Spanish, even though the coefficient 
for this variable is not significant. These results suggest that the children of immigrants and the 
children of mixed couples are more likely to place themselves in the primarily Spanish and the 
“as Spanish as Catalan” category than in any of the others. In coherence with Rico and 
Jennings’s (forthcoming) results, in this model, the economic status of the families does not 
have any effect.  
Model 2 includes the interaction between household income and parents’ immigrant origin. 
If we pay attention to the coefficients of the “immigrant parents” term in this second model, we 
notice that the children of immigrant families, who have the lowest household income in the 
sample, also have a lower probability of self-identifying as “more Catalan than Spanish” or 
“only Catalan”.27 
Hypotheses 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 refer to the impact of immigrant families’ economic 
performance on their children’s national identification. In order to test if either of the two 
hypotheses is fulfilled, we can look at table 5.11 that reports the marginal effect and the 
standard errors of the interaction term. From the results in table 5.11, we can see that household 
income does not have any significant impact on the national identification of those children 
whose parents were born in Catalonia. However, household income does have a significant 
effect on the probability that the children of immigrants identify themselves as being “more 
Catalan than Spanish”. 
The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that this effect is significantly strong; thus, when 
household income goes from its lower level to its higher level, the odds ratio that the children of 
immigrants identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” increases to 3.25. 
 
Table 5.11 Marginal Effect of Household Income on National Identification by Parents’ Origin 
  Coef. s.e. p.value 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Primarily Spanish     
 Catalan-born parents 1.552 1.854 0.403 [-2.082, 5.187] 
  At least one immigrant parent 1.369 1.652 0.407 [-1.870, 4.607] 
More Catalan than Spanish     
 Catalan-born parents -1.222 1.185 0.302 [-3.544, 1.100] 
  At least one immigrant parent 3.250 1.432 0.023 [ 0.444, 6.057] 
Only Catalan     
 Catalan-born parents -0.775 1.281 0.545 [-3.285, 1.735] 
  At least one immigrant parent 1.882 2.125 0.376 [-2.283, 6.049] 
Note: Values estimated from results in Table 5.10 	   	   	   	  
                                                      
27 The variable has been rescaled so the 0 value is directly interpretable.  
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Because of the cross-sectional character of the data, we cannot test the hypothesis of 
economic mobility, but if we take into account the economic standards of most Spanish 
immigrants when they arrived to Catalonia, the hypothesis that immigrant families’ economic 
mobility fosters a more Catalan oriented identification among their offspring seems to be a 
reasonable hypothesis. Of course, it could be argued that better-off immigrants who arrive in 
Catalonia will be more interested in adapting to Catalan standards, and to promote their 
children’s identification with Catalonia to preserve the family’s high status. However, this 
possibility would contradict Rumbaut’s claim. 
To test the school influence and, in particular, the effect of the 1983 reform, respondent’s 
national identification is examined as a function of the number of years during which children 
went to school, and the age group to which children belong (see table 5.12). The age group 
variable will help us test very roughly the effect that the Law of Language Normalization and 
the introduction of education in Catalan in schools had in the generation which entered school 
after 1983, when this Law was first implemented. 
Model 1 in table 5.12 indicates that years of schooling decrease the likelihood that 
individuals identify themselves as primarily Spanish and increase the probability that they self-
identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” and as “only Catalan”.28 Model 1 also shows that the 
younger age-group, that is, individuals born after 1977, is less likely than the older group to 
self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. Apart from this, the two age-groups seem to be 
quite similar in their national identification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
28 It could be argued that due to the association between origin, social class and national 
identification in Catalonia, only those who self-identify more with Catalonia finish secondary school. I 
have checked for this possibility by examining the average years of schooling of the children of natives 
and second generations. As Table 5.4 shows the years of schooling (before university) of these two 
groups is quite similar. This eliminates the possibility that the relationship between years of schooling and 
national identification goes in the other direction. 
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Table 5.12 Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of the 1983 
Reform (Multinomial Logistic Regression) 
  Model 1   Model 2  
  
Primarily 
Spanish 
More 
Catalan 
Only 
Catalan 
Primarily 
Spanish 
More 
Catalan 
Only 
Catalan 
Years of Schooling (YS) -.465*** 0.312** 0.244* -0.261 0.303 0.263 
 (0.141) (0.124) (0.137) (0.235) (0.188) (0.219) 
Younger Generation (YG) 0.439 -0.457* -0.193 1.175 -0.558 -0.104 
 (0.461) (0.260) (0.280) (0.913) (0.906) (0.977) 
YS x YG    -0.281 0.024 -0.028 
    (0.288) (0.249) (0.269) 
Constant -0.198 -0.541 -0.676 -0.710 -0.498 -0.734 
  (0.512) (0.479) (0.531) (0.747) (0.676) (0.794) 
Observations  522   522  
Cluster  379   379  
ll  -651.205   -650.662  
Wald Chi2  31.632(6)   33.998(9)  
Adj.Count R2  0.03   0.03  
Notes: 
The reference category is “As Spanish as Catalan” 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated 
Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5 
Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
However, I am especially interested in learning about whether years of schooling had a 
heterogeneous influence on those children who were completely educated under a system in 
which education in Catalan was compulsory (after 1983), and those who were not. 
Model 2 shows that years of schooling do not have any effect among the older age group, 
that is, the age-group born between 1965 and 1976 and who started school before 1983. 
However, as shown in table 5.13, the marginal effect of every additional year of education after 
compulsory education in Catalan (and before university) decreases the likelihood that 
individuals from the young generation (born between 1977 and 1987) self-identify as “primarily 
Spanish”; and increases the likelihood that they self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. 
These results corroborate Aspachs-Bracons et al.’s results, and prove hypotheses 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 
correct; which state that the impact of schooling was different for those who went to school 
before and after the 1983 implementation of the Law of Language Normalization, and for those 
who –having gone to school after 1983— remained longer in the educational system. 
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Table 5.13 Marginal Effect of Years of Schooling on National Identification by Age Groups 
  coef. s.e. p.value 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Primarily Spanish     
-0.261 0.235 0.267 [-0.723, 0.200] Born between 1965 & 1976 
  
Born between 1977 & 1987 -0.542 0.171 0.002 [-0.878,-0.207] 
More Catalan than Spanish     
0.303 0.188 0.107 [-0.066, 0.672] Born between 1965 & 1976 
  
Born between 1977 & 1987 0.327 0.164 0.046 [ 0.006, 0.648] 
Only Catalan     
0.262 0.219 0.231 [-0.167, 0.692] Born between 1965 & 1976 
  
Born between 1977 & 1987 0.234 0.169 0.165 [-0.096, 0.565] 
Note: Values estimated from results in Table 5.12    
 
However, as I argued in section 3, the implementation of the law was more difficult in 
schools in those neighborhoods in which the children of immigrants concentrated. In order to 
test for the direct and indirect influence of the immediate context on individuals’ national 
identification, and for the heterogeneous effect that the reform may have had, depending on the 
composition of the neighborhood in which the children grew up and in which they went to 
school,29 I have added neighborhood composition to the years of education. Since the years of 
schooling do not seem to affect the identification choices of those individuals who started 
school before 1983, I now restrict the analysis to those individuals who started school after that 
date.  
The results in model 1 (table 5.14) are robust and confirm previous analysis. For those 
individuals who started school after 1983, each additional year of schooling decreases the 
likelihood that children self-identify as “primarily Spanish” and increases the likelihood that 
they self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. The composition of the neighborhood has a 
significant impact on children’s national identification. The immigrant composition of the 
neighborhood reinforces children’s Spanish identification, and lessens the probability that 
individuals self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan”. This shows the 
relevance that the immediate context has within a wider context in which Catalan identification 
is the mainstream identification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
29 In Catalonia, children usually go to the public schools or to the state-aided private schools that are 
closest to their home. There is the possibility that children go to a school in another neighborhood if their 
parents opt for a private school, instead of a public or state-aided private school. The PaD data, however, 
only provides information on the type of school of those children who are still enrolled in school, so I 
cannot control for this here. 
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Table 5.14 Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of the Years of 
Schooling and the Neighborhood Composition (Multinomial Logistic Regression) 
	   Born between 1977 & 1987 
  Model 1   Model 2  
  
Primarily 
Spanish 
More 
Catalan 
Only 
Catalan 
Primarily 
Spanish 
More 
Catalan 
Only 
Catalan 
Years of Schooling (YS) -0.470** 0.337** 0.254 -1.150** 0.186 0.164 
 (0.190) (0.164) (0.181) (0.509) (0.328) (0.306) 
Neighborhood 0.232* -0.396*** -0.483*** -0.119 -0.509* -0.512* 
Composition (NC) (0.126) (0.082) (0.081) (0.275) (0.272) (0.269) 
YS x NC    0.130 0.033 0.010 
    (0.093) (0.075) (0.074) 
Constant -0.901 0.355 0.782 0.942 0.869 1.082 
 (0.975) (0.670) (0.710) (1.517) (1.201) (1.131) 
Observations  373    373  
Cluster  286    286  
ll  -435.498    434.376  
Wald Chi2  80.780(6)    74.198(9)  
Adj.Count R2   0.10     0.10   
Notes: 
The reference category is “As Spanish as Catalan” 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated  
Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5 
Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Model 2 shows that in those neighborhoods in which the percentage of the immigrant 
population is very low (between 0 and 5 per cent), each additional year of schooling after 
compulsory education decreases the probability that individuals self-identify as primarily 
Spanish, but does not make children feel more Catalan. The coefficients for neighborhood 
composition suggest that for children who have only eight years of education, the greater the 
number of immigrants in the neighborhood, the lower is the likelihood that they self-identify as 
primarily Catalan.  
Table 5.15 reports the marginal effect that years of schooling have on offspring’s national 
identification, depending on neighborhood composition. In those neighborhoods in which the 
population born in other regions of Spain is very low to moderate (between 0 and 20 per cent), 
any additional year of education decreases the likelihood of individuals self-identifying as 
primarily Spanish. In addition, and in agreement with hypothesis 5.3, years of schooling 
positively influence the likelihood that an individual self-identifies as “more Catalan than 
Spanish” in those neighborhoods in which the percent of immigrants is moderate (between 20 
and 25 per cent). However, when the presence of immigrants is over 35 per cent, the school 
loses its influence.  
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Table 5.15 Marginal Effect of Years of Schooling on National Identification by Neighborhood 
Composition 
  Coef. s.e p.value 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Primarily Spanish     
 Between 0 and 5% of immigrants -1.15 0.509 0.024 [-2.148,-0.153] 
 Between 20 and 25% -0.63 0.201 0.002 [-1.024,-0.235] 
  Over 35% -0.239 0.243 0.324 [-0.715, 0.236] 
More Catalan than Spanish     
 Between 0 and 5% of immigrants 0.186 0.328 0.571 [-0.457, 0.829] 
 Between 20 and 25% 0.32 0.175 0.068 [-0.023, 0.663] 
  Over 35% 0.42 0.304 0.167 [-0.175, 1.015] 
Only Catalan     
 Between 0 and 5% of immigrants 0.163 0.306 0.593 [-0.437, 0.764] 
 Between 20 and 25% 0.202 0.199 0.31 [-0.188, 0.593] 
  Over 35% 0.232 0.339 0.495 [-0.434, 0.897] 
Note: Values estimated from results in Table 5.14	   	  
 
In order to contrast the joint influence that parents and school have on individuals’ national 
identification, in the next model I add to the previous model parents’ identification and parents’ 
origin. Therefore, each respondent’s identification is now modeled as a function of each 
individual’s parents’ characteristics and each individual’s schooling characteristics. In this case, 
I follow a similar strategy to that followed in table 5.14, and I restrict the analysis to that group 
of individuals who started school after the Law of Language Normalization was implemented. 
The parents’ identification, years of schooling and neighborhood composition variables have 
been transformed into 0 to 1 range variables, so that the magnitude of the coefficients can be 
compared. 
The results in table 5.16 show that parents and school have separate effects on individuals’ 
national identification. While school prevents children from self-identifying as primarily 
Catalan, parents’ identification seems to be the main variable affecting individuals’ 
identification as such. However, as proposed in hypothesis 5.4, once we control for the parents’ 
national identification, the effect that school has on the probability that individuals identify as 
“more Catalan than Spanish” vanishes.30 The immigrant composition of the neighborhood 
                                                      
30 Although the results are not presented here, I have also tested the impact that having a university 
degree has on individuals’ identification. Results show that having a university degree does not affect the 
probability of self-identifying as “Spanish as Catalan” compared to identifying as ‘primarily Spanish’. In 
other words, the years of schooling continue to be the “only” factor fostering individuals’ bi-national 
identification vis à vis the ‘primarily Spanish’ identification. On the other hand, having a university 
degree increases the probability that individuals feel themselves to be ‘more Catalan than Spanish’, even 
after controlling for parents’ identification. Although, it is possible that the contents of degrees such as 
Catalan, History or Political Science can contribute to the shaping of individuals’ identification with 
Catalonia, and facilitate the possibility that teachers exhibit their views on the Catalonia/Spain cleavage, 
there are many other fields in which it is difficult for this to occur, as qualitative materials from my 
interviews show. In this regard, it is hard to believe that the positive association between university and 
national identification has anything to do with the content of the instruction students receive at university. 
A possible explanation for this positive association could come from the fact that university is a more 
diverse environment in which students from native and immigrant families come into contact, and an 
environment in which political mobilization on the center-periphery cleavage encourages students’ 
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continues to have a strong negative effect on the probability that respondents’ self-identify as 
primarily Catalan. Moreover, this variable absorbs the effect of the family’s origin, which loses 
its significance in this specification. 
 
Table 5.16 Determinants of Offspring National Identification: Testing the effect of family and 
school (Multinomial Logistic Regression) 
	   Born between 1977 & 1987 
  Model 1   Model 2  
 
Primarily 
Spanish 
More 
Catalan 
Than 
Spanish 
Only 
Catalan 
Primarily 
Spanish 
More 
Catalan 
Than 
Spanish 
Only 
Catalan 
Identificationparentsa -1.009 4.906*** 9.499*** -1.002 4.902*** 9.494*** 
 (1.555) (1.132) (1.259) (1.559) (1.236) (1.258) 
Immigrant Family  0.727 -0.339 -0.393 0.447 -0.338 -0.245 
(IF) (0.589) (0.387) (0.483) (1.238) (1.445) (1.709) 
Years of Schooling  -1.965** 0.789 -0.128 -2.249** 0.797 -0.114 
(YS) a (0.769) (0.677) (0.863) (1.124) (0.792) (1.022) 
Neighborhood  0.934 -2.045*** -2.859*** 0.921 -2.044*** -2.857*** 
Compositiona (0.749) (0.577) (0.651) (0.755) (0.577) (0.651) 
IF x YS     0.420 -0.065 -0.166 
     (1.503) (1.565) (1.878) 
Constant -1.014 0.258 0.150 -0.825 0.250 0.135 
   (0.871) (0.686) (0.850) (1.060) (0.758) (0.976) 
Observations  373    373  
Cluster  286    286  
ll  -366.28    -366.227  
Wald Chi2         126.063 (12)         127.75 (15) 
Adj.Count R2   0.30     0.30   
Notes: 
The reference category is “As Spanish as Catalan” 
aIdparents, HI and NC have been transformed into a 0 to 1 variable 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption not violated 
Collinearity diagnostics do not detect problems in the additive model. VIF values under 2.5  
Standard Errors Adjusted for Household Clusters 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Finally, to test hypothesis 5.5, model 2 adds an interaction between family origin and years 
of schooling. This interaction allows me to test for the heterogeneous effect that school might 
have among the children of natives and the children of immigrants. The school effect is robust 
to this new specification for the two groups; it fosters bi-national identification and prevents 
individuals identifying themselves as primarily Spanish; however, it does not promote a more 
Catalan oriented identification. Parents’ identification continues to be the key factor affecting 
children’s Catalan identification. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
identification with Catalan identity, or to the fact that the children of natives are more likely to go to 
university. 
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Table 5.17 Marginal Effect of Years of Schooling on National Identification by Family Origin 
  coef. s.e  p.value 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Primarily Spanish     
Catalan-born parents -2.249 1.124 0.045 [-4.452,-0.045] 
At least one immigrant parent -1.829 1.005 0.069 [-3.801, 0.142] 
More Catalan than Spanish     
Catalan-born parents 0.797 0.792 0.314 [-0.754, 2.349] 
At least one immigrant parent 0.732 1.341 0.585 [-1.897, 3.362] 
Only Catalan     
Catalan-born parents -0.113 1.022 0.911 [-2.118, 1.890] 
 At least one immigrant parent -0.280 1.589 0.860 [-3.395, 2.834] 
Note: Values estimated from results in Table 5.16 	   	   	  
 
The results presented in tables 5.10 to 5.17 qualify Aspachs-Bracons et al.’s results. They 
indicate that even if the 1983 reform can account for the generational decrease in the proportion 
of primarily Spanish identifiers in the younger age cohort; what determines that individuals’ 
from the youngest generation feel primarily Catalan (i.e. “more Catalan than Spanish” or “only 
Catalan”) is that their parents feel the same way. Moreover, the results suggest that the influence 
that the adoption of Catalan in schools supposedly had on fostering individuals’ Catalan 
identification is contingent on the composition of the neighborhood in which children grew up 
and the school they went to. Finally, the results have shown that the effect of years of schooling 
is not very different among the children of natives and the children of immigrants,; even if the 
effect of years of schooling is greater in the first group, the effect is always in the same direction 
for both groups.  
The next section discusses these results in detail. 
 
5.8 Discussion 
 
This chapter has touched on many issues related to the influence that parents and school 
have upon individuals’ national identification. The chapter has examined these issues in a 
context in which the national cleavage, regional responsibilities for education, and the presence 
of a population with an immigrant background, affects the concurrence of parents’ and school’s 
messages about the nation. Some aspects examined here undoubtedly demand closer analysis; 
nevertheless, and despite the limitations of the small household sample that I counted on, I have 
been able to gain some notable insights into the question that motivates this research. 
In this regard, the empirical results presented in this chapter have confirmed that parents are 
very important determinants of an individual’s identification. This finding, which could be 
considered commonplace, is not that banal if we take into account the fact that nationalism 
studies, as well as previous empirical research, have argued for the importance of the influence 
of schools on individuals’ national identification, and have not taken into consideration parents’ 
national allegiances.  
To date, evidence on the occurrence of intergenerational changes in national identification 
in Catalonia has relied upon the comparison of different age cohorts or different origin groups. 
By using data from different generations within the same family, this chapter confirms, for the 
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first time, that these changes have also occurred within the same family. As a result, we can say 
that the offspring generation is more Catalan oriented than their parents’ generation.  
Beyond this, I have found that mothers are more successful when transmitting their minority 
primarily Spanish identification to their children; although fathers seem to have a more 
important role in their offspring’s primarily Catalan identification. In previous pages, we have 
also learned that parents and children appear more alike in their language patterns than in their 
national identification. In immigrant families, correlations in language use are also greater than 
in national identification; a finding that provides additional evidence in favor of the idea that 
subjective affiliation to Catalonia is not deterministically linked to the language most frequently 
spoken, especially among second generations, for whom birthplace seems to be a sufficient 
criterion to vindicate a Catalan identity (Woolard, 1989). 
Returning to the issue of generational change, if parents contribute to the reproduction of 
national identification, what explains change? The analyses of section 5.7 have provided us with 
some clues which point to the importance of the social mobility of immigrant families, and to 
the role of schooling.  
Multinomial analyses have shown that, in the better-off immigrant families, children exhibit 
a more Catalan oriented identification. Although the lack of longitudinal data does not allow us 
to test what is behind this result, two alternative mechanisms could be envisaged. One possible 
explanation could be that those immigrant families who moved to Catalonia with a higher 
economic status were also more interested in adapting to Catalan standards, and in promoting 
their children’s identification with Catalonia to preserve their high status. This mechanism, 
however, would contradict the hypothesis that the children of high status immigrants feel more 
attached to their parents’ national identification (Rumbaut, 1994, 756). An alternative and 
possibly more plausible explanation, taking into account the social origin of the majority of 
Spanish immigrants, would be that the social mobility of immigrant families is responsible for 
this association. Thus, the children of those immigrants who have been more successful in 
economic terms would mirror their parents’ gratitude to the host society and, therefore, would 
become more attached to it.  
The 1983 educational reform and schooling in general, has also contributed to explain the 
decrease in the aggregate levels of “primarily Spanish” identifiers in the youngest generation. 
According to my results, the years of schooling after compulsory education seem to prevent 
individuals self-identifying as primarily Spanish. Nevertheless, and contrary to what Aspachs-
Bracons et al. (2008) claimed in their work, my results in this chapter do not show that the 
effect of the years of schooling after compulsory education make individuals more Catalan 
oriented, once we control for parents’ national identification. In other words, although years of 
schooling can account for the decrease that has occurred in aggregate primarily Spanish 
identification over time, language policy has not had the impact stressed by previous studies 
(Martínez-Herrera, 2002; Aspachs-Bracons et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, I have found that the influence that years of education have on children who 
started school after 1983, is contingent on the composition of the neighborhood where they 
grew up and the school they went to. Therefore, years of schooling only increases the 
probability that children self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish” in neighborhoods where 
the percentage of the population born in other regions of Spain is moderate. On the other hand, 
in those neighborhoods where the percentage of the immigrant population is low or very high, 
school does not have any influence. This is an intuitive result, as in schools which are located in 
neighborhoods with a very low percentage of immigrants, students bring their Catalan 
identification from home into the schools; while in those neighborhoods where the percentage 
of immigrants rises to 35 percent or more, exposure to the Catalan language and Catalan culture 
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in school is limited. In short, these results seem to indicate that students are sorted into different 
schools according to the neighborhoods in which they live, and that this sorting partially cancels 
out the influence of school.  
The immediate context in which children live has, therefore, a significant influence on their 
national identification, both directly through contact with neighbors and friends, and indirectly, 
through the school. Nevertheless, parents can consciously lessen this impact by sending their 
children to private schools that are not located in the neighborhood where they live. In this case, 
as the below quotes show, a different kind of sorting, which is determined by parents’ national 
identification, can occur.  
 
-­‐ You tell me that the school you attended was Catalan oriented. Was that your parents’ decision for  
you to attend that school?  
-­‐ Yes. Yes, because it was not a school from our neighborhood, and nor was the school close to my 
home.  
-­‐ Why do you think that they decided to send you there? 
-­‐ One day I asked my mother why and my mother told me that she wanted me to study in Catalan. 
And, of course, the school that was in my neighborhood was, at that time, full of Spanish-
speakers. I do not remember this, eh! That’s what my mother told me. And so they did not want 
that. Explicitly my parents wanted me to go to a school like the one I went to: “progressive” and 
Catalan oriented 
[Anna, child of a mixed couple, born in 1981] 
 
-­‐ And your children, what school did they go to? 
-­‐ I always looked for Catalan schools and schools with an active pedagogy [...] 
-­‐ [...] You told me that you looked for Catalan schools with an advanced pedagogy.... 
-­‐ Yes, yes, and I also looked for schools which were not religious. 
-­‐ And why these three things? 
-­‐ For me, these are a sign of freedom. Children were respected. This was the Rosa Sensat group of 
schools. Rosa Sensat was a great pedagogue, and so these schools show a great respect for the 
children [...] 
-­‐ And Catalan, how was it apparent that these were Catalan schools? 
-­‐ Basically, the school was in Catalan.  
-­‐ When did your children study? Because in 1983, Catalan was introduced in the schools.  
-­‐ Yes, but it was not always guaranteed. In the religious schools, the teaching was in Castilian. And 
the environment was Castilian. And in he public schools, it depended. But, I can tell you, the 
schools we chose used Catalan books.  
[Mari Antonia, autochtonous, born in 1944] 
 
Two more points should be made before concluding this chapter. First, the cross-sectional 
analysis performed here has only provided a snapshot of parents’ and children’s national 
identification, and of the continuities and discontinuities of families’ national identification.31 
However, will parents and children’s similarities persist after children move out of their parents’ 
home? In principle, we might assume that once children move out, parents lose their influence, 
while peers’ or partner’s influence gains leverage. Despite this, there are reasons to think that, in 
some cases, the similarity between parents and children will continue. On the one hand, if 
children move out once their national identification is fully crystallized (something which is 
quite common in the Spanish context as children move out of their parents’ home quite late), it 
will be difficult for their  national identification to change in any radical and permanent way. On 
the other hand, we know that an individual’s choice of friends and partner is many times 
                                                      
31 Due to the low number of cases with longitudinal information on the national identification of the 
children who have moved out of their parents’ home, I have not been able to examine the evolution of 
children’s national identification. 
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endogenous to his/her political orientation (Watson et al. 2004). In Catalonia, where national 
identity is so salient, friends and mating selection can be also endogenous to individuals’ 
national identity. Therefore, my intuition is that the offspring generation will continue to follow 
their parent’s identification after moving out. In any case, longitudinal data and further research 
would be essential in order to confirm this. 
Secondly, as specified above, new educational reforms have been carried out since the 1983 
reform. These changes could eventually have an impact on the national identification of younger 
generations and, perhaps, on the new immigrants and their children arriving from other 
countries. Nevertheless, as the segregation of native Catalans and immigrants persists, it is hard 
to believe that schooling will have such a significant impact on individuals’ national 
identification. 
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CHAPTER 6. CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN THE 
SHORT-TERM 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In previous chapter, I examined intergenerational stability and change. However, as I 
showed in chapter 3, an important part of the aggregate changes that occurred in the 
identification with Spain and Catalonia in the last twenty years were the result of individual 
changes. In chapter 4, I provided some evidence showing that the mobilization of the center-
periphery cleavage around the time the survey was conducted affected individuals’ 
identification and, in particular, second generation individuals. As I highlighted then, the 
analyses of chapter 4 presented an important shortcoming: the cross-sectional character of the 
data did not allow testing for the heterogeneous effect that the mobilization of the cleavage had 
depending on individuals’ prior identification.  
This chapter builds on the idea that the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage can 
modify individuals’ category of self-identification over short periods of time, and that the 
claims made by political elites will affect differently individuals with different identification. 
Thus, those individuals who feel only Spanish and only Catalan will see their identification re-
affirmed and reinforced when political elites’ make claims regarding certain issues. However, 
those individuals who identify with both Spain and Catalonia will be more susceptible to update 
their identification in tune with the messages stemming from the media.  
 Although the existence of a center-periphery cleavage refers to a structural situation, as I 
showed in chapter 4, there are certain moments when a particular issue that reinforces the 
conflict between the two sides of the cleavage becomes highly salient in the media, catalyzes 
public debate and increases confrontation (see table 4.6). This chapter conducts an analysis 
which provides fine-grained evidence in favour of a hypothesis which was already posed in 
chapter 4: i.e. that the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage and the political 
confrontation that is generated around it lead individuals to rethink their national allegiances 
and change them.  
In order to test this idea, the present chapter examines the evolution of individual national 
identification during a highly contested period of time, which started with the Partido Popular 
gaining an absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament and continued over the reform of the 
Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. However, to show that there is a causal relationship between 
what happens in “politics” and individuals attitudes is, at the very least, a complicated task. I 
need therefore to lay out a strategy that helps me to connect the political context and change in 
national identification. The strategy adopted here consists in looking at the effect that the media, 
which have been identified in the literature as relevant intermediaries informing individuals’ 
attitudes and behaviours (Gunther, Montero, and Puhle 2007; Richardson and Beck 2007), and 
party identification have on individuals’ national identification.  
The present chapter moves away from the analysis of aggregate data to the analysis of 
individual data and benefits from a dataset that has not been previously used for these purposes. 
The next section reviews the literature that has previously argued that media shapes collective 
national identification and I argue that, beyond the active role that these studies attribute to 
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television, media also have a less active role transmitting what happens in the political context. 
After describing the broadcasting scene in Catalonia and reviewing the political context over 
those years, different hypothesis on the heterogeneous effect that national and regional 
television have on individuals’ national identification will be discussed. An alternative 
hypothesis will be also presented to test for the effect of a different political intermediary, party 
identification. In order to test the hypothesis presented in section 6.4, the longitudinal data of 
the “Panel de Desigualtats a Catalunya (PaD) – Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2001-2005” will be 
used. This data will be complemented with cross-sectional data from the Institut de Ciències 
Polítiques i Socials (ICPS). The results derived from the descriptive analysis will show that 
change in national identification is non-negligible even in a one-year period. The logistic 
regression analysis, on the other hand, will confirm, consistent with my expectations, that 
Catalan television fosters change towards a more Catalan oriented identification and reduces the 
probability of a change in the direction of greater Spanish identification of those individuals 
who self identified as “as Spanish as Catalan” in 2004. However, a similar effect will not be 
found for Spanish television. Additionally, the results will show that the effect of party 
identification is much more limited. 
 
6.2 Television and the collective and individual national identities  
 
The idea that media shape national identity is broadly extended in the literature (Billig 1995; 
Cormack 2000; Price 1995; van den Bulck 2001; Volcic 2010). In his seminal work, Imagined 
Communities, Anderson (1983) claimed that print played a fundamental role on the forging of 
“imagined political communities”.  However, the spread of radio and television use facilitated 
the banal broadcasting of symbols and references to a nationwide audience.1  
In Europe, state ownership of public broadcasters and state regulation of the broadcasting 
system have traditionally sought to secure a market of national bounded loyalties and interests 
(Price 1995). With this aim, public broadcasting was purposively circumscribed to state 
boundaries and to national sovereignty. Fearing the negative consequences of losing the 
monopoly over this market, states fiercely opposed the entrance of private broadcasters. 
However, and despite the state’s opposition, satellite and cable technology, European 
integration and anti-monopolistic regulation made possible the entrance of private television in 
the media market. 
These new broadcasters made it possible for new identities to gain visibility and 
significance in their competition with traditional national identities (Price 1995).2 However, 
notwithstanding the growth of private broadcasters and the so-called cultural imperialism of 
American productions hindering states’ monopolies in the market for loyalties, state legislation 
has continued to preserve national culture by resisting globalizing influences.3  
                                                      
1 Price (1995) contends that globalization, the importation of US broadcasting products and the 
introduction of satellite and new technologies have somehow diminished the leverage of national 
broadcasters. Despite this, he argues that the state continues controlling the market for loyalties.  
2 Antagonistic notions of the good society held by religious or ideological interest groups within the 
nation can mean that private broadcasters also participate in the competition for national allegiances. In 
this case, competition for loyalties occurs in terms of whose coalition and which values better represent 
the true national identity (Price 1995: 16).  
3 French radio musical broadcasters’ obligation to broadcast 40 per cent of its programming in 
French and the dubbing of American dramas to Spanish or Catalan could be considered as explicit and 
implicit examples of how state or regional institutions’ regulations on broadcasting protect the national 
culture against American cultural products.  
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In fact, against the globalisation thesis, many authors continue to think that television forges 
the national imaginary through nationally produced fictional series (Castelló 2009)4, 
advertisements (MacGregor 2003; O'Donohoe 1999), and the news (Billig 1995; Collins 1990; 
Saperas and Casero 2001). According to Castelló (2009), the location of the television series, 
the use of a vernacular language, the representation of cultural elements and the incorporation of 
references from the present or the past are very important elements through which the nation is 
permanently (re-)produced. Moreover, companies’ brand positioning strategies very often make 
use of local consumer culture and symbolic resources are successfully employed in 
advertisements to encourage the consumption of national products (MacGregor 2003). Above 
all, news is possibly the most routine and banal way to remind viewers of their national 
belonging (Billig 1995). Although Billig’s analysis specifically focuses on newspapers, the 
deixis of nation making, the use (and abuse) of the word “nation”, the organisation of 
newspapers into national and international sections, the space devoted to national news 
compared to international news, and the use of maps in the weather section could be equally 
considered as banal reminders of individuals’ national belonging in television news.  
Mihelj, Bajt, and Pankov (2009) have examined news reporting and have founded that the 
news made use of two distinct forms of nationalism narratives: routine reporting, and crisis or 
celebratory reporting. According to Mihelj, Bajt and Pankov (2009, 60-63), the first reporting 
mode would take place in a daily context, it would show elite dissent on different issues; it 
would reproduce the world of nations by using banal expressions of nationalism; it would be 
directed to a wide audience that it is also divided on their stands regarding different issues; and 
it would make use of open-ended news sequences. In contrast, the celebratory reporting mode 
would be used in the broadcasting of national celebrations; it would show elite consensus; it 
would made use of hot expressions of nationalism; it would be directed to a wide and united 
audience; and it would make use of a continuous narrative.  
However, the characteristics attributed to daily reporting are not so clearly identified in a 
multinational context, where the center-periphery cleavage breaks down elite and audience 
consensus on the idea of the nation. In fact, the centralised or decentralised character of the 
broadcasting system has a decisive importance in these cases. Cormack (2000) has argued that 
when minority language media is dependent on state funding, minority language broadcasting 
tends to have a conservative character and contributes to reproducing the majority identity, vis-
à-vis, alternative notions of national identity.5 Decentralization, on the contrary, makes the 
emergence of regional broadcasters possible and facilitates the daily flagging of contested 
identities on national and regional broadcasters.  
In any case, it is worth asking whether the reproduction of national symbols and the 
references to a collective identity in fictional series, advertisements or the news actually have an 
impact on individuals’ national identification, or do they only contribute to reinforcing 
collective national identities. All the studies mentioned thus far argue that media and, in 
particular, television shapes collective identities through the use of “messages of who we are, 
and of which groups we belong to” (Sampedro 2003, 9). They focus, however, on the supply 
side, and they do not test the alleged leverage that media have on collective identities, nor do 
they look at the effect that television has on individuals’ national identification.   
                                                      
4 Collins (1990) has argued that the link between television consumption and political identities is 
weaker than has usually been argued. His argument is based on an analysis of the Canadian case, where 
the pervasive presence of US productions on Canadian television has not weakened Canadian national 
identity.  
5 In these cases, the use of the minority language loses its symbolic character.    
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However, if we want to examine the link between media and individuals’ positions or 
attitudes, we need to turn our attention to a completely different literature. In the late eighties 
and early nineties, a series of studies on public opinion focused on the impact that the media 
and, in particular, television had on individuals’ attitudes. Contrary to Lazarsfeld et al’s (1944) 
seminal work, these studies argued that agenda setting, the prioritizing of certain news over 
other (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), the way in which the news was framed (Cobb and Kuklinski 
1997; Chong 1996) or the existence of information gaps (Zaller 1996) influenced not only 
individuals’ priorities(Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Miller and Krosnick 1996) and the 
considerations that they took into account when they evaluated political leaders(Chong 1996; 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987), but also their opinions and attitudes (Zaller 1992, 1996). Beyond 
news, other authors have argued that advertisements, electoral campaigns and entertainment 
programs’ use of symbols, images, and expectations also influence individuals’ values and 
attitudes (Pallarés and Gifreu 1998, 14).  
These public opinion studies have all centered on the effect that media have on general 
political attitudes and orientations. However, as far as I know, no previous research has directly 
addressed the study of whether exposure to television does actually shape individuals’ national 
identification.  
 
6.3 The broadcasting scene in Catalonia and a look at the period under consideration 
 
In this section, I would like to describe, first, the broadcasting scene in Catalonia and then 
present, very briefly, the political context which the data covers that will be analyzed in the 
empirical section of this chapter. If the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage had any 
impact on individuals’ identification with Catalonia and Spain, it is worth devoting some effort 
to explain what happened during the years being analyzed (2001-2006) and how the 
mobilization of the cleavage was channelled through television.   
In Spain, regional broadcasters appeared as a by-product of growing regional political 
autonomy and, to a lesser extent, of economic and cultural factors(Sampedro and Van den 
Bulck 1995). As I have already explained, in 1983, the Convergence and Union political 
formation (Convergència i Unió, CiU) created a Catalan public broadcaster (TV3) and a Catalan 
network that secured its independence from the Spanish public broadcaster (TVE) and its 
network (Baget 2003). As Baget (2003) has explained, the creation of this new broadcasting 
system was not, however, free of problems due to the Spanish government and Spanish public 
television’s resistance to losing a broadcasting monopoly. In fact, until the law on private 
television was passed in 1988, the two channels of the Spanish public television (TV1, La 2) 
and the two channels of the Catalan public television (TV3 and Canal 33) monopolized all the 
television supply in Catalonia. After the 1988 law was passed, public broadcasters were forced 
to compete with other national broadcasters (Tele 5, Antena 3, Canal Plus) and later on, with 
other local and regional television broadcasters.  
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Table 6.1 Television Audiences* 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Catalan Public Television        
TV3  21.8 21.4 21.1 19.9 19.6 18.2 
K3-33 6.1 7.0 6.8 6.2 5.3 4.3 
Spanish Public Television       
TV1 19.0 19.5 18.6 17.1 15.5 14.3 
La 2 6.3 6.2 5.8 5.5 4.7 3.8 
Private Televisions       
Tele 5 19.6 19.1 20.3 20.9 20.8 19.3 
Antena 3 19.2 18.8 18.2 19.1 20.2 18.6 
Canal Plus 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.4 6.5 
Digital Platforms & other 
channels 5 5.8 7.0 9.2 11.5 14.9 
*Audience distribution, estimation of viewing time for each channel over the course of a year.  
Source: Idescat 
 
Beyond its public function, public broadcasters have the explicit or implicit objective of 
reproducing a collective national identity. This objective was also present in the origins of the 
Spanish and Catalan public broadcasters. Thus, the 1980 Spanish Radio and Television (RTVE) 
Act included amongst its objectives the promotion of Spanish cultural and linguistic diversity. 
The 2006 Law on the State Entitlement of the Radio and Television preserves this same 
objective and adds the promotion of territorial cohesion. In a similar way, the 1983 Law on the 
creation of the Catalan public Radio and Television Corporation stated the broadcaster’s 
objective to be to promote the Catalan language and culture. Specifically, Catalan television was 
expected to “reflect the values of the Catalan people, offer a space where the presence of the 
Catalan language is guaranteed and promote the awareness of belonging to a different national 
community” (Alexandre 2006, 24).6 
The flagging of Spanish and Catalan identities in Spanish and Catalan broadcasting occurs 
explicitly through the use of the Spanish and Catalan languages, and implicitly through the 
banal use of the vernacular language, the semantics7 and the use of Spanish-centered and 
Catalan-centered frames of reference.8 Moreover, the entertainment programs of Spanish 
broadcasters (including their own production series) are usually shot in Madrid and very rarely 
in other regions of Spain. According to a study by Saperas and Casero (2001) on the 
representation of the Spanish identity in national and regional broadcasters’ news, both public 
and private Spanish television news address a national audience and concentrate on institutional 
spheres that are shared by all citizens in Spain. The study, which was based on the analysis of 
                                                      
6 In particular, TV3 has been considered to be one of the main instruments in the normalization of the 
Catalan language use (Calzada and Llorens 1995, Baguet 2003). As Castelló (2009: 302) argues, this has 
been possible through the representation of a monolingual culture that contrasts with the bilingual Catalan 
society. 
7  TV3 very often uses the word “country” to refer to Catalonia and “Spanish State” to refer to Spain. 
Spanish TV broadcasters, on the other hand, make an extensive use of the adjective Spanish when 
referring, for example, to sportsmen or sport competitions.  
8 The use of Spanish-centered or, more specifically, Madrid-centered frames of reference is not only 
common in Spanish public television, but also among the private broadcasters that broadcast from 
Madrid. The following quote from one of my interviews reflects very clearly this framing: “TV1 is very 
general. They speak to you about the M-30 [a highway which surrounds Madrid] as if this was the most 
natural thing in the world. And I haven’t seen the M-30 in my whole life. I do not think this is intentional, 
but this is centralism. When something happens there [in Madrid], even though [that news] is absolutely 
local, from Madrid, it appears on TV. They are the center.” [Interview #25, Angela, immigrant, born in 
1958]. 
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the content of the news during two weeks, showed that news in national broadcasts present 
Spain as a shared collective referent, and focus on the daily performance of the central 
government, the Congress, the role of the main political parties in the opposition, the judiciary, 
the economy, and sports (Saperas and Casero 2001).  Another study by Ruiz-Collantes et al. 
(2000) regarding the image that nationally broadcast news offers of Catalonia, argues that news 
covering Catalan politics centers its attention on Catalonia on specific issues mainly related to 
sport news, the role of Catalan groups in the Spanish parliament, culture and crime reports (Ruiz 
Collantes et al 2000: 56). Despite this, Catalan regional elections or some conflictive issues 
related to the center-periphery cleavage (e.g. the language reforms, the reform of the Statute, or 
conflicts over competencies) lead to Catalan politics receiving some attention.  
News related to Spanish politics is presented daily on Catalan television, although the 
references to Spanish culture and Spanish identity are usually absent. Moreover, cuts from 
programs by national broadcasters in which journalists from other areas of Spain (mainly 
Madrid), political commentators or the general public’ make any comment against Catalonia 
and Catalan citizens very often appear on certain Catalan television shows (e.g. Alguna 
Pregunta Més).  
However, national and regional television broadcasts in Catalonia are not only Spanish or 
Catalan-centered, but they also contribute to channelling the cleavage in the news. They 
reproduce political elites and political parties’ claims and stances regarding particular issues. In 
addition, national and regional televisions’ editorial policies very often cause the news to lean 
towards one or the other side on contentious issues. And this, I contend, also happened during 
the period the data for this chapter covers (2001-2005). These years coincide with the PP’s 
absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament (2000-2004), the first year of the PSOE minority 
government (2004-2008) and the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (2004-2006). 
This is a period characterized by a high level of political conflict. 
 Following the Tripartit government decision to reform the 1979 Statute of Autonomy of 
Catalonia, the Estatut issue catalyzed the political debate. Those who supported the reform of 
the Estatut claimed that it was necessary to adapt the old law to new times, and that it was 
important that the regional government assume new responsibilities that were previously carried 
out by the central government. Moreover, reformers agreed that the new Statute should include 
the recognition of Catalonia’s national character. From the anti-reform side, it was argued that 
the reform of the Statute was driven by Catalan elites’ interests, rather than by Catalan citizens’ 
concerns. The “anti-Estatut reform” side which was led by the PP, but counted on different 
spokesmen (i.e. political commentators, regional presidents...) from other regions of Spain, also 
argued that the new Estatut and, specially, the definition of Catalonia as a nation contravened 
the Spanish Constitution and would lead to the break-up of Spain. Around these two positions, 
political actors’ discourses and political debate polarized.  
As the reform of the new Statute of Autonomy in Catalonia rose on the political agenda 
(January 2004), significant attention was devoted to the issue by the media. The following 
figure illustrates the increase in the salience of this issue over the period under consideration. 
Using data from the newspaper with the largest daily circulation in Catalonia, La Vanguardia, 
the figure shows the number of news stories in which reference to the Statute was present. The 
figures reflect that this issue gradually gained more and more importance over 2004 but, 
especially, in 2005. 
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Figure 6.1 Number of news stories which contain the word “Estatut” in La Vanguardia 
Newspaper 
  
 
  
Source: La Vanguardia. Hemeroteca 
  
The debate on the content of the reform continued for two years (2004 to 2006), with some 
peaks of fierce conflict in between. The proceedings in the Catalan parliament reinforced the 
competition between the Catalan parties to highlight the allegedly negative relationship between 
Spain and Catalonia (Lago and Montero 2010, 406). An issue that had a significant impact on 
the rise of the conflict was that all Catalan parties’ (with the exception of the Popular Party) 
agreed to define Catalonia as a nation and include this definition in the Preliminary Title of the 
new statute.9  
The conflict also intensified due to other divisive campaigns which surrounded the 
negotiations over the statute. For example, in 2004, a boycott against the consumption of 
Catalan cava was organized in response to a statement by Josep Lluís Carod Rovira, the ERC 
leader, against Madrid’s candidacy for the 2012 Olympic Games. Also, in June 2005, the PP 
organized a demonstration in Salamanca in favour of the unity of the Spanish Civil War Archive 
and against the return of a set of documents that had been confiscated by the Franco government 
to the government of Catalonia. Eventually, the PP would deploy a strategy which sought to 
displace political competition from the left-right dimension to the nationalist dimension, under 
the expectation that this would give them more votes (Bonet, Pérez-Nievas, and Hierro 2010). 
This strategy was staged in different acts in support of the Spanish Constitution, which, 
according to the PP, was being threatened by initiatives such as the reform of the Catalan 
Statute (see, for example, the statement of Mariano Rajoy, the PP leader: “There is only a 
nation, the Spanish one”, El País, 04.12.2005, pp.17). 
Ultimately, the debate on the reform of the  1979 Statute was a new staging of the center-
periphery cleavage. Being against the reform was presented by the Tripartit parties and by the 
CiU as a denial of Catalonia uniqueness within Spain and as a denial of Catalonia’s national 
                                                      
9  The definition of Catalonia as a nation was moved to the Preamble of the Statute during the 
proceedings on the Statute in the Spanish Parliament. 
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character. Conversely, being in favour of the reform was understood by the PP as a proof of 
Catalonia’s lack of solidarity toward the rest of Spain and as an attempt to break up Spain.  
 
6.4 Hypotheses on the Causes of Short-Term Changes in National Identification 
 
Now that I have described the political context which covers my data, in this section I 
present the hypotheses that will be tested below.   
Previous studies have emphasized that the influence of news on individuals’ attitudes is 
contingent, on the one hand, to individuals’ attentiveness and, on the other hand, to individuals’ 
prior beliefs or predispositions (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Miller and Krosnick 1996; Zaller 
1992). Selective exposure to national and regional channels also takes place among Catalan 
viewers. So that viewers’ exposure and consumption of news from a particular broadcaster 
relies heavily on their original national identification. Hence, Spanish identifiers usually watch 
news on Spanish television and Catalan identifiers opt primarily for Catalan broadcasters, as 
Table 6.2 shows.10  
 
Table 6.2 Consumption of news on Spanish and Catalan television by national identification 
 Only 
Spanish 
More 
Spanish 
than 
Catalan 
As 
Spanish 
as 
Catalan 
More 
Catalan 
than 
Spanish 
Only 
Catalan 
Marg. N 
Spanish 
broadcasters 
86.27 80.26 53.53 16.30 5.84 31.17 (616) 
Catalan 
broadcasters 
13.73 19.74 46.47 83.70 92.62 68.83 (1360) 
Marginal 2.58 3.85 34.41 34.46 24.70 100  
N (51) (76) (680) (681) (488)  (1976) 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2004” 
 
Taking this endogeneity problem into account, in order to capture the effect that exposure to 
national and regional television has on national identification,11 I will focus my analysis on 
those individuals that felt as Spanish as Catalan in t1. As it can be observed in table 6.2, this 
group is more or less evenly divided between those who use Spanish and Catalan television for 
watching the news.  In addition, this group of individuals feels Spanish and Catalan at the same 
time, so I can test whether exposure affects this identification, shifting individuals’ 
identification in one or the other direction.12  
My expectation is that: 
 
Hypothesis 6.1.1: those individuals who self-identify both as Spanish and Catalan but watch 
Spanish television in t1, due to their continuous exposure to messages that reinforce their 
Spanish identity, will self identify as more Spanish in t2 
                                                      
10 The fact that Spanish television broadcasts mainly in Spanish and that Catalan television 
broadcasts only in Catalan reinforces Spanish-speakers and Catalan-speakers’ preference for Spanish and 
Catalan television, respectively.  
11 Here, I would like to emphasize that the television is considered to be a channel for political parties 
and political elites’ claims on the center-periphery cleavage. 
12 Making use of qualitative interviews, the next chapter (chapter 7) will show with more detail how 
the media channels the cleavage, and contributes to alter individuals’ identification.   
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Hypothesis 6.1.2: On the contrary, those who watch Catalan television and, consequently, 
are exposed to news and entertainment programs that are Catalan-oriented will self identify as 
more Catalan in t2.  
 
In other words, watching the news on any of the Spanish broadcasters should prevent dual 
identifiers, that is, those individuals who identify both with Spain and Catalonia, from adopting 
a more Catalan identification in t2. In contrast, exposure to Catalan news should prevent dual 
identifiers from adopting a more Spanish identification in t2. 
Moreover, if as Zaller (1992) has shown, individuals’ prior orientations vaccinate them 
against those messages that contradict them, then we should find that: 
 
 Hypothesis 6.2.1 and 6.2.2: those individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish and 
despite that, watch news in Catalan, should not change this identification, and vice versa.13  
 
Apart from the influence that the media might eventually have on individuals’ identification 
as an intermediary which channels the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage and elites 
and political parties’ stands regarding it, we might think that party identification can also orient 
individuals’ national identification.  
The relationship between party identification and issue preferences has been extensively 
studied in the literature. Classical studies presented party identification as a deeply rooted 
individual predisposition that orients individuals’ attitudes and opinions (Campbell et al. 1964; 
Converse 1964). In line with these classical studies, Sears (1983) has defined party 
identification as a symbolic attitude that is shaped during the first stages of life, and after 
crystallizing in early adulthood, remains unchanged, influencing non-symbolic attitudes, such as 
the assessment of political leaders. Other authors such as Jacoby (1988), Green and Palmquist 
(1994) and Bartels (2002) have also argued that party identification orients individuals’ 
perceptions and attitudes.  
At odds with this view, revisionist authors have argued that individuals’ party identification 
is a less stable political orientation, and that it is responsive to government performance, macro-
economic changes and the emergence of new issues (Fiorina 1981; Franklin and John 1983; 
Franklin 1984; Markus 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991).  
In between these two approaches, Dancey and Goren (2010) have recently argued that when 
an issue is partisan contested and this contestation attracts wide attention in the media, then 
individuals adapt their stands on that issue and their party identification to conform to one 
another. The media channels the different parties’ stances regarding an issue; then individuals’ 
party identification cues individuals’ issue attitudes accordingly. Ultimately, individuals’ shifts 
in their stand on a particular issue to conform to their party identification would respond to their 
necessity to be consistent, and reduce cognitive dissonance (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955).14 
As figure 6.1 showed the reform of the Statute received high media coverage. This coverage 
helped to clarify political parties’ stands on the reform. Despite the differences in the parties’ 
positions regarding specific issues in the Statute text, it was clear that the PSC, the ERC, the 
                                                      
13 As long as holding Catalan identification and watching a national broadcaster or holding Spanish 
identification and watching a Catalan broadcaster results in cognitive dissonance and, as a consequence, 
psychological distress (Festinger 1957), it could be that the number of individuals that fall in these cells is 
zero. However, as Table 6.2 shows 14 percent of those who feel only Spanish watch the news in Catalan 
and 6 percent of those who feel only Catalan watch the news in  Spanish. 
14 Of course, individuals can always make use of chains of reasoning to make apparently conflicting 
attitudes compatible (Zanjoc 1960, Sinderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991). 
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ICV and the CiU were, for example, in favour of an enlargement of the Catalan government’ 
competencies or in favour of including the definition of Catalonia as a nation. The PP, on the 
other hand, was against this.  
From here, it can be thought that party identification not only affected individuals’ positions 
regarding the reform of the Statute, but also affected individuals’ identification. Here, it is 
important to recall that the mobilization of the cleavage around the Statute issue had important 
polarizing consequences. One could be in favour of the Statute and, consequently, in favour of 
Catalonia (or against both things). Or one could be against the Statute and for the Spanish 
Constitution (or against both things).  
Again, if political parties’ positions had an effect on individuals’ identification, this effect 
should be more clearly observed in those individuals who hold a “neutral” position and, 
consequently, self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan. Taking this into account, I expect 
that: 
 
 Hypothesis 6.3.1: those individuals that self-identified both with Spain and Catalonia in t1 
and feel close to the political parties that supported the reform (CiU, PSC, ERC and ICV) 
changed their national identification towards a more Catalan identification in t2 to be in tune 
with their parties.  
Hypothesis 6.3.2: Conversely, I expect that a change in the opposite direction occurs among 
those individuals who identified with Spain and Catalonia at the same time, but felt close to the 
PP.  
 
Table 6.3 Summary of hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses on media consumption 
 
Hypothesis 6.1.1 
Those individuals who self-identify both as Spanish and Catalan but watch 
Spanish television in t1, due to their continuous exposure to messages that 
reinforce their Spanishness, will self identify as more Spanish in t2 
Hypothesis 6.1.2 
Those who watch Catalan television and, consequently, are exposed to news 
and entertainment programs that are Catalan-oriented will self identify as more 
Catalan in t2. 
Hypothesis 6.2.1 
Those individuals who self-identify as primarily Spanish and despite that, 
watch news on a Catalan channel, should not change this identification as they 
are “vaccinated” against messages which contradict their identification 
Hypothesis 6.2.2 
Those individuals who self-identify as primarily Catalan and despite that, 
watch news in Spanish, should not change this identification as they are 
“vaccinated” against messages which contradict their identification 
 
Hypothesis on party identification 
 
Hypothesis 6.3.1 
Those individuals that identified both with Spain and Catalonia in t1 and feel 
close to the political parties that supported the reform (CiU, PSC, ERC and 
ICV) changed their national identification towards a more Catalan 
identification in t2 to be in tune with their parties.  
Hypothesis 6.3.2 A change in the opposite direction should occur among those individuals who 
identified with Spain and Catalonia in t1, but felt close to the PP 
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If the results of my empirical analysis demonstrate, as I have hypothesized, that the 
accumulated exposure to television, and party identification make individuals more prone to 
change their the national identification; then we will agree that the individual changes that were 
observed in that short period of time were not random, but related to the mobilization of the 
center-periphery cleavage.  
 
6.5 Methodological Strategy 
 
6.5.1 Data  
 
To test the hypotheses that I have presented above, I draw on the panel data of the Panel de 
Desigualtats Socials a Catalunya (PaD)- Fundació Jaume Bofill, first, second, third and fourth 
waves, 2001/2, 2003, 2004, 2005. So far, the national identification question has been asked in 
four waves, with a two year interval for the first two times that the question was posed 
(2001/02, 2004), one year interval for the third time (2005) and a four year interval for the last 
time that the question was asked (2009). The data I make use of here corresponds to the first 
four waves of the panel, as the data was still not available for the eighth wave when this 
chapter’s analyses were carried out. 
In the first wave, interviews were conducted between September 2001 and June 2002. In the 
second, third and fourth waves, the fieldwork was carried out in two phases, from January to 
July and from October to November. 
Of the 3124 individuals who answered the national identification (NI) item in 2001/02, 2509 
answered in 2004 and 2354 in 2005 (see Table 6.4). Attrition and omissions explain the fewer 
number of respondents in 2004 and 2005. Over 16 percent of the respondents of the national 
identification item in 2001/02 dropped out between the first and the third wave and 8.35 percent 
between the third and the fourth wave. Information is omitted also for 3.39 percent of the 
respondents in 2004. Missing values constitute, therefore, 28.04 percent of the data collected in 
2001/02. Non participation of selected households in the first wave, attrition and omissions 
affect the representativeness of the resulting sample.15 
As I am more interested in the analysis of individual change (the patterns and trends of 
change) than in the representativeness of the data, limited representativeness should not be a 
problem here.   
 
 
 
 
                                                      
15 In the analysis that follows this section, I have performed a listwise deletion, that is, I have deleted 
from the sample any observation for which data was not available for all three waves. Although listwise 
deletion is a common strategy for dealing with missingness, it may yield biased estimates when the 
missing data is not completely at random (MCAR). In order to know whether the attrition problem is 
biasing my analysis, I have carried out a sensitivity analysis. The results of the analysis show that 
missingness depends on other variables rather than on the values of my dependent variable; those who are 
more educated, women, older people and those who live in smaller municipalities have a greater 
probability of remaining in the sample. Also, compared to natives, immigrants (individuals who were 
born in Spain but outside of Catalonia) have a greater probability of dropping out. The lost of low 
educated people and immigrants should reduce the observance of changes. If, despite this, the coefficients 
for these variables are still significant, it will mean that the effect of being educated or being immigrant is 
greater than the coefficients indicate. On the contrary, if the coefficients for these variables are not 
significant, then it could be related to the distribution of the outcome sample. 
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Table 6.4 Panel data: Observations, omissions and attrition 
 2001/02 2004 2005 
N 3124 2509 2354 
Omissions  3.39%  
Attrition 2001/02 - 2003 16%  
Attrition 2003 - 2004  8.35% 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001, 2004, 2005” 
 
6.5.2 Measurement of national identification and the operationalization of the change 
 
As I have previously mentioned, the PaD includes a national identification item in the first, 
third and fourth wave. In the first wave of the PaD, “don’t know” was present. In the third and 
the fourth wave, the order of the answer categories was inverted. “None of them” (NoT) and 
“don’t know” (DK) answers were registered, although these two answer choices were not 
offered to the respondent in the answer categories. 
Contrary to other unidirectional measures, the use of this bidirectional measure provides an 
advantage in evaluating change in a context in which political elites make claims regarding the 
national character of both Spain and Catalonia. While a change from “only Spanish” to “as 
Spanish as Catalan” is meaningful and its interpretation is straightforward, we cannot be certain 
about the meaning and interpretation of what a change from 3 to 4 or from 4 to 6, for instance, 
would mean on a 0 to 10 unidirectional scale of identification with Spain or Catalonia. Beyond 
this, it is important to make clear that here I am not interested in measuring the intensity of the 
national feelings, but whether individuals experience a change in their identification towards 
two different objects of identification: Catalonia and Spain. In this regard, the “only Catalan” to 
“only Spanish” scale allows for the evaluation of important issues related to the politics of 
identity. 
Change will be computed by looking at individuals’ self-placement in the “only Spanish” to 
“only Catalan” scale. A change in the individual’s identification would occur when he or she 
changeshis/her preferred category of identification between t1 and t2.  
However, it could be argued that the changes that occur between adjacent categories are not 
significantly important. To anticipate this possible criticism, in the logistic analysis I will follow 
a more conservative strategy, considering only those changes that imply a jump of the 
identification boundary (i.e. from “primarily Spanish” or “primarily Catalan” to “as Spanish as 
Catalan” or from “primarily Spanish” to “primarily Catalan” and vice versa), to entail a 
consequential change. This means that those changes that occur between the side categories of 
the scale (from “only Catalan” to “more Catalan than Spanish” and from “more Spanish than 
Catalan” to “only Spanish” and vice versa) will not be considered as substantive changes. The 
dependent variable, therefore, will take three values, 0 when the response of the individual do 
not change between t1 and t2, -1 when change occurs in the Spanish direction and 1 when change 
occurs in the Catalan direction.  
I would like to emphasize that by making use of this measure of change, the possibilities of 
the change are significantly constrained. Only those who self-identify “as Catalan as Spanish” 
in t1 are faced with three different possibilities: do not change, change in the primarily Catalan 
direction and change in the primarily Spanish direction. In contrast, those who self-identify as 
primarily Spanish or as primarily Catalan are only faced with two possibilities: do not change or 
change in one direction. In this regard, this measure of the change does not allow us to measure 
whether exposure to television or party identification intensified the feelings of those who self-
placed in the extreme positions in t1.  
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6.5.3 Methodology 
 
In order to test the hypothesis posed above, in the analysis of the direction of change I have 
introduced two variables: the Catalan or Spanish character of the TV broadcasters that 
individuals use to watch news and party closeness. The first variable captures the effect that 
exposure to one or another source of information has on the probability of making an 
identification switch. The second variable accounts for the influence that party identification 
may have on national identification. 
In order to examine the effect that television and party closeness have in the individual 
changes that we observe, I have run a logistic regression of the direction of the change. The 
analysis will examine, on the one hand, the changes that occur in the Spanish direction and, on 
the other hand, the changes that occur in the Catalan direction.16 It is important to mention here 
that the distribution of the ones and zeros is unequal in the outcome variable, so that the number 
of zeros (over 80 per cent) is around eight times higher than the number of ones (around 20 per 
cent). This unbalanced distribution of the outcome variable makes standard errors larger than 
they should be. However, if despite this, we find that our hypotheses are fulfilled, we will have 
stronger evidence in favour of them.  
The endogenous relationship that exists between identification and television consumption 
makes it difficult to test the influence of television on the probability of making a change. As 
shown in table 6.2, those individuals that identify more with Spain watch news on any of the 
Spanish TV broadcasters, while those individuals who identify more with Catalonia watch the 
news on Catalan television. A ceiling effect prevents us from testing the effect that exposure to 
Spanish TV has among those individuals who already identified with Spain in t1, or the effect of 
the exposure to Catalan TV on those individuals who already identified with Catalonia in t1. 
Nevertheless, if despite this, individuals who watch the national (or the regional) television, 
self-identify as more Spanish (or more Catalan) in t2 than in t1, then we can argue that their 
exposure to the news on Spanish (or Catalan) TV channels has had an impact on their 
identification.  
Therefore, the empirical analysis will centre on the analysis of the effect that exposure to 
national or regional television has on those individuals who self-identify with both Spain and 
Catalonia in t1. If the effect of the television is important at all, this effect should be observed, 
specifically, in this group of individuals. 
In order to test the effect of exposure to television, I need a measure of the television 
channel used by respondents that precedes temporally the occurrence of the change. Since in the 
PaD, respondents are only asked in 2004 about their TV consumption, the logistic analysis will 
be carried out only for the second time period (2004-2005), where the inverse causality problem 
is not present.17 Exposure to Spanish or Catalan television will be measured by means of a 
dummy variable that collects information about the origin of the television channel that 
individuals use most frequently for watching news. Those who do not watch TV news or use a 
broadcaster whose production centre is not identifiable (e.g. satellite) will be excluded from the 
                                                      
16 Note that, as I anticipated above, a ceiling effect prevents me from examining the effect of the 
independent variables on the probability of making a change in the Spanish direction among those 
individuals who self-identified as ‘primarily Spanish’ in 2004, and vice versa. 
17 Ideally, it would have been better to have information on the respondents’ television consumption 
and party identification in all three waves to examine the covariance of the changes. Unfortunately, the 
data for television consumption and party identification is asked only once in the first four waves of the 
PaD. 
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analysis (9% of the sample). Consumption of news on any of the public or private Spanish 
broadcasters will be the reference category.  
Respondents are also asked about the political party they feel close to. Here, I am interested 
in learning whether the position that the different political parties adopted during the negotiation 
of the Statute had any effect on the national identification of those respondents who felt close to 
any of the different political parties vis-à-vis those who did not feel close to any political party. 
As the PaD item allows multiple answers, I have considered those individuals who feel close to 
more than one political party as not holding a specific party identification. Party identification, 
therefore, will be included in the analysis by means of dummy variables. Not feeling close to 
any political party will be the reference category.  
In the logistic analysis, I will introduce identification in t1 as a dummy variable. This will 
allow me to test the effect that exposure to Spanish or Catalan broadcasters has among those 
individuals who identified with both Spain and Catalonia at the same time in t1. The reference 
category will be “primarily Spanish” for the analysis of the change in the Catalan direction and 
“primarily Catalan” for the analysis of the change in the Spanish direction. 
I will also include in the model three different controls that may affect the propensity to 
change, independently of the direction of the change: descendancy, education and age. In 
principle, it might be expected that those individuals who, due to migration, have entered into 
contact with a different nation, show a greater propensity to change. Although these individuals 
possibly remain “loyal” to their original identification, after migrating they may have developed 
an attachment to the place where they have been living for an important part of their lives. The 
distress caused by making these feelings compatible with their identification could make their 
identification more ambivalent. 
Although the children of immigrants have had a very different experience than their parents, 
their socialization will likely have been marked by the reception of contradictory messages from 
their parents and the context. Children of mixed couples will have suffered a similar experience, 
although in their case, opposite messages may even come from their parents. Taking all this into 
account, I expect that both second generation individuals and children of mixed couples will be 
more prone to change than natives, for whom national identification should be a more stable 
trait. 
Descendancy will be introduced in the analysis with four dummy variables that will take the 
following values: “autochthonous”, “children of mixed couples”, “second generations” and 
“immigrants”. The autochthonous category will be the reference category in the logistic 
analysis.  
Education should work as an “inhibitor” of change. The role that education plays on the 
stability of political attitudes has been extensively discussed in the literature (Converse 1964; 
Feldman 1989; Zaller 1992). Converse (1964, 227-8) has argued that people without education 
lack articulated attitudes and have more difficulties expressing their political beliefs verbally. 
Following this argument, it is foreseeable that more educated people have a more articulated 
and consistent national identification and that, as a consequence, will be less likely to change 
their identification. The education variable included in the analysis presents three categories 
(lower secondary or less, upper secondary, and college, M.A. or PhD). The reference category 
in the analysis will be lower secondary or less.  
Finally, in order to test the impressionable years’ hypothesis (Alwin and Jon 1991; Sears 
1975), I also introduce in the analysis a quadratic function of age. This will allow me to check 
whether individuals are more prone to change their national identification in early adulthood 
than later on, when political attitudes become fully crystallized. 
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The descriptive of the different variables for the analysis conducted in section 6.7 are 
presented in the next table. 
Table 6.5 Descriptives 
 Wave N % or Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Immigrant 3 357 17.41  0 1 
Second Generation 3 256 12.49  0 1 
Children of mixed couples 3 271 13.22  0 1 
Autochthonous 3 884 43.12  0 1 
Age 3 2050 50.43 16.79 18 91 
Lower Secondary or less 3 1429 69.81  0 1 
Upper Secondary 3 238 11.63  0 1 
University 3 380 18.56  0 1 
No TV 3 180 9.00  0 1 
Catalan TV 3 1285 69.05  0 1 
Spanish TV 3 576 30.95  0 1 
Feel closer to PSC 2 247 12.65  0 1 
Feel closer to PP 2 60 3.07  0 1 
Feel closer to CiU 2 342 17.51  0 1 
Feel closer to ICV 2 90 4.61  0 1 
Feel closer to ERC 2 283 14.49  0 1 
Do not feel close to any party 2 931 47.67  0 1 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2004, 2005” 
 
6.6 Description of the changes 
 
Before going into the logistic analysis it is worth examining which kind of individual 
changes took place across these time periods. Table 6.6 shows the distribution of the national 
identification responses of those individuals who participated in all three waves of the panel. 
Between 2001/2 and 2005, small changes occur in the side categories. The losses in the “more 
Spanish than Catalan” category correspond with increases in the “more Catalan than Spanish” 
and “only Catalan” categories. In particular, the “only Catalan” category and the “more Catalan 
than Spanish” categories increased by 3 percent points over the whole period. However, 
important changes were also found in the “none of them” answers in 2004 and 2005.18 In the 
analyses that follow, I have excluded those individuals who answered “don’t know” or “none of 
them” or who did not answer the identification item in any of the three waves.19 
 
 
 
                                                      
18 Table A.6.1 in the Appendix presents detailed information on the 2001/02 identification of the 
“none of them” category in 2004 and 2005. Table A.6.2 displays the trajectories of those who answered 
“don’t know” or did not answer in 2001/02. The “none of them” category is made up of many of the “as 
Catalan as Spanish” identifiers in 2001, followed by the “only Spanish”, “more Spanish than Catalan” 
and “don't know”, “no answer” categories in 2001/02.The trajectories of those who answered “don’t 
know” or did not answer in 2001 differ. Those who did not answer in 2001 chose first the “only Catalan” 
category in 2004 and 2005, and then the “more Catalan than Spanish”, “as Spanish as Catalan” and “none 
of them” categories. Conversely, those who answered “don’t know” in 2001 chose first the “as Spanish as 
Catalan” category, followed by the “none of them” option. 
19 See Appendix for a detailed analysis of the changes experienced by those individuals who did not 
answer the national identification item or answered “don’t know” or “none of them”. 
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Table 6.6 Distribution of the national identification indicator 2001/02, 2004 and 2005 (%) 
 2001-02 2004 2005 
Only Spanish 4.36 2.89 3.56 
More Spanish than Catalan 5.69 4.00 4.23 
As Spanish as Catalan 33.41 34.30 31.85 
More Catalan than Spanish 30.07 32.43 32.56 
Only Catalan 21.62 23.35 24.64 
None of them  2.71 2.67 
Don’t know 1.56 0.22 0.31 
No answer 3.29 0.09 0.18 
Total 2248 2248 2248 
Notes: 
1  Only those individuals who participated in the three waves are included. 
2I have excluded from the analysis those individuals whose parents and/or themselves were born outside of Spain, as 
for these individuals identification with other nations may be at play. 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001, 2004, 2005” 
 
The aggregate changes that we observe in table 6.6 might seem relatively small if we take 
into account the high level of political conflict that took place in Catalonia at that time. 
However, the small number of changes that we observe at the aggregate level can be hiding 
significant changes at the individual level. As individual changes in one direction can be 
counteracted by individual changes in the other direction, it is necessary to dissect these 
aggregate changes by examining whether individuals changed their national identification 
during those years. The following tables (6.7 and 6.8) show the individual changes which took 
place over this period, and confirm that behind the relatively aggregate stability, an important 
number of individual changes were hidden.  
When we examine the answers of the respondents in 2001/02 and 2004 in more detail, we 
find that those who self-identify with both Spain and Catalonia in 2001/02 are the most stable. 
70 percent of those who self-identified as dual in 2001/02 continue to self-identify as so in 
2004. Interestingly though, those who defined themselves as both Spanish and Catalan at the 
same time are also very stable. Sixty six percent of those who self-identified as “only Catalan” 
in 2001/02 also used this same category to describe themselves in 2004. In contrast, those who 
opted for any of the primarily Spanish (“only Spanish” or “more Spanish than Catalan”) 
categories in 2001/02 are the most unstable. In principle, one might think that those taking an 
extreme position should be more stable; either because they are more resistant to any kind of 
persuasion or because of ceiling effects.20 This, however, does not apply to the “only Spanish” 
identifiers, who are more prone to change their identification from t1 to t2. A possible 
explanation for the instability that we observe among these identifiers could be the socio-
political context in Catalonia, which leads individuals to feel a certain distress when adopting a 
position that does not match the mainstream.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
20 Note that people who place at any of the endpoints of the scale can only move in one direction. 
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Table 6.7 Changes in individual national identification between 2001/02 and 2004 (row 
percents) 
  National Identification 2004  
  Only  
Spanish 
More  
Spanish  
Dual 
More  
Catalan  
Only  
Catalan 
Marg. Total 
Only Spanish 27.78 22.22 43.33 2.22 4.44 4.39 (90) 
More Spanish 7.63 27.12 58.47 5.93 0.85 5.76 (118) 
Dual 3.15 3.72 69.81 18.60 4,72 34.10 (699) 
More Catalan 0.45 0.45 16.82 61.11 21.17 32.49 (666) 
Only Catalan 0.21 0.00 3.77 29.56 66.46 23.27 (477) 
Marginal 2.93 3.95 35.41 33.51 24.20 100  
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Total (60) (81) (726) (687) (496)  (2050) 
Notes: See Table 6.6  
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001, 2004, 2005” 
 
The levels of stability are higher in the following period (2004-2005). This could be due to 
the fact that the time span is shorter. Nevertheless, the patterns of stability and change repeat. 
The middle category continues to be the most stable; 72 percent of those who felt Spanish and 
Catalan at the same time in 2004 continue to feel so in 2005. The “only Catalan” and “more 
Catalan than Spanish” categories follow the dual category in terms of stability. The percent of 
change in the primarily Spanish categories is now considerably lower than in the previous 
period. It is plausible that the limited movement that we observe now on these extreme 
categories stems from the polarization of the cleavage that followed the start of the negotations 
over the reform of the statute. In this sense, it is conceivable that those who already had an 
extreme position in 2004 reinforced their Spanish identification due to the mobilization of the 
cleavage during that period.  
 
Table 6.8 Changes in individual national identification between 2004 and 2005 (row 
percentages) 
  National Identification 2005  
  Only  
Spanish 
More  
Spanish  
Dual 
More  
Catalan  
Only  
Catalan 
Marg. Total 
Only Spanish 50.00 18.33 31.67 0.00 0.00 2.93 (60) 
More Spanish 23.46 43.21 28.40 2.47 2.47 3.95 (81) 
Dual 3.17 5.79 71.63 14.88 4.55 35.41 (726) 
More Catalan 0.00 0.29 12.81 63.17 23.73 33.51 (687) 
Only Catalan 0.20 0.00 5.24 28.63 65.93 24.20 (496) 
Marginal 3.56 4.39 33 33.46 25.61 100  
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Total (53 (90) (676) (686) (525)  (2050) 
Notes: See table 6.6 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001, 2004, 2005” 
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In addition, I am interested in knowing the direction of the changes. Table 6.9 shows that 
using the loose measure of change, in the first period, changes in the Catalan direction (23 
percent) significantly exceeded changes in the Spanish direction (16 per cent). However, in the 
following period, differences are not so important. So, in the later period 17 per cent of the 
changes occurred in the Spanish direction, while the number of changes that took place in the 
Catalan direction was 18 percent. On the whole and making use of this loose measure of 
change, the overall percentage of change was 39 percent between 2001/02 and 2004 and 35 
percent between 2004 and 2005. 
 
Table 6.9 Direction of the changes (column percents) 
 Loose Measure Restricted Measure 
 2001/02 & 2004 2004 & 2005 2001/02 & 2004 2004 & 2005 
Spanish Direction 16.09 16.73 9.02 8.80 
No change 60.95 65.66 76.98 82.02 
Catalan Direction 22.96 17.61 14.00 9.18 
Overall change 39.05 34.34 23.02 17.98 
Notes: See table 6.6 
Source:  “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001, 2004, 2005” 
  
But how consistent were these changes? Table 6.10 shows the direction of the changes over 
the two periods of time. Overall, 47 percent of all individuals did not change their national 
identification over these years. Those who changed only once made up 34 percent. Changes that 
occurred always in the same direction were significantly low (1 percent). And 18 percent of the 
total sample made a switch in opposite directions.  
When we adopt a more restricted measure of the change and we examine only the changes 
that took place between the primarily Spanish, primarily Catalan and dual identification, the 
amount of changes decrease to 23 percent between 2001/02 and 2004 and 18 percent between 
2004 and 2005 (see Table 6.9). Making use of this measure of change, we observe that 69 
percent of all individuals in the sample did not change over the whole period and 22 percent 
changed only once (see Table 6.11). 
 
Table 6. 10 Consistency of the changes over time (cell percentages) 
  2004-2005 period Total 
 Spanish 
Direction 
No change Catalan 
Direction 
 
Spanish 
Direction 0.44 7.95 7.95 335 
No change 6.78 46.78 8.34 1269 
20
01
/0
2-
 2
00
4 
pe
rio
d 
Catalan 
Direction 9.51 10.93 1.32 446 
 Total 343 1346 361 2050 
Notes: See table 6.6 
Source: “Panel de Desigualtats – Fundació Jaume Bofill 2001, 2004, 2005” 
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Table 6.11 Consistency of the changes over time. Restricted measure (cell percents) 
  2004-2005 period Total 
 Spanish 
Direction 
No change Catalan 
Direction 
 
Spanish 
Direction 0.05 4.59 4.39 185 
No change 4.05 68.59 4.44 1580 
20
01
/0
2-
 2
00
4 
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d 
Catalan 
Direction 4.78 8.83 0.29 285 
 Total 182 1681 187 2050 
Notes: See table 6.6 
Source: “Panel de Desigualtats – Fundació Jaume Bofill 2001, 2004, 2005” 
 
From the analysis of these tables, some preliminary conclusions could be drawn. The tables 
show that more changes occurred in the first period, that is, between 2001 and 2004, than in the 
second period, between 2004 and 2005. Despite this, the number of changes that occurred in the 
second period is not negligible.  
 
Figure 6.2 Evolution of the Identification with Spain and Catalonia (2001-2005) (%= 
 
Source: ICPS data 
 
Changes in the Catalan direction exceeded changes in the Spanish direction in the first 
period. If we agree with the idea that what happens in national politics has a decisive 
importance on individuals’ attitudes, we might argue that this movement was a reaction against 
the Spanish nationalism deployed by the PP national government between 2001 and 2004. Over 
this period, the PP majority government’s hot expressions of Spanish nationalism increased.21  
                                                      
21 Between 2000 and 2004, the PP deployed a discourse of Spanish nationalism both indoors and 
outdoors that was staged, for example, on a military parade that went along the Diagonal Avenue on 
Armed Forces Day. The celebration of Armed Forcees Day in Barcelona met with the opposition of a 
significant number of Barcelona citizens (La Vanguardia, 28.05.2000, pp. 19-22).  Hot expressions of 
nationalism were possibly more explicit when  the government responded to the Moroccan “invasion” of 
the islet of Perejil, sending the Spanish Army there and placing a flag at the top of the islet (“España 
recupera el islote de Perejil”, La Vanguardia, 18/7/2002, p. 11) or when a 14 x 21 meters Spanish flag 
was hoisted in Madrid’s Columbus Square and the government stated that a tribute to the Spanish flag 
would take place every month to “symbolize the integrity of Spain” (Federico Trillo, then PP Defense 
0.00 
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This seems to be confirmed by the aggregate data presented in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows how 
primarily Catalan identifiers increased and primarily Spanish identifiers decreased during the PP 
majority government. This trend changes after PSOE arrival to the central government, when 
the percent of primarily Catalan identifiers moderates.    
In any case, the raw data presented so far does not allow for testing the idea that the 
mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage was behind all these changes. The next section 
goes in depth on this idea by examining the effect that television and party identification have 
on individual change in national identification.  
 
6.7 Results  
 
Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show the results of the logistic analysis.22 Changes in the Spanish 
direction (model 1) and changes in the Catalan direction (model 2) are estimated separately. 
Therefore, the analyses exclude individuals who self-identified as ‘primarily Spanish’ in 2004 in 
model 1, and individuals who self-identified as ‘primarily Catalan’ in 2004 in model 2, as 
change is constrained for these groups in the Catalan and Spanish direction, respectively. 
Specification (a) in tables 6.12 and 6.13 presents the simple impact of television and party 
identification, respectively, on the probability of changing national identification between 2004 
and 2005. Specification (b) presents the impact of television (table 6.12) and party identification 
(table 6.13) conditioned upon the individual original national identification in 2004.  
Focusing on the first model (1a) of Table 6.12, it can be observed that the descendancy 
characteristics are related to the probability of making an identification switch in the Spanish 
direction. Thus, immigrants and the children of mixed couples have a greater likelihood of 
making a switch in the Spanish direction. The effect seems to be more important among 
immigrants than among the children of mixed couples. The propensity of immigrants and their 
children to make a change in the Spanish direction is robust to other specifications of the model 
(column 1b). These results seem to indicate that immigrants and the children of mixed couples 
are certainly more volatile than the autochthonous population, although the occurrence of the 
changes is not independent of the direction in which these changes occur. This also applies to 
the second generations, although this group’s propensity to change is not significantly different 
than the autochthonous group’s propensity to change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
ministry, “Tormenta política por la decisión del Gobierno de instaurar un homenaje mensual a la 
bandera”, La Vanguardia, 3/10/2002, p. 21). 
22 As I have previously mentioned, I have included in the analysis only those individuals for which 
complete three-wave data is available. 
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Table 6.12 Determinants of short-term changes. Accounting for the effect of exposure to news 
on regional television on national identification in 2005 (Binomial logistic regression) 
 Changes in the 
Spanish Direction 
Changes in the  
Catalan Direction 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Identification in 2004     
Dual -0.281 -0.086 2.098*** -0.285 
 (0.204) (0.270) (0.204) (0.269) 
Origin     
Children of mixed couples 0.948*** 0.975*** 0.385 0.195 
 (0.264) (0.265) (0.266) (0.275) 
Second Generation 0.443 0.468 -0.437 -0.502 
 (0.316) (0.318) (0.307) (0.306) 
Immigrant 1.339*** 1.386*** -0.160 -0.359 
 (0.249) (0.255) (0.249) (0.242) 
Education     
Secondary -0.085 -0.069 -0.427 -0.536 
 (0.293) (0.293) (0.336) (0.344) 
University Degree -0.444 -0.437 -0.388 -0.420 
 (0.280) (0.280) (0.279) (0.289) 
Age -0.008 -0.007 0.039 0.030 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) 
Age2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
News Consumption     
Catalan TV -0.223 -0.041 0.121 -3.129*** 
 (0.210) (0.270) (0.203) (0.418) 
Interaction     
Dual X Catalan TV  -0.460  4.333*** 
  (0.413)  (0.465) 
     
Constant -2.720** -2.891*** -4.720*** -2.604** 
 (0.853) (0.867) (0.919) (0.943) 
   
                                                                                           
Observations 1686 2,001 1,694 1,694 
Log-likelihood -491.432 -490.795 -464.795 -409.914 
D.F. 9.000 10.000 9.000 10.000 
Chi-Square 
Correctly classified 
70.510 
90.57% 
71.786 
90.57% 
1,694 
90.14% 
1,694 
90.14% 
Notes:  
1No change is the reference category in the four models.  
2As change is constrained in the Spanish direction for those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004, the 
analyses exclude these individuals in 1a and 1b. The contrary applies for 2a and 2b. Here change is constrained in the Catalan 
direction for those individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004, so these individuals are excluded from the 
analyses.  
3Dual in model 1b refers to the effect that exposure to Spanish television has among those individuals who self-identified as 
as Spanish as Catalan in 2004. The same applies for model 2b. 
4In model 1b, Catalan TV accounts for the effect that exposure to news on a Catalan television channel has among those 
individuals who self-identified as primarily Catalan in 2004. In model 2b, Catalan TV accounts for the effect that exposure to 
Catalan television has among those individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004. 
5Lincom computes the estimate value and standard error of linear combinations of coefficients.  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Although, the sign of the coefficients indicate that those who completed secondary 
education and those who possess a university degree seem to be less susceptible to change than 
those with lower education levels, this effect is not significant. Neither is age related to 
individuals’ propensity to change.  
Finally, those individuals who self-identified as “as Spanish as Catalan” in 2004 are 
significantly more likely to show a primarily Catalan identification in 2005.  
Next, I am interested in learning the effect that exposure to a Catalan or Spanish broadcaster 
had on respondents’ probability of changing their national identification in the years examined. 
The non significant coefficients of Catalan TV in columns 1a and 2a indicate that television did 
not have any direct influence on the likelihood of making a switch either in the Spanish 
direction, or in the Catalan direction.  
We can turn now to the models with the interactions (columns 1b and 2b in Table 6.12). The 
non coefficient for “dual” in 1b and 2b refers to those individuals who self-identified as both 
Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and watch news on Spanish television. However, this coefficient is 
not significant, which means that the consumption of news from a Spanish broadcaster does not 
affect the likelihood of changing national identification between 2004 and 2005. Generally, this 
result contradicts hypothesis 6.1.1 and indicates that exposure to a Spanish broadcaster does not 
foster changes in the Spanish direction, neither does it inhibit changes in the Catalan direction 
among those individuals who self-identified as as Spanish as Catalan in 2004.  
The coefficient of “Catalan TV” in column 1b refers to those individuals who self-identified 
as “primarily Catalan” in 2004 and watch news on a Catalan channel. The non-significance of 
this coefficient indicates that, for these individuals, watching the news on Catalan television 
does not affect their probability of change. On the contrary, the significant coefficient of 
‘Catalan TV’ in column 2b shows that those who self-identified as ‘primarily Spanish’ and 
watched TV3 in 2004 were less likely to make a switch in the Catalan direction. This result 
confirms, in agreement with hypothesis 6.2.1, that those individuals’ who feel primarily Spanish 
are vaccinated against those messages coming from Catalan television that contradict their prior 
orientations or feelings.  
To provide a meaningful interpretation of the interaction between self-identifying as both 
Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and watching the news on Catalan television, it is necessary to 
calculate the joint effect of the constitutive and interaction terms, as well as its standard error 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Franzese and Kam 2007). Table 6.13 includes the marginal 
effect of watching the news on a Spanish and Catalan television channel on those individuals 
who felt both Spanish and Catalan in 2004. The results (see test 1) show that exposure to 
Catalan television fostered changes in the Catalan direction between 2004 and 2005 among 
those who self identified as Spanish and Catalan and it depressed the probability of change in 
the Spanish direction among these same individuals, although in this latter case the effect is 
significant only at a very marginal level.  
In order to check the robustness of these results, I have repeated the analyses for an 
alternative measure of exposure to news. Thus, I have tested this model excluding Spanish and 
Catalan private broadcasters (see test 2). 23 The results confirm that exposure to Spanish public 
television does not have any leverage on the likelihood of a shift in the Spanish direction. 
However, the effect of Catalan public television is confirmed: those who felt “as Spanish as 
                                                      
23 Bearing in mind that in March 2004, the PSOE won the general elections and the management of 
Spanish public television changed, I have also run the analysis only for those individuals who were 
interviewed before the change in the management of Spanish public television took place. The results 
confirm the results in table 6.13.  
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Catalan” in 2004 and watched the news on Catalan public television show a greater propensity 
to self-identify as primarily Catalan and a lower propensity to self-identify as primarily Spanish 
in 2005.24 
 
Table 6.13 Marginal effect of watching the news on a Spanish or Catalan television channel 
among individuals who self-identify as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 
 Broadcaster coef. s.e. p.value 95% confidence intervals 
TEST 1      
Catalan TV  -0.501 0.333 0.132 [-1.153      0.151] Change in the 
Spanish Direction Spanish TV  -0.086 0.270 0.750 [-0.616      0.443] 
Catalan TV   1.204 0.236 0.000 [0.740       1.666] Change in the 
Catalan direction Spanish TV  -0.285 0.269 0.289 [-0.813     0.242] 
      
TEST 2      
TV3  -0.799 0.391 0.041 [-1.565    -0.033] Change in the 
Spanish Direction TVE  0.454 0.422 0.283 [-0.374     1.282] 
TV3 0.975 0.320 0.002 [0.348      1.601] Change in the 
Catalan direction TVE 0.005 0.410 0.989 [-0.798     0.809] 
Notes:  
1TV3 is the public Catalan television and TVE is the public Spanish television 
2Values estimated from results in Table 6.12 
 
I also want to test whether party identification works as a cue which orients individuals’ 
identification with the nation when partisan debate clarifies political parties stands’ regarding 
the center-periphery cleavage. As in table 6.12, I have run a logistic analysis to  test the single 
effect of party identification (models 1a and 2a) and the effect that party identification had 
among those individuals who self-identified as as Spanish as Catalan in 2004 (models 1b and 
2b).25 The analyses are presented in table 6.14.  
The results for the control variables differ in some aspects to the results shown in table 6.12, 
but they seem to be quite robust for the different specifications of the model (with and without 
interactions). As in the previous model, being immigrant or the child of mixed couples 
increased the probability of making a switch in the Spanish direction between 2004 and 2005. 
This is not confirmed for second generation individuals, although, as in the analysis for 
exposure to Catalan and Spanish television, this group and the immigrant group are less likely 
than the autochthonous group to make a change in the Catalan direction; however, in this case,  
 
                                                      
24 Although the results are not presented here, I have repeated these analyses for exposure to news on 
a Catalan or a Spanish radio station. The results confirm that those individuals who felt both Spanish and 
Catalan in 2004 and listened to the news on a Catalan radio station were more prone to self-identify as 
primarily Catalan in 2005. This significant effect is not found when the analyses compare those who read 
Catalan and Spanish newspapers, although the sign of the coefficient goes in the expected direction. Yet, 
here it is worth noting that the number of individuals who read the newspaper on a daily basis is only 38 
percent. In additon newspapers’ readers are very possibly more sophisticated, and this may make them 
less susceptible to being persuaded by the messages that stem from the media.  
25 Identification with ERC predicts change in the Catalan direction perfectly, so the results of this 
analysis are not presented.   
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Table 6.14 Determinants of short-term changes. Accounting for the effect of exposure to news 
on regional television on national identification in 2005. 
 
Changes in the 
Spanish Direction 
Changes in the 
Catalan Direction 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Identification in 2004     
Dual -0.460* -0.420+ 1.689*** 1.800*** 
 (0.196) (0.255) (0.194) (0.270) 
Origin     
Children of mixed couples 0.954*** 1.002*** 0.328 0.238 
 (0.261) (0.264) (0.259) (0.260) 
Second Generation 0.424 0.476 -0.663* -0.751* 
 (0.308) (0.310) (0.304) (0.304) 
Immigrant 1.258*** 1.328*** -0.327 -0.390+ 
 (0.232) (0.238) (0.233) (0.232) 
Education     
Secondary -0.122 -0.128 -0.399 -0.395 
 (0.291) (0.292) (0.332) (0.334) 
University Degree -0.374 -0.388 -0.321 -0.270 
 (0.270) (0.271) (0.269) (0.271) 
Age 0.013 0.015 0.032 0.023 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Feel close to     
PSC -0.122 -0.237 0.202 1.279*** 
 (0.247) (0.354) (0.238) (0.377) 
PP 0.281 -0.420 0.595 1.689** 
 (0.404) (0.661) (0.385) (0.614) 
CiU -0.184 0.024 0.008 -1.264* 
 (0.243) (0.270) (0.233) (0.624) 
ICV 0.047 0.279 0.271 0.018 
 (0.399) (0.439) (0.396) (0.757) 
Interactions     
Dual* PSC  0.160  -1.512** 
  (0.487)  (0.473) 
Dual * PP  1.220  -1.529* 
  (0.838)  (0.770) 
Dual * CiU  -1.055  1.661* 
  (0.678)  (0.675) 
Dual * ICV  -1.094  0.367 
  (1.134)  (0.888) 
     
Constant -2.975*** -3.063*** -4.088*** -3.879*** 
 (0.865) (0.870) (0.893) (0.903) 
     
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,508 1,508 
Log-likelihood -484.429 -480.871 -470.758 -457.014 
D.F. 12.000 16.000 12.000 16.000 
Chi-Square 49.609 56.725 112.408 139.896 
Correctly Classified 89.33 89.33 88.86 88.86 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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the association is statistically significant. Neither education nor age seem to have any effect on 
the probability of change in one or the other direction. 
Those who self-identified as as Spanish as Catalan in 2004 were less likely to self-identify 
as primarily Spanish, and more likely to self-identify as primarily Catalan in 2005 (see columns 
1a and 2a in Table 6.14). 
Columns 1a and 2a also report the effect that feeling close to a party in 2004 had over the 
likelihood of switching individuals’ identification towards a more Spanish or more Catalan 
oriented identification in 2005. The lack of significance of these coefficients shows that political 
parties do not perform directly as a cue which predicts the change or the absence of change.26 
In columns 1b and 2b, the coefficient for dual indicates that the dual identifiers who did not 
feel close to any party in 2004 were less prone to make a switch in the Spanish direction and 
more prone to make a switch in the Catalan direction. Also, in column 2b, the significant 
coefficients of closeness to the PSC, the PP and the CiU must be interpreted as follows: Those 
individuals who self-identified as primarily Spanish in 2004 and felt close to the PSC and the 
PP are more likely to self-identify as more Catalan oriented in 2005; while those individuals 
who felt primarily Spanish and declared that they felt close to the CiU seem to be less likely to 
change. These results, which are counterintuitive, must be taken very cautiously due to the 
limited number of cases of individuals who felt primarily Spanish and felt close to these parties 
in 2004 and changed towards the Catalan direction in 2005.  
Now, to learn about the effect of the interaction, we cannot only look at the interaction 
term, as is very often mistakenly done  (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Franzese and Kam 
2007). We need to see the joint effect of “feeling close to a political party” and the interaction 
term. These effects are shown in table 6.15. 
 
Table 6.15 Marginal effect of feeling close to a political party among individuals who self-
identify as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 
 Feel close to coef. s.e. p.value 95% confidence intervals 
      
PSC -0.077 0.343 0.823 [-0.749    0.596] 
PP 0.800 0.515 0.120 [-0.209    1.808] 
CiU -1.031 0.625 0.100 [-2.258    0.196] 
Change in the 
Spanish Direction 
ICV -0.815 1.048 0.437 [-2.869    1.239] 
PSC -0.233 0.293 0.428 [-0.809    0.343] 
PP 0.159 0.466 0.733 [-0.754    1.073] 
CiU 0.396 0.270 0.141 [-0.131    0.925] 
Change in the 
Catalan direction 
ICV 0.385 0.473 0.415 [-0.542    1.313] 
Note: Values estimated from results in Table 6.14 
 
 In view of these results, we can say that party closeness does not perform as a cue which 
orients the national identification of dual identifiers. These results, which refute hypothesis 6.3.1 
and 6.3.2, can be interpreted in two ways.   
                                                      
26 As those individuals who feel close to the ERC do not change, I have excluded these individuals 
from the analysis. 
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 To test the robustness of these results, I have repeated the analyses focusing now on voters 
to the different political parties in the 2003 regional elections. The results are presented in table 
6.16. 
 
Table 6.16 Marginal effect of voting for a political party among individuals who self-identify as 
both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 
 Feel close to coef. s.e. p.value 95% confidence intervals 
      
PSC -0.324 0.365 0.374        [-1.039     0.390] 
PP -0.270 0.561 0.630        [-1.370     0.829] 
CiU -0.730 0.451 0.105 [-1.613   0.153] 
Change in the 
Spanish Direction 
ICV -0.796 0.787 0.311 [-2.338    0.745] 
PSC -0.260 0.337 0.441 [-0.920    0.401] 
PP -1.308 0.656 0.046 [-2.594    -0.022] 
CiU 0.532 0.314 0.090 [-0.083   1.147] 
Change in the 
Catalan direction 
ICV 0.225 0.484 0.642 [-0.724    1.173] 
Note: Values estimated from results of an analysis which is not presented here but replicates the analyses performed 
in Table 6.14, including vote in 2003 regional elections, rather than closeness to parties. 
 
 Looking at table 6.16, it can be seen that those who self-identified as both Spanish and 
Catalan in 2004 and had voted for the CiU in 2003 were less likely to self-identify as primarily 
Spanish and more likely to self-identify as primarily Catalan in 2005. This effect is marginally 
significant. Also, those who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004 and had voted 
for the PP in 2003 were less likely to make a switch in the Catalan direction in 2005. These 
results partially confirm hypothesis 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.for the CiU and the PP, two political parties 
which clearly campaigned in favour and against the reform of the statute, respectively.  
These results provide limited evidence in favour of the idea that party identification in 
Catalonia orients attitudes and, in particular, individuals’ identification with Spain and 
Catalonia at the time the Catalan Statute was being reformed. This result, which challenges 
Dancey and Goren (2010), could be explained by the fact that in the European context, party 
identification is a looser political allegiance than in the American context (Fleury and Lewis-
Beck 201). Actually, we could even argue the contrary. That is, that individuals’ identification 
with Spain and Catalonia orients individuals’ sympathy for the different parties in Catalonia. 
This would be coherent with Carsey and Layman’s (2006) idea that when an issue is personally 
important for an individual, he or she will modify his or her vote or party identification to 
conform to this issue.  
 
6.8 Discussion 
 
This chapter aimed to show that politics and, in particular, the saliency of the center-
periphery cleavage has an effect on individual shifts in national identification. With this 
objective in mind, the empirical analysis carried out in this chapter has examined the association 
between exposure to Spanish and Catalan television, on the one hand, and party identification, 
on the other hand, and shifts in individual national identification.  
The idea that the media shapes individuals’ identification with the region or the nation in 
multinational contexts is not new (Martínez-Herrera 2002); however, in this chapter, I have 
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stressed this idea and examined whether television can actually lead individuals to modify their 
identification over time. The underlining argument behind this idea is that the media channels 
conflict among political elites’ regarding particular issues (the Statute reform, in this case), and 
that individuals’ receive messages which lean to one side or the other of the center-periphery 
cleavage. These messages cause individuals to revise their identification. Although this chapter 
leaves the mechanism which connects the messages which stem from the media with change 
towards a more Spanish or more Catalan oriented identification unexplained, I will turn to this 
question in the following chapter (chapter 7). Making use of qualitative evidence, in chapter 7 I 
illustrate how elites’ messages make individuals’ react, reaffirming their original identification 
when they feel only Spanish or only Catalan, and changing it when their identification is dual.  
An alternative mechanism has been proposed in this chapter. According to it, party 
identification should perform as a cue that orients individuals’ stands regarding the center-
periphery cleavage and, consequently, national identification. In other words, party 
sympathizers will try to make their position on the center-periphery cleavage consistent with 
their party’s position, if necessary, changing their national identification.  
Ultimately, these two mechanisms refer to individuals’ need to make their feelings and 
stands on a particular issue consistent in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Osgood and 
Tannenbaum 1955). 
The results presented here partially confirm the hypotheses presented in section 6.4. 
Although exposure to Catalan television made those individuals who identified as both Spanish 
and Catalan in 2004 more susceptible to change towards a primarily Catalan identification in 
2005 and reduced the likelihood of making a switch towards a primarily Spanish identification, 
the opposite does not seem to be true for exposure to Spanish television. This result could be 
due to the fact that expressions of hot nationalism are more pervasive on Catalan television than 
on Spanish television. Actually, we could even say that Spanish television’s nationalist content 
is much more banal and, possibly, less effective than the nationalist content of Catalan 
television.  
My results provide limited evidence in favour of the heuristic leverage of party 
identification over individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia. Generally, these results 
seem to refute Dancey and Goren’s (2010) hypothesis and reveal the low influence of party 
closeness in multiparty contexts.  
All in all, the models presented here seem to be more appropriate to explaining changes in 
the Catalan direction, while changes in the Spanish direction remain under-explained and only 
determined by the non-autochtonous origin of respondents. This result could be related to the 
influence of the surrounding context not being captured in these models. In this regard, it is 
important to highlight that while the Catalan elites and the Catalan media mobilize citizens 
towards a more Catalan oriented identification, there is only one political party (the PP) which 
seeks to mobilize citizens towards a more Spanish oriented identification.  
Some important shortcomings and caveats should be mentioned before concluding. First, 
this chapter has argued that the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage makes individuals 
susceptible to change. In order to provide comprehensive evidence of this argument, I should 
replicate the analysis for a period in which the center-periphery cleavage was dormant. The 
difficulty in finding a period in which the center-periphery cleavage has been completely 
dormant and the absence of data prevents me from testing this counterfactual. Still, it is possible 
that even when the center-periphery cleavage is not as salient as it was during the period under 
consideration, exposure to Catalan television would continue to model individuals’ national 
identification. This possibility, of course, would limit the scope of my findings, but it would not 
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invalidate the fact that television performs as a political intermediary channelling the conflict 
and orienting national identification in one or the other direction.  
Moreover, the analyses performed in this chapter have been carried out under the 
assumption that the observed instability in individuals’ declared national identification is 
completely due to real changes. Despite this, it is possible that the lack of reliability of the 
measurement instrument mixes real changes with changes due to measurement errors. 
Measurement errors are present when the questionnaire item fails to capture the individual’s real 
attitude or opinion (see Saris and Gallhofer 2007). In this regard, Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall 
(1965) and Achen (1975) have argued that individuals’ true opinions or attitudes can fall in 
between the response categories offered to the respondents. Measurement errors can be also 
related to respondent’s lack of opinions regarding a particular issue. When survey respondents 
lack an opinion on a particular issue, then they may pick randomly among the different response 
categories (Converse, 1964).  
Some measures have been taken to respond to the possible presence of measurement error. 
First, in the empirical analysis, I have adopted a conservative strategy and I have considered as 
changes only those changes that occur between “primarily Spanish”, “as Spanish as Catalan,” 
and “primarily Catalan” categories. In this regard, I have considered that those changes that 
occurred between the adjacent “only Catalan” and “more Catalan than Spanish” categories, and 
between the “only Spanish” and the “more Spanish than Catalan” categories are not 
consequential. Secondly, although the analysis could have computed the changes that occurred 
between t1 and t2 (or t2 and t3) for those individuals who answered in these two waves, I have 
excluded from the analysis all the individuals who did not answer or answered “don’t know” or 
“none of them” in any of the waves, as these individuals were uncertain about their national 
identification or did not feel comfortable with the answer categories that were offered to them. 
Also, against the non-attitudes hypothesis, here I contend that the saliency of the center-
periphery cleavage and its immediate connectedness to identity means that most individuals in 
Catalonia possess a national identification. More importantly, the fact that the hypotheses posed 
in this chapter are confirmed in the empirical analysis supports the idea that these changes are, 
with a high probability, true changes and not random changes due to measurement errors. 
Finally, I would like to emphasize that this chapter has not only empirical, but also 
theoretical implications. This chapter has shown that identification with the nation seems to be a 
less stable and more changeable trait than has usually been thought. In a span of time of one 
year (2004-2005), around twenty per cent of the PaD sampling changed its previous 
identification. Therefore, we can say that the way in which political elites mobilize the center-
periphery cleavage has, undoubtedly, an important effect on citizens’ national identity. 
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CHAPTER 7. CHANGE IN NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION: 
QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the last few decades, the study of Catalan identity, its political expressions and the issue 
of immigration from other parts of Spain in Catalonia has deserved the attention of a significant 
number of ethnographic and qualitative studies. From the anthropology field, Barrera’s (1985) 
has analyzed the symbolic elements of the Catalan identity, and the arguments individuals use to 
establish boundaries and to stress the differences between the group they belong through 
processes of stereotyping. Pujadas and Comas (1982) have also examined the political meanings 
of the Catalan identity, and the Catalannes topics.  
More recently, Béjar (2008) has explored the expressions of Spanish and Catalan 
nationalism, and its interaction with individuals’ feelings of belonging. Her research shows that 
individuals’ understandings of the Spanish and Catalan nationalism are multiple and contested. 
The author identifies five different discourses which are present in the Spanish citizens: the 
traditional Spanish nationalism; the neo-españolismo discourse, which rejects all kind of 
nationalisms (including Spanish nationalism); a discourse which is tolerant with periphery 
nationalisms; the Catalanism discourse, which goes from naïve nationalism to asymmetric 
federalism; and the pro-independence nationalism discourse in the Basque Country.  
Beyond this, ethnographic research in Catalonia has also put special attention to the study of 
Catalan language as the core value of the Catalan identity. Woolard (1989), for example, has 
examined not only the languages uses, but the symbolic value of Catalan and Spanish 
languages, as well as the status that the language confer to its speakers. Her work shows that a 
change has occurred over the years in the solidarity value of the language and so, in recent 
times, the use of Catalan confers a greater solidarity towards Catalan non-native speakers. 
Despite this, Catalan language has continued to be considered a language of greater status both 
among Catalan speakers, and Spanish speakers (Woolard and Gahng 1990).  
Moreover, and due to the numeric importance of immigrants in Catalonia, qualitative 
research on the issue of identity in Catalonia has been also related to the study of immigrants’ 
identity, and to the processes of acculturation (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and Masella 
2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Comas and Pujadas 1991; de la Calle and Miley 2008; 
Martín Díaz 1991; Solé 1980).  
In this chapter, however, I move away from the study of the collective meanings’ of Catalan 
and Spanish identity, or from the study of the language as the core value of these identities. This 
chapter leaves aside static views’ on identity and focuses on the movement and, particularly, on 
the change in the category of national identification. The chapter dives in qualitative materials 
collected in thirty-eight semi-structured interviews with a twofold goal: to exemplify different 
processes of change (intra-generational and inter-generational identificational assimilation and 
reactive changes) and to illustrate the mechanism which lies behind the latter kind of changes.  
Processes of identificational stability and identificational assimilation will be examined 
within the immigrant generation, and between the immigrant and the second generation. In the 
immigrant generation, identificational assimilation entails the acquisition of a new category of 
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identification, which can be eventually accompanied by the loss of an old category of 
identification (individual change). In the second generation, these changes imply that 
individuals develop an attachment towards the society where they have been born, and 
eventually loss the identification inherited from their parents (intergenerational change).  
The other kinds of processes to which I will pay attention in this chapter are processes of 
reactive reaffirmation and reactive change. These reactive processes occur when individuals 
perceive that their group identification or, one of their two forms of identifications (when they 
identify with two groups) is being attacked, scorned or demised.   
Individuals with dual identifications can perceive them as compatible and complementary, 
or they can understood them as oppositional and contradictory (Benet-Martínez and Haritatos 
2005; Haritatos and Benet-Martínez 2002). However, individuals’ compatible or incompatible 
understandings of their national identification choices are determined by the context in which 
they are embedded.  
In the Catalan context, Catalan nationalist parties present very often Catalan and Spanish 
identifications as incompatible. Moreover, the asymmetric distribution of the political parties 
along the center periphery cleavage has caused that more efforts are made and more resources 
are employed to encourage Catalan identity vis-à-vis Spanish identity. Only the Popular Party 
and the Ciutadans party, more recently, have explicitly mobilized Spanish identity. The strategy 
of the Popular Party has usually consisted of mobilizing Spanish identity against Catalan 
nationalism. This strategy has had a backlash effect and, as I showed in previous chapter, 
aggregate primarily Catalan identification has increased significantly during the years of the PP 
majority government. 
In line with my argument in chapters 4 and 6, in this chapter I will argue that changes at the 
aggregate level are related to individual changes. I will show that political parties’ mobilization 
of the center-periphery cleavage causes individuals to re-affirm or modify its prior 
identification. The mobilization of the cleavage is staged in different ways: by means of party 
leaders or political elites’ stances or actions regarding specific issues related to the cleavage 
(e.g. the reform of the Catalan Statute, the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Catalan Statute), 
by the organization of divisive campaigns as the ones I referred in chapter 6 (e.g. the boycott to 
the Catalan cava, the collection of signatures organized by the PP against the Catalan Statute in 
other regions of Spain) or by initiatives which mobilize Catalan identification (e.g. the 
organization of unofficial referendums on independence from Spain). Out-group party leaders 
or political elites’ cleavage-related stances or actions are very often framed as attacks or 
mistreatments towards the group. Individuals’ perception that their group is being attacked or 
mistreated provokes an emotional reaction. Yet, this emotional reaction is contingent to 
individuals’ prior identification. When individuals have a crystallized, strong, exclusive 
(Spanish or Catalan) identification, perceived attacks or mistreatments will thicken and reaffirm 
prior exclusive identifications. On the contrary, when individuals hold dual identifications, such 
attacks or mistreatments can provoke that individuals’ reaffirm the identity they perceive is 
being attacked or mistreated, and alienate from the other identification. In the first case, we 
should observe individuals’ identification stability, on the second case, we should observe a 
change.  
Besides this, in the chapter I will argue too that the mobilization of the center-periphery 
cleavage very often contributes to reinforce immigrants and second generations’ disaffection 
towards Catalan-specific issues, on the one hand, and to strengthen the feeling that their national 
positions are not represented, on the other.  
 Apart from this section, this chapter consists of five more sections. The next section 
presents the methodological design, and it details the method employed to collect and analyze 
Change in National Identification 
 180 
the qualitative materials in which this chapter builds on. The third section reflects on the 
mechanisms that lie behind identificational assimilation, and it incorporates some of the 
findings of the dissertation. This section also illustrates individual and inter-generational 
processes of identificational assimilation. The fourth section focuses on the analysis of reactive 
reaffirmation and reactive change. In the section, I include some excerpts from the interviews to 
show the occurrence of this type of reactions and to argue that the mobilization of the national 
cleavage provokes suck kind of short-term changes. Before ending, this chapter tackles the issue 
of the national identification salience. This dissertation started from the idea that in a context 
such as the Catalan one, national identification should be a salient identification for most 
individuals. In this section, however, I will show that this is not always the case. The final 
section concludes.  
 
7.2 Methodology  
 
This chapter builds on thirty-eight semi-structured qualitative interviews that I conducted in 
Catalonia with individuals from different origins, ages and educational levels. In this section, I 
detail briefly the characteristics of my qualitative research, from its origin to the analytical 
phase. In this section, I also discuss some problems I have encountered in the analysis of the 
interviews and, in particular, interviewees’ evasion strategies and social desirability problems. 
For the design of the fieldwork, the interviews, and in the analysis of the data, I have followed 
Kvale (1996) and Vallés (1997). 
 
7.2.1 Timing and location 
 
The interviews were conducted in three phases: the summer of 2008, the fall of 2010 and 
the winter of 2012. The fieldwork was preceded and surrounded by different events: the victory 
of the Spanish national team in the Europe Cup, the re-negotiation of the financial model of 
inter-territorial redistribution and the starting of the economic crisis, in the first case; the Ruling 
of the Constitutional Court on the 2006 Catalan Statute, which cancelled some of the 2006 
Statute’s articles and re-interpreted others, the demonstration Som una nació, nosaltres decidim, 
the victory of the Spanish national team in the World Cup, the celebration of unofficial 
referendums on the independence of Catalonia from Spain, the 29 September general strike and 
the economic crisis, in the second phase. In the third phase, the Popular Party’ arrival to the 
national government and the economic crisis surrounded the interviews. Some of these events 
were brought in during the course of the conversations to learn about respondents’ stands, others 
were brought in by the respondents themselves. 
All the interviews took place in the province of Barcelona although some of my 
interviewees had spent part of their lives or do live in other provinces. The province, 
nevertheless, was not considered to be a relevant variable influencing my dependent variable: 
change in national identification. Other contextual variables, such as the percent of Spanish 
immigrants in the neighborhood or the municipality were respondents live, were considered 
more relevant to guarantee the diversity of the outcome sample, and therefore were taken into 
consideration when selecting the interviewees.    
 Some of the interviews took place in Barcelona, others in the metropolitan area and others 
in different municipalities of the province of Barcelona. 
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Table 7.1 Timing of the interviews 
Fieldwork phase Number 
2008 Summer 15 
2010 Fall 17 
2012 Winter 6 
 
7.2.2 Sampling issues and search for respondents 
 
In the first phase, the interviews were mainly addressed to individuals born in other regions 
of Spain, and individuals who had at least one parent born outside of Catalonia. At this stage of 
my research, I was mainly interested in studying the immigrants’ processes of identificational 
assimilation, and learning how parents’ identification influenced children’s identification. 
Therefore, the search for respondents and the content of the interviews were oriented by this 
interest. Fifteen interviews were carried out between July 2008 and August 2008. In five cases 
(ten interviews), the interviews’ were carried out with children and one of their parents.  
Over the course of my doctoral research, I became interested as well in the processes of 
identificational change of the population with Catalan familial origins. The decision to include 
this population in my research was motivated by the findings of my quantitative analysis. The 
decomposition analysis of the CIS data had showed that aggregate changes have also occurred 
in this group of the population between 1988 and 2010. These changes have meant a noticeably 
overall increase in the percent of individuals who self-identify as “only Catalan” (see chapter 3, 
table 3.11). Although part of the aggregate change could be attributed to inter-generational 
changes, the greater part of the change derived from intra-cohort changes and, therefore, 
individual changes. Bearing this in mind, the interviews were re-oriented to account for these 
changes too.  
In a more systematic way, I proceeded to make a quota sampling design in which the 
criteria of the quota were: the respondents’ and their parents’ origin, their birth cohort, and their 
educational levels.1 These criteria aimed at guaranteeing the typological representation of the 
Catalan society. 2   
The search for respondents was, therefore, based on these three criteria, and potential 
respondents were reached through contacts of contacts. Very soon, I realized that these criteria 
were insufficient to guarantee the heterogeneity of the outcome sample, in particular, regarding 
respondents’ ideological leanings. Moreover, this appeared to be a very relevant criterion and 
leaving this criterion aside would have biased the outcome sample. Therefore, the initial quote 
sampling design evolved to a sequential, more flexible, sampling design (Valles 2007), and I put 
more efforts to reach respondents which had been inaccessible at first place and, specifically, 
interviewees with rightist leanings. 
                                                      
1 Change in the category of national identification is examined in three groups: immigrants, second 
generations or children of mixed couples and the autochthonous population. The processes of change that 
these three groups can eventually experience are significantly different, and this is so because their 
identification options have been built on different bases. In this regard, we can argue that immigrants can 
consciously decide whether they want to keep their adscriptive identification, or acquire a new category 
of identification. In this regard, we can assume that behind immigrants’ processes of identificational 
change or identificational stability, there is a conscious more or less deliberate choice. Unlike immigrants, 
second generations have in principle two adscriptive identifications: the one they inherit from their 
parents and the one they acquire by birth. Children of mixed couples also have two adscribed 
identifications, although in their case, both forms of identification have been inherited from their parents. 
Finally, in the Catalan context, natives also have two identificational options and so, they either identify 
with Catalonia or they identify with Catalonia and Spain at the same time. 
2 Quotes were established according to the 2009 ICPS data (see Annex Table A.7.1). 
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The outcome sample consists of 7 autochthonous, 16 second generations and children of 
mixed couples, and 11 immigrants. Table 7.2 presents the outcome sample and the socio-
demographic (cohort and educational characteristics) of the respondents.  
 
Table 7.2 Outcome Sample: Origin, cohort and educational characteristics 
 Autochthons 
 Secondary or 
lower 
University Total 
Before 1959 0 2 2 
Between 1960 and 1979 1 1 2 
After 1980 2 2 4 
Total 3 4 8 
 Second Generations and  
Children of mixed couples 
 Secondary or 
lower 
University Total 
Before 1959 2 3 5 
Between 1960 and 1979 2 5 7 
After 1980 2 3 5 
Total 5 11 17 
 Immigrants 
 Secondary or 
lower 
University Total 
Before 1959 0 0 0 
Between 1960 and 1979 0 0 0 
After 1980 9 4 13 
Total 9 4 13 
 
Table 7.3 and 7.4 present the respondents’ national identification and respondents’ recall in 
the most recent regional elections before the interview took place. Here, it is worth mentioning 
that the outcome sample does not reproduce the distribution of the Catalan society regarding 
these two variables, but it does reproduce its diversity. Yet, these tables reflect the variety of 
respondents’ national identification and respondents’ ideological leanings.  
 
Table 7.3 National identification by origin in the outcome sample 
 Only Spanish 
More 
Spanish 
than 
Catalan 
As 
Spanish as 
Catalan 
More 
Catalan 
than 
Spanish 
Only 
Catalan Total 
Autochthonous 0 0 1 3 4 8 
Second Generations and 
children of mixed 
couples 
1 1 9 2 4 17 
Immigrants 2 2 7 0 2 13 
Total 3 3 17 5 10 38 
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Table 7.4 Vote recall in last regional elections before the interview 
 N 
CiU 7 
PSC 12 
ERC 6 
ICV 7 
PP 4 
Ciutadans 2 
Total 38 
 
7.2.3 Interviews structure and themes covered 
 
The interviews consisted of a number of themes, and a series of open questions. After the 
interview, I passed a follow-up questionnaire with questions on the socio-demographic 
characteristic and ideological leanings of the interview. When the answer to these closed 
questions had emerged in the course of the interview, I avoid asking these questions again. 
Although the sequence of the themes in the interview had a chronological order, this order was 
very often altered to accommodate topics to the flow of the conversation. In the first phase, the 
themes covered included respondent’s origins, his or her arrival to Catalonia (in the case of 
immigrants), the origin characteristics of his or her familial, social and working networks, his or 
her educational process, the respondents’ language practices, issues of cultural distance and 
identificational transmission, respondent’s feelings of attachment to Spain and Catalonia, the 
meanings respondent attributes to his or her identification, respondent’s ideological leanings, 
and his or her perception regarding the success of his or her (or their parents’) migratory 
process.  
In the second and third phases of the fieldwork, I introduced other topics through which I 
aimed to learn about “period” changes in national identification. These topics were: 
socialization experiences, language practices, the interviewee’ experiences in the university, 
decisions over their children education, the political events which have marked him or her, the 
interviewee’ experiences during the transition to democracy, the interviewee’s political 
leanings, his or her opinion regarding the institutional relationship between Catalan and Spanish 
governments, whether he or she had followed the negotiation of the Statute and his or her 
opinion on it, his or her opinion regarding the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute, and 
whether they participated in demonstrations on support of the Statute or the Spanish national 
team World Cup victory’ celebrations.  
All interviewees were briefed on the issues of anonymity and confidentiality, and on the 
interview motivation. I framed the interviews as centered on the issue of national identification 
in Catalonia. Despite this, when the interview reach the issues of self-identification, some of the 
interviewees tried to run away of the topic, as they considered that national labels were not 
appropriate for describing them (see section 7.5).   
 
7.2.4 Analysis 
 
 All the interviews were transcribed. However, in some cases, the interviewees made use of 
personal tales which were not relevant for the object of study. In those cases, the interview was 
transcribed with lesser degree of detail depending on whether the information interviewees 
provided was relevant for the object of study.  
 After the transcription, the second step in the analysis process was to establish the relevant 
topics for the analysis. In the design of the questionnaire, I had sketched a guide of topics. 
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However, not all the topics covered in the interviews would be now used. Therefore, in the 
analysis of the interviewees’ discourses, I focused in the following issues: examples of 
identificational stability and change (identificational assimilation within the immigrant 
generation, and between the immigrant and the second generation, and reactive changes), the 
meanings interviewees attribute to their Spanish or Catalan identification, the salience of the 
national identification vis-à-vis other forms of identification, and the influence of the political 
context on individuals’ identification or on their political preferences.3  
 My interest on these aspects was directly related with the twofold purpose of this chapter: to 
exemplify process of change in national identification and to learn about the mechanisms which 
lie behind short-term changes in the category of identification. These topics are the ones which 
will be examined in this chapter.  
 Additionally, an issue which emerged very clearly in some interviews with immigrants and, 
some second generations, was the “under-representativeness” of their national positions and 
political disaffection. This issue will be superficially examined in the analytical sections of this 
chapter.  
 Beside these issues, the interviews were rich in other topics: political discontent due to the 
way in which political parties were dealing with the economic crisis was very possibly the issue 
which appeared more frequently in the flow of the conversations (specially, in the second phase 
of the fieldwork). Despite the interviewees’ discourses on these topics were remarkable, as they 
were not relevant for the object of study of my dissertation, I have left them outside of my 
analysis. 
 The oldest interviewee of my sample brought in the conversation her memories about the 
Spanish Civil War and her father’s, a leader of Catholic Action, persecution by the “rojos”. 
Others recalled the dictatorship’s repression, indoctrination in the Franco Regime’s public 
schools, their or others’ involvement on subversive activities during the dictatorship, their 
experiences of the transition, as well as their migratory experiences. Some young interviewees 
also recalled some tales their parents had explained to them about the transition (the 1977 
“Llibertat, Amnistia, Estatut d’Autonomia” demonstration) or their parents’ migratory 
experiences. Some of the events evoked in the interviews have become part of Catalans’ 
collective memory. Although these topics will not be discussed here (unless they are 
specifically related with my argument), I would like to highlight that its richness could serve for 
the purpose of a secondary analysis of the qualitative materials. 
 The transcribed interviews were coded with special attention to the topics of interest. Here, 
it is important to highlight that the purpose of these interviewees was not to make a quantitative 
treatment of the interviews, nor to produce a theory or make general statements, but to 
exemplify processes of change, and to illustrate the mechanisms which lie behind process of 
reactive reaffirmation and reactive chaneg. For this particular reason, the analysis of the 
interviews was mainly descriptive and interpretative. 
 
7.2.5 Problematic issues: evasion, social desirability and ex-post rationalizations 
 
In this section, I would like mentioning some problems that have emerged in the course of 
the interviews. These problems are frequently found when interviews deal with sensitive 
questions (Fujii 2010).  
                                                      
3 In the interviews, I touched other issues, such as parents’ decisions over their children education, 
which I have used in other parts of this dissertation (see chapter 5).  
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I have named the first of these problems evasion. Some of the interviewees decided not to 
reveal their opinions regarding topics which I brought in to the interview (i.e. the reform of the 
Statute, the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute). One of my interviewees specifically 
told me that she did not want to enter to discuss about those topics because she was not 
interested on them. Other interviewees were too general in their discourses, or they turned 
things upside down just to avoid being clear on what they really thought. All these conscious or 
unconscious strategies of evasion made difficult I could have a full insight on where the 
interview really stood regarding the reform of the Statute, for example. 
As I mentioned in previous chapter, the Statute reform was an issue which attracted 
certainly much attention during many months. It was also an issue which caused a lot of 
contestation, and political parties and political elites’ oppositional stances on the Statute 
produced an atmosphere of acute political tension. This could possibly help to explain the 
emergence of two kinds of feelings which have become apparent in the course of my 
conversations with the interviewees: tiredness or exhaustion (people became bored of hearing 
about a topic in which they were not so much interested at first) or annoyance (people became 
angry with the disappointing result of an issue on which they were very much interested in). 
Although annoyance appeared much more clearly in the interviews, my suspicion is that the 
expressed feeling of tiredness was actually reflecting interviewees’ lack of interest on the 
reform of the Statute and, in some occasions, their positions against the reform of the Statute or 
the Statute itself. As an example of this kind of evasion, I would like to mention that some of 
my interviewees argued that they did not remember whether they had voted in the referendum 
of the Statute or not. 
Certainly, interviewees’ evasion to reveal their true opinions could also reflect the absence 
of rapport or confidence on the part of the interviewee, or it could just reflect another problem 
which has been at play in some interviews: social desirability.  
Social desirability is also a major problem in a topic as the one I am dealing with. While 
Catalanist ideas are part of the mainstream and are, therefore, socially well considered, opinions 
against the mainstream are often exposed to social scorn. Of course, this depends on the context 
where these ideas are expressed. So, in the interviewees’ immediate context, it can happen that 
the mainstream ideas turn minority ideas, and minority views are expressed freely without the 
mainstream social pressure. Two reasons can explain why social desirability has not been 
always overcome in the interviews: first, the difficulty to establish a close rapport between the 
interviewer and the interviewee in a single meeting; second, interviewees’ accommodation and 
internalization of the “mainstream language”. The following quote reflects that political 
correctness very often conditions the use of language:  
 
- How would you define Catalonia: as a country, an autonomous community, a region, a 
nation, otherwise? 
- Me? Well, I don’t know, don’t know how to define it. I have no definition. On the one 
hand, definitions… The word nation has a pejorative connotation. Politically, it is a little 
bit strong, right? It provokes clashes. And, on the other hand, I do not feel as I am part of 
any nation. I don’t know how to tell you, I live in Spain, but I am very careful not to say 
“España”, “el país” (she laughs) but, I do not know, Països Catalans, Països. There are 
things that you’re used to say and I use them, and I say that. 
[Quote #1, Interview #22, Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956]4 
 
Besides this, due to the political and social discredit of the Spanish right in Catalonia, which 
comes from some Popular Party leaders’ past relation with Franco’s regime, to its emphasis on 
                                                      
4 The names of the interviewees are fictitious to guarantee his anonymity.  
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Spanish nationalism and its belligerent attitude towards Catalan nationalism, and to the fact that 
the Popular Party has traditionally appeared as the main opponent to decentralization, people in 
Catalonia tend to hide their sympathies to the Popular Party.5 This has also caused that, in 
certain occasions, when I asked people about their political leanings or vote choices, 
respondents resorted to silences before answering, and even half-truths.  
These two problems make even more important the analysis and the interpretation of meta-
data, that is, interviewees’ “spoken and unspoken thoughts and feelings which they do not 
always articulate in their stories or interview responses” (Fujii 2010).  
Finally, and before finishing this section, I would like to raise an additional problem which 
might affect the results of the interviews’ analyses. In order to learn about individuals’ 
change/stability in their national identification, in the interviews I had to collect retrospective 
information on the interviewees’ opinions, beliefs and attachments. When retrospective 
information is collected, there is always the risk that individuals incur on ex-post rationalization 
and try to appear congruent (i.e. that they not change). By the same token, we can think that the 
“observed” reactive changes are, in fact, ex-post rationalizations of individuals’ primarily 
attachment to Spain/Catalonia. This would imply, for example, that an individual who has 
always felt Catalan, reports having experience a change (from identifying both with Spain and 
Catalonia to identifying as “only Catalan”) and they blame Spanish elites’ mistreatment of 
Catalonia for their “radicalization”.  
 My argument, in this chapter, is that despite the imperfection of the measurement 
instruments, the quantitative and qualitative evidence that this dissertation has provided reflect 
that period changes in individuals’ identification do actually occur.  
 
7.3 Processes of identificational assimilation 
 
In this section, I revisit first some studies from the literature on immigration which have 
investigated the processes of identificational assimilation within the immigrant generation, and 
between different generations in Catalonia and I bring in some of the findings of my own 
research. I next illustrate these processes using qualitative evidence from my interviews.  
 
7.3.1 Examining identificational assimilation and inter-generational changes within immigrants 
families 
 
When the concept of identificational assimilation was originally coined, it was conceived as 
the final stage of a process which was supposed to occur already in the immigrants’ first 
generation (Gordon 1964). Identificational assimilation, as Gordon understood it, implied the 
abandonment of immigrants’ original category of national/ethnic identification and the adoption 
of the host society national identification. The normative outlook and the linearity assumption 
of the Assimilation Theory fostered intensive critique, and caused the emergence of alternative 
approaches to study immigrants’ incorporation into the receiving society. For example, in 
“Acculturation as varieties of adaptation”, Berry (1984) defended that immigrants follow very 
different tracks in their incorporation to the host society. The outcome of these processes can be 
immigrants’ assimilation, integration, separation, or marginalization.  
Focusing on the children of immigrants’ generation, Portes and Zhou (1993) have also 
proposed that second generations follow segmented tracks (segmented assimilation) in their 
                                                      
5 As Dinas (forthcoming) has shown, this has also caused that Popular Party is seen as more right-
wing than in the rest of Spain.   
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maturity processes: acculturation and integration in the middle-class, assimilation into the 
underclass, or economic advancement within ethnic enclaves.6  
Building on Berry’s (1984) acculturation typology, Bourhis et al (1997) have also developed 
a model which starts from the idea that immigrants’ incorporation to the receiving society is an 
interactive process that depends on both: the immigrants’ willingness of being included in a 
particular national group and adopting aspects of the host majority culture and the host society’s 
willingness to incorporate immigrants into its group. The interaction of immigrants’ strategies 
of integration (assimilation, separation, anomie or individualism), on the one side, and the host 
community strategies (integration, assimilation, segregation, exclusion or individualism), on the 
other side, determines the outcome of immigrants’ incorporation.  
Despite criticisms, the Assimilation Theory has been argued to be a still valid theoretical 
framework to explain inter-generational transformations among the new immigrants in the 
United States and beyond (Alba 1990; Alba and Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001). From this 
theoretical framework, inter and intra-generational identificational change has been found to be 
related to age at arrival, generation, years of residence, years of education in the host society, 
language fluency, cultural distance, household size, immigrants’ residential concentration or 
intermarriage and social mobility (Dustmann 1996; Gans 2007; Rogler, Cooney, and Ortiz 
1980; Waters and Jiménez 2005). Beside this, certain personality traits, such as individuals’ 
openness to new experiences, has also been considered to have an important role when 
facilitating individuals’ social assimilation (Dustmann 1996; Taft 1967) 
Assimilation Theory has been also the theoretical framework of classical and recent studies 
on Spanish immigrants’ incorporation into Catalonia (Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, and 
Masella 2008b; Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; Comas and Pujadas 1991; de la Calle and Miley 
2008; Maluquer i Sostres 1963; Pinilla de las Heras 1973; Solé 1981a).7 The question of 
whether Spanish immigrants and their children have been assimilated in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country has been re-examined in two recent works which have stressed the important 
role that language policies have had on this processes (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008a; de la Calle 
and Miley 2008). These two studies, which have been already referred in previous chapters, 
have reached nevertheless to opposite conclusions. On the one side, Aspachs-Bracons et al 
(2008a) have found that compulsory education in Catalan has fostered identification with 
Catalonia among the children of immigrants, while voluntary education in Basque language has 
not fostered a more oriented Basque identification among this group. On the other side, de la 
Calle and Miley (2008) have found that even though linguistic assimilation has been more 
important in Catalonia, assimilation into feelings of subjective identification and the support for 
nationalist views and aspirations (ideological assimilation) has been more important in the 
Basque Country.8 Interestingly, de la Calle and Miley attribute these differences to the fact that, 
                                                      
6 Wimmer (2007) has argued that the segmented assimilation theoretical framework is, in fact, a neo-
assimilationist theory, which explains the incorporation of immigrants to the receiving society with the 
same framework of the Assimilation Theory. 
7 From the mid nineties, the massive arrival of immigrants from other parts of the world to Catalonia 
caused that politicians and researchers’ concerns got displaced from the Spanish immigrants in Catalonia, 
to the immigrants from abroad. Actually, as it has been highlighted elsewhere, the idea that the 
“immigrant” term is not appropriate anymore to refer to those people who were originally from other 
regions of Spain, but have been living in Catalonia for most of their lives has also gained support . 
8 In de la Calle and Miley’s work, ideological assimilation (or “Catalanization”, using Solé’s 
terminology) would be the outcome of a process which takes immigrants to identify with the beliefs and 
goals of Catalan nationalism (i.e. the belief that Catalonia is a nation, self-determination preferences, 
etc.). However, when examining the issue of Spanish immigrants’ incorporation into Catalonia, Solé  
already warned that integration has to be differentiated from “Catalanization”, and that the two processes 
can occurred separately. Actually, it is worth highlighting here that the assumption that assimilation is 
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in the Basque Country, regional governments have promoted the use of the Basque language in 
a “less intense and conflictual way”.  
My own research on this dissertation provides limited evidence in favor of the idea that the 
language policies implemented by the Catalan governments had led to a more Catalan oriented 
identification among the second generations, the group which was mainly targeted by the 
Catalan government language policies.9 So my analyses in chapter 3 have shown that the 
association between being able to speak or write Catalan and identifying as primarily Catalan 
has decreased over time in this group, what suggests that the learned language has lost leverage 
as a determinant of Catalan identification. On the other hand, chapter 5 has shown that 
immigrant families’ residential concentration in immigrant neighborhoods has prevented the 
school to have a more assimilationist function. More specifically, chapter 5’s results have 
revealed that the years of schooling can promote a bi-national identification among the children 
of immigrants, but they do not cause that second generations develop a more Catalan oriented 
identification, as Aspasch-Bracons et al’s (2008b; 2008a) argued, unless children of immigrants 
attend schools in neighborhoods in which the share of autochthonous is significantly greater 
than the share of immigrants.  
Generally, chapter 5 provided some insights on the issue of (intergenerational and intra-
generational) identificational assimilation. And so, the chapter analyses have shown that the 
immigrant families’ economic progress, their residential integration and children of immigrants’ 
interaction with children of natives in school are factors which reinforce each other fostering the 
identificational assimilation of the second generations.  
 
7.3.2  Illustrating identificational change among Spanish immigrants in Catalonia 
 
In this section, I illustrate the identificational evolution of Spanish immigrants in Catalonia.  
I show that, as Solé (1984) anticipated, the development of bonds of attachment towards 
Catalonia among the immigrants has not been necessarily accompanied by a process of 
Catalanization, defined as immigrants’ identification with the Catalan symbols and the Catalan 
nationalism aspirations. I report, as well, divergent trajectories which have led to very different 
identificational outcomes.    
Most of the interviewees which were born outside Catalonia have developed some kind of 
fondness towards Catalonia. They have incorporated a new (acquired) category of identification 
which has been added to their Spanish adscriptive identification. However, the replacement or 
the substitution of one category for another has been rarely evidenced in the interviews, and this 
is so because these kinds of changes are psychologically very demanding, as the following 
quote from Ana’s interview shows:   
 
“I am Spanish, and I cannot deny my identity. I cannot and, moreover, I do not want to deny 
my identity. So, I am Spanish, I am not Catalan. And I have always passed this on my 
children. It emerges from the liver, it is something that is yours, and I do not have reason to 
deny it. I am what I am, and I do not want to deny it either. It would mean that I deny to 
                                                                                                                                                               
only reached when immigrants adjust to Catalan nationalist aspirations mistakenly presupposes that all 
autochthons share these nationalist aspirations. Due to this, in this dissertation, I have defined national 
identification change as the acquisition or the lost of a category of identification, without making 
aprioristic assumptions on whether these changes are accompanied by an ideological change. 
9 Many immigrants arrived in Catalonia after having finished school and, therefore, they were not 
educated in Catalonia. The autochthonous and the children of mixed couples, on the other hand, can learn 
Catalan at home. This makes that the second generation group is the main targeted group of the language 
policies implemented in school.  
María José Hierro Hernández 
 189 
myself, and to my family, and I will never do it.” [Quote #2, Interview #4, Ana, immigrant, 
born in 1952] 
 
Ana, who married an autochthonous Catalan thirty-one years ago, makes, however, a 
difference between feeling Catalan and being Catalan.10 So, even though she recognizes she is 
not Catalan (as her husband or her children are), she feels both Spanish as Catalan now. She 
speaks Catalan and she identifies with some of the symbols of Catalonia. She recognizes, for 
example, that Catalonia is a nation and she used to hang out the Senyera, as well as the flag 
from her region of origin, to commemorate September 11th (she does not do it anymore because 
the neighbors of the building do it  now jointly).  
In general, immigrants and also some second generations relate their attachment to 
Catalonia to their lives experiences. They have spent in Catalonia most part of their lives, and 
they feel good living in Catalonia. However, their attachment to Catalonia seems to be less 
deeply rooted than it is their attachment to the places where they were born. 
 
“I have been living in Catalonia for many years, I have been very well here, for this reason I 
have continued living here, and I love this land.” [Quote #3, Interview #14, Juan, immigrant, 
born in 1940] 
 
“I feel Catalan because I have spent many years living here, working here. I have developed 
my life here. I am sixty years old now, and I have been here for thirty seven years. So, I feel 
myself Catalan as it concerns to the development of my life, and my work.” [Quote #4, 
Interview #2, Pedro, immigrant, born in 1948] 
 
“Actually, I think this [my feeling] has less to do with the territory, as it has to do with the 
feeling that you belong here, because you have your home here, you have your friends, you 
have your links here, that’s what it makes me feel from here. That is, it is not so much the 
territory of Catalonia.” [Quote #5, Interview #12, Alicia, second generation, born in 1976] 
  
“I am in part from here now. Well, if you ask me, as if you had been born here? Then, the 
answer is no. I still have my roots where I was born, my father lives there, I go every year. 
And well, my brothers live there, my nephews live there” [Quote #6, Interview #6, Fernando, 
immigrant, born in 1946] 
 
While most immigrants seem to have developed some feelings of attachment to Catalonia 
and have even integrated socially, they have rarely attained Catalanization, i.e. identification 
with the Catalan nationalism aspirations. Milagros, for example, is a prototypical case of 
successful social and linguistic integration. She is a high educated immigrant from Aragon. Her 
reason to immigrate was completely different from that of most immigrants: she came to 
Catalonia because she was eager to live in a big city as Barcelona. When she decided to migrate 
in 1982, she was aware that she would have to learn Catalan in order to find a job as teacher. So 
the first thing she did when she arrived in Barcelona was to enroll her in a Catalan course. 
Milagros witnessed how hard was for many of her co-workers, teachers as well, to learn Catalan 
out of obligation. She thinks her open attitude was crucial for her feeling comfortable living in 
Catalonia, and making many friends, even Catalan “nationalists”. However, she has not attained 
identification with the Catalan nationalism aspirations.  
  
“My place is now Catalonia, right? I am Catalan from adoption. I speak Catalan, all my work 
is in Catalan, I am delighted to live here, and I love a lot Catalonia. But I do not have a 
nationalist feeling, maybe because that is something more visceral, very emotional, and I have 
                                                      
10 The distinction between being and feeling Catalan in the immigrants has been also highlighted by 
Barrera (1985) and Woolard (1989). 
Change in National Identification 
 190 
not lived that. I did not spend the first part of my life here.” [Quote #7, Interview #22, 
Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956] 
 
Actually, Catalan nationalism has caused that some immigrants and their children alienated 
from Catalan politics. This became evident when I introduced in the conversation the issue of 
the Statute reform. Some of the interviewees claimed not to be interested on this issue, not to 
have followed the news regarding it, and not to have participated in the demonstrations in 
support of the Statute. The reasons why these interviewees do not involve themselves in Catalan 
politics emerges very clear from their discourses:  
 
“It [the Statute] has not affected my life. Maybe, if it had affected my life, in some personal 
way... But it does not affect me, it does not affect my relationships, neither does it affect my 
work. Well, now the Tripartit rules; if the law changes, I adapt myself. I fight for those things 
that I think matter to me, my co-workers, my students, right?.” [Quote #8, Interview #22, 
Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956] 
 
 “It [the Statute] has not changed my life at all. I can tell you, as a worker, my situation and 
the situation of the people who surrounds me, of every working people that I know have 
changed very little.” [Quote #9, Interview #23, Eva, second generation, born in 1971] 
 
“The Statute has not given me anything. To me, as Catalan, as someone who lives here, the 
Statute had not given me anything, that is the truth. I have not felt myself with more rights, 
with less rights, neither have I felt myself more Catalan, or less Catalan. I have not felt 
anything even closer to that. And regarding the Constitutional Court Ruling, in practical 
terms, it did not change my life at all.” [Quote #10, Interview #38, Juan José, second 
generation, born in 1983] 
 
“I hardly ever vote in the regional elections. They are so radical that I hardly ever vote. No, 
no, no. There is not any party to which I can vote... Oh, well, four years ago I voted for Albert 
Rivera [Ciutadans’ leader].” [Quote #11, Interview #24, Isabel, immigrant, born in 1932] 
 
Isabel’s words evidence an idea which is shared by other immigrants and second 
generations. Regional politics is “too much” focused on Catalan-specific, “radical” nationalist 
issues. Besides, as long as there is not a political party which represents properly this people 
positions, they prefer not to vote. This idea, which motivated the emergence of Ciutadans in 
2006 and explains its electoral success, is expressed with more detail in the following quote 
from another interviewee: 
 
“There is almost 50% of the population which does not feel they are represented [in the 
Catalan institutions]. And the evidence of this is that a high percentage of them do not go to 
vote. It is bad that they do not vote, but they do not vote because they think everyone is the 
same, all the politicians (…). I am a little bit shocked because there has been a referendum to 
vote for a Statute, and 50 percent, more than the 50 percent did not go to vote. But, I heard 
them speak, and then they do not agree with many issues, and I do not understand this because 
people should vote. If you don’t agree, then you say no. Then these people, I am alarmed, 
because when you ask them, these people see this [the Statute] wrong. Well, then, why didn’t 
you vote? And they answer, because they do not feel they are represented by any of the 
parties, that all are the same, they justify their behavior so (…). You must know that there is a 
lot abstention here, and there is a lot abstention precisely in the regional issues, no in the 
general elections. And this should not be so.” [Quote #12, Interview #14, Juan, immigrant, 
born in 1940] 
 
The perception that Catalan nationalism has gained terrain over the years has even caused 
other interviewees to reinforce its Spanish identification, and reject every expression of 
Catalanism. Antonio, who was a very active trade unionist in the seventies and is a grass-root 
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member of the PSC-PSOE,11 has experienced a regression in his attachment to Catalonia due to 
this.12  So, today he claims to be only Spanish, and to feel less attached to Catalonia than in the 
past.  
 
 “Yes, I went to welcome [Josep] Tarradellas… I claimed for the Statute and the Autonomy of 
Catalonia. And today, I regret it, I regret it. I feel sorry for having participated [on those 
demonstrations], because they used me. I thought I was fighting to gain democratic rights for 
Spain, and then I realized that I was participating in sectarian Catalanism.” [Quote #13, 
Interview #13, Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951] 
 
In chapter 4, I explained that, during the seventies, left parties and trade unions in Catalonia 
got to bring together the labor rights and the democratization and self-government struggles. 
The working class, made up by Spanish immigrants, involved actively in those fights. However, 
thirty years later, those parties’ social bases seem to have changed their outlooks as this other 
interviewee recounts about her father who was also a trade unionist.   
 
“During Franco’s regime, my father was one of those activists... you know? He was the most 
Catalan possible. I don’t understand, because he is now very, very Spanish. It was the time to 
make claims, so he claimed.” [Quote #14, Interview #29, Sara, second generation, born in 
1980] 
 
“He is now Spanish. But he was one of the first who placed the Senyera in the mountain. 
Every September 11th, an enormous Senyera was hoisted in the mountain of Pallars, and he 
was one of the first who did it, even I think that it was on his initiative. And now, I cannot 
understand how he is now so Spanish.” [Quote #15, Interview #29, Sara, second generation, 
born in 1980] 
 
Yet, immigrants have also experienced opposite changes as the story from the following 
interviewee’s reflects. José Carlos’ trajectory is a trajectory of progressive identificational 
assimilation, which seems to be motivated by a feeling of gratitude towards Catalonia.   
 
- “I am going to tell you something, I am not… maybe this is the Stockholm syndrome, we 
live here and so… But me, myself, without speaking Catalan, I almost feel more Catalan 
than from Aragon, I do not deny it, but I almost feel more Catalan.  
- How many years have you been living here? 
- For more than forty years 
- Those are many years. 
- Those are many years. But moreover, Catalonia has always treated me very well. Catalonia 
and the Catalans, I must say. 
- In which sense? 
- In every sense. I have never had a conflict with Catalans for the reason I were not from here. 
I have never feel underestimated for being from Aragon o for not being Catalan, let’s say. 
Never, never… And now, I am working for a Catalan company. On the contrary, I have 
been with the technical director of my company and he speaks to me in Spanish, he even 
does not think about speaking to me in Catalan. And sometimes, it has happened that he was 
speaking to me in Spanish, and I was speaking Catalan. Absurd situations. And I spoke bad 
Catalan, of course” [Quote #16, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1950] 
 
                                                      
11  In the interview, he emphasized that he was member of the PSC-PSOE, and not the PSC which he 
considers to be too Catalanist. 
12 A similar process is experienced by one of the participants of the focus group organized by Béjar 
(2008, 53). As Béjar explains, Pepe, a fifty years old man from Barcelona, who was a progressive anti-
Francoist and rejected Spanish nationalism, decided to abandon the Republican flag and to embrace the 
Spanish flag during the Olympic games held in Barcelona. Pepe’s change is presented as a reaction to a 
pro-independence campaign which took place during that year.   
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The processes of identificational change experienced by Antonio and the one experienced 
by José Carlos had gone in opposite directions. This is somehow surprising if we think that the 
two interviewees are about the same age (Antonio was born in 1951 and José Carlos was born in 
1950), the two went through vocational training education in their regions of origin, and the two 
of them arrived in Catalonia when they were 18 years old. Marriage differentiated them a little 
bit. Antonio got married with his home-town girlfriend and José Carlos got married with a 
woman whose parents were from Andalusia, but who was born in Catalonia. Contrary to 
Antonio’s wife, José Carlos’s wife spent her childhood in a village where the percent of 
immigrants was very small, so she learned Catalan when she was a child.  
Antonio and José Carlos’ working trajectories have been also very distinct. When Antonio 
was 19 years old he started to work in the SEAT, where he was surrounded only by immigrants. 
He spent there his whole working life, until he went to early retirement. José Carlos, on the 
contrary, started his working life in a small enterprise, in which the proportion of Catalans and 
immigrants was more balanced. He worked then in different enterprises of middle size, and 
when he was 35 years old he entered to work for the Catalan Public Television until he went to 
early retirement. Besides, Antonio has always lived in a town where the percent of immigrants 
is very high, and the presence of Andalusia’s and Extremadura’s associations is very important. 
Actually, he has had an active member of one of these associations, in which he got his family 
involved. José Carlos, on the contrary, has lived in an eminent Catalan area (with a GDP per 
capita above the Catalan average) since he was 35 years old.  
José Carlos’s work in the Catalan television, his social mobility, and his belief that 
Catalonia has always treated him very well seem to be behind his process of Catalanization. 
This process has taken him not only to vote for the new Statute in the referendum, but also to 
declare his disagreement with the Constitutional Court Ruling, and to even vote for 
independence in the unofficial referendum on Catalonia independence from Spain which was 
organized in the municipality where he lives in 2010.13   
Antonio regards distrustfully those who hide their origins. José Carlos, on the contrary, 
dislikes that there are people living in Catalonia who complaint about Catalonia and the 
Catalans.  
 
“I joined one of the Extremadura’s Associations, the first one I saw, because I met a person 
who was from the same village where I was and he denied Extremadura, he was embarrassed, 
very ashamed of having born in Extremadura. Maybe, because he had a past that he probably 
did not like, he spoke Catalan and was integrated in a Catalan village. He did not want to 
know anything about Extremadura; he felt Catalan. That caused I looked for a place 
[Extremadura’s association] in which I could participate myself.” [Quote #17, Interview #13, 
Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951] 
 
“These are people who do not feel from here. I know some people like that. And I tell them, I 
don’t know why you are here, I tell them frankly. Because these people like to provoke, there 
are some people like that, they like provoking and saying: ‘Catalans are bastards’” [Quote 
#18, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1950] 
 
The stories of Antonio and José Luis illustrate the occurrence of a change in opposite 
directions. Generally, it can be said that interviewees’ secondary socialization, their working 
                                                      
13 In September 2009, an unofficial referendum for Catalonia independence took place in Arenys de 
Munt. After this referendum took place, similar referendums were organized in 465 out of 946 Catalan 
municipalities (Lago and Montero 2010, 407).  
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experiences, their residential choices and, more generally, their lives’ trajectories have oriented 
their opposite identificational changes.14 The two following cases support also this argument.   
Mari Tere and Enrique’ lives went also parallel for many years in many regards. Mari Tere 
was born in 1947 and Enrique was born in 1949. Their parents were from other regions of 
Spain; their families arrived to Catalonia when they were small kids (Mari Tere was four years 
old and Enrique was two years old). At their homes the two spoke Spanish with their parents. 
However, in the villages where their parents settled in, the presence of other immigrants was 
symbolic, so they both learned Catalan very early in their interaction with other children. Yet, at 
some point in time, Mari Tere and Enrique trajectories diverged. Mari Tere studied first to be a 
teacher, and then she studied History at the university.    
 
“The fact of having studied History and, moreover, Contemporary History and to know the 
History of Catalonia helped me to look at things in a particular way.” [Quote #19, Interview 
#5, Mari Tere, immigrant, born in 1947] 
 
The university marked her trajectory, but not only because she studied the history of 
Catalonia, but because it gave her the opportunity to interact with people who was originally 
from Catalonia. At a time when very few people studied, and those who studied had most of 
them a Catalan origin, her passing through the university impacted significantly her way of 
thinking. At the university, she met her husband who was originally from Catalonia and who 
spoke Catalan with his parents. When his husband was doing his military service, they both took 
the decision to write letters to each other in Catalan. As Franco’s regime had forbidden the 
teaching of Catalan in schools, very few people could write Catalan at that time (around 1965). 
Therefore, Mari Tere and her husband linguistic activism already reflected a strong commitment 
with the core value of Catalan identity.  
Mari Tere feels only Catalan, but she reports having felt the same since she was young. She 
has not experience any change in her national identification. Actually her Catalanness is not 
only a feeling, but a willing of being.  
 
                                                      
14 We know that in Catalonia, individuals’ origin and their social status partly overlap (see table 1.3). 
Now, immigrants’ economic and social mobility can lead immigrants to enter into a high-status group 
(the autochthonous group), and to become more similar to this group. When this social mobility is 
accompanied by an external attribution (“blaming” Catalonia for one’s success), this mobility can cause 
that immigrants adopt the lifestyles of high status autochthonous. Extending the argument, we could think 
that immigrants do not only adopt the high-status autochthonous’ lifestyles, but they also develop the 
feelings of attachment to the host society that the autochthonous possess. Although chapter five only 
speculated on the mechanism which explains the relationship between immigrant families’ good 
economic performance and the identificational assimilation of the offspring, the comparison of Antonio 
and José Carlos trajectories give us some clues regarding the mechanism which might be at play. José 
Carlos’s economic and social mobility seem to lie behind his feelings of gratitude to the receiving society 
(“Catalonia has always treated me very well”) and his identification as Catalan. As I argued in chapter 5, 
immigrants’ feelings of gratitude to the receiving society and their identification with it can be passed on 
their children fostering, in this way, a stronger identification with Catalonia in the latter. Reitz and Sklar  
have argued that the relationship goes in the opposite direction. According to these authors, immigrants’ 
attachment to their places of origin (i.e. retention of the originally language or maintenance of ethnic 
networks) has an economic cost among the European-origin immigrants in Toronto. The translation of 
Reitz and Sklar’s argument to the Catalan context would imply that Spanish immigrants’ maintenance of 
their attachment to Spain, expressed as their resistance to learn Catalan, weaken theirs and their children’s 
labor and social opportunities. However, looking at the José Carlos’ trajectory and taking into account 
that he never learned to speak Catalan, it seems that the causal relation goes in the other way. 
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“I feel Catalan. But I always say I have been born in that place [a different region from 
Catalonia], so people know it. But the feeling and what I want to be is Catalan.” [Quote #20, 
Interview #5, Mari Tere, immigrant, born in 1947] 
 
Mari Tere has very strong group identification, and she has made hers the aspirations of the 
Catalan nationalism. In her discourse, she reproduces many of the arguments used by the 
Catalan nationalist parties, to which she uses to vote, when they vindicate Catalonia’s self-
determination or independence. So, she refers to Spain economic plundering of Catalonia, to the 
fact that Spanish institutions cut off the Catalan Parliament’s will in the parliamentary 
procedure of the Catalan Statute, to the grudge of Spain against Catalonia when banning a 
Catalan national team, etc.  
Enrique’s political evolution has been completely the opposite. He remained in his village, 
and he studied Tourism in a University School close to his village. He reports not have lived, 
not witnessed the students’ movement, or the dictatorship’ repression. 
 
“All I did was to study, later on I found a good job, and then, all I did was to work. That’s it”. 
[Quote #21, Interview #35, Enrique, immigrant, born in 1949] 
 
      Enrique started working as a hotel manager, and later on he became the owner of a hotel. He 
got married with a woman who had been born in Catalonia, from a mixed couple, and who 
spoke Catalan with her parents. However, Enrique and his wife speak each other in Spanish, and 
they speak Spanish to their children too. Although speaking Spanish at home was not a 
conscious decision, he recognizes he is very satisfied with that, as he knows that many young 
people cannot speak Spanish properly nowadays. He claims his political ideas were shaped over 
the years, maybe somehow inspired by the teachings he received in the public high school he 
attended in his village during Franco’s dictatorship. When Enrique was around forty years old 
(around 1989), he was invited to participate more actively in politics, and to appear in the 
Partido Popular’s lists of his village’s city hall. He accepted. His decision to be an active 
member of the PP is striking if we take into account his familial context. 
 
“My father said nothing, because I knew already what he thought. He was different, he had 
more Republican thoughts. My mother told me that I should not enter in politics. You know… 
those kinds of things. But I don’t regret anything. This gave me the opportunity to explain and 
say what I think and tell many people: you lie, what you are telling is not true.” [Quote #22, 
Interview #35, Enrique, immigrant, born in 1949] 
 
Enrique feels both Spanish and Catalan, and nor does he report having changed his 
identification with Spain and Catalonia over time. He explains to me that he is constantly 
accused of being against Catalonia and the Catalan language. Despite that, he does consider 
himself Catalan: 
 
“They also tell me: you are against the Catalan language. I then say, see I have studied in 
Catalonia, I have worked in Catalonia, with my wife, we got married in Catalonia, and my 
children are Catalan. Do you really think that I do not want the best for Catalonia? Naturally, I 
want the best for Catalonia. But what I think is the best is not what you are doing.” [Quote 
#23,Interview #35, Enrique, immigrant, born in 1949] 
 
Enrique complains that Spanish is not well taught in school, that the Spanish flag is not 
hoisted in his village’s city hall, or that some streets and squares’ names has been renamed in 
order to delete the presence of Spain in his village. His discourse coincides, in this way, with his 
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own party’s, the Popular Party, complains regarding Catalan nationalism harassment of the 
Spanish language and of the Spanish symbols in Catalonia.  
 
These four interviewees’ stories illustrate the occurrence of both changes, as well as 
stability. Now, why some of these immigrants’ identification has evolved over time, while it has 
remained the same in other cases? We know that Antonio (interview #13) and José Carlos 
(interview #18) arrived in Catalonia at a time its national identification was, very possibly, not 
fully crystallized. Their migratory experience, therefore, impacted significantly on the strength 
of their attachments. On the contrary, Mari Tere (interview #5) and Enrique (interview #35) 
arrived in Catalonia when they were small kids, so they followed a process of socialization 
which was not impacted by any migratory experience. Undergoing a migratory experience as a 
young adult could be, therefore, an important factor when explaining change and stability in 
immigrants’ national identification, although further research would be needed to confirm this 
hypothesis. 
 
7.3.4 Illustrating identificational change between immigrants and their children 
 
In the summer 2008, I carried out ten interviews with parents and children of the same 
family. These interviews have helped me to look into the two generations’ identificational 
similarities and differences. Direct questions on the interviewees’ father/mother’ feelings of 
attachment towards Spain and Catalonia were also posed to native and seconds generations to 
learn about the similarities and differences in the parents and the offspring generations. 
Interviews with parents and children from the same family provide qualitative evidence of the 
intergenerational transmission of the national allegiances, something that the descriptive 
analyses presented in chapter 5 already highlighted. Despite this, some second generations also 
report having experienced a radical switch in relation to their parents’ identification. 
In the interviews I conducted with parents and children from the same family, four out of 
five cases reflect that parents and children agree in their national self-categorization. 
Differences in the parent/child identification were only relevant in the case of Antonio 
(Interview #13) and his daughter Alicia. While the former feels “only Spanish”, Alicia feels 
both Spanish and Catalan. Alicia’s feelings of attachment with Catalonia are, however, more 
similar to her mother’s, Angela. Angela was present in the interview to her husband, and she 
interrupted him in several occasions to make clear that she did not feel as her husband and that 
she also felt Catalan. However, even if Alicia does not look like her father as concerns to her 
identification with Catalonia, she resembles him as it regards to how she defines Catalonia (as a 
region) or in the fact that the two of them are against Catalonia’s independence.  
Within the second generations and also among the children of mixed couples I interviewed, 
I have found significant differences not only in their attachment to Spain and Catalonia, but also 
in how compatible or incompatible they perceive to be these attachments (Benet-Martínez and 
Haritatos 2005; Benet-Martínez et al. 2002).  
Some interviewees, children of mixed couples or second generations, who self-identify as 
both Spanish and Catalan, emphasized their Spanishness over the course of the interview to 
make clear that they are not distinct from people in other regions of Spain. These interviewees 
consider Catalonia to be part of Spain, and they organize their identification with Spain and 
Catalonia in concentric circles, with their Catalan identification being nested in their Spanish 
identification.  
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“I was born in Catalonia and I feel Catalan. However, when I travel around Spain, or when I 
am in Salamanca or anywhere else, then I feel as Asturian as the people from Asturias, or as 
Galician... I’m comfortable when I go there, and I also really enjoy traveling around Spain” 
[Quote #24, Interview #15, Carlos, second generation, born in 1972] 
 
“I am as Spanish as a guy from Asturias, as a boy from Asturias, or as a person from 
Extremadura” [Quote #25, Interview #9, Mario, second generation, born in 1970] 
 
Carlos is the son of a mixed couple. His father, Juan, feels “a little bit more Spanish than 
Catalan because he spent his youth in his village and his roots are there”. In the interview with 
his father, he makes a biographic sketch of his wife:  
 
“My wife is more Spanish than I am. I do guarantee it. And she is originally from Catalonia, 
and from a very Catalan family, but she does not want to hear anyone about her having to give 
up being Spanish.” [Quote #26, Interview #14, Juan, immigrant, born in 1940] 
 
Carlos, who speaks Catalan with his mother and at work, does not seem to be very attached 
to the Catalan language. In the interview, he complains that English is today much more 
important than Catalan is, and he states that he would rather prefer her daughter learn English 
well, and that Catalan was only an optional subject in school. He explains to me that his feelings 
of attachment have changed over the years, so today “he feels less Spanish and less Catalan 
because all these circumstances” [which surrounded the reform of the Statute].  
Mario, on the other hand, is the son of two Andalucians. He never learned Catalan properly 
because he “was not good at it”. This, however, is causing him problems to consolidate the 
position he got in the Catalan police. Although Mario complains that Catalan institutions should 
not require a proof of competence in Catalan, as no proof of competence in Spanish is required, 
he claims not being upset due to this. Actually, Mario reports that over the years he has became 
less extreme in his opinions towards the Catalan government language regulations.  
In any case, second generation interviewees’ identification with Catalonia seems to be 
independent of their language practices. In fact, as the case of Carlos shows, being competent in 
Catalan and having Catalan as mother tongue does not mean that people always feel more 
Catalan oriented. Conversely, the fact that second generations declare not being competent in 
Catalan is not incompatible with the fact that they have “Catalanized”, and share some of the 
values, beliefs and goals that nationalist parties defend.  
The case of Sara is of interest here. Sara, who was born in 1980, is the daughter of two 
Andalusians. Her parents arrived in Catalonia when they were small kids, but they were always 
surrounded by other Andalusians, so none of them learned Catalan. As mentioned above, Sara’s 
father was a trade unionist and an active person in contesting Franco’s regime. According to 
her, his father feels today only Spanish, however she feels only Catalan. When I ask her about 
any event that she thinks has marked her in some way, she refers to the Constitutional Court 
Ruling on the Catalan Statute.15  
 
“The Ruling of the Statute has made me more Catalanist. I cannot understand how a law 
which was passed. Well, allegedly. A law which was downsized [in its processing in the 
Spanish Parliament], but it was approved in a referendum by the people, a law who people 
voted, a law which was passed in the Catalan Parliament…How is possible that a party [the 
                                                      
15 In the interview, I asked the interviewees whether they could mention a political, national or 
international, event that they consider to be important for the recent history and which have impacted 
them in some particular way. This question was posed before the questions on the Statute reform or the 
Constitutional Court Ruling were posed. I am grateful to Carolina Galais for her suggestion to incorporate 
this question in the interview outline.   
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PP] who hates Catalonia comes and say: “we do not want this”. And some judges, whose term 
has already expired in some cases, say that the Statute is not ok. This causes one feels 
powerless, and one wonders where democracy is. I do not understand it. So it is because of 
this that I feel that I do not want to know anything about Spain. I am Catalan and I am pro-
independence. I am not of those who say “to hell with Spain”. On the contrary, Spain is my 
parents’ country; I am fond of Spain because of my parents and because I lived there, but I am 
Catalan and I see that they are…, that is, my feeling is that they do not want us, therefore, I do 
not want to be Spanish, and after the Statute, even less. This is outrageous.” [Quote #27, 
Interview #29, Sara, second generation, born in 1980] 
 
According to Sara’s tale, the Ruling did not only end up re-affirming her identification as 
“only Catalan”, but it also caused she evolved to be more “Catalanist” to the point she is now in 
favor of Catalonia’s independence. Yet her position is compatible with the fact that she speaks 
Catalan very badly and she never speaks Catalan in front of friends because she is ashamed. 
Despite this, she is now making the effort to speak Catalan at work, and to speak Catalan to her 
small daughter because Sara does not want her to end up not being competent in Catalan.16    
Sara’s story is very similar to Álvaro’s. Álvaro’s parents came to Catalonia when they were 
very young. When Álvaro introduces to me his family, he makes very clear that his parents feel 
Andalusian, although he feels Catalan, as his brother does. As Sara, Álvaro is not proficient in 
Catalan. In the interview, he explains that at his primary school, most courses were taught in 
Spanish, so when he went to high school it was very difficult for him to adapt to a context in 
which only Catalan was spoken. However, Álvaro does not report to have had any problems 
with this. Over the conversation, he emphasizes his rejection to any expression of Spanish 
nationalism, and he brings in several examples which have reinforced his identification with 
Catalonia.  
 
“I remember a collection of signatures; I remember that there were two elderly people [on 
news in TV]. They were asked the reason why they had come to sing in. The woman said 
“[we have come to sign] against the Catalans.”  The husband corrected her: “no, no, against 
the [Catalan] Statute.” And she said: “You can say what you want, but this is against the 
Catalans.” And there were a lot of people surrounding them who were insulting to Catalonia, 
in general.17 Bad moment for going on vacation out of Catalonia. You see how much they can 
piss off organizing an act like that one... This was promoted by a political party [the PP] 
which had passed Statutes, such as the Valencia’s Statute, which included a clause saying that 
anything adopted in the Statute of Catalonia would be applied automatically in Valencia.”18 
[Quote #28, Interview #30, Álvaro, second generation, born in 1976] 
 
Second generations and children of mixed families are “biculturals” who have internalized 
more than one culture (Benet-Martínez and Haritatos 2005). In the Catalan context, however, 
confrontation along the cleavage very often pushes people to choose between one or the other 
                                                      
16 Sara’s case exemplifies that identification shifts might precede linguistic shifts and that the 
relationship is endogenous.   
17 Here the interviewee refers to a collection of signatures organized by the Popular Party in 2006 in 
different regions of Spain. The signatures were aimed to support a legislative initiative organized by the 
PP to ask to the Spanish government that it organize a referendum asking the following question: “Do 
you consider convenient that Spain continue to be a single nation in which all its citizens are equal on 
rights, obligations, and on the access to public provisions?. According to the PP, the Catalan Statute text 
had consequences on the other regions finances and rights, and this justified that people from other 
regions had the right to take a position regarding the Catalan Statute.  
18 The Statute of the Valencia Community was also reformed in 2006. It includes a clause 
(Disposición Adicional Segunda, Ley Orgánica 1/2006, de 10 de abril, de Reforma de la Ley Orgánica 
5/1982, de 1 de junio, de Estatuto de Autonomía de la Comunidad Valenciana) which specifies that the 
Valencia Community’s regional government will watched to guarantee that the Valencia Community’s 
self-government is updated in equal terms to other regions self-government rights.  
Change in National Identification 
 198 
side, between Spain and Catalonia. This has consequences on the way people organize their 
national allegiances. In some cases, second generations make a choice, reject Spain as a valid 
category of national identification for them, and self-identify as only Catalan (Interviews #29 
Sara, and #30 Álvaro). Other second generations embed their Catalan identification within their 
Spanish identification (Interviews #9 Mario, and #15 Carlos). Some second generations 
perceive the two cultures as compatible and complementary; others, on the contrary, perceive 
them as oppositional and contradictory (Benet-Martínez et al. 2002; Haritatos and Benet-
Martínez 2002) and they end up defining themselves by “opposition” to others.  
 
- Would you say you identify as only Spanish, more Spanish than Catalan, as Spanish as 
Catalan, as more Catalan than Spanish, or only Catalan? 
- Now, just to bother… If I would have to answer this question in a survey I would tell you 
“only Spanish”. But then, this question is biased. First, what does it mean to be Spanish and 
what does it mean to be Catalan? 
- That was the following question. What makes you identify with Spain, and what…? 
- In the present situation this is difficult to say. There was a sage who said that you don’t 
realize that you are a nationalist until you cross over another nationalist, so then you become 
nationalist but of the opposite sign (…) 
- So, how would you define yourself then? 
- Me? Yugoslavian. It all depends on the references.  
[Quote #29, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed couple, born in 1975] 
 
Some other second generations experience difficulties to self-categorize themselves.19 Birth 
makes them Catalan. Nevertheless, their familial context makes them Spanish. This is, for 
example, the case of Juan José. Juan José is the middle child of a couple, consisting of two 
skilled professionals who came to Catalonia around 1980, after immigration rates had fallen 
down. Juan José’s education at a state-aid private school was mainly in Spanish, although he 
had some courses in Catalan. He speaks Catalan with friends and with some co-workers, but he 
feels more comfortable speaking Spanish. In the interview, he seems to have problems to 
classify himself as either Catalan or Spanish. At some point during the interview, it becomes 
evident that even though he recognizes that he is Catalan because he was born in Catalonia (“I 
am the first Catalan in the family”), he feels more Spanish than Catalan. The importance of the 
family context is exemplified in the following quote: 
 
“At the end of the day, that is what I have always experienced, what I have experienced at 
home. At home, we have never listened to Catalan singers. To me, Raimon or Lluis Llach are 
unknown, I have never listened to them. I mean, I have never listened to them, but I neither 
have interest in listening to them, that is the truth. Now, that I have grown up, I am starting to 
listen to Els Amics de les Arts or Manel. I listen to them, and I liked them. But then, the radio 
and the television… I rarely watch TV3. Well, the truth is that I almost never watch TV now, 
but this is what I have experienced, and I feel good with it. At the end, I feel good with that 
because my family is from outside Catalonia” [Quote #30, Interview #38, Juan José, second 
generation, born in 1983]. 
 
Parents, therefore, seem to have a significant influence on shaping their children’s 
identification with Spain. This identification is sometimes intentionally promoted by involving 
children in cultural associations: 
 
                                                      
19 Barrera (1985) and Woolard (1989) have also reported ambivalent identities among second 
generations.  
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“They [his daughters] have participated on theater groups, choir groups; they have learned the 
Extremadura dances; they have worn the regional suits. So they have lived the culture from 
Extremadura very closely” [Quote #31, Interview #13, Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951]. 
 
Besides, the second generations who keep strong attachments to Spain (despite them feeling 
Catalan, at the same time) have very often had a close relationship with their parents’ places of 
origin. Juan José (interview #38), for example, used to spend around two or three months 
(Christmas, summer time) every year in their parents’ place of origin and, this was so until his 
two grandmothers died. Therefore, for many second generations, their attachment to Spain is 
not only inherited from their parents, but built upon their own experiences. Additionally, it is 
important to highlight that many of these children have grown up in a neighborhoods in which 
most people had an immigrant origin, so they had little opportunities to socialize with children 
of natives. This separation was sometimes reproduced in the high school.  
 
“[In the high school] there were two separate worlds. There was even a bar where Castilian 
speakers met and a bar where Catalan speakers met” [Quote #32, Interview #1, Arantxa, 
second generation, born in 1979] 
 
All these elements (contact with the parents’ place of origin, participation on cultural 
associations, or the residential concentration of immigrants in some neighborhoods) reinforce 
immigrants’ transmission of their Spanish identification. Despite this, as the cases of Sara 
(interview #29) and Álvaro (interview #30) show, second generations sometimes experience 
radical switches in relation to their parents. Taking into account the impact that the Statute issue 
and some of the divisive campaigns which were organized around it (e.g. the PP collections of 
signatures) have had on these two interviewees, we can imagine that these events performed as 
catalysts of these interviewees’ Catalan identification. Although this idea is coherent with the 
argument that events socialize individuals’ attitudes in the specific domains that make salient 
(Sears and Valentino 1997), more research should be done to learn about the impact that the 
Statute reform had on young adults and on how these events interact with other variables 
(parents’ identification).  
 
7.4. Processes of reactive change 
 
To this point I have illustrated the occurrence of process of identificational stability and 
identificational assimilation within the immigrants’ generation and between the immigrants and 
the second generation.  
Identificational assimilation is the result of a long-term process. However, other changes 
can occur more rapidly. These kind of changes, to which I have referred in this dissertation as 
period changes, or as short-term changes can be seen as individuals’ reaction to elites’ 
mobilization of the cleavage. This section is devoted to exemplify processes of reactive 
reaffirmation and reactive change and to illustrate the mechanism which lie behind them. 
 
7.4.1 Explaining reactive changes 
 
The term reactive change is based on the concept of reactive ethnicity coined by  Portes and 
Rumbaut (2001). Reactive ethnicity refers to a process of ethnic identification reaffirmation 
which emerges when second generations are confronted to hostile receiving societies, and they 
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perceive that their ethnic group is being threatened, persecuted or excluded.20 Building on this 
concept, I name reactive changes to those changes which occur when individuals who have dual 
group identifications perceive that one of the groups they identify with is being mistreated or 
attacked by the other and, accordingly, they react reaffirming the identification which is being 
mistreated or attacked, and rejecting the other identification.  
When two conditions hold, that is, when the number of these reactive changes is 
numerically important, and when they occur in the same direction (or the number of changes in 
one direction exceeds the number of changes in the other directions), these changes produce 
aggregate period changes. As chapter 3 showed, aggregate period changes in national 
identification have been significantly important over the last thirty years both in the Catalan 
society as a whole, but especially in the autochthonous population (see table 3.11).  
Over the dissertation, I have argued that the individual changes behind these aggregate 
period changes are related to changes in the context and, in particular, to elites’ mobilization of 
the center-periphery cleavage. In chapter 4, I argued that confrontation between Spanish and 
Catalan parties regarding issues related to the center-periphery cleavage (e.g. language policy 
reforms, decentralization of responsibilities, financial resources transferences, the reform of the 
Catalan Statute, the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Catalan statute, etc.) was behind this 
kind of changes. The results of chapter 4, although modest, suggested that when the levels of 
confrontation between the Spanish and Catalan elites were very high then natives tend to exhibit 
a more Catalan oriented identification, while second generations tend to exhibit a more Spanish 
oriented identification.  
Although in chapter 4 I did not go into depth on the mechanism which explains this 
association, I suggested that Spanish and Catalan parties’ opposite stances regarding 
identitarian-framed issues mobilize individuals’ identification. This mobilization has a twofold 
effect: it pushes autochthonous to re-affirm their Catalan identification at the expense of their 
Spanish identification, and it causes second generations, who hold dual identifications but still 
maintain strong bonds of attachment to Spain, to re-affirm their Spanish identification at the 
expense of their Catalan identification. Unfortunately, the use of cross-sectional data limits the 
proper test of this argument as I lacked of information on the individual prior-identification.21    
In the previous chapter, I have examined more deeply short-term individual changes in 
national identification using individual panel data. The analysis focused on a period of high 
political confrontation between the Spanish and the Catalan political parties over the Popular 
Party’s majority government and the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. In that 
chapter, I argued that political parties’ mobilization of the cleavage, channelled by Spanish and 
Catalan television broadcasters, took those who self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan in t1 
(2004) to redefine its identification in t2 (2005). The results of my analyses showed that 
exposure to Catalan television influenced those individuals who self-identified as Spanish as 
Catalan in t1, and caused they became more Catalan oriented in t2 (2005). Nevertheless, the 
analyses did not find the opposite effect for Spanish television, possibly due to the fact that the 
Catalan television gives a greater attention to broadcast issues which confront Spain and Catalan 
political parties along the cleavage.  
In line with Chapter 4’s argument, I argued that the media and, in particular, television 
channels Spanish and Catalan elites’ opposite stances regarding an identitarian-framed issue, the 
reform of the Statute of Catalonia. Individuals’ exposure to political elites’ divide and polarized 
                                                      
20 Portes and Rumbaut (2001) explain, for example, that some of their Mexican interviewees’ ethnic 
self-identity reinforced when Proposition 187, a law which bans illegal immigrants’ use of health care, 
public education, and other social services in California, was passed in a referendum in 1994. 
21 In the chapter, I had to assume that all second generations have dual identifications. 
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messages regarding the reform of the Statute pushed those individuals who hold dual 
identifications and watch Catalan television to give priority to their Catalan identification over 
their Spanish identification.  
According to the Portes and Rumbaut’s (2001) formulation of the concept of reactive 
ethnicity, ethnic reaffirmation occur when some event affects the group in some particular way 
occur. In the Catalan context, the events or issues which cause individuals’ alteration of their 
national identification are related to the center-periphery cleavage.  
In my interviews, the event which emerged more clearly as the one causing such kind of 
changes was the negotiation of the new Statute of Autonomy and the Spanish Constitutional 
Court Ruling on the new Statute. In chapter 4, I already described the reform of the Statute 
process, from its origin to the approval of the Statute in the 2006 referendum. In chapter 6, I 
also argued that political parties adopted antagonist positions and framed the debate so that 
those who were against the new Statute were in fact denying Catalonia’s rights, and those who 
were in favor of the Statute were breaking up Spain.  
After the Statute was approved, the Popular Party, the Spanish Ombudsman and the Popular 
Party regional government of Murcia appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court against the 
Statute22. The regional governments of La Rioja, Valencia, Aragón and the Balearic Islands (all 
from the Popular Party) also appealed against some of the Catalan Statute’s articles.  
While the Constitutional Court was deciding on the Catalan Statute, a series of unofficial 
referendums on independence from Spain were organized in Catalan municipalities. The first 
referendum took place in September 2009 in Arenys de Mar, an 8,000 inhabitants town. After this 
referendum took place, the initiative spread to other municipalities so that between 2009 and 
2011 around one half of the Catalan municipalities held similar queries. Although originally 
promoted from the civil society, these referendums were very quickly backed by Catalan 
nationalist parties and, in particular, the CiU and the ERC. The overall turnout in these 
referendum was around 18 percent, although participation was unevenly distributed, with a 
minimum turnout of 5 percent and a maximum turnout of 90 percent in some localities (Muñoz 
and Guinjoan 2013).  
Four years after the PP appealed against the Catalonia Statute, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court reached a consensus and pronounced a Ruling. The Ruling declared the greater part of the 
text constitutional. Nevertheless, it highlighted that the Preamble, which defined Catalonia as a 
nation, had not legal effectiveness, besides it declared 14 articles unconstitutional and it 
reinterpreted others. Some of the articles the Spanish Constitutional Court reinterpreted were 
related to Catalonia’s historic rights, to Catalonia’s national symbols, and to the promotion of 
Catalan language. 
The Constitutional Court Ruling was framed by Catalan parties as an attack to the Catalan 
Catalonia and to its citizens’ will, given that Catalan citizens had endorsed the Statute in a 
referendum four years ago. Omnium Cultural organized a demonstration in Barcelona on July 
10, 2010 with the motto “Som una nació, nosaltres decidim”.23 The aim of the demonstration 
was to protest against the Constitutional Court Ruling, and to claim for the Catalans’ right to 
                                                      
22 The number of articles appealed ranged between 187 in the case of the PP to 117 in the case of the 
Murcia government.  
23 Omnium Cultural is an organization which was created in 1961 to promote the Catalan culture and 
the Catalan language, as well as the national identity of Catalonia. Although its activities were banned 
during the dictatorship, it continued working underground. Since the arrival of the democracy, Omnium 
Cultural has played an important role in promoting the Catalan culture and the Catalan language. More 
recently, the organization has also played a leading role when claiming for Catalonia’s self-determination 
right.  
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decide on those issues which specifically concern Catalonia. The Catalan parties, with the 
exception of the PP and Ciutadans, supported the demonstration. As a result of these events, 
people mobilized and claimed for their right to decide.24  
Now, the question to be asked here would be: How these kinds of events, which made 
salient the cleavage, end up affecting individuals’ identification? To answer to this question we 
have to look towards the political parties, which very often set themselves up as spokesperson 
of the Catalans or the Spanish peoples. Political parties leaders’ or spokesperson’s reactions to 
these issues take the form of political claims or stances on the “group collective” position, and 
are very often framed as offenses to the group identity.  
As I have already mentioned that the reform of the Catalan Statute was framed by the 
Catalan parties as a way to express “Catalonia’s willingness to be, and further advance in the 
recognition of its collective identity”.25 On the other hand, the Spanish Constitutional Court 
Ruling was claimed to be a “collective humiliation”.26 The Popular Party, on the other hand, 
defended that the Catalan Statute was “inacceptable” and that it broke the 1978 Constitutional 
agreement.27 The PP also contended that the PSOE’s national government concessions to the 
nationalist Catalan parties were questioning Spanish national nature and were contributing to 
the “Balkanization of Spain”,28 while the Ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Statute 
ratified the Spanish Constitution and preserved the Spanish nation.29  
Yet, political parties’ confrontation along the center-periphery cleavage does not take place 
in the vacuum. Confrontation is very often surrounded by campaigns which seek to make salient 
                                                      
24 Interestingly, one day after this demonstration took place, the Spanish National Team won the 
FIFA World Cup. People mobilized and celebrated the Spanish National Team victory. During those 
weeks, the Senyeras hanging out from the windows or the balconies of many people’s apartments 
competed with the Spanish flags which hung out from the windows or the balconies of other peoples’ 
apartments.   
25 Avui Catalunya, en el seu procés de construcció nacional, expressa la seva voluntat d’ésser i de 
continuar avançant en el reconeixement de la seva identitat col·lectiva i en el perfeccionament i 
l’ampliació de l’autogovern per mitjà d’aquest nou Estatut. [Preamble of the Statute. Proposta de reforma 
de l’Estatut d’autonomia de Catalunya. Presentació i defensa al Congrés dels Diputats. Text de la 
Proposta en castellà, anglès i català Barcelona, 2006 Quaderns de l’Estatut, 2] 
26 Pujol, Jordi (2010) La reacción no puede ser más espasmódica. Article retrieved from the Centre 
d’Estudis Jordi Pujol on April 6, 2012 [www.jordipujol.cat/es/jp/articles/8466] 
27 Mariano Rajoy, PP’s leader statements in Cadiz on January 31, 2006 in an act sponsored by the PP 
to start the campaign to collect supports against the Catalan Statute.  
28 José María Aznar, PP’s leader and president of the Spanish government between 1996 and 2004, 
statement in an interview to the Argentinan newspaper “La Nación”. Retrieved on April 6, 2012 from 
[http://www.lanacion.com.ar/736627-jose-maria-aznar-espana-esta-en-riesgo-de-balcanizacion] 
29 This is obviously an oversimplification of these years’ political confrontation. Spanish parties and 
Catalan parties did not adopted monolithic stands regarding the reform of the Statute or the Constitutional 
Court Ruling. Neither people adopted so clear-cut stances (see Béjar 2008, 101-102). As I have already 
mentioned, the PP leaders in Catalonia rejected the reform of the Statute, which they considered to be an 
unnecessary reform and to be against the Spanish Constitution. The Ciutadans platform, which would 
become later a political party and concurred to the 2006 regional elections standing against Catalan 
nationalism, was also against the Statute. Within the PSOE, some leaders and, in particular, the José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero, the Spanish prime minister between 2004 and 2011, took a position in favor of the 
Statute. Other regional leaders of the PSOE claimed against it (i.e. Juan José Rodríguez Ibarra, 
Extremadura’s region president between 1982 and 2007, requested that the Catalan Statute proceedings 
were stopped in the Spanish parliament). The PSOE ended up supporting the Statute after some articles of 
the Statute submitted by the Catalan Parliament to the Spanish Parliament were modified. This said it is 
worth highlighting that one of the main consequences of the cleavage is its ability to reduce the 
complexity of political competition in two sides: they and us, those who are in favor of the Statute reform 
and against the Constitutional Court Ruling (Catalonia and the Catalan people), and those who are against 
the Statute and for the Constitutional Court Ruling (Spain and the Spanish people). 
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individuals’ national identities, and mobilize them for or against the contested issue.30 These 
campaigns, which are very often divisive campaigns, “accentuate the group differences, 
heighten group consciousness of those differences, and promote ethnic group solidarity and 
political mobilization” (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 148).  
Media usually play a fundamental role when broadcasting these campaigns. Actually, 
television and radio broadcasters and, in particular, political commentators sometimes deepen 
the center-periphery cleavage far beyond the political leaders’ statements.  
In the next section, I illustrate the occurrence of reactive changes. The excerpts I present 
provide some clues which help us to understand how the mobilization of the center-periphery 
cleavage around particular issues affects interviewees’ identification with Spain and Catalonia. 
Interviews reveal that those stances interviewees’ perceive that affect in some negative way the 
group collective identity provoke an emotional reaction on the interviewees, and cause that their 
identification reinforces, or changes. Whether individuals’ identification reaffirms or change 
will depend on whether individuals have an exclusive Spanish or Catalan identification, or 
whether they identify with both Spain and Catalonia, at least, to some extent. The interviewees’ 
tales will also evidence that these stances which are stemmed by the media reach to them 
directly or indirectly in a two-step flow of communication.  
Besides this, it is worth noting that the issues referred above did not only cause that people’ 
identification reaffirmed or changed. For some immigrants and second generations, the reform 
of the Statute did not have consequences over their feelings of identification with Spain or 
Catalonia, but it reinforced their disaffection with Catalan politics (see quotes #8, #9 and #10 
above). Here, individuals’ prior interest in Catalan politics has emerged as a key element. In this 
way, the analyses of the interviews as a whole suggest that when immigrants or second 
generations are very much politicized and pay attention to Catalan-specific issues then stances 
or expressions of Catalan nationalism cause them to reaffirm their Spanish identification. On the 
contrary, when immigrants or second generations’ are estranged from issues which are related to 
the Catalan politics, the aforementioned issues (i.e. the reform of the Statute, the Constitutional 
Court Ruling on the Statute, the referendums on the Catalonia independence, etc.) do not alter 
their identification with Spain and Catalonia.  
 
7.4.2 Illustrating reactive changes 
 
The two following excerpts illustrate a process which has led the interviewees to feel less 
Spanish and more Catalan, in the first case, and to reaffirm Catalan identification, in the second. 
In the first excerpt, I reproduce part of my conversation with Flor. Flor comes from a mixed 
family. Her father was from Catalonia, but her mother was originally from La Mancha. Flor was 
brought up in a bilingual environment in which their parents talked to her in Catalan, and the 
Spanish language was transmitted to her by her maternal grandmother, who lived with her 
families during her childhood. In the interview, she evokes the time in which she protested 
against the killings of Manuel Fernández Márquez (a worker of the Besós Heat Station who was 
                                                      
30 In chapter 6, I already made reference to some divisive campaigns which were promoted by the 
Spanish rightist media or by the Popular Party itself: e.g. the 2004 boycott against the consumption of 
Catalan cava, the 2005 campaign in favour of the unity of the Spanish Civil War Archive and against the 
devolution of a set of documents that had been confiscated by the Franco’s government to the government 
of Catalonia, or the 2006 collection of signatures to organize a referendum against the Catalan Statute. 
Other campaigns or acts were organized on those years to mobilize people for the Statute: demonstrations 
with the motto “Som una nació, nosaltres decidim”, unofficial referendums for the Catalan independence. 
These latter initiatives were also intended to evidence the deepening conflict between Spain and 
Catalonia. 
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killed by the Guardia Civil in 1973) and Salvador Puig-Antich (1974), and she explains she was 
member of the CNT for many years. In her discourse, she appears to have experienced a process 
of reactive change. In her case, the Cava’s boycott, the Constitutional Court Ruling on the 
Statute and Catalonia’s fiscal mistreatment are presented as the issues having caused her to 
change. She names these events as “serious injuries to the Catalan people” and to herself, as part 
of the Catalan people.  
 
- I feel primarily Catalan. But I have some bonds of attachment to Spain because I have a part, 
part of my roots is from La Mancha and, I do not deny those roots. However, my Catalan 
part has been more attacked and, maybe because of that I have reacted, reaffirming it more.  
- Would you say then that you ever felt more identified with Spain than you identify now? 
- Yes, yes. No so many years ago I felt myself Catalan, but part of the Spanish State.  
- And now, you don’t feel anymore? 
- Now less and less. 
- From when you would say? 
- Maybe, in the last ten years [since 2002]. 
- For any reason? 
- Yes. I remember that, before, when someone said that Spanish people had something against 
the Catalans, I told myself: “those are nonsense, how paranoid we are!” (…) But from some 
years ago..,, I remember I went to Zamora once to see my aunt, for a celebration. [She 
describes that she wanted to buy Cava in Zamora, a city in Castile, but that this was not 
possible because at that time there was a boycott against the Catalan Cava, and the shop 
assistants told her that they did not sell Cava from Catalonia]. So then, I started to listen to 
some things I had not wanted to listen to before. I started to listen to some radio stations I 
have never tuned in before. And then I thought: “oh my god! How can it be? How can it be 
that they speak like that about us, and that people accept it and they believe it?” And, later 
on, the Ruling on the Statute, and the attitude that the central government is having 
regarding Catalonia’s finance and other things, I consider these serious injuries to the 
Catalan people, so to us. 
- Let’s talked about that moment, the reform of the Statute. How would you live that period, 
politically speaking? 
- Painful. First, the time the Court took to pronounce a Ruling, the way the PP behaved, that 
afterwards they appeared they had do nothing. I found it embarrassing. I think that it was as 
a result of all these kinds of things I’ve been feeling less Spanish and more Catalan, let’s 
say. Before I felt Catalan and Spanish at the same time, but now I feel less and less Spanish.  
[Quote #33, Interview #37, Flor, mixed couple child, born in 1949] 
 
A similar process is experienced by Mari Antonia, who is the daughter of a native couple. 
Maria Antonia attended a public school at the time of Franco’s dictatorship (between 1948 and 
1958). She recalls singing the “Cara al Sol” and repeating phrases like: “What’s the democracy? 
It is the political system which is ruining the world”. Maria Antonia learned to love Catalonia 
when she incidentally became involved in a group of Catholic scouts. In the scouts, she learned 
Catalan songs, a sense of homeland and Catalan history. In the course of the conversation, 
however, she introduces herself as a non-Catalanist person, who is for a federal state.   
 
- Would you say you identify as only Spanish, more Spanish than Catalan, as Spanish as 
Catalan, as more Catalan than Spanish, or only Catalan? 
- More Catalan than Spanish. 
- And, what would you say that it causes that you identify more with Catalonia? 
- Now, I feel more Catalan for the misunderstanding. Now I reaffirm more. I have had the 
need to live in many parts of Spain because of my husband’s work. I lived in Madrid, I lived 
in Almeria (…). And so, this lack of communication that many Catalans have had [with 
Spanish people] I have not ever experienced that. I made good friends everywhere, I felt 
welcome, I demystified much here what happened there ... but of course, now I do not see it 
like that. Now the positions are much more radicalized. I feel more Catalan because I want 
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my traditions, I want my tongue, I want my culture, but this does not mean I am also part, 
because of the territory, of a big country (…)  
- You have said that you reaffirm more now. Since when does this happen? 
- From the PP majority government (2000-2004). 
- Why? What did it happen then? 
- Well there was a great discredit, contempt, manipulation, a continuous attack on everyone 
which appeared to be Catalan. Nor do I want to get into the politicians game, because they 
play with people’s opinions, but I saw clearly that they were manipulating us, they were 
discrediting us and they were making of us a clear minority. As we are now. 
- And would you say that this caused you changed? 
- It encourage more [my feelings], let’s say. I became more aware of. Before I thought, bah! It 
is the same everywhere. But it is not true. It is not the same (…) Even with some friends of 
Almería… I used to telephone these frinds every Christmas to learn how they were. The first 
thing they told me “Listen, how is Carod31? And I answered: “Hey, I am calling to ask about 
your children, and I guess that you want to ask me about mine?”. They have turned very 
“peperos”.32 They are very tense.  
- So, would you say you feel more Catalan now than 15 years ago, let’s say? 
- Yes, of course, much more. 
[Quote #34, Interview #36, Mari Antonia, native, born in 1944] 
 
As Maria Antonia says, her reactive reaffirmation went back to the PP majority government 
(2000-2004).33 But as in the case of Flor, Maria Antonia refers to the contempt, the attacks 
Catalan people have suffered. Unlike Flor, Mari Antonia’s reactive change does not seem to 
have caused her to change her identification with Spain and Catalonia, but it has made it more 
salient, and it has reaffirmed it. Maria Antonia has not become pro-independence. Flor, on the 
contrary, explains that she has also changed her political preferences. In this regard, it could be 
stated that for many people these changes are politically consequential. 
 
- Which is the organization of the state you are more comfortable with, thinking about Spain 
and Catalonia? 
- Until recently, a multinational state, like the United States, respecting that each of the 
countries, which make it up, have their own laws, their own organization. I had never 
considered myself a separatist. I was Catalanist, but I was not pro-independence. I must say 
that in recent times I have also shifted towards separatism. 
[Quote #35, Interview #37, Flor, mixed couple child, born in 1949] 
 
As Mari Antonia’s words show, political contestation can also affect people relationships 
with out-group members. Similar clashes are often reported by people who were born in other 
regions of Spain when they go back to their regions of origin for holidays or to visit the part of 
its family that remains there. José Carlos, for example, explained to me that every time he goes 
back to his region of origin, he argues with his sister and his brother-in-law because they have 
an idea of Catalonia which is prevailing in the rest of Spain [the idea that Catalonia is always 
annoying to Spain].  
                                                      
31 Josep Lluis Carod Rovira was the ERC leader between 2004 and 2008 and the vice-president of the 
second Tripartit government between 2006 and 2010.  During those years, Carod Rovira became the main 
target of some Spanish political commentators because of some of the acts or statements he was involved 
in. In January 2004, Carod Rovira had a covert meeting with some representatives of the ETA terrorist 
group to exclude Catalonia and its citizens from the ETA targets. The meeting was publicly aired some 
days later causing a crisis in the regional government. His stands in favor of Catalonia’s independence, 
and a statement calling not to support Madrid Candidacy to host the Olympic Games in 2012, after the 
aspirations of the Hockey Catalan Team to compete as a national team were frustrated, were referred as 
provoking the Spanish boycott to the Catalan cava.  
32 Peperos is a pejorative way to refer to supporters of the Partido Popular.  
33 In her study, Béjar (2008) has also detected that the Partido Popular attempt to recover the Spanish 
national sentiment, during his majority government, irritated many people.  
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Negative comments about Catalonia do not necessarily come from their own families, but 
from friends or acquaintances. These kinds of comments are very often based on the idea that 
Catalonia is selfish, or on the idea that Spanish language is forbidden or persecuted in Catalonia. 
Many of my interviewees attribute such comments to people’s ignorance and to the lack of 
knowing of Catalonia, as well as to the Spanish broadcasters’ manipulation of the information 
which people in Spain receive about Catalonia. In general, such comments annoy them, and 
make them to feel upset. Some interviewees, however, consider that such comments are 
justified because they are reactions against Catalan nationalism’s attitudes or policies 
(interviews #13 Antonio, and #14 Juan).  
People’s negative experiences with members of the out-group are very often interpreted as a 
confirmation of their prior belief, and causes they reinforce their original identification, 
avoiding identificational change and fostering stability. This is the case of Antonio who, as 
reported above, became disillusioned with the nationalist drift that Catalan politics took after the 
transition to democracy.  
  
“I asked once for a subvention to organize a play in Castilian, and I was denied it because the 
play was in Castilian, and the Catalan plays were subsidized” [Quote #36, Interview #13, 
Antonio, immigrant, born in 1951] 
 
This reinforcing mechanism which produces a reactive reaffirmation of individuals’ prior 
identification operates on the two directions: it reinforces Spanish prior identification or Catalan 
prior identification. And it does not only operate among those who have an immigrant origin, 
but it also operates among born-in-Catalonia interviewees when they interact with Spanish 
people.  
 
I try not to prejudge, but when my girlfriend and I are victims of prejudice, the truth is that 
that makes me angry. I remember, for example, we went to La Rioja, to Santo Domingo de 
la Calzada, and for a number of reasons we could not stay in the guesthouse where we had 
thought to stay. It was too late, so we went outside to a campsite. When we gave the 
receptionist my girlfriend ID, the guy’s face physically changed and he said “Catalan?”. We 
said “yes”. He said “look, I have only this plot left”. The plot was behind the toilet, on a 
slope, on top of an anthill. We thought about leaving and spending the night in our car 
directly, but we stayed. [Quote #37, Interview #30, Álvaro, second generation, born in 1976] 
 
Another of my interviewees, Elia, who was born in Catalonia, but whose parents were too 
from other regions of Spain, reports many of such negative interactions at her work (she works 
for the Catalan branch of a Spanish company), and when she travels around Spain. Two of these 
negative experiences seem to have left a lasting mark upon her. The first one took place when 
the Atocha bombing on March 11, 2004. That day there was a co-worker from Madrid visiting 
Barcelona’s branch. 
 
“I remember he looked at us and said “This is Carod’s [Josep Lluis Carod Rovira] 
responsibility”. But he told that with such a hate… See, I perceived such a hate, that I even 
broke into tears. I realized how much they hate us”. [Quote #38, Interview #25, Elia, second 
generation, 1953] 
 
The other experience was less traumatic for her, but also very hurting as she states. It 
happened during a holidays in Cordoba. She and her husband went to Cordoba during the 
evening and her child, a teenager, stayed at the rural house they had hired for the holidays. 
When they got back from Cordoba, they found their daughter outside the house, because she had 
left and had forgotten the keys inside.  
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“There was a house a little bit isolated and, again, the same kind of jokes: Well, if you want to 
come in, even though you are Catalans, we will allow you to come in” [Quote #39,Interview 
#25, Elia, second generation, 1953]  
 
Such negative experiences with out-group members reinforce interviewees’ alienation from 
Catalonia (in the case of interview #13 Antonio) and from Spain (in the case of interviews #30 
Álvaro and #25 Elia), forge a reactive identification and foster stability. Experiences of positive 
interactions, however, are selectively filtered or not taken into consideration.  
In any case, reactive changes towards a more Catalan oriented-identification can be also 
experienced by immigrants. The following excerpt from my interview with José Carlos shows 
that he has felt more Catalan, the more attacks to Catalonia he perceived to come from the 
Spanish media or from Spanish people. He refers to this change as a “defensive syndrome”.  
 
- And, may I ask you, how do you feel: only Spanish, more Spanish than Catalan, as Spanish 
as Catalan, more Catalan than Spanish or only Catalan? 
- Well, for a long time I felt as Spanish as Catalan, evenly. But right now, I almost feel more 
Catalan than Spanish. 
- And why would you say this is so? 
- Well, as things have developed, I feel as if, I don’t know. When I hear politicians or Spanish 
nationalist people, it is as if…, I feel as if they attacked Catalonia, and that makes me be 
more Catalan, to say something. I do not know. It is like a defensive syndrome, I do not 
know. But the truth is that, sometimes, when you hear some statements…. 
- From whom? 
- From people, Spanish politicians, or well, in Intereconomía [a far-right TV channel] I only 
see the cuts which appear in the zapping shows, but with that I have enough (…)  
- But do you still feel Spanish in some way? 
- Well, the truth is that I feel less Spanish now, at most from Aragon. From Aragon, because I 
want. I have not denied the fact that I am from Aragon, from the cradle. But it does not 
attract me much the “Españolismo”. Because when you hear some people who says “those 
Catalan nationalist”. Those who say so are, in turn, Spanish nationalists, and that never 
counts. [Quote #40, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1950] 
 
Change can also occur in the other direction (towards a more Spanish identification) as the 
case of Andrés shows. Andrés is the son of a mixed couple. However, even if his mother was 
born in Catalonia, his mother’s parents were from Almeria. Although he has always spoken 
Spanish to his parents and brother, he took the decision to speak Catalan to his wife (the 
daughter of a mixed couple). Andrés grew up in a city with a high percent of Spanish 
immigrants, close to Barcelona. His contact with autochthons was very limited until he went 
into the university, where he involved in politics and became a member of the Esquerra Unida i 
Alternativa (EUiA).34 As he explains, his involvement in politics has much to do with the fact 
that his father worked at the SEAT and was very linked to the Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO) 
Trade Union and the PSUC. Andrés campaigned in favor of the Statute, partly because the party 
he is member of campaigned in favor of the Statute. However, over those years, he became 
disappointed with the Tripartit government. According to his tale, the Tripartit put so much 
effort on the reform of the Statute, that this issue end-up frustrating a left-oriented project in 
Catalonia and, beyond this, his own expectations on the Tripartit government. As a result of 
this:  
 
                                                      
34 EUiA is a left wing Catalan political party which was created in 1998. It comes from the PSUC 
and the Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya Since 2002, EUiA is part of the coalition Iniciativa per 
Catalunya Verds – Esquerra Unida I Alternativa.  
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“Now I exaggerate more my nationality, without losing the rationality, which is what you 
can never lose. But, now, I even see with sympathies the Spanish flag, when I have never 
experienced that in the past.” [Quote #41, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed couple, 
born in 1975] 
 
In parallel to this change, Andrés has also changed his preferences regarding the territorial 
organization of the State to the point that he even agrees with the Ciutadans’ Political Party 
stances in these issues (“I sometimes “ciudadaneo” a little bit”).  
 
“If some people have become pro-independence [as a result of the Statute reform], I have 
approached to more unitary positions”. [Quote #42, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed 
couple, born in 1975] 
 
According to Andrés’ tale, his change is a reaction to the approach that “many people” 
adopted regarding the reform of the Statute. 
 
- “I was annoyed because many people considered it as a pre-constitution. I was annoyed 
because self-determination is very often understood as only one part [separatists] does what 
they want without counting on with the other part [those who are not separatist]” [Quote 
#43, Interview #20, Andrés, child of a mixed couple, born in 1975] 
 
The regressive process that Andrés seems to have experienced in his identification with 
Catalonia is similar to the process experienced by Antonio (quote #13, interview #13) years ago. 
Both Andrés and Antonio have reaffirmed its Spanish identification in a reactive way. They 
have responded against Catalan nationalism or against pro-independence campaigns which, as 
they explained to me, have “disproportionate” media coverage, while the preferences of the 
population with an immigrant origin are not taken into account. 
The negotiation of the reform of the Statute of Catalonia mobilized not only people in 
Catalonia, but also people from outside Catalonia. Very often the Statute of Catalonia 
monopolized conversations outside Catalonia and, as the following excerpt from my 
conversation to Juan José reflects, this has consequences on individuals’ identification. When 
the Statute was being negotiated in the Spanish Parliament, Juan José was abroad in an Erasmus 
stay. There he met other Catalan and Spanish students with whom he talked about the Statute 
issue.  
 
- There were people from other parts of Spain, from Madrid or Andalusia, who took an anti-
Catalan attitude, in the sense that… I think that this issue was not well sold, not from one 
side, not from the other, right? But their comments were a bit…, they said things like: you 
are part of a people who want the independence (…). They resented from it. In the end, they 
used connotations and topics like the Catalans are mean, unsupportive (…). I had never felt 
strange of being Catalan, and then I thought, I am Catalan. 
- Did this bother to you? 
- Yes, it bothered me, while I was staying abroad that bothered me. Then here, as I caught up 
a little more with the subject, I did not feel upset anymore. But, yes, there, I was annoyed, 
because we were everyday speaking about it. Let’s say I had to go outside Catalonia to feel 
Catalan (…) I had to live abroad for me feeling Catalan. Because at the end of the day, if we 
are all bad people, then I felt a little bit Catalan. I mean I feel Catalan, but there I felt more. I 
felt much more. [Quote #44, Interview #38, Juan José, second generation, born in 1983] 
 
As I have already described above, Juan José is a second generation young man with an 
ambivalent identification with Spain and Catalonia. Although “he has been born Catalan”, he 
feels mainly Spanish because his familial and cultural referents are all Spanish. However, out of 
his familial context, when his Catalan identification was attacked, he also reacted reaffirming it. 
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When he turned to Catalonia after his six months Erasmus stay, he “very quickly caught up with 
what was happening”. When I asked him in the interview (which took place in 2012) whether he 
voted for or against in the referendum on the Statute, he told me that he did not remember, 
although he did remember voting against Catalonia independence in the referendum that took 
place in Barcelona in April 11th, 2011.  
Media have a fundamental role when channeling political parties, and elites’ stances 
regarding contested issues. However, television and radio broadcasters and, in particular, 
political commentators sometimes contribute to the conflict deepening. Many of my 
interviewees, for example, referred to the negative role that the Cope radio station and Tele 
Madrid broadcaster played during the Statute reform.35 
 
“There was much tension, it was a shame that Mr. Rajoy went to Andalusia putting a table in 
the markets and... I saw TV cuts in which you saw a couple saying “Is these against the 
Catalan Statute?” “Ah, so this is against Catalan people, then yes, I will sign” [Mª Carmen is 
reproducing here the same news that was referred above interview # 20 Álvaro] Are they 
stupid? In Catalonia, there are people who vote the PP, all sorts of people, right? But I mean, 
this maliciously way to create division covertly, and not so covertly. Subtly, they wanted to 
predispose people against us... And I do not know what they thought the Statute was. Of 
course, there was misinformation and manipulation. These were the times when the COPE 
was day after day with an incendiary discourse, always against the Catalans, and the truth is 
that I felt very uncomfortable. Very uncomfortable, to the point that even if I am not for the 
independence of Catalonia, I know realize that they [the PP, the COPE] were promoting it. I 
mean they were forcing people to be independent!” [Quote #45, Interview #36, Mari Antonia, 
autochthonous, born in 1944]. 
 
Yet, when asked about the radio station or TV channels interviewees use to listen to or 
watch the news more often, they very often declare not to listen to, or nor to watch those radio 
stations or TV channels they accuse of promoting confrontation. Negative stands against the 
Statute or, more generally, against Catalonia, made by out-group elites, out-group political 
commentators or simply by the Spanish people reach people in Catalonia in two different ways: 
in a two-step flow of communication or through “cuts” from other broadcasters which were 
reproduced in the Catalan radio or television. In the first case, negative-framed messages 
stemmed from the media reach first to “intermediaries” who pass on these statements to their 
friends, relatives or co-workers (Katz 1957; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944).  
 
“People told me things that I thought were not possible, but I didn’t want to tune the COPE 
on” [Quote #46, Interview #37, Flor, child of a mixed couple, born in 1949] 
 
In some occasions, interviewees check themselves whether these things that had been 
passed on them from friends or relatives were actually true. In these cases, they themselves tune 
these radio stations or TV channels.  
 
“So, then a day, while I was driving I decided to change the radio station and I tuned the 
COPE and I thought: Oh my God! How can it be? How can it be that they speak like that 
                                                      
35 The Cope is a radio station own by the Spanish Catholic church. Between 2003 and 2009, Federico 
Jiménez Losantos directed and presented a morning program in the COPE. As a political commentator, he 
has always claimed against Catalonia’s linguistic policies, which he argues to be discriminatory for the 
Spanish speakers and he opposed to the Catalan Statute, among other reasons, because it questioned the 
Spanish nation. During some years, the COPE was not allowed to broadcast in Catalonia. The regional 
government did not renew the broadcasting licenses arguing that the radio station did not fulfill the laws 
regarding broadcasting in Catalan language. Tele Madrid is the television public broadcaster of the 
Madrid regional government. The television has also broadcasted polemic documentaries which claimed 
that Spanish language was persecuted in Catalonia. These documentaries spread around on the internet so 
everybody could have access to them. Tele Madrid cannot be tuned in Catalonia.   
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about us, and that people accept it and they believe it?” [Quote #47, Interview #20, Flor, child 
of a mixed couple, born in 1949] 
 
 “Sometimes, I watch radical things against me [radical broadcasters which have an 
ideological outlook opposite to him]. For example, I watch Intereconomía [a far-right TV 
broadcaster since 2008] and I go to bed with a high degree of alteration (laughing)” [Quote 
#47, Interview #28, Robert, autochthonous, born in 1968] 
 
Yet, selective exposure to one-side information does not prevent interviewees from 
receiving negative-framed messages against Catalonia. On the contrary, negative messages or 
negative claims regarding the in-group also stem from the media they consume and, in 
particular, from Catalan broadcasters. Many of my interviewees refer, for example, to those TV 
“shows” on the Catalan TV which consist of putting together “cuts” of programs from other 
television channels. These programs sometimes selectively reproduce the negative statements 
made by political leaders or political commentators about Catalonia or about other issues related 
to Catalan politics.36  
 
“Sometimes there are shows… In Telemadrid, specifically, there is such a great hate that 
when you see those cuts on TV, they produce on you a great aggressiveness” [Quote #48, 
Interview #25, Elia, second generation, born in 1953]   
 
- The truth is that, sometimes, when you hear some statements…. 
- From whom? 
- From people, Spanish politicians, or well, in Intereconomía, I only see the cuts which appear 
in some shows, but with that I have enough […]  
[Quote #49, Interview #18, José Carlos, immigrant, born in 1951]   
 
Besides, interviewees also referred to talk shows in which commentators discuss about the 
political news, and mobilize people in favor of the Statute and against the Constitutional Court 
Ruling. 
 
“I use to listen to RAC 1 [a Catalan radio station]. Every morning there is a talk show on 
politics, and they tracked the status of the Catalan Statute in the Constitutional Court. They 
tracked it so, well, this issue gets under your skin and when it explodes, you are already 
heated” [Quote #50, Interview #29, Sara, second generation, born in 1980]  
 
Radio and television broadcasters are also being selective when broadcasting the news, and 
priming some issues over others. Andrés, for example, complained that while the demonstration 
organized to protest against the Constitutional Court Ruling of the Statute, or the unofficial 
referendum on the Catalonia independence in Arenys de Munt have a very wide coverage by the 
Catalan public Television, the celebration of the national team victory in the FIFA World Cup 
was not properly covered. According to Andrés, this evidences that Catalan elites and Catalan 
media intentionally make a partial portrayal of the Catalan society. 
“Before the demonstration of the Statute [“Som una nació, nosaltres decidim”], there was 
another demonstration, and it was clear that this demonstration had a broad [Catalan] 
nationalistic content. And it was clear that there were people from Catalunya Radio, Jordi 
Basté… It was clear that he was trying to summon people to that demonstration.... It seems 
clear that the latest demonstration in favor of the Statute, it was also summoned... I think it is 
obvious that the TV [Catalan Public Television] connected all the time with that 
demonstration. I am not stupid, nobody is, it is self-evident” [Quote #51, Interview #20, 
Andrés, son of mixed couple, born in 1976] 
 
                                                      
36 Cuts of Catalan television programs are also passed in some Spanish rightist broadcasters 
(especially, Intereconomía). However, none of my interviewees made reference to them.   
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In the previous chapter, I showed that the effect of individuals’ exposure to the Catalan 
television was significantly more important than the effect of exposure to the Spanish television 
when explaining changes in individuals’ national identification. The interviewees’ tales 
regarding the media role suggest that Catalan television contributes greater to channel the 
cleavage and mobilize viewers’ Catalan identification.  
 All in all, the excerpts presented here illustrate a mechanism which connects the 
mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage with changes in individuals’ national 
identification. The reform of the Statute of Catalonia and the Constitutional Court Ruling on the 
Statute are only two of the many issues which have confronted Spanish and Catalan political 
parties over the later thirty years. Party leaders’ opposite stands on these issues make salient the 
cleavage. The media broadcast negative statements regarding the group or regarding the group’s 
interests, which have been previously defined by Spanish and Catalan parties. Confrontation 
and divisiveness has a polarizing and backlash effect. People receives these negative-frame 
stances directly or indirectly and they react to the mobilization of the cleavage in two ways: 
either they react reaffirming their exclusive Catalan or Spanish identification, when they have a 
very strong and crystallized identification, or either they prioritize their identification with the 
group which they perceive is being attacked or mistreated, when they hold dual identifications. 
In the first case, the mobilization of the cleavage causes individuals’ stability on their 
identification. In the second case, it causes changes.  
 This effect might be even more important on the generation which is exposed to higher 
levels of confrontation during their “impressionable years”, as Sara (interview #29) and Álvaro 
(interview #29) cases suggest. For this generation, these issues might become catalyst for 
preadult socialization (Sears and Valentino 1997). Of course, this does not deny the possibility 
that over the years, this people identification changes; however, as these events stick deeply in 
their minds, it might be more difficult a change to occur.  
 Moreover it is worth mentioning that polarization and divisiveness around the national 
cleavage can have a secondary effect. For that people who are disaffected with Catalan politics 
and more concerned with issues aligned over the left-right divide, political elites’ confrontation 
along the national cleavage can reinforce this disaffection. Individuals cause that they get tired 
with these issues, and that their national identification becomes even less salient, so they end up 
“feeling less Spanish, and less Catalan” (Interview #14 Carlos, child of a mixed couple, born in 
1972).  
 The following table summarizes the findings of the interviews’ analyses.  
 
 
Change in National Identification 
 212 
Table 7.5 Reactive change and reactive reaffirmation in national identification 
 Reactive effects on national identification Other outcomes 
 Reaffirmation of 
Spanish identification 
Change in Spanish 
Direction (previously 
felt both Spanish and 
Catalan)1 
Reaffirmation of 
Catalan identification 
Change in Catalan 
Direction (previously 
felt both Spanish and 
Catalan)1 
Reinforce alienation 
with Catalan-specific 
issues 
 
No reactive change 
reported  in the 
interviews 
Autochthonous 
  #17 Clara 
#28 Robert 
#34 Asunción 
#36 Mª Antonia 
#16 Jordi 
#37 Flor 
 
 #21 Pere 
#31 Marc 
#33 Rafael 
Second Generations and 
children of mixed 
couples 
#9 Mario 
 
#20 Andrés # 25 Elia 
# 29 Sara 
# 30 Álvaro 
#11 Fátima 
#19 Anna 
#12 Alicia 
#15 Carlos 
#20 Andrés 
#23 Eva 
#26 Elena 
#1 Arancha 
#3 Bernat 
#7 Miguel 
 
Immigrants 
#14 Juan 
#24 Isabel 
#13 Antonio #5 Mari Tere 
 
 
#18 José Carlos 
#38 Juan José 
(no lasting effect) 
#10 Dolores 
#22 Milagros 
#27 Ángela 
 
 
#2 Pedro 
#4 Ana 
#6 Fernando 
#8 Sandra 
#32 Víctor 
#35 Enrique 
Notes 1: These interviewees felt both Spanish and Catalan in different degrees. Changes in the Spanish direction are more common when individuals feel both Spanish and Catalan but still 
are more Spanish oriented. Changes in the Catalan direction are more common when individuals feel both Spanish and Catalan but still have a more oriented Catalan identification. 
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7.5 A brief note on the national identification saliency 
 
Even though this dissertation has not examined saliency, but self-categorization, I would 
like to make a brief note on this issue. In chapter two, I already mentioned that individuals 
identify with different social categories (gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion), and that the 
salience of national identification over other forms of identification is contingent to the broad 
context in which people is embedded in.  
In the context of Catalonia, the center-periphery cleavage makes that national identity is a 
highly salient form of identification. Certainly, there have been moments in which contestation 
regarding issues which confronted Spanish and Catalan political parties (e.g. the negotiation of 
language policies in the Catalan parliament, the reform of the Catalan Statute, or the 
Constitutional Court Ruling on the new Catalan Statute, etc.) have caused the salience of this 
form of identification has arisen more highly.  
However, the salience of individuals’ identification with the nation varies. And this has 
become evident in some of the interviews, even though all of them were framed as being 
focused on the issue of national identity.  
 
“When you wake up in the morning, do you wake up thinking about whether you are Catalan 
or Spanish? No. You are thinking that you have to go to work, or about your kid’s 
kindergarten.” [Quote #52, Interview #20, Andrés, child of mixed couple, born in 1975] 
 
The greater relevance of role identities (as worker, as parent) vis à vis national identity does 
not imply that respondents do not have a national identity. None of my interviewers have denied 
having a national identity, although some of them did not feel comfortable or avoid classifying 
themselves as Catalan or Spanish when I directly asked them about.  
  
“I consider myself from the world, a human being, a person from the world, from the Planet 
Earth. And I am not going to categorized myself using any nationality.” [Quote #53, Interview 
#23, Eva, second generation, born in 1941] 
 
“The truth is that I have not a feeling of belonging. I don’t feel… When people speaks about 
Spain, exacerbating their feelings, or about Catalonia, or Barcelona… I do not feel this. I feel 
that I am more an inhabitant of the planet, someone who wants to live in, who wants that 
people in the world understands each other” [Quote #54, Interview #27, Angela, immigrant, 
born in 1958] 
 
“I do not feel Catalan, or Castilian, or Spanish, right? So if someone asks me, are you from 
this nation or from this other nation? Well, no. And there are many people like me. And I 
know many people who do not feel (...). I think most people or at least most of the people 
with whom I relate make no difference, nation, country, whatever.” [Quote #55, Interview 
#22, Milagros, immigrant, born in 1956] 
 
Moreover, in some interviews it became clear that even though people had preferences for 
national-related issues (i.e self-determination, independence), they gave greater importance to 
issues which are related to the left-right cleavage.  
 
“For me there are much more important things than the independence. I do not want the 
independence of Catalonia if there are still social inequalities, income inequalities. If this is 
so, the independence of Catalonia is useless for me.” [Quote #56, Interview #19, Anna, child 
of mixed couple, born in 1981] 
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This position contrasts with the position of other interviewees who claim to frame 
everything in national terms. 
 
“I always place myself in the national question” [Quote #57, Interview #31, Marc, autochthonous, 
born in 1983] 
 
Or those who interpreted every question from the interview in national terms, as it becomes 
clear from the following excerpt of one of my interviews:  
 
- I would like you to think about a political event, national or international, which you think has been 
important for the recent history? 
- Well, it would make me happy to vote for the Catalan independence.  
- But this is something it has not yet happen. 
- Well, yes, but there has been a movement. In some villages, it has been already done. 
- Do you refer to the self-determination queries? 
- Of course, to the queries (…). 
- Ok, and now, can you mention an international event which has been important for the recent 
history? 
- You know what we really commemorate on September 11th. People think that it is a celebration, oh 
great! When we lost everything, on September 11th. So, well, I know that it will be very difficult to 
get the independence from Spain, but I do not feel myself valued [as Catalan], and since I do not 
feel myself valued I would vote for the independence of Catalonia”. 
[Quote #58, Interview #25, Elia, second generation, born in 1953] 
 
Generally, those interviewees who have a more Catalan oriented identification are also 
those whose national identification seems to be more salient. The cleavage in Catalonia favors 
it. The asymmetry in the distribution of political parties along the cleavage, and the fact that 
only the Popular Party and, more recently, the Ciutadans mobilize Spanish identification could 
account for these differences.  
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
In chapter 3, I tracked the evolution of identification with Spain and Catalonia from 1984 to 
2010. The depiction of the aggregate national identification evidenced different processes of 
change: a gradual and slight decrease in the percent of immigrants who feel primarily Spanish 
(see table 3.10), a gradual and more significant increase in the percent of autochthonous who 
feel “primarily Catalan” (see table 3.11) and period changes between the “as Spanish as 
Catalan” and the primarily Catalan categories (see figure 3.2)  
This dissertation has tried to account for the individual changes which lie behind these 
aggregate changes. Although in the previous chapters I have examined both long-term and 
short-term changes in national identification, my genuine interest in this dissertation was to shed 
light over the causes of short-term changes (periodic changes). In this regard, over the 
dissertation I have tried to provide evidence in favor of my main hypothesis: political parties’ 
mobilization of the cleavage alters individuals’ national identification. 
This chapter has exemplified two kinds of processes: processes of identificational 
assimilation and stability and processes of reactive reaffirmation and reactive change. While 
identificational assimilation has been presented as the result of long-term processes with many 
intervening variables, reactive changes have been argued to be motivated by a more direct 
cause: the mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage by political parties and political elites.  
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Making use of qualitative materials collected in thirty eight semi-structured interviews, I 
have illustrated the occurrence of both long-term and short-term changes in national 
identification.  
The excerpts of the interviews I have reproduced suggest that most immigrants have 
developed some kind of attachment to Catalonia. This attachment is based on their lives’ 
experiences in Catalonia, and is very often less deeply rooted than their attachment to their 
places of origin. Immigrants’ attachment to Catalonia has sometimes entailed immigrants and 
second generations’ Catalanization. Catalanization can occur in different ways. In some cases, it 
entails immigrants’ linguistic assimilation and their recognition of Catalan nation and symbols, 
although it does not imply that immigrants lose their original identification (Interview #4 Ana). 
In other cases, immigrants lose their original identification with Spain, recognize Catalonia’s 
national character and claim for Catalonia’s self-determination right, but they do not assimilate 
linguistically (quote #16 interview #18 José Carlos).  
In other occasions, immigrants’ and second generations’ attachment to Catalonia has been 
attuned with a sentiment of disaffection with Catalan politics (quote #8 interview #22 Milagros, 
quote #9 interview #23 Eva, quote #10 interview #38 Juan José) or with a feeling that their 
national positions are not being properly represented (quote #11 interview #24 Isabel, quote #12 
interview #14 Juan). This latter feeling can even cause that individuals’ experience a regression 
in their identification with Catalonia, and that they reaffirm their original Spanish identification 
(quote #13 interview #13 Antonio, quote #41 interview #20 Andrés).  
Interviews with parents and children from the same family, and with second generations to 
which I questioned about their parents’ national identification, show that children’s attachment 
with Spain is shaped through direct (e.g. through children’s involvement in cultural 
associations) and indirect (e.g. through contact with parents’ places of origin, residential 
concentration of immigrants in some neighborhoods) conditioning. Therefore, we can say that 
immigrant parents intentionally or unintentionally try to retain their children’s attachment to 
Spain (quote #2 interview #4 Ana, quote #31 interview #13 Antonio, interview #35 Enrique). 
Now, even though second generations’ identification as Catalans is primarily based on their 
origin, their emotional attachment to Catalonia is also very often transmitted by their parents. 
This mainly occurs when the immigrant parents have experienced an identificational switch 
themselves.  
The interviews have also revealed that second generations individuals sometimes shift 
radically their identification in relation to their parents’ (Interviews #29 Sara, #30 Álvaro). 
Although these shifts seem to be related to the experience or exposure to particular events (e.g. 
the reform of the Statute, the collection of signatures organized by the PP, the Constitutional 
Court Ruling on the Statute, etc), further research should be done to learn how the political 
context interacts with individual characteristics to produce inter-generational changes.  
Generally, the analyses of the interviews have shown that people respond to political 
parties’ mobilization of the national cleavage re-affirming their identifications, when they hold 
crystallized and exclusive identifications (e.g. interviews #5 Mari Tere, #24 Isabel, #25 Elia, 
quote #34 interview #36 Mari Antonia), or changing their prior identifications with Spain and 
Catalonia, when they hold dual identifications (quote #13 interview #13 Antonio, quote 33 
interview #37 Flor, quote #40 interview #18 José Carlos, quote #41 interview #20 Andrés).  
The analysis of the interviews has also revealed that autochthonous who identified to some 
extent with both Spain and Catalonia are more susceptible to experience these kinds of reactive 
changes (see table 7.5). Conversely, immigrants and second generation who felt both Spanish 
and Catalan very often alienated from Catalan-specific issues. Only those individuals who are 
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more Spanish oriented and are, at the same time, very involved in politics seem to be affected 
negatively by expressions of Catalan nationalism (interviews #13 Antonio and #20 Andrés).  
The interviews with people from different profiles have also evidenced that change in 
national identification is sometimes accompanied by changes in people’s political preferences 
and, in particular, in their preferences for the territorial organization of the state and Catalonia’s 
independence of Spain (Interview #18 José Carlos,  quote #42 interview  #20 Andrés, quote #35 
interview #37 Flor).  
Individuals’ responses in surveys are snapshots which reflect what individuals’ feel at the 
moment they are asked about. The panel data used in previous chapter showed that some 
individuals felt differently in 2001/02 than they felt in 2004 or 2005. I contend that these 
differences reflect people’s reactive changes occurred as a result of political elites’ mobilization 
of the cleavage.  
Lacking of a better instrument which allows checking individuals’ reaction to political 
elites’ stances on issues related to the cleavage, here I have proposed a plausible mechanism to 
explain how political elites’ statements, actions or policies affect individuals’ identification. 
Focusing on the reform of the Catalan Statute and the Constitutional Court Ruling on the Statute 
as examples, I have argued that both Spanish and Catalan political elites made an identitarian 
frame of these issues. Confrontation regarding these issues was staged by Spanish and Catalan 
elites’ stances. These stances reach people either through a two-step flow of communication or 
directly through their exposure to one-side information. Individuals’ perception that political 
elites’ statements or actions are an attack to the group they identify with get through, little by 
little, and provoke an emotional reaction. As a result of this, dual identifiers react re-affirming 
their identification with the group they feel is being attacked or mistreated, and losing their 
identification with the other group.  
People changes do not necessarily occur overnight, and its perdurability might depend on 
how important the issue is, and how intense the divisive campaign organized around it is. Yet, 
my contention is that when reactive changes occur in the same direction (or the number of 
changes which occur in one direction goes above the number of changes which occurs in the 
other direction) and they are numerically important, then we should observe the occurrence of 
period changes in the aggregate.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Main findings and contributions 
 
In this section I go over the main findings of this research and I highlight its main 
contributions. This dissertation has sought to improve our knowledge on the factors which lie 
behind change in national identification, particularly, in contexts in which there is a center-
periphery cleavage. In doing so, the present study generally contributes to an increasing 
literature which is concerned with the study of identity change and national identity change, in 
particular.  
 In the dissertation, I have offered a conceptual and analytical framework for the study of 
individual change in national identification (chapter 2). In line with Brubaker and Cooper 
(2000), I have proposed to center research on individuals’ identification, which is a more 
tractable and operationalized concept than identity, and I have set the limits of the national 
identification concept. National identification has been argued to be anchored on two elements: 
the nation’s territorial character and its political nature. These two elements have been claimed 
to render individuals’ identification with the nation different from other forms of identification 
and, ethnic identification in particular. 
The chapter has also contended that previous research dealing with the issue of identity 
change has tackled different dimension of change, without explicitly stating it. This has 
introduced some conceptual confusion and it has limited the advance of research on this issue. 
So in order to overcome this shortcoming, I have proposed to distinguish among different 
dimensions along which change can occur (self-categorization, content, salience and intensity).  
I have also elaborated on the grounds or pre-conditions which render change in these different 
dimensions possible. Here, I have referred to institutional changes that entail either a 
redefinition of the national boundaries or a change in the nation’s symbolic referents; to events 
such as wars or natural catastrophes; to the existence of a repertoire of nations with which 
individuals; or to other individual circumstances such as immigration and conscription. 
All in all, the conceptual and analytical framework that I have provided in the dissertation 
leaves us in a better position to cope with the study of the causes and consequences of 
individual change in national identification.  
As concerns to the main research question: what lies behind change in national 
identification in context in which there is a center-periphery cleavage? My dissertation has 
offered an alternative explanation which complements the decentralization argument. Previous 
studies have argued that in multinational countries, political decentralization lays behind 
aggregate changes in national identification (Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2009; Guibernau 2006, 
2007). Individuals’ exposure to regional institutions actions and interaction with them would 
account for the gradual increase of regional oriented identification and the progressive decrease 
of identification with the overarching state. While the decentralization explanation accounts for 
the long-term trends observed in the aggregate national identification, the explanation I have 
proposed here provides a better account for the periodic changes that are observed when 
national identification is tracked over time. 
Building on the in-depth analysis of the Catalan case, I have argued that change in national 
identification is driven by political parties’ mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage. 
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Although the center-periphery structures political competition in a permanent way, there are 
some periods in which a particular policy or issue (e.g. language policies, the Statute reform) 
confronts political parties more importantly and exacerbates the cleavage. Individuals react to 
political parties’ confrontation updating their identification. When individuals’ changes occur in 
the same direction (or the changes which occur in one direction go above the changes which 
occur in the other direction) and when these changes are numerically important, then a periodic 
change in the levels of identification with Spain and Catalonia will be observed.  
This argument has been tested in different ways, making used of different sources of data, 
and both quantitative and qualitative techniques.  
In chapter 4, I have analyzed longitudinal cross-sectional data to learn whether changes in 
the political context are associated with changes in aggregate and individual national 
identification. Two hypotheses have been posed and tested in this chapter: first, aggregate levels 
of identification with Catalonia should increase when the Catalan nationalist parties’ incentives 
to mobilize the cleavage have been greater, and vice versa. Second, Spanish and Catalan parties’ 
confrontation on cleavage-related issues affects individuals’ identification and foster 
polarization.  
Regarding the first hypothesis, I have argued that the CiU have had greater incentives to 
mobilize the cleavage in order to maximize nationalist vote in the next election when its 
bargaining power has been low (i.e. when the PSOE and the PP have held a majority in the 
Spanish parliament, or when the PSOE has been able to resort to alternative supports from other 
small parliamentary parties). On the contrary, when the CiU has been crucial to form majorities 
in the Spanish parliament, then the party’ capabilities to influence legislative production (and to 
get some kind of compensation in exchange for its support) have increased, and so have its 
incentives to demobilize the cleavage and activate retrospective voting. Regarding the second 
hypothesis, I have defended that the effect of political parties’ confrontation should be different 
depending on individuals’ prior-identification. So that, when confrontation rises exclusive 
Catalan identification should increase among those who were already more Catalan oriented, 
and exclusive Spanish identification should increase among those who feel more Spanish 
oriented. As longitudinal cross-sectional data does not allows examining the heterogeneous 
effects of political confrontation conditioning on individuals’ prior identification, in these 
analyses I have proxied prior-identification by individuals’ family origins.  
The results of chapter 4 have yielded mixed results. It has been shown that during the period 
in which the CiU supported the PSOE minority government, identification with Catalonia went 
down. However, a similar effect has not been found for the period during which the CiU 
supported the PP minority government (although the sign of the coefficient goes in the expected 
direction), which questions the hypothesis that identification with Catalonia moderates when the 
nationalist parties are influential in the Spanish parliament. 
On the other hand, the level of confrontation between the Catalan and Spanish parties on 
issues related to center-periphery cleavage has been found to matter. Thus, while higher levels 
of confrontation strengthen identification with Catalonia in the autochthonous group, in the 
second generations’ group, confrontation weakens identification with Catalonia. Although this 
effect is not significant in the immigrants and the second generations’ groups, the sign of the 
coefficient goes in the expected direction. Altogether, these results suggest that high levels of 
confrontation polarize individuals’ identification.  
A second test of this argument is provided in chapter 6. This time the analyses make use of 
panel study (Panel de Desigualtats a Catalunya) which covers a highly contested period of time 
which during the negotiation of the new Catalan Statute. The use of panel data allows dealing 
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with some of the problems of cross-sectional data and to provide evidence on the occurrence of 
individual short-time change.  
In this regard, the descriptive analyses have shown that 23 percent of those who self-
identified as Spanish as Catalan in 2001/02 switched their national identification in 2004. 
Although the magnitude of individual change is lower between 2004 and 2005, it is still 
surprisingly important for a one-year period. 18 percent of those who felt as Spanish as Catalan 
in 2004 changed its identification in 2005. In this later case, change was evenly distributed 
among those who made a switched in the Spanish direction and those who made a switched in 
the Catalan direction.  
The chapter takes up the argument presented in chapter 4, and it argues that regional and 
national television broadcasters channel political confrontation and mobilize viewers’ regional 
or national identification, respectively. The immediate connectedness between the cleavage-
related issues and the individuals’ national identification should lead those individuals who are 
exposed to news in regional broadcasters to reinforce their regional identification, and those 
individuals who are exposed to news in national broadcasters to reinforce their national 
identification.  
Taking into account that the relationship between individuals’ Spanish (or Catalan) 
identification and exposure to one-side information from Spanish (or Catalan) broadcaster is 
endogenous, I test this hypothesis among those individuals who felt “as Catalan as Spanish” in 
t1 (2004).  
The chapter also tests the hypotheses that party identification orientates individuals’ 
identification, especially when a cleavage-related issue centers partisan debate and, accordingly, 
political parties adopt clear-cut positions on it. Again, the immediate connectedness between 
individuals’ positions on the cleavage and their identification with Spain and Catalonia, and 
individuals need to be consistent and conform their national identification to the party’s they 
feel close supports my expectation.  
The results of my analyses show that while exposure to Catalan television news has a strong 
influence (preventing change in the Spanish direction and fostering change in the Catalan 
direction), a similar effect is not found for the Spanish broadcasters. Evidence from the 
qualitative interviews suggests that Catalan television has a greater ability to channel the 
cleavage and to mobilize its viewers’ Catalan identification. As illustrated in the qualitative 
chapter, Catalan television channels the conflict in two ways: by giving more coverage to 
initiatives or acts in which Catalan identification is mobilized and, more importantly, by 
selectively transmitting claims made against Catalonia by Spanish politicians or political 
commentators from other Spanish broadcasters. 
Moreover, and contrary to my expectations, the chapter findings provide limited evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that party identification cues national identification when the cleavage is 
highly salient. A possibly explanation to this finding, which challenges Dancey and Goren 
(2010), could be that in Catalonia individuals’ attachments to parties are looser and, 
accordingly, individuals are less constraint to conform their national identification to the 
political party they feel closer. Evidence regarding the weakness of partisan identification in 
other European countries suggests that this might be a plausible explanation for this non-finding 
(Fleury and Lewis-Beck 201). Besides, and in agreement with some of the interviews’ 
discourses, we could state that identification shifts are not caused by individuals’ preferred party 
claims, but by other political parties’ messages against one’s group identity.  
Finally, the argument that individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia is shaped in 
relation to political elites’ mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage is also dealt in the 
qualitative chapter (chapter 7). Making use of qualitative information collected in thirty-eight 
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interviews conducted with individuals from different backgrounds and with different profiles, 
my dissertation illustrates the mechanism which causally connects political confrontation along 
the center-periphery cleavage and individual change in national identification. This mechanism, 
I contend, is generalizable to other context in which deep political cleavages structure political 
competition.  
 The qualitative extracts presented in chapter 7 show that identity framed or negative 
framed messages made by political elites reach individuals directly (by exposure to one-side 
information) or indirectly (through a two-step flow of communication). Individuals’ perception 
that their group identity is being attacked provokes a reaction which is contingent to 
individuals’ prior identification. When individuals feel exclusively Spanish or exclusively 
Catalan, they react reaffirming these identifications. Conversely, when people identify with 
both Spain and Catalonia, they prioritize their identification with the group they perceive is 
being mistreated and weakening their identification with the elite group making the negative-
framed claim. In this way, confrontation has a polarizing effect on individuals’ identification.  
Although the qualitative evidence suggest that processes of reactive reaffirmation and 
reactive change are more common among the autochthonous and children of mixed couples, 
and among individuals who have a more Catalan oriented identification, reactive reaffirmation 
and reactive change also occur among immigrants and second generations who have a more 
Spanish oriented identification. In this case, individuals react mainly against expressions of 
Catalan nationalism. Moreover, the qualitative interviews have shown that some immigrants’ 
and second generations’ feeling that Catalan-specific issues receive a disproportionate attention 
can also reinforce individuals’ disaffection with Catalan politics and their feeling that their 
positions are not properly represented.  
Beyond the argument that individual change in national identification is driven by political 
parties’ mobilization of the center-periphery cleavage, this dissertation has also examined other 
questions related to the issue of identificational change: the identificational assimilation of 
immigrants and second generations and the intra-generational transmission and replacement of 
national identification within Catalan families.   
Regarding the first question, in chapter 4, I have analyzed whether Catalan parties’ overt 
definition of Catalanness and the language policies that were promoted by the CiU governments 
to build a single Catalan-speaking community have affected individuals’ identification with 
Catalonia. In particular, I have tested whether the adscriptive components of identity (descent 
and origin) have lost importance in favor of the “learned” language when predicting individuals’ 
identification with Catalonia. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis would demonstrate that the 
Catalan parties’ strategy to de-primordialize Catalan identity and to assimilate second 
generations, the group which was mainly targeted by the language policies, has been successful.  
My analyses have shown, though, that the adscriptive elements of identity continue to be an 
important determinant of individuals’ identification with Spain and Catalonia. Actually, 
contrary to my expectations, origin and descent seem to be today more important than it was in 
1987. This has been caused by the autochthonous population greater proneness to identify as 
“only Catalan”, and the second generations’ lower likelihood to self-identify as “more Catalan 
than Spanish”. The results have also revealed that the “learned language” is today less important 
to predict identification with Catalonia among the second generations.  
Altogether, these results suggest that the policies implemented by the CiU governments 
have contributed to reinforcing the autochthonous’ Catalan identification at the expense of 
Spanish identification. However, Catalan parties’ choice for an overt definition of Catalaness, 
and the CiU’s promotion of assimilationist language policies do not seem to have fostered so far 
the identificational assimilation of immigrants and second generations.  
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Regarding the second question, chapter 5 has dealt thoroughly with the issue of inter-
generational change and stability within the family. The chapter has contrasted the influence of 
parents and school on forging individuals’ identification. Although parents’ and school’s 
national socialization goes usually in the same direction, in Catalonia variation in parents’ 
identification allows teasing out these two socialization agents’ impact.  
The results of the descriptive analyses of this chapter, which draw on the household data of 
the Panel de Desigualtats a Catalunya (Fundació Jaume Bofill), confirm the occurrence of 
intergenerational changes within families in Catalonia. Children are more “Catalan oriented” 
than their mothers and their fathers, regardless of the parents’ origin.  
The empirical analyses of the chapter show, in agreement with Aspachs-Bracons et al 
(2008a, 2008b), that the 1983 language reform has contributed to explaining the decrease in the 
levels of primarily Spanish identifiers in the generation which was educated after the language 
reformed was implemented in. However, these analyses have also shown that the school 
influence is less important than argued in classical studies of nationalism and in more recent 
empirical studies, and that the parents and the family background characteristics are key 
determinants of individuals’ identification. The omission of relevant variables related to 
individuals’ family characteristics have been the cause that we had overestimated the school 
influence so far.  
Three main findings support this argument. First, the children of immigrant families, which 
are economically successful, are more prone to self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. 
This finding is argued to evidence that the economic mobility of immigrant parents and the 
feelings of gratitude towards the receiving society that this economic progress generates have 
fostered their children identification with Catalonia. Second, the neighborhood in which the 
family lives affects individuals’ identification directly and indirectly. When children grow up in 
neighborhoods in which the proportion of immigrants is relatively high, then they are less likely 
to self-identify as primarily Catalan. Besides, the leverage that school has in national 
identification varies depending on the neighborhood in which the family lives. Thus, only in 
those neighborhoods in which the number of natives is sufficiently high, then the years of 
schooling increase the odds that individuals self-identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”. 
Altogether, these two findings suggest that school contact between children of natives and 
children of immigrants is an efficient mechanism to promote the identificational assimilation of 
the latter. Third, when the parents and school leverage is contrasted, parents’ identification is 
found to be the main element affecting individuals’ Catalan oriented identification. Therefore, 
even though the years of schooling have contributed to encouraging a dual identification with 
Spain and Catalonia, what influences most that individuals’ feel primarily Catalan (i.e. “more 
Catalan than Spanish” or “only Catalan”) is that their parents feel the same way. Evidence from 
the qualitative interviews show, moreover, that the parents can deliberately lessen the impact 
that a predominantly immigrant context have on their children, by sending them to private 
Catalan oriented schools. 
All in all, this chapter’s results qualify previous studies’ findings (Aspachs-Bracons, 2008a, 
2008b) and suggest that the Catalan school ability to instill a Catalan oriented identification in 
students is much limited than claimed before.  
Here, it should be also highlighted that an important contribution of this dissertation is that 
it has empirically tested the leverage of the media and the school on individuals’ identification 
with the nation. The idea that the mass media and the school are the state’s main instrument of 
national socialization is pervasive in previous research. Classical studies of nationalism have 
always pointed to education as a key agent fostering collective national consciousness 
(Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1991; Smith 1979; Weber 1976). 
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More recent studies have also contended that the mass media have a fundamental role when 
“flagging” or “reminding” individuals’ nationhood (Billig 1995). Recent studies have also 
claimed that beyond the role that education has historically performed in the formation of a 
national consciousness, the school and the media have an important role in shaping individual 
identification with “stateless nations” (Martínez-Herrera 2002). Previous studies have 
notwithstanding rarely tested the extent of these socialization agents’ influence. My dissertation, 
therefore, has contributed to filling this gap in previous research.  
The results of my research on this matter suggest that, in contexts in which the center-
periphery cleavage structures political competition, television mobilizes individuals’ 
identification importantly. However, whereas public regional television seems to be a very 
effective instrument to channel the conflict and prioritize individuals’ regional attachment of 
dual identifiers, the banal nationalism of the public national television seems to have a less 
influencing role, at least in the short-run. Besides, as already stated, my research has shown that 
the school’s impact is less determinant once that parents’ characteristics are taken into 
consideration. Among the children of autochthonous, the school only reinforces parents’ 
national socialization. Among the children of immigrants, the school can only foster a more 
Catalan oriented identification when children attend to schools in which the proportion of 
autochthonous is sufficiently high. This finding has important political implications and it 
highlights that avoiding autochthonous and immigrants’ segregation in schools is key to foster 
the latter’s identificational assimilation.    
The dissertation has also made a methodological contribution. Making use of novel sources 
of panel and household data and combining the analysis of this data with qualitative data, I have 
been able to solve some of the shortcomings of previous research. In particular, the in-depth 
examination of this data has allowed solving the problem of ecological inference that previous 
research suffers of.  
All in all, and before concluding, it can be stated that this dissertation has generally helped 
to identify some macro and micro factors which foster change in the individual category of 
identification in contexts in which there is a center-periphery cleavage and a demographically 
relevant immigrant population. The dissertation has moreover shown that individuals’ origin 
and prior identification interacts with these factors to foster stability and change. The following 
table summarizes the dissertation main findings. These findings are generalizable to other 
contexts which share with Catalonia these characteristics. 
Change in National Identification 
 224 
Table 8.1 Determinants of stability and change in context with a center-periphery cleavage and immigrant contexts 
Macro- factors Individuals characteristics Micro-factors Mechanism  Direction of change Aggregate Outcome 
Autochthonous Catalan 
Second generations 
Alleged exposure to one-
side information 
 
Individuals perception that 
their group identity is 
being mistreated or 
attacked by out-group 
members causes 
individuals’ reactive 
change 
Spanish 
Spanish identifiers Exposure to Spanish media Reactive re-affirmation Stability 
Exposure to Spanish 
media Spanish Dual identifiers Exposure to Catalan 
media 
Reactive change 
Catalan 
Political parties’ 
confrontation along the 
center periphery cleavage 
Catalan identifiers Exposure to Catalan media Reactive re-affirmation Stability 
Polarization* 
 
Immigrant families’ 
economic mobility 
 
Parents’ feeling of 
gratitude towards the host 
society and transmission 
of these feelings to their 
children 
Catalan Identificational Assimilation 
Low levels of 
autochthonous in the 
neighborhood & the 
school children of 
immigrants attend 
Separation Stability 
Inter-generational 
identificational  
stability 
 
Second generations 
 
High levels of 
autochthonous in the 
neighborhood & the 
school children of 
immigrants attend 
Contact Catalan Identificational Assimilation 
* Only observed when individuals’ changes occur in the same direction (or the changes which occur in one direction go above the changes which occur in the other direction) and when these 
changes are numerically important. 
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8.2 Limitations and directions for further research 
 
Before concluding, I would like to mention some of the limitations of my research and to 
stress how the research initiated with this dissertation should be pushed forward.  
As stated above, this dissertation sought to improve our knowledge about the factors which 
foster change in the individual category of self-identification in contexts in which political 
competition is organized along the center-periphery cleavage and in immigrant contexts. The 
dissertation has focused, however, on the demand side, and it had devoted much less attention to 
the supply side. This focus on the demand side responded to a deliberate and practical reason: to 
make my research feasible. Hence, further research should concentrate on the supply side.  
In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that the cleavage exacerbates when Catalan 
nationalist parties’ have implemented centrifugal strategies or policies, when national parties 
and, the Popular Party in particular, have resisted to move the decentralization process forward, 
when Spanish and Catalan party leaders and media commentators have made negative claims on 
cleavage-related issues, or when divisive campaigns have been promoted to mobilize and 
oppose Catalan and Spanish identities. Additional efforts should be made to detail the strategies 
that political parties make use of to mobilize the cleavage, and to learn about the role that the 
different parties play on them.  
Related to this, it would be worth to go in depth on the issue of the agency and the elites’ 
intentionality. When political parties develop these strategies are they really looking to alter 
individuals’ identification or are they just moved by vote-seeking interests? In chapter 4, I used 
qualitative evidence to show that the main Catalan parties agreed to promote an overt non-
primordial definition of Catalanness and to develop language-immersion policies to assimilate 
the children of Spanish immigrants. The Catalan parties’ ultimate goal was to build a single 
Catalan-speaking community and to avoid any ethnic division in the Catalan society. Beyond 
this, in this same chapter, I argued that nationalist parties’ incentives to mobilize the cleavage 
have increased when they have been in a worst position to influence legislative policies in the 
Spanish parliament, and vice versa. Although chapter 4 tested the main implications of this 
assumption (i.e. that aggregate identification with Catalonia increases when nationalist parties 
cannot influence the legislative production, and decreases when they are in a position to get 
some kind of compensation from supporting minority governments), additional evidence should 
be provided to sustain this chapters’ assumption. In this regard, future versions of this work 
should investigate this issue more deeply.  
Chapter 5 has shown, in line with previous research (Rico and Jennings, forthcoming), that 
the family has an important influence over individuals’ national identification. Parents’ 
characteristics and the composition of the neighborhood in which families live have been found 
to reinforce parents’ national socialization. These two factors have been also found to determine 
the school children attend. This finding has implied that parents do not only influence directly 
their children’s national identification, but they also influence it indirectly. Now while the 
dissertation has helped to explain how national identification is reproduced within the family, 
the issue of what lies behind inter-generational change within families requires more attention. 
Chapter 5 has revealed, in agreement with Aspachs-Bracons et al (2008a, 2008b), that the  
language reform implemented in 1983 in Catalan schools can account for part of the decrease of 
the levels of primarily Spanish identifiers. However, we still do not know what explains inter-
generational change within the autochthonous families and the immigrant families in which the 
children feel primarily Catalan.  
Chapter 7 has provided some cues that should be pursued further to shed light on this issue. 
In this regard, we should examine more thoroughly how political confrontation forges the 
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national identification of those individuals who experience high levels of conflict during their 
impressionable years, and how this interacts with individuals’ characteristics.  
 An additional issue that has been posed in chapter 5 and for which I have provided some 
evidence in chapter 7 would require more refinement: i.e. the argument that economic mobility 
fosters the children of immigrants’ identificational assimilation. Research should accurate the 
testing of this hypothesis making use of more appropriate panel data. 
In addition to all this, this dissertation has opened new questions that should be advanced 
inter-disciplinarily and making use of new methodologies. Here we could refer to the question 
of how enduring change is and to the question of what causes that some individuals are more 
prone to change than others. The answer to these questions approaches us to the social 
psychology discipline, and requires that we examine the role that emotions and individuals’ 
personality traits play here.  
Also and related to this, it is worth mentioning here that political scientists dealing with the 
issue of ethnic change have all considered it as the outcome of a rational decision (Chandra 
2004; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Kalyvas 2008; Laitin 1998). Rational explanations of 
group identity change exclude the possibility that change can be the consequence of non-
motivational mechanisms.  
However, this dissertation has suggested that more attention should be paid to the role that 
emotions play as mediators of individuals’ stability and change. The qualitative interviews have 
revealed that political claims made by political parties or media commentators provoke an 
emotional reaction and that this emotional reaction mediates reactive reaffirmation and reactive 
change. Now, more research is needed to learn about the emotional reactions that positive and 
negative claims made by in-group and out-group elites provoke, and to understand how this 
emotional reactions mediate in the process of identificational change. Experimental techniques 
could help here to advance this research. Actually, this methodology could also be useful to 
solve some of the problems of causality that my research with observational data has not been 
able to deal with.    
Finally, and thinking more broadly, this dissertation has set a framework from which 
change in national identification can be studied. Although this research has focused on the study 
of changes in individuals’ category of national identification in contexts in which a center-
periphery cleavage is present an immigration context, the floor is open to study what triggers 
change in other dimensions (content, salience and intensity) and which are the consequences of 
them.  
All this considered I feel compel to recognize here that this dissertation does not close the 
research question posed at the beginning of this study, but it opens new directions to push 
further and continue our research on the issue of national identity change.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Additional tables and figures to Chapter 1 
 
Table A.1.1 Association between bi-directional indicators and other measures of identification 
 Only Spanish More Spanish than Catalan As Spanish as Catalan  More Catalan than Spanish Only Catalan 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Cataloniaa  45 7.33 2.08 44 6.84 2.67 240 8.68 1.61 155 9.05 1.29 82 9.52 0.97 
Spain b 45 8.95 1.48 44 8.75 2 239 8.19 1.94 153 6.06 2.25 81 3.9 2.82 
Nationalismc 41 2.22 2.38 44 2.93 2.53 224 4.79 2.79 153 7.09 2.02 82 8.84 1.53 
Spanishnessd 43 8.67 1.82 44 8.22 2.13 230 6.15 2.54 155 3.68 2.29 82 1.26 1.94 
Note: The table reports the mean values of different measures of identification for those individuals who identify as “only Spanish”, “more Spanish than Catalan”, “as Spanish as Catalan”, “more 
Catalan than Spanish”, and “only Catalan”. 
a To what extent do you feel identify with Catalonia? To answer, use this scale where 0 means that you feel “not identified” and 10 means “very identified”. 
bTo what extent do you feel identify with Spain? To answer, use this scale where 0 means that you feel “not identified” and 10 means “very identified”. 
c In relation to the Catalan nationalist feeling, could you please tell me, where would you place yourself on this scale where 0 means “minimum nationalism” and 10 “maximum nationalism”. 
d And in relation to the Spanish feeling, could you please tell me, where would you place yourself on this scale where 0 means “minimum Spanishness” and 10 “maximum Spanishness”. 
Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007 
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Figure A.1.1 Evolution of major political parties in Catalonia since 1977 
 
 
Note: *ICV and EUiA merged again in 2003 
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Figure A.1.2 Pride of Being Spanish by National Identification (Frequencies)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the wording of the Pride of Being Spanish question went as follows. To what extent are you proud of 
being Spanish? Do you feel “very proud”, “quite proud”, “not very proud” or “not proud at all”. 
Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007 
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Figure A.1.3 Pride of Being Catalan by National Identification (Frequencies)  
 
Note: the wording of the Pride of Being Catalan question went as follows. To what extent are you proud of being 
Spanish? Do you feel “very proud”, “quite proud”, “not very proud” or “not proud at all”? 
Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007 
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Figure A.1.4 Preferences over the institutional organization of the State by National 
Identification (Frequencies)  
 
Note: The wording of this question is as follows: I will now show you some alternative formula on the 
organization of the state in Spain. Please tell me, which one do you prefer? The answer categories for this 
question are: A state with a Central Government without Autonomous Communities (Centralism), a state with 
Autonomous Communities as at present (Status-quo), a state in which Autonomous Communities could have 
greater autonomy than at present (>Autonomy), or a state that would recognize the Autonomous Communities 
the possibility of becoming independent states (Self-Determination). 
       Source: CIS, Study # 2667, 2007 
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Additional tables and figures to Chapter 3 
 
Table A.3.1 CIS Series of data coverage 
Study No. 1403 1412 1719 1750 1978 1987 2052 2137 2228 2298 2374 2410 2450 2543 2610 2643 2667 2734 2799 2852 2857 
Month Mar. April Dec. June Oct. Jan. April Feb. Nov. Oct. Nov. Mar. Mar. Oct. Dec. May Jan. Jan. April Oct. Dec 
Year 19841 1984 1987 1988 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 
National Id. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Origin X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X  X X X 
Parents’ Origin  X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X  X X X 
Catalan  X X X X X X X X X X X X     X    X 
Age X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Sex X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Education X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Party Id.   X X X X  X X   X  X X X   X X  
Vote Recall in N   X X X  X X X X X  X X X X X X X X  
Vote Recall in R   X X X  X X  X X X  X X X X X X X  
Habitat X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Pre-electoral  X X X X X        X      X  
Post-electoral            X          X 
Question 2 A A A B C C D C C C D C D C C C D C D D D 
Answer3 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
Sample size 1484 2281 2891 2899 2500 2484 1007 2000 747 1006 1368 2778 1135 3571 920 1494 587 1500 902 3061 2966 
No of - news - - 4 1 12 2 2 2 17 11 7 10 7 - 19 1 8 - 5 4 14 
No of + news - - 3 4 5 1 1 1 6 4 1 5 1 - 6 3 3 - 3 0 3 
Notes: 
1In those years in which more than one survey contained information on the respondent’s national identification, as well as on the respondent and their parents’ birth origin, and knowledge of Catalan I 
have selected the first survey conducted in that year. 
2Question Wording: 
A. In which of the following situations would you include yourself? 
B. And with regard to your national sentiments, in which of the following situations would you include yourself? 
C. With which of the following phrases do you identify to a greater extent? 
D. Which of the following phrases would you say that express better your sentiments? 
3Answer categories:  
1. I feel only Spanish   2. I feel more Spanish than Catalan   3. I feel as Spanish as Catalan   4. I feel more Catalan than Spanish   5. I feel only Catalan   8. Don’t know   9. Don’t answer 
*Vote Recall N/R = vote recall in national/regional elections                                
**No of -/+ news: number of news that depict a negative or positive atmosphere regarding the Spain-Catalonia relationships 
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Figure A.3.1 Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (Only Spanish) 
 
 
Figure A.3.2 Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (More Spanish than Catalan) 
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Figure A.3.3 Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (As Spanish as Catalan) 
 
 
Figure A.3.4 Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (More Catalan than Spanish) 
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Figure A.3.5 Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (Only Catalan) 
 
 
Figure A.3.6 Comparison of data from ICPS and CIS (Don’t know/ don’t answer) 
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Additional tables and figures to Chapter 4 
 
Table A.4.1 Historical Electoral Performance of Major Catalan Parties 
1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 1999 2003 2006 2010 
 % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats % seats 
Convergència i Unió (CiU) 27.83 43 46.80 72 45.72 69 46.19 70 40.95 60 37.70 56 30.94 46 31.52 48 38.43 62 
Partit dels Socialistes de 
Catalunya  (PSC-PSOE) 22.43 33 30.11 41 29.78 42 27.55 40 24.88 34 30.33 36 31.16 42 26.82 37 18.38 28 
Iniciativa per Catalunya 
Verds (ICV) -Esquerra 
Unida i Alternativa (EUiA)  
18.77 25 5.58 6 7.76 9 6.50 7 9.71 11 2.51 3 7.28 9 10.65 14 7.37 10 
Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya  (ERC) 8.90 14 4.41 5 4.14 6 7.96 11 9.49 13 8.67 12 16.44 23 9.52 12 7.00 10 
Partido Popular (PP)   7.70 11 5.31 6 5.97 7 13.08 17 9.51 12 11.89 15 14.03 21 12.37 18 
PSC-Ciutadans pel Canvi- 
IC-Verds            7.52 16       
Centristes de Catalunya-
(UCD)  10.61 18                 
Partido Socialista de 
Andalucía-PartidoAndaluz  
(PSA) 
2.66 2                 
Centro Democrático Social  
(CDS)     3.83 3             
Ciutadans-Partido de la 
ciudadanía                3.03 3 3.39 3 
Solidaritat Catalana per la 
Independència (SI)                 3.29 4 
Type of Government 
CiU minority 
government 
 
CiU majority 
government 
 
CiU majority 
government 
 
CiU majority 
government 
 
CiU minority 
government 
 
CiU minority 
government 
 
Coalition 
Government 
Tripartit i 
(PSC + ERC 
+ ICV) 
Coalition 
Government 
Tripartit i 
(PSC + ERC 
+ ICV) 
CiU minority 
government 
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Additional Tables and Analysis to Chapter 6 
 
Analysis of the no answers and of the “don’t know” and “none of them” answers  
 
Table A.6.1 presents detailed information on the 2001/02 identification of the “none of them” 
category in 2004 and 2005. The results show that the “none of them” category is made up by 
many of the “as Catalan as Spanish” identifiers in 2001. 
 
Table A.6.1 National Identification in 2001 if none of them in 2004 or 2005 (%/N) 
 2004 2005 
Only Spanish 6.56 5.00 
More Spanish than Catalan 6.56 5.00 
As Spanish as Catalan 47.54 48.33 
More Catalan than Spanish 9.84 8.33 
Only Catalan 6.56 6.67 
Don’t Know 16.39 18.33 
No Answer 6.56 8.33 
Total 61 60 
Notes: 
1 Only those individuals who participated in the three waves are presented here. 
2 I have excluded from the analysis those individuals whose parents and themselves were born out 
of Spain as for these individuals; identification with other nations may be at play. 
 Source: “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001-05” 
 
Table A.6.2 displays the trajectories of those who answered “don’t know” or did not answer 
in 2001/02. The trajectories of those who answered “don’t know” or did not answer in 2001 
differ. Those who did not answer in 2001 chose first the “more Spanish than Catalan” category 
in 2004 and the “as Spanish as Catalan category” in 2005. Conversely, those who answered 
“don’t know” in 2001 chose first the “as Spanish as Catalan” category in 2004 and the “none of 
them category” in 2005. 
 
Table A.6.2 National Identification in 2004 and 2005 if DN or NA in 2001 (%/N) 
 No Answer Don’t Know 
 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Only Spanish 32.43  5.71  
More Spanish than Catalan 39.19 35.14 11.43       17.14 
As Spanish as Catalan     18.92 39.19 37.14 25.71 
More Catalan than Spanish     1.35 14.86 8.57    11.43 
Only Catalan 2.70 2.70 8.57 5.71 
None of them 5.41 6.76 28.57 31.43 
Don’t Know  1.35      8.57 
No Answer     
Total 74 74 71 63 
See notes in Table A.6.1 
Source: “Panel de Desigualtats -Fundació Jaume  Bofill, 2001-05” 
 
Although the analyses are not shown here, those who did not answer to the national 
identification item in any of the waves differ with those who did answer in the three waves only 
in the age distribution. The sample of those who answered “don’t know” or answered “none of 
them” and those who answered in all the three waves differ also in the education distribution. 
Interestingly, those who are more educated seem to be more uncomfortable with the 
respondents categories that the item offers to the respondents.  
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Additional Tables to Chapter 7 
 
Table A.7.1 Quotes: Projected number of interviews 
 Autochthonous 
 Education 
Cohort Secondary 
Education 
or lower 
University Total 
Before 1959 2  1  3  
Between 1960 and 1979 2  2  4  
After 1980 4  1  5  
Total 8 4  12  
 
 Second Generations and children of mixed couples 
 Education 
Cohort Secondary 
Education 
or lower 
University Total 
Before 1959 2  1  3  
Between 1960 and 1979 4  1  5  
After 1980 2  1  3  
Total 8  3  11  
 
 
 Immigrants 
 Education 
Cohort Secondary 
Education 
or lower 
University Total 
Before 1959 0  0  0  
Between 1960 and 1979 1  1 2  
After 1980 5  0  3  
Total 6  1 11  
Quotes were established from the ICPS survey (2009)  
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